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ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis examines the trade relationships between China and colonial Australia 
between 1860 and 1880. At the time, the Australian continent was emerging from the 
boom created by the 1850s gold rushes in the colonies of Victoria and New South 
Wales. China had submitted to the debts incurred from the two Opium Wars and, 
through that, the creation of the Treaty Ports. New companies and export industries 
were being developed. Trade between Australia and China increased. The key products 
included coal from New South Wales, sandalwood from Western Australia and tea from 
China. Together, they created a flourishing trade environment. 
Attention in the China-Australia trade discourse has been overly restricted to the tea 
trade and the search for staples to pay for the tea. This thesis moves beyond this past 
bilateral consideration. Instead, it argues that a fuller understanding of the China–
Australia trade relationship needs to be multifaceted and multi-national. Much bilateral 
trade was conducted via intermediary ports and traders, rather than directly between 
ports and traders in Australia and China. Further, complex payment and remittance 
systems involved firms based in an array of countries, including Great Britain, India and 
the United States. This thesis, thus, states the importance of analysing trade 
relationships within a multilateral focus. 
This thesis uses analysis at the transaction level to explain the prevalent multilateral 
relationships of this period. Archival records from England, the United States and Hong 
Kong supplement those in Australia to provide insights into the methods employed to 
complete transactions. This thesis provides history with an interpretation of the records 
relating to the China-Australia trade. It engages the correspondence and financial 
records of of key companies like Jardine Matheson & Co. of England, Augustine Heard 
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& Co. and Russell & Co. of the United States and Robert Towns and Co. from Australia, 
among others, to interpret the transactions.  
Analysing trade at a transactional level requires an interdisciplinary approach that draws 
on insights from a mixture of historical sub-disciplines, including economic history, 
business history, maritime history, Australian history, China Treaty Port history, 
Chinese mercantile history and the histories of various commodities. All of these 
feature in this thesis under the umbrella of trade history to create a broader 
comprehension of port-to-port relationships. Interpreting at the transaction level moves 
this interdisciplinary study into an alternate realm, one that opens a better understanding 
of how each of its elements placed Australia within the global trade environment of the 
1860s and 1870s. 
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 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
In a letter to the Superintendent of the Australian Agricultural Company (AAC) of 
Newcastle, New South Wales, dated 20 June 1863, Jardine, Matheson & Co. (JM&Co.) 
of Hong Kong stated that the barque Ettrick, upon delivering tea to Melbourne, would 
“proceed to Newcastle to your consignment to fill up with Coal, in order that we may 
have an opportunity of testing a fair trial of the quality you supply.”1 The letter was 
initiated following correspondence between Mr Edward Hamilton, the Governor of 
AAC in London and JM&Co.’s representative in London, Matheson & Co. Hamilton 
offered Matheson & Co., an incentive to take on the order. AAC would rebate 50 per 
cent of the selling price.2 The Ettrick departed Newcastle on 6 October 1863 with 380 
tons of AAC coal. The venture was favourable to JM&Co., and through them Matheson 
& Co. For AAC, they noted that such an opportunity “will afford the Company much 
gratification to know that the Company may be found suitable for your China trade.” 
The transactions allowed AAC an entry in to the coal market of China.3 However, there 
was more to this transaction and the movements of the Ettrick than just a trip to 
Melbourne, Newcastle and back to China. 
 
The Ettrick was a new vessel, built in England and launched in June 1862 for Matheson 
& Co. It was built for the China trade.4 The vessel sailed for China following its launch 
and was thus ready for service in the Chinese trade for JM&Co. In April 1863, freight 
                                      
1 Letter from JM&Co. to The Superintendent of the Australian Agricultural Company, Newcastle, 20 
June 1863 Letters to India JMA C10/55.  
2 “Extract of letter dated 5th Feb 1863 from Edward Hamilton to Matheson & Co.” Letter from JM&Co. to 
The Superintendent of the Australian Agricultural Company, Newcastle, 20 June 1863 Letters to India 
JMA C10/55. 
3 Letter from Australian Agricultural Company, Newcastle to JM&Co., 3 October 1863 Correspondence: 
Business Letters: Australasia JMA B6/3. 
4 Lloyd’s Register of British and Foreign Shipping. From 1st July, 1863, to the 30th June, 1864. London: 
Cox and Wyman, 1863. No. 781. The Ettrick was built at the Vaux shipyards in Harwick, UK. 
 2 
costs for shipments from China to Australian ports were high. JM&Co. assigned the 
Ettrick with a cargo of tea from Foochow to Melbourne at a discounted freight rate.5 It 
was the first tea shipment for the vessel.6 
 
The shipment had two parcels. The first contained 1000 packages of tea. Messrs Wilson 
& Buchanan of Geelong, south of Melbourne, requested of their London representatives, 
Messrs Redfern Alexander & Co. (RA&Co.), to order the tea on their behalf. RA&Co. 
placed the order with JM&Co.7 The second parcel was a joint shipment of 7619 
packages of tea between James Henty & Co. of Melbourne and JM&Co. 8  In 
communications between JM&Co. and James Henty & Co., the former requested that 
the unloading be made at haste so that the Ettrick could sail to Newcastle to load with 
the AAC coal.9  
 
AAC fulfilled its promise when the Ettrick arrived in Newcastle, providing 380 tons of 
the coal from its mines to be loaded on the vessel. AAC and JM&Co. used a third firm, 
Bingle, White & Co., as the shipping agent in Newcastle to assist with the processing of 
the shipment.10 The Ettrick then travelled to Woosung, the port on the Yangtze River 
nearest Shanghai.11 There, JM&Co took ownership of the coal to sell it to buyers in 
                                      
5 Letter from JM&Co. to James Henty & Co. 28 April 1863 Letters to India JMA C10/55. 
6 Letter from JM&Co. to James Henty & Co. 17 June 1863 Letters to India JMA C10/55. The Ettrick was 
required to stop in Hong Kong to obtain a new crew for the journey. 
7 Invoice to Messrs Wilson Buchanan & Co. 9 June 1863 Invoices of Hong Kong Office JMA A6/13. 
8 Invoice to Messr J. Henty & Co. 9 June 1863 Invoices of Hong Kong Office JMA A6/13. 
9 Letter from JM&Co. to James Henty & Co. 17 June 1863 Letters to India JMA C10/55; “Shipping.” 
Age 2 September 1863: 4; “Shipping.” Age 19 September 1863: 4; “Melbourne.” Empire 22 September 
1863: 4. The Ettrick arrived in Melbourne 1 September 1863 and departed for Newcastle 20 September 
1863 with two boxes of tea for that port. James Henty & Co. were the shipping agent. 
10 “Newcastle.” SMH 26 September 1863: 6; “Shipping.” NCHRDN 7 October 1863: 2. 
11 “Shipping Intelligence.” North China Herald 12 December 1863: 5. Woosung was the main port for 
Shanghai, located approximately 23kms from the centre of Shanghai. The waterways from Woosung to 
Shanghai were not deep enough for foreign vessels to travel.  
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Shanghai. The Ettrick then departed for Hong Kong.12 The full journey had taken just 
under six months including lay days in Hong Kong, Newcastle and Shanghai. 
 
The success of this first journey of the Ettrick immediately led to another. Taking 
advantage of discounting the freight rate for chartering the Ettrick, JM&Co. sent the 
vessel to Foochow to load with tea.13 The tea shipment was to be delivered, during this 
journey, to Sydney prior to the master of the vessel taking up the same arrangement 
with AAC in Newcastle.14 Similar to the first journey, two parcels made up the cargo 
from Foochow to Sydney. The first was a joint shipment of tea between JM&Co. and 
their agents in Sydney, Thacker Daniell & Co.15 The second parcel was of 1000 
packages of tea destined for Messr Cargill & Co. of Dunedin, New Zealand. The parcel 
had been ordered by RA&Co. on Cargill & Co.’s behalf. It was also consigned to 
Messrs Gilchrist Watt & Co. in Sydney who were to tranship the parcel to Dunedin.16 
 
At the time of the second cargo travelling to Sydney, Thacker Daniell & Co. were asked 
to assist JM&Co. A matter arose following an unsuccessful transaction of coal to China 
by the Newcastle Wallsend Coal Company. Their Secretary, Mr P. W. Binney was 
asked to pay Thacker Daniell an amount of £165.15.5 to cover the remaining costs of 
the transaction. JM&Co. requested Thacker Daniell to “please place to the credit of our 
                                      
12 “Shipping Intelligence.” North China Herald 19 December 1863: 5. 
13 Letter from JM&Co. to Thacker Daniell & Co. 27 January 1874 Letters to India JMA C10/56. JM&Co. 
charged £5 per ton for the Foochow to Sydney freight rate when the standard rate was £5/10/- per ton. 
14 Letter from JM&Co. to Thacker Daniell & Co. 11 February 1874 Letters to India JMA C10/56; Letter 
from JM&Co. to Australian Agricultural Company, Newcastle 11 February 1874 Letters to India JMA 
C10/56. 
15 Invoice to Messr Thacker Daniell & Co. 11 February 1864 Invoices of Hong Kong Office JMA A6/14; 
Letter from JM&Co. to Thacker Daniell & Co. 27 January 1874 Letters to India JMA C10/56; Letter 
from JM&Co. to Thacker Daniell & Co. 11 February 1874 Letters to India JMA C10/56. 
16 Letter from JM&Co. to Cargill & Co. 11 February 1874 Letters to India JMA C10/56; Invoice to Messr 
Cargill & Co. 11 February 1864 Invoices of Hong Kong Office JMA A6/14. Also, 6 boxes of tea were 
shipped to Henry Moore valued at $111 under his account and risk. Invoice to Messr Henry Moore 12 
February 1864 Invoices of Hong Kong Office JMA A6/14; Letter from JM&Co. to Gilchrist Watt & Co. 
11 February 1874 Letters to India JMA C10/56. 
 4 
account upon receipt, and include in your next remittance to Calcutta.”17 That account 
was paid by Binney on 5 February 1864. Thacker Daniell & Co. forwarded the amount 
as part of three boxes of gold sent to Jardine Skinner & Co. of Calcutta on 21 June 
1864.18 The Ettrick completed the second journey as it did the first. At Newcastle, 580 
tons of AAC coal were loaded. The vessel departed Newcastle under the agency of 
Bingle & Co.19 The Ettrick sailed for Woosung where JM&Co. unloaded the coal for 
local sale. The Ettrick then returned to Hong Kong for the next charter.20 
 
The account of these two journeys of the Ettrick in 1863 and 1864 reveal a set of 
complex relationships. The relationships were tied together by the several merchant 
firms that were active in the China-Australia trade of 1860 to 1880. They resided 
throughout the world and not just in China or Australia. In China, the Treaty Ports were 
enclaves of trade, housing numerous Western merchant firms that provided a link, 
through compradors, between the Chinese producers and domestic traders in China and 
the international trading community.21 Such firms included JM&Co., as was present in 
the Ettrick story, Augustine Heard & Co. (AH&Co.), Russell & Co., Siemssen & Co. 
and others. The firms had offices in each of the Treaty Ports. They were linked to either 
partner houses or parent firms located in the UK, Europe or the United States. Western 
firms also competed against local Chinese traders who had their own relationships and 
                                      
17 Letter from JM&Co. to Thacker Daniell & Co. 27 January 1874 Letters to India JMA C10/56. 
18 Messrs Jardine Matheson & Co. in a/c with Thacker Daniell & Co. 30 June 1864 Accounts & memo: 
Sydney JMA A8/38/4. 
19 “Shipping.” NCHRDN 22 June 1864: 2. The company was the same as for the first voyage of the 
Ettrick, but had altered its name. 
20 “Shipping Intelligence.” North China Herald 13 August 1864: 7. 
21  Yen-Ping Hao, The Comprador in Nineteenth Century China: Bridge between East and West. 
Cambridge: MA: Harvard University Press, 1970: 2; Yen-Ping Hao, "A “New Class” in China’s Treaty 
Ports: The Rise of the Comprador-Merchants." The Business History Review 44, no. 4 (1970): 459; 
Kuang Yung Pao, "The Compradore: His Position in the Foreign Trade of China." The Economic Journal 
21, no. 84 (1911): 638, 640; C. G. F. Simkin, The Traditional Trade of Asia. London: Oxford University 
Press, 1968: 279. 
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strategies in trade.22 The links which both Western and Chinese traders maintained, 
extended throughout Southeast Asia and to Australia. The colonies of Australia each 
had their merchant communities, many undertaking trade with the their counterparts in 
China. The majority of the merchants had Western origins, although the Chinese also 
had a representation in the trade. The trade with China was patronised extensively by 
the Australian merchant houses. For example, JM&Co. dealt with correspondence from 
more than 150 different Australian firms over the two decade period.  
 
Beyond China and Australia were the merchants who assisted in facilitating the trade. In 
the Ettrick story they were the two London-based firms RA&Co. and Matheson & Co. 
A number of other London merchant houses represented Australian merchants in their 
dealings with China. Further, in the Ettrick story is the Calcutta firm, Jardine Skinner & 
Co. They provided assistance to JM&Co. in accepting remittances from Australia. 
Merchants in Singapore, both Western and Chinese, also played an important role in the 
China-Australia trade. At the beginning of the 1860s, the interaction between merchants 
in Australia and China together with those in London, Calcutta and Singapore, created a 
thriving trade relationship. Answering the question how these links were created, 
maintained and exploited is to the main objective of this study. 
 
The study of the Ettrick showed that an apparent bilateral trade relationship existed 
between Australia and China. Tea was sent from China to Australia and coal was taken 
from Australia to China. This is the general basic understanding of how commodity 
trade takes place. The story, though, provides clues that the transactions were more 
complex. The intervention of the various firms in London, acting on behalf of 
                                      
22 Alister Bowen, "The Merchants: Chinese Social Organisation in Colonial Australia." Australian 
Historical Studies 42, no. 1 (2011): 35-36; Adam McKeown, "Conceptualizing Chinese Diasporas, 1842 
to 1949." The Journal of Asian Studies 58, no. 2 (1999): 317; Simkin, The Traditional Trade of Asia: 274; 
Elizabeth Sinn, Power and Charity: A Chinese Merchant Elite in Colonial Hong Kong. Hong Kong: 
Hong Kong University Press, 2003: 84. 
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Australian and New Zealand merchants, alters the discourse from commodity-driven to 
that which includes an analysis of finances. The same applies to the Jardine Skinner & 
Co. connection. Yet, only very rarely does economic history analysis reveal the 
concomitant financial transactions that were also of importance, as per the Ettrick 
examples. Delving into the two trips and interpreting how the shipments were paid for 
and how the remittances were completed yields a more intricate and complex account of 
how these trade relations unfolded. The addition of passing gold to Jardine Skinner & 
Co. at Calcutta is just one example of the various methods of remittance. This study 
examines the story of the Ettrick and many others, at the transaction level, to create an 
understanding of how the trade relationship functioned beyond what appears a mere 
trade of one good for another. 
 
Within the Ettrick story are elements of imperial exchange. Those firms outside 
Australia and China that were involved in the transactions had connections with strong 
links to the British Empire. The Ettrick example demonstrates the importance of the 
world’s centre of finance at the time, London, and the firms at that city to the distant 
China – Australia trade. Extending remittances to India created another connection to 
the empire. There, the gold from Australia entered an existing global, multilateral 
movement of finances involving India, China and the UK with a later connection to the 
United States.23 Further, those remittances that were completed in London were then 
used to purchase goods for export from the UK or elsewhere for the Australian markets. 
 
The introduction of commodities from Australia for the China markets brought about a 
balance in the trade with tea for some of the Australian colonies. Throughout the first 
half of the nineteenth century, Australian merchants searched for an export good to send 
                                      
23 Takeshi Hamashita, Linda Grove, and Mark Selden, eds. China, East Asia and the Global Economy: 
Regional and Historical Perspectives. New York: Routledge, 2008: 126. 
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to China. Shipments of tea from China to Australia had created a significant bilateral 
trade advantage for China.24 By the early 1860s, two goods emerged to counter this 
imbalance. In New South Wales (NSW), coal was a primary export commodity to ports 
throughout the world. In Western Australia (WA), sandalwood was an important export 
commodity to China. Coal and sandalwood exports provided a balance to the tea 
shipments for the respective colonies in Australia.25 Understanding the trade of these 
two commodities and of tea provides the basis of this study.  
 
The trade of commodities between Australia and China was more than a simple set of 
transactions. Numerous institutions were included as part of the transactions. These 
institutions extended the direct China-Australia trade into a global environment. The 
connection through London financial banks and firms created an avenue to deliver 
remittances from trade. Redfern Alexander & Co. in the Ettrick story was one firm 
heavily involved in the trade between China and Australasia as was Jardine Skinner & 
Co., in Calcutta. Whether in Australia, in London or in Calcutta, financial institutions 
were vital to the processing of transactions and remittances. 
 
The two Ettrick journeys also highlight the use of networks and, through that, the trust 
that was required for transactions in the China-Australian trade between firms that were 
physically located at a great distance to be successful. Two of the four transactions were 
performed as joint shipments between JM&Co. and an Australian merchant firm. 
JM&Co. trusted the Australian firm to sell the tea at a value that would attain the largest 
mutual profit, or the smallest loss. Numerous other examples of trust existed in the 
China-Australian trade. Trust was vital in maintaining relationships as well as solving 
                                      
24 Sandra Tweedie, Trading Partners: Australia and Asia 1790-1993. Sydney: University of NSW Press, 
1994: 15. 
25 Coal and sandalwood could be termed “staples” in relation to the trade with China. For a discussion on 
Australia and staples, see: J. W. McCarty, "The Staple Approach in Australian Economic History." 
Australian Economic History Review 4 (1964): 1-22. 
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problems. The Newcastle Wallsend Coal Company incident was an example of the 
latter. JM&Co. trusted their agents in Sydney to act on their behalf in recouping money 
owed to them through a failed transaction. 
 
Numerous actors must have been present in the overall trade relationship between China 
and Australia, beyond the Ettrick story. This realisation raises the questions of who was 
involved, how did this trade relationship function and how did it relate to China and 
Australia? The Ettrick story shows that people, commodities, institutions and networks 
each form part of the overall trade relationship. Their analysis throughout this study 
contributes an answer to the overall question of how the trade relationship between 
China and Australia took shape and functioned. The analysis creates an understanding 
of the importance of China to Australia and Australia to China. The Ettrick example 
opens up alternate thinking. Analysing the questions this thesis poses uncovers a 
different relationship. It was a relationship that was complex with numerous actors 
present.  
 
An ambiguous relationship 
 
Eric Andrews, in his 1985 book Australia and China: The ambiguous relationship 
discusses the Chinese in Australia from early European settlement to 1985. Andrews 
sets out his discussion primarily to present the Chinese after 1901. His analysis of the 
nineteenth century is centred on restrictive immigration, gold mining and racism.26 He 
leaves the intricacies of the bilateral trade relationship between China and Australia 
undiscussed. To Australian historians like Andrews, the ambiguous relationship was an 
understanding of how Australians viewed and reacted to Chinese immigration. “The 
                                      
26 Eric M. Andrews, Australia and China: The Ambiguous Relationship. Carlton, Vic: Melbourne 
University Press, 1985: 1-34. 
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Chinese flood,” as Andrews termed it, commenced in the early 1850s and continued 
throughout the remainder of the century.27 It was driven by numerous gold finds – from 
Victoria to Queensland and from Northern Territory to WA.  
 
Andrews’ analysis of the relationship between China and Australia exemplifies the 
views of many past Australian historians. Like Andrews, these Australian historians 
have put forward that the China – Australia relationship formed the basis of a discourse 
related to a white Australia. That discourse created a certain view of the Chinese in the 
nineteenth century, one that was centred on racism and concerns of untempered 
immigration. Australian historians have, thus, tended to use the discourse in their 
development of the the history of Chinese – Australian relationships.28  Thus, the 
discourse became part of a general paradigm that had the belief that the relationship 
between China and Australia is, and has been, labelled by historians of Chinese-
Australian history as, the Chinese “presence” in Australia.29  
 
                                      
27 Andrews, Australia and China: 5. 
28 For a discussion on Chinese migration, exclusion and racial inferiority, see: Persia Crawford Campbell, 
Chinese Coolie Emigration to Countries within the British Empire. London: Frank Cass & Co., 1971: 56-
79; Andrew Markus, "Government Control of Chinese Migration to Australia, 1855-1975." In The 
Overseas Chinese in Australasia: History, Settlement and Interactions, edited by Henry Chan, Ann 
Curthoys and Nora Chiang. 69-81. Taipei, Taiwan: Interdisciplinary Group for Australian Studies, 
National Taiwan University ; Canberra, ACT: Centre for the Study of the Chinese Southern Diaspora, 
Australian National University, 2001; Andrew Markus, Fear and Hatred : Purifying Australia and 
California 1850-1901. Sydney: Hale & Iremonger, 1979; Ching-yan Choi, Chinese Migration and 
Settlement in Australia. Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1975; Kathryn Cronin, Colonial Casualties : 
Chinese in Early Victoria. Carlton, Vic: Melbourne University Press, 1982; Myra Willard, History of the 
White Australia Policy to 1920. 2nd ed.  Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1967; Anthony C. 
Palfreeman, The Administration of the White Australia Policy. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 
1967; Alexander T. Yarwood, Asian Migration to Australia: The Background to Exclusion, 1896-1923. 
Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1964; Ann Curthoys, "Conflict and Consensus." In White Are 
Our Enemies? Racism and the Working Class in Australia., edited by Ann Curthoys and Andrew Markus. 
48-65. Sydney: Hale and Monger, 1978; Charles A. Price, The Great White Walls Are Built : Restrictive 
Immigration to North America and Australasia, 1836-1888. Canberra: The Australian Institute of 
International Affairs in association with Australian National University Press, 1974. 
29 Robert Macklin, Dragon & Kangaroo: Australia and China's Shared History from the Goldfields to the 
Present Day. Sydney: Hachette, 2017: back cover. See the review by Richard Rigby. 
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A new discourse was initiated by a plea from historian Jennifer Cushman in 1984.30 
Cushman argued that the study of Chinese in Australia should be viewed through a 
mirror. The Chinese Australians were individuals who should be regarded as individuals 
and should be viewed as we would view ourselves and not as a race. Cushman’s work 
established a new flurry of historical and archaeological studies.31  One historian, Adam 
McKeown, gave the new discourse a label. He defined it as an emerging discipline of 
“Chinese Australian Studies.” 32  The discipline, however, remained within the 
parameters of the existing paradigm of Chinese-Australian history as nearly all 
historians continued the story of the Chinese in Australia. 
 
                                      
30 Jennifer Cushman, "A 'Colonial Casualty': The Chinese Community in Australian Historiography." 
Asian Studies Review 7, no. 3 (1984): 101; For an appraisal of Cushman, see Henry Chan, "Becoming 
Chinese but Remaining Australian: The Future of the Down Under Chinese Past." In The Overseas 
Chinese in Australasia: History, Settlement and Interactions, edited by Henry Chan, Ann Curthoys and 
Nora Chiang. 1-15. Taipei, Taiwan: Interdisciplinary Group for Australian Studies (IGAS), National 
Taiwan University ; Canberra, ACT : Centre for the Study of the Chinese Southern Diaspora, Australian 
National University, 2001: 3. 
31 For discussions highlighting the Chinese from the Chinese perspective and as Chinese in Australia, 
including pre-1984 works, see: John Fitzgerald, Big White Lie: Chinese Australians in White Australia. 
Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2007; Yuanfang Shen, Dragon Seed in the Antipodes : 
Chinese-Australian Autobiographies.  Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 2001; Ye Sang, The Year 
the Dragon Came. St. Lucia, Qld: University of Queensland Press, 1996; Shirley Fitzgerald, Red Tape, 
Gold Scissors : The Story of Sydney's Chinese. Sydney: State Library of New South Wales Press, 1997; 
Christine Inglis, "Chinese in Australia." The International Migration Review 6, no. 3 (1972): 266-81; 
Shaoqing Cao, "From Mutual Aid to Public Interest: Chinese Secret Societies in Australia." Translated by 
Duncan Campbell. In After the Rush : Regulation, Participation and Chinese Communities in Australia, 
1860-1940, edited by John Fitzgerald, Sophie Couchman and Paul Macgregor. 133-51. Kingsbury, Vic: 
Otherland Literary Journal, 2004; Barry McGowan, Tracking the Dragon : A History of the Chinese in 
the Riverina. Wagga Wagga, NSW: Museum of the Riverina, Wagga Wagga, 2010; Janis Wilton, Golden 
Threads: The Chinese in Regional New South Wales, 1850-1950. Armidale, N.S.W.: New England 
Regional Art Museum in association with Powerhouse Pub., 2004. For Chinese Australians from an 
archaeological perspective, see: R. Ian Jack, "The Contribution of Archaeology to the History of the 
Overseas Chinese." In Chinese in Australia and New Zealand : A Multidisciplinary Approach, edited by 
Jan Ryan. New Delhi: New Age International Publishers, 1995; Jane Lydon, 'Many Inventions' the 
Chinese in the Rocks, Sydney, 1890-1930. Clayton, Vic: Monash Publications in History, 1999; Virginia 
Esposito, Rice Bowls and Dinner Plates : Ceramic Artifacts from Chinese Gold Mining Sites in Southeast 
New South Wales, Mid 19th to Early 20th Century. Oxford: Archaeopress, 2014; Barry McGowan, 
Bungonia to Braidwood : An Historical and Archaeological Account of the Shoalhaven and Mongarlowe 
Goldfields. Canberra: Barry McGowan, 1996; Barry McGowan, Lost Mines Revisited : Historic Mining 
Communities of the Monaro, Southern Tablelands and South West Slopes Districts of New South Wales. 
Canberra: Barry McGowan, 1996. 
32 Adam McKeown, "Introduction: The Continuing Reformulation of Chinese Australians." In After the 
Rush : Regulation, Participation and Chinese Communities in Australia, 1860-1940, edited by John 
Fitzgerald, Sophie Couchman and Paul Macgregor. 1-9. Kingsbury, Vic: Otherland Literary Journal, 
2004: 7. 
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A few historians have chosen to open avenues to investigate trade relationships by 
Australians with China. Recently, Ben Mountford, in his 2016 book Britain, China and 
Colonial Australia, investigates how Australia engaged with China since 1788 and how 
that related to British Far Eastern interests.33 Mountford uses a political lens to open up 
a narrative of this relationship. In the opening chapter, Mountford views the position of 
the new European settlements of Australia as a route towards China from England. His 
emphasis was that of trade with Western merchants in Canton in the early 1800s and 
later in the Treaty Ports.34 Mountford’s analysis of trade from the mid-nineteenth 
century onwards is halted as he then returns to the discourse of analysing Chinese 
immigration to Australia. The political dependence of his work meant that trade was no 
longer the focus. This thesis will take up the thread that Mountford commenced. 
 
Chinese merchants were part of the general discussion of the Chinese in Australia. They 
imported goods for the Chinese miners, assisted with their migration to Australia and 
their return home to China, and worked with Western merchants. For instance, Chinese 
merchants were ever-present in the port of Cooktown, North Queensland in the mid-to-
late 1870s.35 Kevin Rains’ 2005 doctoral thesis on the Chinese in Cooktown elaborates 
on this topic. The Chinese were the consignees of goods imported and exported. They 
were not, however, the importing or exporting agents. That task was completed by the 
few Western merchants. Rains proposes that the Western merchants were heavily 
involved in the trade with China acting as “intermediaries” within joint 
                                      
33 Benjamin Mountford, Britain, China and Colonial Australia. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016. 
34 Mountford, Britain, China and Colonial Australia: 7-45. Mountford uses extensive correspondence 
from JM&Co. to describe the connections from 1819 onwards. The chapter only explains the trade until 
the commencement of the gold rushes in Victoria in the early 1850s. 
35 For a discussion on Cooktown and the Palmer River goldfields, see Robert Ormston. "The Rise and 
Fall of a Frontier Mining Town: Cooktown 1873-85." PhD. University of Queensland, 1996; Kevin Rains. 
"Intersections: The Overseas Chinese Social Landscape of Cooktown, 1873-1935." PhD. University of 
Queensland, 2005. Noreen Kirkman, "From Minority to Majority: Chinese on the Palmer River Gold-
Field, 1873-1876." In Race Relations in North Queensland, edited by Henry Reynolds. Townsville: James 
Cook University, 1993. 
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Chinese/Western ventures.36 The Chinese merchants took advantage of these ventures. 
Rains adds that they made use of Western methods of transport, communications and 
banking. They also used the postal system to send gold to China.37 
 
Research similar to Rains’ in-depth analysis of Chinese mercantile activity of the late 
nineteenth century is rare. A few biographical publications on specific Chinese 
merchants in Australia offer some further details. Two Chinese merchants, Lowe Kong 
Meng of Melbourne and Quong Tart of Sydney, have been analysed, although Tart’s 
primary mercantile work was after 1880.38 Meng, though, was heavily engaged in the 
interaction between Hong Kong and Melbourne even before 1860. He owned a number 
of vessels and acted as an agent for shipments to and from China.39 Meng also 
cooperated with the Western merchants in Victoria.40 
 
Sandra Tweedie summarised the analysis of Western mercantile activity between 
Australia and China in her 1994 book on trade between Australia and Asia from first 
European settlement to 1993. As with Andrews, she accorded the nineteenth century 
minor attention, indicating  that bilateral trade was minimal. Tweedie further dismissed 
both sandalwood and coal as key export commodities from colonial Australia to China 
throughout the second half of the nineteenth century. She summarised that sandalwood 
                                      
36 Rains, “Intersections.”: 268. 
37 Rains, “Intersections.”: 198-99. 
38 Robert Travers, Australian Mandarin: The Life and Times of Quong Tart. Sydney: Kangaroo Press, 
1981; Margaret Tart, The Life of Quong Tart: Or, How a Foreigner Succeeded in a British Community. 
Sydney: W. M. Maclardy, 1911; Macklin, Dragon & Kangaroo. Macklin devotes much of his research to 
Quong Tart. Paul Macgregor, "Chinese Political Values in Colonial Victoria: Lowe Kong Meng and the 
Legacy of the July 1880 Election." Journal of Chinese Overseas 9 (2013): 135-75; Macgregor, Paul. 
"Lowe Kong Meng and Chinese Engagement in the International Trade of Colonial Victoria." 
Provenance, no. 11 (2012). https://www.prov.vic.gov.au/explore-collection/provenance-
journal/provenance-2012/lowe-kong-meng-and-chinese-engagement. (cited 4 April 2014). 
39 Macgregor, "Lowe Kong Meng and Chinese Engagement” 
40 Lowe Kong Meng and Louis Ah Mouy were founders of the Commercial Bank of Australia. 
Macgregor, “Chinese Political Values.”: 143. 
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was not “the much needed staple”41 for early colonial hopes and that the coal trade to 
China was negligible.42 Tweedie substantiated her conclusions with colonial trade 
statistics over a longer period than this current work. Interpretation at the transaction 
level allows this study to question Tweedie’s conclusions. 
 
Viewing Tweedie’s conclusions raises the question why historians have neglected the 
trade relationship between China and Australia? One answer lies in how Australians, 
both at the time and historians who have written about the nineteenth century, define 
China. For many, it has been the Chinese in China only. Yet, Australia’s direct 
relationship with China in the nineteenth century was almost never with the Chinese. 
They were hidden behind the gateway that was the Treaty Port system.43 Australians, 
whether Chinese or Westerners, had to deal with and through this system. To 
Australians it was a system where Western merchants in the Treaty Ports were at the 
forefront.44 Thus, trade between Australia and China was trade with the Treaty Ports. 
The “Chinese in Australia” discourse that flows through the historiography of Chinese-
Australians has, at best, bypassed any connection with the Treaty Port system. This 
reasoning provides one explanation of why the trade relationship has been discounted 
and neglected. 
 
The Treaty Port system was integral in creating an understanding of trade between 
Australia and China. It consisted of numerous Western and Chinese merchants. For 
Australia, the Western merchants were the contact at the ports. Firms such as JM&Co., 
AH&Co., Russell & Co. and others traded with Australian firms on a regular basis. 
                                      
41 Tweedie. Trading Partners: 15. 
42 Tweedie. Trading Partners: 21. 
43 McKeown, "Conceptualizing Chinese Diasporas.”: 313. 
44 Jürgen Osterhammel, "British Business in China, 1860s-1950s." In British Business in Asia since 1860, 
edited by Geoffrey Jones and Richard P. T. Davenport-Hines. 189-216. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1989: 191-92. Osterhammel states that the entire foreign trade of China was handled by 
foreign firms. 
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Australia’s first connection with JM&Co. was late in 1819 through a shipment of tea on 
the Marquis of Hastings.45 The vessel arrived in Sydney on 5 April 1820.46 Its cargo 
consisted of sugars and teas of various kinds.47 Thereafter Australian merchants strived 
to attain a close relationship with the merchant houses of JM&Co. and others.48 By the 
early 1830s, JM&Co. had their own agents in Sydney. Towards the end of that decade, 
JM&Co. also began collaborating with another prominent Sydney merchant, Henry 
Moore & Co. It was a partnership that would last through the 1860s and 1870s.49 
 
Historians of the Treaty Port merchants in the second half of the nineteenth century 
have rarely given attention to any connections with Australia. Throughout the individual 
histories of the merchant houses, the Australian colonies receive no mention or, at best, 
a fleeting glimpse. The published histories of JM&Co., AH&Co. or Russell & Co. 
reveal no interest in the connection with Australia.50 A brief, though out-dated, analysis 
of the connection between JM&Co. and the Asia-Pacific region from the perspective of 
those in the Asia-Pacific region was produced by Jane Roth in 1967. That discussion 
only provides bare details of what is available in the JM&Co. archives.51 The rare 
counter example is that of John Samuel Swire. Swire was very interested in the gold 
                                      
45 Mountford, Britain, China and Colonial Australia: 31. 
46 Ship News.” SGNSWA 5 April 1820:4. 
47 SGNSWA 8 April 1820: 2. See advertisement in column 3. Based on advertising in later editions of the 
same newspaper, Robert Campbell Jn. appears to be the consignee of most of the cargo. SGNSWA 22 
April 1820: 2. 
48 “Messrs. Charles Magniac & Co. in account current with Robert Campbell Co.” 29 December 1824 
Current accounts: Australia JM A8/48/1. Magniac & Co. were the precursor of JM&Co. 
49 Mountford, Britain, China and Colonial Australia: 33.  
50 See: Robert Blake, Jardine Matheson: Traders of the Far East. London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 
1999; Carol Matheson Connell, A Business at Risk: Jardine Matheson and the Hong Kong Trading 
Industry. Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers, 2004; Carol Matheson Connell, "Jardine Matheson & 
Company: The Role of External Organization in a Nineteenth-Century Trading Firm." Enterprise & 
Society 4, no. 1 (2003): 99-138; Carol Matheson Connell, "Entrepreneurial Enterprise and 'Image' in the 
Nineteenth-Century Trading Firm: Shaping the Legal Environment for Business." Business History 48, 
no. 2 (2006): 193-219; Alan Reid, "The Steel Frame." In The Thistle and the Jade: A Celebration of 150 
Years of Jardine Matheson & Co., edited by Maggie Keswick. 11-49: Hong Kong, 1982. Maggie 
Keswick, ed. The Thistle and the Jade: A Celebration of Jardine, Matheson & Co. London: Octopus, 
1982; Stephen Cameron Lockwood, Augustine Heard and Company, 1858-1862; American Merchants in 
China. Harvard East Asian Monographs. Cambridge, MA: East Asian Research Center, Harvard 
University, 1971; Robert W. Lovett, "The Heard Collection and Its Story." The Business History Review 
35, no. 4 (1961): 567-73.  
51 Jane Roth, "The Jardine Matheson Archive." Journal of Pacific History 2 (1967): 172-74. 
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discoveries in Victoria in the 1850s.52 He set up a branch of his company in Melbourne 
titled Swire Brothers & Co. That company and its later iterations, became the primary 
agent for Swire in Australia.53 This neglect has created a gap in the history of these 
Treaty Port firms that the current study intends to fill. 
 
Presentation of study 
 
The current study is developed to answer the questions presented above and to fill the 
gaps in historical research identified above. There are six chapters. Three primary 
chapters on commodities sit in the middle. They are preceded by a discussion of the 
transport methodology and succeeded by a discussion of the development and role of 
trust and networks in trade relations. Leading into these five chapters is a preliminary 
discussion creating a context for the remainder of the study. Each chapter addresses a 
distinct set of questions. The commodities chapters overlap to some degree. This, 
however, is not significant as the trade of each commodity was structured quite 
differently. Only the method of remittance has similarities. The structure of the three 
core chapters follow a similar, set format. Each will include a statistical background for 
a descriptive history of the trade. Each will then analyse how the trade was performed. 
Finally, each will discuss how the remittances necessary to conclude trade deals were 
concluded. 
 
The trade connection between colonial Australia and China was unique. The colonies of 
Australia were developing and their supply of exports and demand for imports altered 
significantly during each decade in the nineteenth century. This was very much the case 
following the gold rushes of the 1850s. Chapter one opens up the elements of the trade 
                                      
52 Sheila Marriner, and Francis E. Hyde, The Senior John Samuel Swire 1825-98: Management in Far 
Eastern Shipping Trades. Liverpool: Liverpool University Press, 1967: 13-15. 
53 Marriner and Hyde, Senior John Samuel Swire: 50. 
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for discussion to create a context for the remainder of the study. In China, the Treaty 
Port system was the mainstay of trade. The chapter asks how the Treaty Port system 
was devised and how it related to Australia. Specifically, how did the Treaty Port 
system act as a door to the Chinese for the products that Australia exported to China or 
imported from China? At the other end of the trade, the chapter examines the trade 
system that existed in Australia. For both China and Australia, the chapter asks who was 
involved and why they became interested in trading with China? To tie up the trade 
relationships, the chapter investigates the connections that existed for merchants in the 
1860s and 1870s. Specifically, the analysis relates to the institutions that governed the 
behaviour of producers and traders in the industry. 
 
Merchants throughout the world have had the desire to minimise transaction time and 
costs. Shortness of turnover of transactions led to more trade. For merchants of the 
1860s and early 1870s, the connection between China and Australia was impeded by the 
necessity to use sail for transport. Advancements in marine technology together with a 
mail contract in 1873 created, for merchants in China and Australia, a breakthrough in 
transport. That breakthrough involved steamers traversing the Torres Strait to get from 
the primary markets of colonial Australia’s east coast to China. It was a shorter distance 
than the traditional eastward, through the Pacific, or westward, via Cape Leeuwin, 
journeys. Use of this route led to improvements in transaction time. Chapter two 
investigates the development of the new route. The chapter answers questions relating 
to the importance of choosing such a route. The chapter ventures to establish how the 
advancement of maritime transport technology led to a transition from sail to steam on 
the journeys between China and eastern Australia. It also asks how the route was 
eventually opened as a permanent trade route, what previous efforts were employed and 
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who was involved. The answers provide a foundation for the analysis of how 
commodities were actually moved between Australia and China. 
 
An important prerequisite for the transition from sail to steam was the availability of 
coal. NSW was the primary coal producing colony of nineteenth century Australia. 
Most of the coal mined was exported. China was one of the two biggest international 
importers during the 1860s and 1870s period, only behind New Zealand. Chapter three 
therefore analyses the coal trade with China. The chapter commences by asking why 
merchants in China were interested in NSW coal and how merchants in NSW worked to 
satisfy this demand. Statistical data is then provided to divulge what differences 
occurred between the exports from the two coal exporting ports of Sydney and 
Newcastle. That creates a descriptive picture of the trade of coal to the Chinese ports. 
These results, when combined with the available qualitative material, made up mainly 
of company correspondence and government documents, substantiate explanations of 
why or how the trade of coal varied throughout the 1860s and 1870s. Completing each 
transaction were the remittances. How were these fulfilled within the trade relationship? 
Chapter 3 concludes by interpreting how firms in different parts of the world interacted 
and became part of the Australia to China coal trade. 
 
The trade of WA sandalwood to China was quite different to that of coal. The specific 
end consumers were the Chinese. They were serviced by the merchants in Shanghai 
more than any other Chinese port. That is, the trade of sandalwood was from WA to 
Shanghai. However, the route also included ports in between where the wood was 
purchased and transhipped towards Shanghai. The main intermediary ports were 
Singapore and Hong Kong. The first question posed in Chapter four relates to the route 
that sandalwood took from WA to China. The route reveals that both Chinese and 
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Western merchants were active in the sandalwood trade at each of the ports along the 
route. The chapter searches for answers relating to who was involved and what their 
aims were. Through this is developed an understanding of the market forces present and 
the strategies underpinning these forces. Owing to this complexity and the markets in 
WA, the methods of remittances varied. Some had connections to London firms, but 
unlike the coal trade, these were particularly pertinent to future transactions between 
London and WA. 
 
Coal and sandalwood were the two primary commodities imported by China from 
Australia. Tea was the primary export from China to Australia. In Chapter five the trade 
of tea to Australia is investigated. The emphasis of the chapter is not on how the trade 
related to China. Instead, it looks at an element of the trade that existed with at least two 
of the Western merchants in China. That was the use of joint-account transactions with 
Australian merchants. This chapter investigates who was involved, how they were 
involved and how the joint-account transaction process was completed. The system by 
which payments for tea shipments were effected was complex itself. The adventures 
into joint-account shipments added another step. For JM&Co., that step involved the 
transfer of gold to India as a method of payment. Why India? The chapter answers this 
question together with an assessment of who was involved in the movement of gold. 
The chapter is extended to explore the trade of sugar from China to Australia and how 
these imports added to the discussion of the usage of gold shipments to India.  
 
Chapter six ties up the previous three core chapters through an analysis of the networks 
of producers and merchants that maintained trading relations and the relevant mutual 
trust that sustained these networks to mutual advantage. The chapter uses Granovetter’s 
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theoretical conceptualisation of ‘Triadic Closures’ to analyse this issue.54 Granovetter 
analysed strong and weak ties, bringing them together as triangles of trust networks. 
Amongst the problems of developing strong networks is poor communication. The 
question of how did communication alter throughout the period is explored first in this 
chapter. The chapter then focuses on analysing what are the different types of 
transactions and how these relate to networks and trust. Examined are single, joint and 
inter-relationship transactions. The chapter uses this analysis and asks how these 
networks and trust levels were used to solve problems that eventuated through other 
transactions. Finally, the chapter extends network ties within a hierarchical framework. 
It investigates how the strength of trade relationships could proceed up a hierarchical 
ladder through further improvements of networks and trust.  
 
Methodological review 
 
The history of trade relationships between China and Australia during the 1860s and 
1870s is essentially unknown. To understand these relationship requires a reconstructive 
history.55 This study develops a narrative through a detailed research of primary sources. 
These primary sources deliver reliable facts that allow a reconstruction of numerous 
discourses and the development of respective conclusions. They feed the general 
narrative that is based around the thesis questions. For example, in the Ettrick story the 
fact that RA&Co. were involved in transactions during both the 1863 and 1864 journeys 
is the basis for an existing dialogue of the connection between London firms and the 
China-Australia trade relationship. The general narrative of the trade relationship, 
therefore, is enhanced through the reconstruction of the transaction, from its initiation to 
                                      
54 Mark Granovetter. "The Strength of Weak Ties." American Journal of Sociology 78, no. 6 (1973): 
1360-80. 
55 For a detailed discussion on reconstructive, constructive and deconstructive history, see Douglas Booth, 
The Field: Truth and Fiction in Sport History.  London: Routledge, 2005. 
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its conclusion. This study, thus, relies on facts to explain what happened and draws 
conclusions as to why it happened.56 
 
An interdisciplinary approach is also required to promote the narrative. The study draws 
on insights from a mixture of historical sub-disciplines. Included within this study are 
elements of economic and business history, maritime history, Australian history, China 
Treaty Port history, Chinese mercantile history and the histories of various commodities. 
The study integrates these insights into a basis for a more comprehensive understanding 
of the answers to the thesis questions. These insights are also integrated and coherent, 
thus separating the study from one that is multi-disciplinary.57 Analysing the China-
Australia trade relationship at the transaction level treads beyond the dispersal of 
bilateral statistics. It pushes the study towards other concerns, sub-disciplines that 
enhance the above results. The Ettrick story encompasses elements of maritime history 
through the vessel journeys, business history in the transactions, commodity history and, 
above each, economic sociology through the networks and trust relationships. What the 
Ettrick story delivers, within interdisciplinarity, is a “complex system” where the 
pattern of behaviour, in this case the method of completing the transaction, is shown to 
be consistent.58 This study not only understands that a pattern exists but investigates 
why the behaviour of protagonists exhibits that pattern. 
 
                                      
56 Booth, The Field: 9, 26-27. 
57 William H. Newell, "A Theory of Interdisciplinary Studies." Issues in Integrative Studies 19 (2001): 2. 
The issue of this journal contains a number of other papers discussing Newell’s theories and a response 
from Newell. Newell further explains that “the boundaries between disciplines are in (small) part the 
result of historical accident or evolution of the disciplines as socio-political organisations, but they also 
reflect differences in reality.” Newell believes that each discipline “has developed concepts, theories, and 
methods uniquely adapted to the portion of reality it has chosen to study. The delimited focus of each 
discipline has yielded not only narrowness of vision but also power of explanation.” William H. Newell, 
"Reply to the Respondents to "a Theory of Interdisciplinary Studies"." Issues in Integrative Studies 19 
(2001): 145-46. 
58 Newell, "A Theory of Interdisciplinary Studies.": 8-9, 20; Newell, “Reply to the Respondents.”: 144; S. 
Bailis, "Contending with Complexity: Responding to William H. Newell’s “a Theory of Interdisciplinary 
Studies"." Issues in Integrative Studies 19 (2001): 36; J. L. Mackey, "Another Approach to 
Interdisciplinary Studies." Issues in Integrative Studies 19 (2001): 59-70. 
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The current study is one that takes a historical perspective of economic and trade history. 
In using both quantitative and qualitative data to recreate the past, the study interprets 
the information gathered and analyses the data to reach conclusions. That is, the study 
interprets the facts and doesn’t attempt to create theories to fit with the data. Alfred D. 
Chandler Jnr. wrote over half a century ago that there are distinct differences between 
economists and historians in the way that they view data and create solutions to 
economic history.  
The economist concentrates on the manipulation of numbers so as to provide 
useful theories about changes or trends in prices, income, wages, capital 
formation, and such-theories which help to make understandable the economic 
process of production, distribution or investment, and the relationships between 
them. .. The historian, on the other hand, attempts to re-create from the written 
records a human situation that existed in the past. .. He is particularly 
fascinated .. by the interrelationship between personalities, social systems, and 
cultural attitudes.”59 
 
That is, to Chandler, the historian “merely hopes to re-create, or partially, re-create, 
some small part of man’s activities in the past” and that the historian “should leave the 
matter of predicting what might have happened in the past to the economist.”60 In this 
study, these “men” are the merchants and firms who were involved in the trade 
relationships. 
 
That is not to say that the role of economic and business histories are to be discounted. 
They provide relevant definitions of terms relating to transactions.61 The business cycle, 
exchange rates, freight rates and others each play their part within this study. Similarly, 
                                      
59 Alfred D. Chandler, "Comment." Explorations in Entrepreneurial History 6, no. 1 (1968): 67-68. 
60 Chandler, “Comment”: 68, 72. 
61 For a discussion on economic and business history, see, for example: Gordon Boyce, and Simon Ville. 
The Development of Modern Business. New York: Palgrave, 2002; Joseph Alois Schumpeter, Business 
Cycles : A Theoretical, Historical and Statistical Analysis of the Capitalist Process. New York: McGraw-
Hill, 1939; Fritz J. Redlich, J. D. Glover, Arthur M. Johnson, George Rogers Taylor, and Richard C. 
Overton. "Approaches in Business History." The Business History Review 36, no. 1 (1962): 61-86; 
Christopher Lloyd, "Analytical Frameworks of Australia's Economic History." In The Cambridge 
Economic History of Australia, edited by Simon Ville and Glenn Withers. 52-69. Melbourne: Cambridge 
University Press, 2015; Randall Morck, and Bernard Yeung. "Economics, History, and Causation." The 
Business History Review 85 (2011): 39-63. 
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the methods used by businesses, the networks that are created and maintained and the 
respective relationships and requirements of trust each play an important role 
throughout this study. As an interdisciplinary study, economic and business history 
provide assistance to the study’s analysis. That said, they do not dominate the study, nor 
govern it. Instead, the narrative employs relevant selections of economic and business 
history to develop an overall picture of the trade relationships between China and 
Australia from 1860 to 1880.  
 
The connection between China and Australia through trade is presented here using 
descriptive and analytical methods of history. Descriptive history provides an 
understanding of the facts based on quantitative and empirical data. It allows for the 
construction of tabular or graphical representations by means of mathematical models, 
especially statistics, to support arguments.62 The method answers the questions of where, 
when, who and what by gathering, interrogating and verifying factual evidence. On the 
other side is analytical history. It searches for causes of history and the choice to use 
concepts, comparisons and contexts to build arguments around. It is here where the how 
and why questions are proposed.63 Historians, however, are not delimited by one 
category. The historian may, as Louis Gottschalk affirms, “be in both groups at the 
same or different times even though he may emphasize his adherence to one rather than 
the other.”64 This study employs a descriptive history to determine the extent of the 
                                      
62 Kaya Yilmaz, "Comparison of Quantitative and Qualitative Research Traditions: Epistemological, 
Theoretical and Methodological Differences." European Journal of Education 48, no. 2 (2013): 311. 
63 Booth, The Field: 6. Booth’s book discusses the theory behind sport history, although his work is also 
trying to implant that sub-discipline within the overall history field of study and thus there are numerous 
overlapping theories. In the case here, Booth is using the work of another sport historian, Nancy Struna to 
explain where sport historians place themselves. See: Nancy Struna, "Historical Research in Physical 
Activity." In Research Methods in Physical Activity, edited by Jerry Thomas and Jack Nelson. 251-75. 
Champaign, IL: Human Kinetics, 1996. Louis Gottschalk in the early 1960s, as the Chairman of the 
Committee on Historiography of the Social Science Research Council, used the term “theoretical 
historian” instead of “analytical historian” stating that “they try to find in their subject matter a basis for 
comparison, classification, interpretation or generalization.” Louis Gottschalk, ed. Generalizations in the 
Writing of History. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963: v. 
64 Gottschalk, Generalizations in the Writing of History: v. 
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trade of a commodity. The study also engages analytical history in understanding the 
transaction methods and how they defined the trade. 
 
Sources 
 
The gathering of large data sets of information is important to analysing the history of 
trade. This study is no less an example of a collection of such evidence. It uses a 
combination of quantitative and qualitative data. The quantitative data are presented as 
graphs and tables. These data were obtained from a variety of sources. Three used in the 
study are government records, shipping data from newspapers and commercial 
summaries. The qualitative data was primarily found in the business archives of firms 
involved in the China-Australia trade. Those records accessed for this study were 
related to correspondence and finance. Government reports and Parliamentary debates 
supplemented the other qualitative sources. 
 
Government statistical records create a source for annual summaries of shipping, 
imports, exports and other related trade data including duties and tariffs. Individual 
colonial governments provided statistical information to the Colonial Office in 
London.65 That information was in the form of Blue Books or Statistical Records.66 This 
study extracts information from various government records and summarises that in the 
form of graphs and tables. The primary problem with using the statistical data was a 
lack of standardisation in their presentation. The standardisation of information specific 
                                      
65 They were published in sets of Statistical Tables. Summaries were also published in Statistical 
Abstracts. These two variants of the tabular information were initially published on an annual basis. By 
1875, the publication was standardised to be for every three years. 
66 Statistical Tables relating to the Colonial and Other Possessions of the United Kingdom. Part XVI. 
(1876-7-8.) House of Commons, no. C.2867 (1881) London: G.E. Eyre and W. Spottiswoode, 1881: iii. 
“The original returns from the Colonies are, broadly speaking, of two kinds, namely, the Blue Books, 
which are furnished by most of the Crown Colonies according to forms supplied by the Colonial Office 
after consultation with this Department, and the Statistical Registers and other documents which are 
usually published in the larger Colonies where there is responsible Government.” 
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to the Australian Colonies only commenced following an 1875 conference held in 
Tasmania.67 Thus, the complete compilation of statistics for the individual colonies 
required, in some cases, estimations.68 
 
Newspapers located in China and Australia included both transport and trade data. 
Shipping lists of the time commonly contained the destination or origin of vessels as 
well as the import and export data for each individual vessel. Shipping agents were 
commonly included. The above information has been analysed to create trade data for 
individual ports. It thus provides a supplement to government statistics. 69  The 
newspapers were commonly missing data. That led, in some cases, to incomplete data 
sets. Newspapers also refined the information over time. Limited information was 
published towards the end of the 1860-1880 period.70 Where more than one newspaper 
provided the same data, the problem of incomplete information could be overcome.71 
 
Commercial summaries were of the form of Prices Current circulars, Commercial 
Reports located in newspapers and commercial information included at the end of 
communications between merchants. Prices Current circulars have existed since the 
eighteenth century containing enumeration of various merchandise with details of their 
                                      
67 Statistical Tables relating to the Colonial and Other Possessions of the United Kingdom. Part XV. 
(1871-2-3-4-5.) House of Commons, no. C.20329 (1878) London: G.E. Eyre and W. Spottiswoode, 1878: 
iii. Although an agreement was made for uniformity in compiling statistics, the final decision for 
conformity with the agreement did not take place for a few more years. 
68 In the case of Western Australia, the value of exports per destination was not provided. That value was 
calculated based upon the quantity of the commodity, the total quantity and the total value.  
69 For example, a breakdown of the exports of coal from both Newcastle and Sydney in New South Wales 
to both Hong Kong and to Shanghai, creates four different sets of data and allows for a more 
comprehensive understanding of the movement of coal from New South Wales to the Chinese ports. 
70 There was a noticeable declination in the amount and type of information available towards the latter 
part of the period and with certain newspapers either merging with others or going out of business with, 
what appears, altered editorial focus, the gathering of complete information from newspapers published in 
the late 1870s became difficult.  
71 For example, where there were missing issues or no information provided in the Newcastle, NSW 
papers relating to exports of coal, certain Sydney newspapers could assist in possessing the missing 
information. Similarly, in Sydney, all three newspapers – Sydney Mail, Empire and SMH were required 
access to obtain complete information. 
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price, duties, where applicable, and supply.72 They became quite sophisticated. By the 
mid-nineteenth century, the Prices Current circulars were used as detailed market 
tools. 73  The circulars from Augustine Heard & Co. collection provide various 
information for this study.74 Included in the circulars were: detailed analysis of the 
various commodities being exported from China; the latest pricing details for goods sent 
to and received from Australia; the value of charters of vessels en-route to Australia; 
and the shipping lists to and from Hong Kong. The detailed shipping details for vessels 
carrying tea from the various Chinese ports to Australia included, for each vessel, 
information on the size of the tea cargo in pounds. The pricing details for specific 
commodities imported to Hong Kong and the size of the tea cargo were summarised for 
this study. Similarly, the Commercial Reports and other commercial information 
provided by merchants assisted in creating other data sets. 
 
The qualitative data for this study was primarily sourced from a number of business 
archives. Only a small group of merchant firms have retained their records. Preservation 
of records was not a specific requirement for all firms. Those firms that were created 
through political devices were, by the enabling act or by charter, required to keep 
certain records.75 For example, AAC have archives located in England and Australia. 
                                      
72 Mary G. Mason, "Aspects of the Trade between China and America, 1840-1870." Bulletin of the 
Business Historical Society 10, no. 2 (1936): 27. 
73 Michael Aldous, "Rehabilitating the Intermediary: Brokers and Auctioneers in the Nineteenth-Century 
Anglo-Indian Trade." Business History 59, no. 4 (2017): 537. Aldous stated that by “1850 the reports 
examined long-run trends, underpinned by statistical data and used increasingly nuanced methods of 
analysis.” 
74 Prices Current P945 Cartons 31-33 AHA. These cartons are not part of the general AH collection, AH 
MS766 which are all on microfilm. The Prices Current circulars had not been digitized at the time they 
were accessed and were located in a set of boxes that required a special request for access. The circulars 
are from late in the 1859-60 season until the end of the 1875-76. At the conclusion of each season a 
summary was provided for that season and the previous few. Lockwood describes AH&Co.’s Prices 
Current. “Heard’s circular, “Prices Current,” contained factual information about the state of commerce 
in China: current stocks if imports on had, sales to date, prices of all products at the several ports, exports 
to date, and important political news. Heard’s circular was made up on cooperation with several other 
houses, the Customs, and the newspapers. It was sent to constituents in the West on the fortnightly 
mailboat.” Lockwood, Augustine Heard and Company: 11. 
75 John Armstrong, and Stephanie Jones. Business Documents: Their Origins, Sources and Uses in 
Historical Research.  London: Mansell Publishing Limited, 1987: 3. 
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Their records, however, are limited to reports and similar documents.  Preserving a copy 
of all correspondence with foreign firms was not specifically required by law. Financial 
statements relating to transactions were another item rarely found in firms similar to 
AAC.76 For most private firms in Australia, any requirement has been non-existent.77 
British and American companies, with offices in the Chinese Treaty Ports, have 
extensive records in their archives. The primary company archives sourced for this 
study include JM&Co., AH&Co. and Russell & Co. in UK and American archives and 
AAC and Robert Towns & Co. in Australia. 
 
The most important record that has been used in this study is the correspondence 
between merchants in China and those in Australia. The lack of Australian merchant 
records has led to an alternate method for research. This study interprets outward 
correspondence from Australian merchants by viewing the inward correspondence of 
the Treaty Port firms. The letters from Australian firms creates a semblance of how the 
colonial Australian merchant houses proceeded with their work in the trade.78 Both 
British and American firms retained significant records of their trade with Australian 
merchant firms. The records, however, are incomplete with large gaps in the archives of 
the American firms. The JM&Co. archive is also missing inward correspondence for 
specific years relating to certain geographical regions of Australia.79 Viewing related 
outgoing correspondence from China delivers one method to overcome this problem. 
 
                                      
76 The Australian Agricultural Company archives are split between various sites, including the Mitchell 
Library in Sydney and the Noel Butlin (ANU) Archives located in Canberra. 
77 The primary example, and perhaps only example in Australia, is the Robert Towns collection at the 
Mitchell Library in Sydney. 
78 The amount of correspondence and other items could be developed in to individual archives for each 
company, or at least these could be catalogued as such for future researchers, such is its abundance for 
certain firms. 
79 There were no inward letters from Victoria for 1862. 
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Correspondence exists in the “out” and “in” Letter Books. The purpose of the “out” 
letter books were to act as a file copy of the letters sent, a reminder of what had 
transpired in the transaction, and, on occasions, as evidence for legal proceedings. The 
“in” letter book generally contained the original letters, some with notes scribbled upon, 
and only when those letters had been attended to.80 Thus, a transaction between 
merchants in China and Australia could be traced from its instigation, as an indent or an 
initial notice of transport of a commodity, to its culmination following the fulfilment of 
the requirements of the remittance.  
 
Various documents became complementary to the correspondence assisting with the 
analysis of transactions. One such were the Treaty Port firms’ financial records. These 
included invoices and transaction statements that created a monetary path for the 
transaction.81 JM&Co.’s invoices also divulged the names of the Chinese tea traders 
involved in the initial transactions.82 In these documents, companies were designated 
symbols or marks to differentiate their cargoes from others.83 Another document was 
the six-monthly account for each of the primary merchant houses in Australia. Through 
these documents can be found the payments, or acceptances of payments, by the 
Australian merchants to various other firms on behalf of JM&Co.84 They included the 
list of individual gold shipments from Australia to Calcutta on behalf of JM&Co. 
                                      
80 Armstrong and Jones, Business Documents: 60. 
81 For the period 1860-1880, see: Invoices of Hong Kong Office JMA A6/12 to A6/26; Memo and 
accounts: Australia and NZ; Russell & Co. invoices, 1877-1881. RA Series I: volume 5; Business and 
financial papers: Accounts Current AHA II A 9 v.83 to v.91. 
82 The invoices provided by JM&Co. included the list of all Chinese vendors who sold the tea to the 
representative of JM&Co. Invoices of Hong Kong Office JMA A6/12 to A6/26; Memo and accounts: 
Australia and NZ. 
83 Each firm was provided with a symbol, similar to a brand (a mark was branded on sandalwood by the 
Western Australian merchants when there were multiple merchant lots in the cargo holds of vessels 
heading to China), to designate it. This symbol was also placed on the packages that were to be delivered 
to the receiving firm to designate them differently to the other parcels in the cargo holds.  
84 For 1860-1880, see: Accounts: Sydney JMA A8/32/7; Miscellaneous accounts JMA A8/36/6; Accounts 
& memos: Sydney JMA A8/38/4; Current accounts: Australia JMA A8/48/1; Invoices for SE Asia and 
Australia JMA A8/66/1; Memo and accounts: Australia and NZ JMA A8/123/3. The latter has one 
account which may be in the wrong file. For an AH&Co. example, see Business and financial papers: 
Journals AHA II A 1 v.17 to v.23.  
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Shipping documents, nominally Bills of Lading, also contributed to the analysis by 
providing extra items of information about the transaction.85 Insurance documents were 
a further source of information.86  
 
Other archival material used in this study include Government reports and 
Parliamentary debates. These discuss various aspects of the trade. For example, the 
quality of coal from the NSW mines were discussed as part of “tests” by Admiralty in 
London.87 The results were presented as reports to the UK House of Commons. 
Similarly, a discussion of the coal and sandalwood trade existed in various China 
maritime and trade documents that were presented to the various institutions.88 Each of 
these documents created either alternatives to or supplementary views of the 
information gathered through the correspondence or the statistics of the trade. 
 
Notes on terms 
 
The study contains various abbreviations and terms to assist with describing the data. 
The list of abbreviations have been presented at the beginning of the study. The method 
of describing places, located in China, that proliferated in Western publications of the 
time follows the guidelines of the Chinese Postal Map Romanization.89 There were, 
however, the occasional variants to the spelling and, in some cases, the word “foo” was 
appended to the name. For example, Foochow and Foochow-foo are the same place. 
                                      
85 For 1860-1880, see: Memo and accounts: Australia and NZ JMA A8/123/3; Bills of lading: Australia 
and NZ JMA A8/135/1; Shipping papers: Bound papers AHA II B 1 v.173 to v.177; Shipping papers: 
Loose papers AHA II B 2 C-17-A f.10 to f.11, AHA II B 2 C-17-B f.12 to f.16 and AHA II B C-S-1 to C-
S-16. 
86 For 1860-1880, see: A. Heard & Co. Insurance Agents, Canton Office AHA II D v.304 to v.305. 
87 See, for example: Australian coal. Return, showing the result of the recent experiments under the 
direction of the Admiralty, as to the value for naval purposes, of Australian coal. HoC, no. 337 (1862). 
88 See, for example: Robert Hart, "China. Trade Statistics of the Treaty Ports, for the Period 1863-1872." 
Shanghai: Imperial Maritime Customs Press, 1873. (Compiled for the Austro-Hungarian Universal 
Exhibition, Vienna, 1873) 
89 A table of all Chinese cities that appear in this study is given in Appendix 1. 
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Similarly, certain vowels were altered, as in the case of Chinkiang and Chenkiang. Thus, 
there will be times, throughout this study, where variants of the same name will be 
included, based on the source of a quote or document. In regard to other geographical 
terminology, the names United Kingdom (UK) and Great Britain, or British, are 
interchangeable, for simplicity, in this study. Further, while as a nation Australia did not 
exist, it is used throughout the study within the understanding that it relates to the 
islands of mainland Australia, Tasmania and its other islands. Frank Broeze, explains 
that “prior to 1901 Australia was a geographical rather than a political term, used to 
indicate the island continent that had been known earlier as New Holland.”90 
 
The values, weights and measures also varied in China and other ports relating to the 
China – Australia trade. The British standard currency was the Pound Sterling (£) which, 
in China, was converted in Hong Kong to Spanish Dollars ($), in Foochow to Taels (ℑ) 
and similarly in Shanghai and other Chinese ports. The Taels were divided into smaller 
amounts such that ℑ1 = 10 mace or 100 candareens. In Singapore, the Dollar ($) was 
also used, while in India it was the silver Rupee (Rp). In the colonial Australian ports 
the Pound Sterling (£) was the currency. For weights, items were either calculated in 
piculs (133 1/3 lbs.) or in standard Western measurements of pounds (lbs.), 
hundredweights (cwts., or 112 lbs.) or tons (2,240 lbs.).91 Piculs were commonly used 
when weighing sandalwood, arriving in China. The value of these on the market were 
defined as an amount of Taels per picul and an example of this is ℑ3.8.5 ppc, which 
reads as “3 Taels, 8 mace, 5 candareens per picul.” 
 
                                      
90 Frank Broeze, "The View from Inside: Robert Brooks and the British Connection." The Push 2 (1978): 
5. 
91 Taels and mace can also be found as measurements of weight. 
 30 
Throughout the current study are found the use of numerous terms relating to merchants, 
the exchange of goods and other elements of trade. Previously mentioned, for example, 
have been indent and Bill of Lading. The remainder of this section is devoted to 
providing definitions of those terms used at the time of the 1860s and 1870s in trade. 
 
The primary exponent of trade between China and Australia were the merchants, those 
who bought and sold goods.92 That simple definition, as shall be explained in Chapter 1, 
evolved over time. For the current study, merchants are those engaged in foreign trade 
and the institutions included in that trade. In the nineteenth century, these merchants 
became involved in trade as commission merchants. 93  That is, they were agents 
“employed to sell goods or merchandize, consigned or delivered to him by or for his 
principal for a compensation commonly called factorage or commission.” 94  The 
commission agent can be either a “factor” or a “broker.” The factor “differs from the 
broker in this, that he may buy or sell in his own name, and is entrusted with the 
possession and disposal of the goods.”95 The broker was an agent who negotiated on 
behalf of two parties and received, as compensation, a brokerage fee.96 Merchants 
involved in the China – Australia trade were either factors or brokers. When goods 
arrived in China or in Australia, the consignee took ownership of those goods prior to 
their sale. In the Ettrick example at the commencement of this chapter, JM&Co. took 
ownership of the coal imported to Shanghai and, based on market knowledge, sold the 
                                      
92 Stanley D. Chapman, Merchant Enterprise in Britain: From the Industrial Revolution to World War I. 
Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992: 3. 
93 Chapman, Merchant Enterprise in Britain: 4. 
94 J. M. Lely, Wharton's Law-Lexicon: Forming an Epitome of the Law of England; and Containing Full 
Explanations of the Technical Terms and Phrases Thereof, Both Ancient and Modern. Including the 
Various Legal Terms Used in Commerce Business; Together with a Translation of Latin Law Marims; 
and Selected Titles from the Civil, Scotch, and Indian Law. 7th ed. Boston: Soule and Bugbee, 1883: 35-
36, 169, 170, 185. 
95 Lely, Wharton's Law-Lexicon, 7th ed.: 332. See also Thomas Edlyne Tomlins, The Law Dictionary, 
Explaining the Rise, Progress, and Present State of the British Law: Defining and Interpreting the Terms 
or Words of Art, and Comprising Also Copious Information on the Subjects of Trade and Government. 
4th ed. 2 vols. Vol. 1, London: n.p., 1835, for the discussion on Factors. 
96 Lely, Wharton's Law-Lexicon, 7th ed.: 113. 
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coal for AAC, receiving a commission for its services. Several other examples will 
appear throughout the remainder of the study. 
 
A variant of the merchant in the Ettrick example relates to the “joint-account” 
transactions. The joint-account transactions in the China – Australia trade are 
enterprises or ventures undertaken by a firm in China and one in Australia such that the 
risks and commercial speculation are shared. Through this, expenses are shared as are 
the returns from sales whether they attain a profit or a loss.97 Although most joint 
ventures tend to be for a specific purpose and thus only remain for a limited period, 
joint-account transactions were found to exist between parties in China and Australia 
throughout the period of the 1860s and 1870s. The Ettrick example shows two joint-
account transactions. The ventures between JM&Co. and James Henty & Co. existed 
throughout the two decades. 
 
The process of initiating an order included an “indent.” These were normally attached to 
a draft, also termed a bill of exchange when related to foreign transactions.98 The indent 
was an order by one merchant house to another, located overseas from each other, 
requesting the purchase or sale of goods.99 The drafts were signed, written orders 
whereby one firm instructed another to pay a specified amount to a third party.100 In the 
case of tea purchases, for example, an Australian merchant may send an indent for a 
parcel of tea together with a draft on an international bank to a merchant house in China. 
                                      
97 Guy Hammett, Dictionary of International Trade Terms. Canterbury: Financial World Publishing, 
2001: 174. 
98 Hammett, Dictionary of International Trade Terms: 119-20. 
99 Hammett, Dictionary of International Trade Terms: 165. For purchases, almost all indents were “open 
indents.” The export house was allowed to choose the supplier they wished. The case of coal purchases 
were, in some cases, closed indents. The China firm requested coal only from a specific colliery. The 
Ettrick example was not an indent for coal from AAC as JM&Co. were acting as commission agents on 
behalf of AAC who were attempting to enter the China market. 
100 Hammett, Dictionary of International Trade Terms: 119-20; Lely, Wharton's Law-Lexicon, 7th ed.: 97. 
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The draft was signed by the Australian merchant instructing the bank to pay the China 
merchant the value of the draft. 
 
The transmission of goods from one port to another for sale includes various documents. 
The Bill of Lading was signed by the ship’s master verifying receipt of goods. A copy 
was provided to the consignor, one to the consignee and one was kept by the master. 
The document provided evidence of the ownership of the goods being shipped.101 The 
consignee, as the purchaser of the goods, was provided with an Invoice for the goods, 
with purchase values and the list of charges applied by the commission merchant.102 
Primarily, the Invoice was only instructive. The payment had been made prior to 
delivery through the draft that accompanied the indent. A third document commonly 
found included was the Charter Party. The document was an agreement by a ship’s 
master to rent all or part of his vessel for the purpose of transporting goods on a 
specified voyage.103 In the period of the 1860s and 1870s vessels were commonly either 
chartered for single or return voyages. In other cases, a vessel was chartered for a 
specific period of time as opposed to a single journey.104 One such example occurred 
with the charter of the Peninsular and Orient vessel Adria by the Hong Kong company 
Hop Kee & Co. for four months to travel from Hong Kong to Cooktown and then to 
Newcastle and return to Hong Kong.105  
 
                                      
101 Lely, Wharton's Law-Lexicon, 7th ed.: 98. 
102 Lely, Wharton's Law-Lexicon, 7th ed.: 430. 
103 Lely, Wharton's Law-Lexicon, 7th ed.: 144. 
104 Hammett, Dictionary of International Trade Terms: 74. 
105 Memorandum for the Board, 8th March 1875. P&O/3/11, Reports from Managing Directors to Board 
1874-77, Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Records, National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, 
England; Cooktown Courier 27 March 1875: 2-3; The Hong Kong Times, Daily Advertiser, and Shipping 
Gazette 22 February 1875: 1. Noreen Kirkman “From Minority to Majority”: 249n37 states that the s.s. 
Victoria was the first vessel to arrive from overseas. The Cooktown Courier 6 February 1875: 2 clearly 
states in its description that the vessel left from Sydney as do numerous newspapers from New South 
Wales. The Victoria did carry Chinese, and they may have arrived into Sydney from overseas, but the 
Adria was the first vessel to specifically arrive from overseas to the port of Cooktown. 
 33 
Goods exported to China from Australia required an alternate payment method as the 
China merchant house acted only as a commission merchant selling the goods on behalf 
of the Australian merchant. The payment method to the Australian merchant was in the 
form of a remittance. The remittance equated to money, or equivalent, sent by the China 
merchant to the Australian merchant.106 Commonly, that remittance was sent to a 
representative of the Australian merchant based in a different port to assist with the 
payment of goods to the Australian merchant. London merchant houses were used by 
many Australian merchants and China merchants sent drafts to London as remittances. 
Others included merchants in Singapore and Manilla. Most London firms acted as 
clearing houses. The firms in London exchanged drafts of each other’s house and settled 
any differences.107 Not all drafts were cleared at face value. Many were discounted. 
Discounting was common when a Bill of Exchange was purchased by an institution 
(nominally a bank) before a stipulated time. In this case, the bank extracted a percentage, 
a discount rate, from the value of the Bill.108 Finally, the remittance was also used by 
merchants in Australia as collateral for the purchase of goods to be sent from China. 
Although no money or drafts were exchanged, the value of the transactions were 
accounted for through bilateral trade between the two merchants. 
  
                                      
106 Lely, Wharton's Law-Lexicon, 7th ed.: 710. 
107 Lely, Wharton's Law-Lexicon, 7th ed.: 157. 
108 Lely, Wharton's Law-Lexicon, 7th ed.: 259; Hammett, Dictionary of International Trade Terms: 114. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
A RELATIONSHIP NOT TOO FAR 
 
Trade connections between merchants in Australia and the outside world were 
continuously evolving throughout the nineteenth century. Australia had been, during the 
nineteenth century, intrinsically linked to Great Britain and Europe through trade and 
immigration. Yet, emerging, or possibly lingering, was a developing connection with 
the nearer geographical neighbour, Asia. Certainly, the colonies of Australia maintained 
strong trade links with India from the time of the earliest settlements in Port Jackson 
and Hobart Town. These connections became stronger in 1813 after the British East 
India Company’s (BEIC) restrictions on trade for India were lifted. The connections 
with Canton and China were less strong. Even with the end of the BEIC’s control over 
British trade to China in 1834, there was a delay before extensive trade existed between 
colonial Australia and the ports of China. By the 1860s everything changed, in both 
China and Australia. 
 
China had, commercially, altered significantly by 1860. That alteration was created 
through two conflicts between China and Great Britain. Prior to these, the Ch’ing 
government enforced a closed door policy with regard to foreigners and their trade. 
Canton was the only port open to Westerners for trade. Defeat in the two “Opium Wars” 
(1840-42, 1856-60) by China led to a concession by the Ch’ing government to open a 
number of ports to trade for Westerners. Five, including Canton, were contained within 
the 1842 Treaty of Nanking and another eleven through the 1858 Treaty of Tientsin, 
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ratified by the Convention of Peking in 1860.1 These ports were labelled as the “Treaty 
Ports.” The combination of the treaties and the opening of the ports to trade directly 
contributed to the shifting of the centre of commerce, for many foreign merchants, from 
Canton to Shanghai.2 That alteration was eventually found to be to the advantage of 
colonial Australian merchants. More so, from 1860, these facilitated improvements in 
the trade of tea, coal, sandalwood and other commodities between China and Australia.  
 
Colonial Australia, or specifically the colonies of New South Wales and Victoria, 
changed significantly in the 1850s. The discoveries of gold fields in the two colonies 
created not only an increase in population through the speculators who ventured to the 
fields, but also, by 1860, improvements in the financial positions of the two colonies.3 
In a “rush that never ended,” gold, amongst numerous other metals, was important to 
the development of each and every colony in Australia.4 By the end of the nineteenth 
century, new considerable gold fields had been found throughout Queensland, in the 
Northern Territory of South Australia and in Western Australia. Gold created for 
Australians, by the 1860s, a new level of wealth to pay for its goods. Over the next three 
decades, as economist Noel Butlin stated, “Australian economic growth as a whole was 
sustained, stable and rapid.”5 It was an economic boom.6 Thus, gold created for 
                                      
1 For a lengthy discussion on the Treaty Ports of China and Japan, see: Wm. Fred Mayers, Treaties 
between the Empire of China and Foreign Powers, Together with Regulations for the Conduct of Foreign 
Trade. Shanghai: J. Broadhurst Tootal, 1877. 
2 Yü-t'ang Sun, "The Historical Development and Aggressive Nature of American Imperialist Investment 
in China (1784-1914)." Chinese Studies in History 8, no. 3 (1975): 6. American merchants and others 
were afforded special rights including “fixed tariffs, extraterritorial rights and most-favored nation 
treatment.” 
3 Allen C. Kelley, "Demographic Change and Economic Growth: Australia 1861-1911." Explorations in 
Entrepreneurial History 5, no. 3 (1968): 208-09. Kelley termed this a demographic shock. However, 
there were residual effects on the next generations with mild depressions and unemployment in the late 
1860s and late 1870s. Jenny Lee, and Charles Fahey, "A Boom for Whom? Some Developments in the 
Australian Labour Market, 1870-1891." Labour History 50 (1986): 22. 
4 Geoffrey Blainey, The Rush That Never Ended: A History of Australian Mining. Melbourne: Melbourne 
University Press, 1969: 2. 
5 Noel Butlin, "The Shape of the Australian Economy, 1861-1900." The Economic Record 34, no. 67 
(1958): 11. 
 36 
Australia the ability to become a player within the multi-lateral trade arrangements that 
existed between England, India and China. Gold presented England with a new method 
of paying for its own imports. The new fortunes also allowed, at that time, Australian 
merchants to invest in new ventures, ventures that included trade with China.  
 
The trade relationship between the Australian colonies and the Treaty Ports of China 
was centred around a number of mercantile firms. These firms, as with the trade 
relationship, were evolving in the methods they employed to perform trade. The current 
chapter sets out to understand who were the primary merchants involved in the China – 
Australia trade relationship of the 1860s and 1870s. The Ettrick example in the 
Introduction of this study delivers a brief understanding of some of the merchants and 
their trade. The relationship between various firms, in the Ettrick example, is intimated. 
This chapter extends the knowledge to a broader understanding of the mercantile 
relationships that existed between those in the Treaty Ports and those in colonial 
Australia. The analysis is augmented with the links that were also in place with firms in 
the UK and other countries. Thus, the broader question of this chapter is to ask who or 
what was involved in trade relationships between China and Australia in the 1860s and 
1870s and how did those people and institutions work to enhance the relationships? 
 
Early trade relationships with China 
 
Australia’s first connection with China took place prior to European settlement. Hunters 
from Makassar travelled to northern Australia in search of trepang, also known as 
                                                                                                                
6 For a discussion on the “Long Boom” see: Roger McGhee, "The Long Boom, 1860-1890." Chap. 5 In 
Essays in Economic History of Australia, edited by James Griffin. 135-85. Hong Kong: Jacaranda Press, 
1976. 
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bêche-de-mer.7 On occasion, Chinese joined the natives on their journey to Australia.8 
From Makassar, Chinese merchants collected the trepang and exported it to China, thus 
creating the first comprehensive trade of Australian products to China.9 The Chinese 
also largely financed the trepang trade. 10  These were Hokkien traders who had 
developed organised networks from south Fukien to the East Indies and ports including 
Makassar prior to the eighteenth century and before.11 Chinese junks were also said to 
have arrived in the Torres Strait in search of trepang.12 However, beyond that, extensive 
trade for Australia with the outside world was non-existent. 
 
Australia became a European colony in 1788 with the arrival of the British settler 
colonists to its east coast at Port Jackson.13 The new colony, called New South Wales, 
relied on arriving vessels, generally from England and occasionally from India, for 
supplies.14  In Sydney, the capital of the new colony, the soldiers and a few wealthy 
                                      
7 Regina Ganter, "China and the Beginning of Australian History." The Great Circle 25, no. 1 (2003): 10. 
See, also Knapp, G. J., and Heather Sutherland. Monsoon Traders : Ships, Skippers and Commodities in 
Eighteenth-Century Makassar. Leiden: KITLV Press, 2004. 
8 Heather Sutherland, "Trepang and Wangkang: The China Trade of Eighteenth-Century Makassar C. 
1720s-1840s." Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde, Authority and enterprise among the 
peoples of South Sulawesi 156, no. 3 (2000): 454. 
9 Charles C. Macknight, The Voyage to Marege' : Macassan Trepangers in Northern Australia. Carlton: 
Melbourne University Press, 1976: 12; Sandy Blair and Nicholas Hall, "Macassan Sea Roads: The 
Heritage of Intecultural Maritime Routes Connecting Australia to Southeast Asia." Historic Environment 
25, no. 3 (2013): 46. Initially, the ships originated from Amoy, but after 1781, those from Canton took 
prominence in the trade. Leonard Blussé, "Chinese Shipping to the Nanyang in the Second Half of the 
Eighteenth Century." In Chinese Circulations: Capital, Commodities, and Networks in Southeast Asia, 
edited by Eric Tagliacosso and Wen-Chin Chang. 221-58. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2011: 
230. 
10 Blussé, “Chinese Shipping to the Nanyang.”: 236n31. 
11 James K. Chin, "Junk Trade, Business Networks, and Sojourning Communities: Hokkien Merchants in 
Early Maritime Asia." Journal of Chinese Overseas 6 (2010): 193. 
12 Guy Ramsey, "The Chinese Diaspora in Torres Strait: Cross-Cultural Connections and Contentions on 
Thursday Island." In Navigating Boundaries: The Asian Diaspora in Torres Strait, edited by Anna 
Shnukal, Guy Ramsay and Yuriko Nagata. 53-79. Canberra: Pandanus Books, 2004: 54. 
13 Three of the vessels that, in 1788, arrived with the new settlers and convicts (Lady Penrhyn, Charlotte 
and  Scarborough) were directed to Canton to collect tea for the homebound journey. A. K. Cavanagh, 
"The Return of the First Fleet Ships." The Great Circle 11, no. 2 (1989): 1. The connection to Canton for 
tea was done under the instruction of the BEIC. Alan Frost, "The East India Company and the Choice of 
Botany Bay." Australian Historical Studies 16, no. 65 (1975): 607-08. 
14 Margaret Steven, Merchant Campbell, 1769-1846: A Study of Colonial Trade. Melbourne: Oxford 
University Press, 1965: 18, 26. 
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partisans were the merchants.15 At the commencement of the nineteenth century, 
entrepreneurs became prevalent in Sydney. Robert Campbell16 and Simeon Lord17 were 
the two most prominent. Through these two and other merchants, trade was established 
with a variety of Asian ports, including those in India, Penang18 and Canton.19 Although 
there was a trade embargo on British trade with China employed through the regulations 
of the BEIC,20 these merchants engaged in various methods to overcome the BEIC 
regulations. One was to create a triangle of trade involving both Canton and Calcutta. 21  
Another method, very common during the first decade of the nineteenth century, was to 
trade with vessels of American ownership. American vessels commonly landed in 
Sydney to trade, some of which continued their journey to Canton.22 The BEIC 
restrictions were lifted in 1834.23 Between 1834 and 1860, trade from Australia to 
China was minimal. Shipments of tea, though, continued to arrive in the various ports of 
the Australian colonies. Regular traffic was thus maintained between China and 
Australia. By the 1860s, that traffic was to increase considerably. 
 
                                      
15 Charles E. T. Newman, The Spirit of Wharf House: Campbell Enterprise from Calcutta to Canberra. 
Sydney: Angus and Robertson, 1961: 13. 
16 David R. Hainsworth, "Trade within the Colony." In Economic Growth of Australia, 1788-1821, edited 
by G. J. Abbott and N. B. Nairn. 267-84. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1969: 274; Steven, 
Merchant Campbell: 1; Newman, The Spirit of Wharf House: 6, 19. 
17 David R. Hainsworth, Builders and Adventurers; the Traders and the Emergence of the Colony 1788-
1821. Melbourne: Cassell Australia, 1968: 3; E. C. Rowland, "Simeon Lord, a Merchant Prince of Botany 
Bay." Journal of the Royal Australian Historical Society 30 (1944): 159-63, 166-67; Hainsworth, “Trade 
within the Colony.”: 274. Lord tried unsuccessfully in 1806 to convince the Governor to allow him to 
bypass the regulations of the BEIC. That success was finally attained in 1818. 
18 The General Wellesley arrived from Penang in Sydney on 13 February 1807 with a large cargo 
including tea. The Dundee arrived from Penang in Sydney on 18 July 1808. “Ship News.” SGNSWA 15 
February 1807: 2; “Ship News.” SGNSWA 24 July 1808: 2. 
19 The Perseverance sailed from Sydney on 9 February 1807 for Canton. She returned from Canton on 5 
May 1808. “Ship News.” SGNSWA 15 February 1807: 2; “Ship News.” SGNSWA 22 May 1808: 1. 
20 Brian Pinkstone, and David Meredith. Global Connections: A History of Exports and the Australian 
Economy.  Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1992: 17; Noel Butlin, Forming a 
Colonial Economy, Australia 1810-1850. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994: 164. 
21  Hainsworth, “Trade within the Colony.”: 176. Merchant John Macarthur, proposed to deliver 
sandalwood to Canton. From the earnings in Canton, Macarthur’s partner in India would then procure 
goods for the Sydney market. The venture failed owing to a lack of start up funds. 
22 Based on the shipping records attained from the “Ship News” in the SGNSWA up to five vessels per 
year arrived from American ports, normally those in New England, including Nantucket. Many were in 
Sydney to resupply for their seal and whale hunting efforts. Others travelled to Canton, some returning. 
These marine industries were important to the early NSW economy. Max Colwell. Whaling around 
Australia.  Adelaide: Rigby Limited, 1969: 3, 18-19. 
23 Pinkstone and Meredith, Global Connections: 17. 
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One impetus to the growth of trade in the 1860s was the major discontinuity, or shock, 
in colonial Australia’s economic development that was created by the gold discoveries 
of the early 1850s in Victoria and New South Wales.24 From an agrarian economy 
reliant on the wheat and wool industries, the focus of colonial Australia and its exports 
immediately turned to the mining sector, gold joining an existing South Australian 
copper industry.25 The extraction of gold created prosperity for the country and hence 
initiated a new stage of economic expansion in Australia.26 Yet, more so than the 
corresponding finds in California, Australian gold helped underpin a stable international 
multilateral monetary system.27 
 
The major effect of the creation of the gold industry was the ability of colonial Australia 
to create a new staple. The highest percentage of gold exported was to Great Britain, not 
only improving the bilateral relationship between Great Britain and the Australian 
colonies but also assisting with the rapidly expanding international trade after 1850.28 
The excessive imports of gold by Great Britain helped solidify the strength of their 
financial sector as well as providing Great Britain with the funds for further foreign 
investments. For Australia, gold became and remained the dominant export commodity 
for a period of two decades following its discovery. In 1861, for example, gold 
amounted to half the value of all exports.29 
 
The post-mid-century period attracted merchants to be part of a complex global 
economy. Australia’s input was through its new found gold reserves. The movement of 
                                      
24 W. A. Sinclair, The Process of Economic Development in Australia.  Melbourne: Cheshire, 1976: 79. 
25 Sinclair, Economic Development in Australia: 76. 
26 Ian W. McLean, Why Australia Prospered: The Shifting Sources of Economic Growth.  Princeton, NJ: 
Princeton University Press, 2013: 65; Pinkstone and Meredith, Global Connections: 33. 
27 Pinkstone and Meredith, Global Connections: 33. 
28 McLean, Why Australia Prospered: 76. 
29 McLean, Why Australia Prospered: 71; Pinkstone and Meredith, Global Connections: 36; Geoffrey 
Blainey, "Technology in Australian History." Australian Economic History Review 4 (1964): 119. 
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bullion and drafts throughout Asia in the nineteenth century was quite common. This 
movement generated a number of complex multilateral trade relationships that involved 
China, India and England together with other relevant countries. Takeshi Hamashita, in 
his translated collection of works China, East Asia and the Global Economy: Regional 
and Historical Perspectives, emphasizes the importance of multi-lateral trade 
relationships. Hamashita relates that, for example, in the late 1840s, the trade of opium, 
cotton and tea created imbalances and trade deficits that required bullion as a medium to 
cover.30 Together with bullion, many drafts co-existed within a multilateral trade regime. 
Hamashita’s work precedes the period of the gold finds in NSW and Victoria and thus 
he dismisses Australia as trifling as “it can be hardly said that there is any course of 
exchange in these places.”31 The fact that by the late 1850s and the following decades 
Australia was a global lead exporter of gold, cleared a path for the ports of Sydney and 
Melbourne to establish recognition within the overall multilateral trade discourse 
involving Great Britain, India and China. 
 
The discovery of gold had a secondary effect. It created the heavy migration of Chinese 
to Australia. The Chinese had alternate cultural habits and culinary needs to the 
Westerners. They required different imports to those who were serviced by Western 
merchants in the ports of Melbourne and Sydney. Out of this requirement emerged the 
Chinese mercantile community. In the Introduction, I have noted the vast number of 
Chinese merchants that were in Cooktown in the late 1870s. Similarly, there would 
have been significant networks of Chinese merchants in both Melbourne and Sydney 
from the 1850s. In one document from 1859, the size of the Chinese mercantile 
                                      
30 Takeshi Hamashita, Linda Grove, and Mark Selden, eds. China, East Asia and the Global Economy: 
Regional and Historical Perspectives. New York: Routledge, 2008: 118. 
31 Hamashita et al, China, East Asia: 121. 
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community was said to be over 200 in Melbourne alone.32 The fact that there was a 
Chinese mercantile community in those ports and that they were involved in importing 
produce from China means that there are two paths, whether distinct or intersecting, that 
require understanding. The trade relationship between China and Australia involved the 
Westerners and the Chinese. 
 
At the commencement of the 1860s, Australia was considered attractive for investment 
and trade. Mercantile firms in the Treaty Ports of China viewed, with interest, the 
expanding and prosperous economies of the various Australian colonies. The expansion 
of the population of the colonies, the removal of certain institutional restrictions 
together with the development and trade of local resources created opportunities for 
merchant firms in Australia, China and elsewhere. By the 1860s, trade between China 
and Australia was more extensive than it had been in the past which, in turn, galvanized 
numerous trade relationships between the firms taking part. 
 
The Treaty Port System 
 
The Treaty Port system was created following the first Opium War. Through the Treaty 
of Nanking (1842), the four ports of Amoy, Foochow, Ningpo and Shanghai were 
opened to foreigners. The rights to Canton were extended and the island of Hong Kong 
was annexed by the British. The Treaty stated that, within the Treaty Ports, British 
subjects “shall be allowed to reside, for the purpose of carrying on their mercantile 
pursuits.”33 That is, China was ostensibly forced to participate in international free 
                                      
32 “Chinese Residence Tax.” Argus 31 May 1859: 7. In his deposition, Mr. King, merchant in Melbourne, 
stated that there were “some 200 merchants and persons in their employment” when describing the 
Chinese mercantile community. 
33 Mayers, Treaties between the Empire of China and Foreign Powers: 1. See Article II. 
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trade.34 Additional ports were opened following the second Opium War. The Treaty of 
Tientsin (1858), ratified by the Peking Convention (1860), required the opening of the 
ports of Newchwang, Chefoo, Formosa, Swatow and Hainan.35 Also, the port of 
Chinkiang and up to three ports, as far as Hankow, inland on the Yangtze River, were 
included.36 By the 1860s, British merchants, followed by merchants from other Western 
nations, commenced cohabitation, and thus competition, with the existing Chinese 
mercantile community at the various Treaty Ports located along the Chinese coast and 
the Yangtze River. Australian merchants were trading with the Western merchant firms 
in these ports. 
 
The creation of the Treaty Ports were viewed by many Chinese as an imposition on 
China.37 Yet, the Treaty Ports also controlled the Westerners from further incursion into 
China. Historian Rhoads Murphey considered the ports as beachheads of imperial 
incursion.38 As beachheads, the ports were only semi-colonies of the foreign powers.39 
Western powers were unable to attain dominance over the whole country, but were 
limited in access to those ports opened following the implementation of the various 
treaties. Murphey also advanced that the Chinese Treaty Ports were “enclave economies 
and enclave worlds ideologically and institutionally.”40 There was a border, both 
notionally and in some way physical, between the Treaty Ports and the remainder of 
                                      
34 Robert Nield, The China Coast: Trade and the First Treaty Ports. Hong Kong: Joint Publishing, 2010: 
10-11. 
35 Mayers, Treaties between the Empire of China and Foreign Powers: 13. Article XI. 
36 Mayers, Treaties between the Empire of China and Foreign Powers: 13. Article X. Initially Chinkiang 
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37 Sun, “The Historical Development.”: 3-4. Sun terms this period as the “period of mature capitalism,” a 
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38 Rhoads Murphey, The Treaty Ports and China's Modernization: What Went Wrong? Michigan Papers 
in Chinese Studies.  Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Center for Chinese Studies, 1970: 1. 
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40 Rhoads Murphey, The Outsiders: The Western Experience in India and China. Ann Arbor: University 
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China. The Western inhabitants, the mercantile firms, existed behind a screen put up 
both by the treaties and the Chinese themselves. 
 
The bridge that crossed over this boundary in the nineteenth century was the comprador. 
Historian Yen P’ing Hao described the comprador as “the Chinese manager of a foreign 
firm in China, serving as middleman in the company’s dealings with the Chinese.”41 
The comprador has been given various titles, including cross-cultural brokers and 
bicultural middlemen.42 Hao explains that the expansion of the West in modern times 
brought about a degree of international contact and fusion of cultures, and the Treaty 
Ports in late Ch’ing China, where different cultures met, constituted a typical hybrid 
society.43 Thus the compradors were vital for the Western firms to complete business in 
the Chinese Treaty Ports.44 Not only was the company’s comprador the link to other 
Chinese merchants, they performed numerous other duties. These included the 
recruitment and supervision of Chinese staff, managing monetary affairs, obtaining and 
supplying market intelligence and other general duties relating to transactions with 
Chinese merchants.45 
 
The compradors of the 1860s and 1870s had Cantonese roots. Many came from the 
early merchant class that worked in Canton prior to 1842. They had already been in 
contact with the Westerners, particularly the British, and thus were able to communicate 
reasonably well in English. Their ability to translate was important, though those with 
                                      
41  Yen-P’ing Hao, The Comprador in Nineteenth Century China: Bridge between East and West.  
Cambridge: MA: Harvard University Press, 1970: 1. 
42 Stephen R. Halsey, Quest for Power: European Imperialism and the Making of Chinese Statecraft.  
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2015: 65; Yen-P‘ing Hao, "A “New Class” in China’s Treaty 
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43 Hao, The Comprador in Nineteenth Century China: 459. 
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business acumen and connections were preferred.46 Most of the primary Western 
merchant houses employed Cantonese compradors.47 Thus, the extent of reach of and 
the links generated by the Cantonese compradors was developed throughout the various 
Treaty Ports. Western firms in Shanghai, particularly, employed Cantonese compradors 
as they had been connected with the firms’ southern offices prior to the second Opium 
War and had added skills including ship building and ship repairing.48 
 
The spread of Cantonese compradors created extensive familial connections between 
the various Treaty Ports. The connections extended beyond the primary family to the 
clan and village.49 Chinese historian Pui Tak Lee stated that “Cantonese compradors 
filled the new ports by personal ties, extending their influence from one place to 
another.” The Canton supremacy that existed within the Shanghai Chinese merchant 
environment provided for them the lead in foreign trade.50 That supremacy extended to 
South East Asia, also known as the “Nanyang.” 51  Thus, through the Cantonese 
merchants, a highway of mercantile familial links existed from South East Asia to the 
Treaty Ports of central and northern China.52  
 
The most important participants of the trade in the Chinese Treaty Ports were the 
Chinese merchants. The Treaty Port system provided advantages for the Chinese 
merchants. Foremost, it presented the merchants with the ability to interact with 
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international markets. The treaties of 1842 and 1858 had unshackled the constraints 
imposed by the Ch’ing government, pre-1842, that funnelled all connection with 
Westerners through Canton. To the Chinese merchant class, the Treaty Ports provided a 
link with economic opportunism outside of the port.53 The impact of international trade 
was significant on domestic trade as well.54 By the late 1860s, Chinese merchants had 
taken control of port-to-port commerce in the minor Treaty Ports, relegating the 
foreigners in China’s external trade to such ports as Shanghai and Hong Kong.55 The 
Treaty Ports thus presented these Chinese with the ability to venture outside of the 
realm of trading domestically with other Chinese. That is, to the Chinese merchants, the 
Treaty Ports were portals to foreign trade. 
 
The Chinese merchants were also portals. They provided the link between the country 
Chinese and the Westerners. Goods that were obtained from the country areas were 
passed from the farmer through a chain of Chinese merchants and eventually to the 
Western firm for sale to foreign markets. Similarly, goods received by the Western 
merchant were then passed through various Chinese hands prior to arriving at their 
destination.56 The position of the Western merchant firm within this chain was as a 
commission agent, not only for Westerners from overseas but also for the Chinese 
merchants who dealt with them.57 
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The connection between the Chinese merchants and the Western merchants was also 
bypassed on occasions. Many Chinese merchants preferred, from the mid-1860s, to 
work with local dealers instead of foreign merchants. Certainly, following the 
termination of the Taiping conflict in 1864, Chinese merchants became more involved 
as intermediaries for overseas trade.58 They used guilds, brokers or hongs.59 Chinese 
goods were thus transported along the pre-existing trade routes developed by other 
Chinese merchant houses in the Nanyang and farther abroad.  
 
Nevertheless, it was common for these Chinese merchant houses to be connected to 
Western merchants. The Houqua clan were one prominent hong that invested heavily in 
trade and Western enterprises.60 The clan was created through the work of Cantonese 
merchant Wu Bingjian.61 The Houqua dominated Sino-western trade of Canton in the 
early nineteenth century.62 Following the conclusion of the Sino-British conflicts, the 
Houqua extended their reach to Shanghai and continued their strong alliance with 
American companies such as Russell & Co.63  
 
The Chinese merchants were the intermediate brokers who controlled the internal 
marketing structures of the movement of the goods throughout China.64 At the ports, the 
Chinese merchants exchanged goods with either Chinese importers or the compradors, 
representatives of the Western importers. There were any number of wholesalers 
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involved in the transfer of goods.65 For those goods imported to China by Westerners, 
the comprador would sell to the foreign goods wholesaler who would sell to one or 
more wholesalers from city to city and then to a retailer in a village. Bypassing the 
marketing channel also occurred. A few inland merchants ventured to the Treaty Ports, 
such as Shanghai, to deal directly with the compradors.66 However, these merchants 
encountered resistance from the guilds that protected the existing supply chains. Those 
guilds controlled the distribution networks in the inland districts. They regulated the 
infrastructure of the trade, including the production, sale and transport of 
commodities.67 Whether direct from the port to the inland or through a chain of 
merchants, the method of delivery of goods within China was complex yet structured. 
Australian merchants were both hidden from this chain and were not involved in the 
chain’s processes, the Western merchant in the Treaty Ports being both the barrier and 
link between the two. 
 
Goods that came from Australia or those travelling to Australia were provided, within 
the view of Australian merchants, by Western merchant houses in the Treaty Ports. 
These Australian merchants did not deal directly with the Chinese merchants or 
networks at the Treaty Ports. The importance of the Western merchant houses in the 
Treaty Ports is thus of significance in understanding the trade relationship. Numerous 
merchant houses existed within the Treaty Ports of China. A few were heavily involved 
with trade to and from Australia. 
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European merchant houses in China 
 
The Treaty Ports of China consisted of numerous merchant houses providing services to 
both the foreigners who exported goods to China and who required goods exported 
from China to themselves. They were “agency houses,” primarily a trading firm that 
delivered numerous other services than just the exchange of goods, including banking, 
brokerage of bills and insurance.68 The agency houses emerged at the time of the 
termination of the BEIC’s hold of trade in China.69 They provided their counterparts in 
overseas ports numerous skills. Specifically, the foreign firms preferred to have the risk 
of dealing in China managed by a firm with market knowledge, reputation, influence, 
and strong financial management skills of the Chinese market.70 At the same time, the 
removal of BEIC’s hold allowed for the rising merchant class of Sydney and Hobart 
Town to become more interested in the China trade.71 By the 1860s, Australian 
merchants predominantly worked with Western merchants in China that were connected 
to the United Kingdom or to the United States.72 Throughout the 1860s and 1870s, 
Australian merchants engaged three major companies - Jardine Matheson & Co. 
(JM&Co.), Russell & Co. and Augustine Heard & Co. (AH&Co.). 
 
The British merchant house, located in China, with the strongest reputation was JM&Co. 
The firm dates back to the earliest partnership of Cox and Reid who created a company 
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in Canton in 1782. In 1832, the firm had evolved into JM&Co.73 Initially, JM&Co. 
participated in direct sales and purchases. By 1860, they chose to take up the duty of 
commission agent, which was common amongst other firms at the time.74 Commissions 
contained less risk for JM&Co.75 Instead of taking the risks of sales and purchases for 
themselves, they performed risk-broking for foreign firms and extracted a commission 
for ancillary services.76 The management of the ancillary services was important to 
JM&Co. as it was to other Western merchants in China who wanted to survive the 
increasing influence of Chinese merchants in similar business areas.77 
 
JM&Co. was also involved in various investments. By the 1870s, JM&Co. were part of 
two fixed capital investments, a silk filature in Shanghai and a sugar refining plant in 
Hong Kong. In the same decade JM&Co. were involved in the attempted introduction 
of railways in China, Malaya and Korea.78 Another venture, together with Dent and 
Company, was the formation and running of the Canton Insurance Company.79 Founded 
in 1805, the company provided set insurance rates for shippers and was popular with 
many Western merchants in China.80 In 1835, Dent relinquished their ownership, 
leaving JM&Co. full ownership of the Canton Insurance Company. Throughout the 
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1860s and 1870s, in JM&Co.’s dealings with Australian merchants, JM&Co. primarily 
used the Canton Insurance Company for their part of any joint account transactions. In 
the earliest days of these transactions, many Australian merchants also had their portion 
insured through the Canton Insurance Company.81 
 
JM&Co. recognised the importance of spreading the risk in transactions. From the 
1850s, JM&Co. became involved in numerous joint-account transactions with various 
merchant firms, whether Chinese or Western and whether in China or in foreign ports. 
In 1851, JM&Co. commenced joint-account export shipments of tea with the Shanghai 
firm Mau Foong Hong. As a Cantonese hong, Mau Foong Hong was already well-
known to JM&Co. and thus was found comfortable to work with.82 This was extended 
in the mid-1860s and for the following decade, into joint investments with other 
Chinese merchant houses. 83  External to China, JM&Co. conducted joint-account 
transactions in opium with their agents in Calcutta, Jardine Skinner & Co.84 Thus, by 
the 1860s, entering into joint-account transactions with Australian firms was a simple 
extension for JM&Co. The joint account transactions occurred with the principal agents 
in each of the primary trading ports of the Australian colonies.85 
 
American firms were part of the China trade from the late eighteenth century. The 
Empress of China arrived in Macao in 1784, commencing American expansionism in 
Asia. The leading commercial house from America was Russell & Company. The 
company was formed in Providence, Rhode Island in 1824 as Russell & Company and 
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in 1830 took over from Perkins and Company in Canton.86 Following the termination of 
the BEIC monopoly, Russell & Co., together with British enterprises JM&Co. and Dent, 
Whiteman & Co. formed a coalition to assume control of the financial and commercial 
responsibilities of the BEIC in China. Russell & Co. also worked closely with JM&Co. 
in the early opium trade from India.87 
 
Russell & Co. were an important power in shipping, specifically after the Yangtze River 
was opened for Western trade in 1858. In 1862, Russell & Co. formed the Shanghai 
Steam Navigation Company with the aid of funding from American, British and 
Chinese capital.88 The new company became prominent on the Yangtze River from 
1864 and in the years 1866-67 had almost a complete monopoly of the foreign shipping 
trade along the river.89 Thereafter, the company lost its stranglehold on the trade along 
the river with the formation of first the China Navigation Company by John Swire of 
London in 186790 and in 1872, the China-owned Chinese Merchant Steam Navigation 
Company.91 Thus, by 1877, Russell & Co. had relinquished their shipping interests 
along the Yangtze River. They sold their entire fleet of the Shanghai Steam Navigation 
Company to the Chinese Merchant Steam Navigation Company.92  
 
The connection with the Shanghai Steam Navigation Company for Russell & Co. meant 
that they were importers and consumers of steaming coal. Australian merchants in NSW 
delivered the service as coal exporters for Russell & Co.. The trade details provided in 
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the North China Herald, of Shanghai, show that many vessels arrived from Newcastle 
or Sydney with coal for Russell & Co. One merchant house in Sydney was strongly 
involved with Russell & Co. Robert Towns & Co., who exported to China coal, 
sandalwood, beef amongst other items and imported tea, sugar, rice and condiments 
from China was a primary agent for Russell & Co. in Australia.93  
 
Augustine Heard was a partner of Russell & Co. until 1840. In that year, a dispute led 
Heard and Joseph Coolidge to break away from Russell & Co. and create AH&Co.94 
AH&Co. grew to become the primary American competitor for Russell & Co., setting 
up branches in Hong Kong, Shanghai and Foochow in the 1850s.95 AH&Co. became 
involved in the tea trade as an agency engaging Chinese tea dealers in various ports. As 
with other Western merchant houses, AH&Co’s. operation involved intermediaries, 
including compradors.96 Also, like JM&Co., AH&Co. provided a number of ancillary 
services. AH&Co.’s banking services offered a good interest rate on investments. That 
drew numerous Chinese and Western merchants in China to deposit their funds with 
AH&Co.97 Chinese merchants, specifically, were Heard’s primary customers in the 
local trade.98 
 
The company, AH&Co., only existed in China until 1875. Robert Lovett, in his 
discussions on the Heard archives at the Baker Library of the Harvard Business School 
in Boston, explains that a number of causes led to the eventual demise of the firm in 
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China. Expensive legal cases together with a significant misappropriation of funds in 
Boston created the basis.99 Lovett states that when the company finally concluded its 
business on 19 April 1875, a number of other factors contributed to the end. The 
extravagant living of the company in China, the inability to terminate the employment 
of staff to reduce costs, the rise of competition in the banking industry and similarly the 
competition put forward by the Chinese in the Treaty Ports and, possibly, a side effect 
of the panic in the United States in 1873 each brought the company to its knees. For a 
few years following 1875 some of Heard’s partners attempted to keep the company 
afloat by establishing a new company, in Shanghai, called Heard & Co., but the 
enterprise only lasted a few years.100 The affect on Australian merchants was significant. 
AH&Co., and later Heard & Co., were important importers of Newcastle coal. AH&Co. 
was also involved in numerous transactions of tea shipments to Australian merchants.101 
 
A number of other Western merchants in the Chinese Treaty Ports were involved in the 
trade with Australian merchants. Swire, as mentioned in the Introduction, developed a 
keen interest in the Australian markets, much being related to the gold discoveries. 
Others, less well known were common traders with Australian merchants. The English 
company, Gibb, Livingston & Co. of Hong Kong and Shanghai, existed both as 
commission agents as well as agencies for numerous insurance and shipping companies. 
The company was founded in Canton in 1836.102 One of the maritime companies that 
Gibb, Livingston & Co. held agency for was the Eastern and Australian Mail Steam 
Company (E&A). E&A opened up trade between China and the eastern Australian 
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colonies through the Torres Strait in 1873.103 Hong Kong’s oldest German merchant 
house was the firm Siemssen & Co. Founded in 1846, Siemssen & Co. extended their 
operations to Hong Kong in 1855 and later to Shanghai, Hankow, Tientsin and 
Tsingtau.104 Siemssen & Co. were interested in trading with Australians and became the 
primary competitor to JM&Co. in the Shanghai sandalwood trade.105 Shipping records 
from Hong Kong and Shanghai provide a list of other merchant houses in those ports 
that dealt with Australian merchants.106 For example, in Shanghai, Frazar & Co. were 
significant importers of coal from either Sydney or Newcastle.107 
 
Merchant houses in Australia 
 
Australian merchants played an important role in the China – Australia trade. Many 
merchant houses that existed in the 1860s, extended their trade to include China. Other 
firms, that were founded shortly afterwards, chose to enter into trade with merchants of 
the Chinese Treaty Ports. Between 1860 and 1880, more than 200 Australian firms were 
involved in trade with China, whether as exporters, importers or as commission agents 
for Western firms located in the Chinese Treaty Ports.108 The number of Chinese 
merchant firms in Australian ports and the hinterland was also significant. Together, the 
large number of European and Chinese merchant houses in Australia created an 
expansive trade relationship with China. 
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There was an element of Britishness about the Western merchant class of colonial 
Australia in the 1860s and 1870s. Most came from England with an English schooling 
and had settled in Australia. Some were sent to Australia to set up agencies for English 
firms while others arrived in Australia, having moved through other British colonies. 
The Australian merchants also fell into two groupings. The first were the agents, who 
were the preferred connections in Australia for the primary Western merchants in China. 
The second were those merchants who, independently, dealt with various merchant 
houses in China. From China, the primary two merchant houses that, from as early as 
the 1820s, traded with merchants in Sydney, Melbourne and Hobart were Dent & Co. 
and JM&Co. Their representatives in Australia were continuously feuding with each 
other over the period.109  
 
Dent & Co. employed Richard Jones as their initial agent in Sydney. The relationship 
allowed Jones to attain prominence in the Sydney – China trade throughout the 1820s. 
Jones had arrived in Sydney in 1809 and by 1815 had become the agent for the Bombay 
firm Forbes & Co. prior to connecting with Dent.110 Jones remained as Dent & Co.’s 
representative until the early 1840s when he suffered financially owing to the economic 
depression of the early 1840s.111 Dent dispatched William Fanning to replace Jones as 
their agent in Sydney in 1842.112 In 1845, Fanning joined with George Griffiths to form 
Griffiths Fanning & Co. Griffiths was also an agent for John Gore & Co. of London, 
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one of the leading traders with the Australian colonies at the time.113 Combining the two 
made the firm powerful within the ranks of Sydney merchant houses. Griffiths, Fanning 
& Co. had, by the early 1860s, become involved with another prominent China-based 
firm, AH&Co.114 
 
The history of JM&Co.’s agents in Australian ports is more extensive than that of Dent 
& Co. The continuous turnover of companies in Sydney, particularly, meant that even 
with a regular agent in Sydney, JM&Co. investigated a number of other, permanent, 
options. The first contact with Australia was in 1819-20 through a shipment of tea from 
Magniac & Co. of Canton.115 Later Robert Campbell became involved with JM&Co. 
providing themselves as agents.116 In 1829, Thomas Edwards opened an agency in 
Sydney under the name T. E. Edwards and at the commencement of 1833 formed the 
company Edwards and Hunter with Matthew Hunter.117 From that point on the primary 
agency for JM&Co. changed hands and name on a number of occasions over the next 
four decades.118 During the 1860s and 1870s, three companies represented JM&Co. in 
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Sydney. They were Thacker, Daniell & Co., Daniell, King & Co. and in 1871, George 
King & Co.119 
 
The agent for JM&Co. in Melbourne was solely James Henty & Co. That stability led, 
eventually, to a stronger relationship between the two companies. Henty did not arrive 
in Melbourne directly from London. He had already attempted to establish himself in 
the new Swan River (WA) colony in 1830 but found that not to his liking.120 In 1832, 
Henty sailed for Launceston, van Diemen’s Land (Tasmania).121 In Launceston, Henty 
established the firm James Henty & Co. However, the firm suffered and, in 1846, 
eventually failed.122 Henty departed for London, returning with his family to Victoria in 
1851 at the time of the commencement of the gold rushes in Victoria and NSW.123 In 
Melbourne, Henty re-established his business James Henty & Co. 124  By the 
commencement of the 1860s, James Henty & Co. were procurers of gold, shipping that 
to England along with cargoes of tallow and wool.125 Henty became involved in 
mercantile trade with JM&Co. from as early as 1853 and continued until after 1880.126 
 
The firm Henry Moore & Co. were one of JM&Co.’s established traders in Sydney. 
That brought Moore into direct competition with JM&Co.’s primary agents in that port. 
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Henry Moore & Co. were established in 1837.127 The firm began by procuring whale-oil 
and exporting it on vessels returning to London.128 Henry Moore & Co. imported sugar 
from Mauritius and through the income generated from the sugar sales chose to enter 
the tea trade.129 The firm contacted JM&Co. and, by the end of the 1830s, became 
JM&Co.’s second primary trader in Australia. During the first Opium War, Henry 
Moore & Co. used shipments of whalebone and oil sent to Magniac, Jardine & Co. in 
London to pay for imported tea from JM&Co.130 Similar to James Henty & Co., Henry 
Moore & Co. went into receivership in the mid-1840s.131 Following the seizure of all 
the firm’s assets by creditors, Henry Moore re-established the firm to work as a 
commission agent.132 During the 1860s and 1870s, Moore was involved in the coal and 
sandalwood export trade of Sydney to JM&Co. 
 
Robert Towns was a pre-eminent merchant of Sydney in the nineteenth century.133 
Towns arrived in Sydney in 1827.134 He established the company R. Towns in 1842 and 
began trading with Hong Kong by the mid-1840s.135 In 1854 the company was renamed 
R. Towns & Co.136 and continued as a mercantile firm after Towns’ death in 1873.137 
Towns had represented English merchant Robert Brooks from the mid-1840s138 and 
also became involved in the Coalcliff collieries, south of Sydney, as well as being the 
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agent for the Pacific Mail Steamship Company by the 1870s.139 More importantly, 
Towns was the agent for the China-based company Russell & Co. in Sydney importing 
cargoes of tea and sugar.140 The sugar originated from Manilla, transhipped in Hong 
Kong. By the 1850s, Towns had brought together a large fleet of vessels that were 
involved in the sandalwood and whale export trades.141 Towns was still exporting 
sandalwood to China in the early 1860s and coal to numerous ports in the Pacific 
throughout the 1860s and 1870s. 
 
Sydney and Melbourne were the base for numerous other merchant firms that dealt with 
firms in China. Two prominent Sydney firms dealt with AH&Co. during the period, 
both considered important to the American Hong Kong-based firm. Lamb Parbury & 
Co. was formed in 1837 through the joining of forces of William Lamb and Frederick 
Parbury.142 Both men had arrived in Sydney on the same vessel in 1829.143 The firm 
was initially involved in the whaling industry but chose to sell their vessels as their 
primary competition were the cheaper American vessels with crew that both cost less 
and were able to stay out working in the ocean without the need to consume alcohol.144 
Parbury chose to depart Sydney for London in 1847. Parbury Lamb & Co. were 
represented by F. Parbury & Co. in London and dealt with AH&Co. and JM&Co. 
during the 1860s and 1870s. 
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Wilkinson Brothers & Co. were a firm that by 1860 held offices in Sydney and 
Melbourne. The company was initiated by Simon Wilkinson from the early 1840s as S. 
Wilkinson, junior & Co.145 The firm was engaged with American firms, primarily in 
Boston, importing goods from America or acting on the behalf of American vessels that 
arrived in Sydney with whale oil and similar products.146 During the firm’s early days, 
the first American consul to New South Wales, James Hartwell Williams, joined the 
firm.147 In 1853, S. Wilkinson, junior & Co. established a branch in Melbourne and the 
firm was renamed Wilkinson Brothers & Co.148 Wilkinson Brothers & Co. continued to 
be involved in the Boston trade, extending to San Francisco and Valparaiso.149 By the 
mid-1850s, Wilkinson Brothers & Co. were importing tea from China through 
Augustine Heard & Co.150 In late 1866, problems occurred with finances and by 1868, 
Wilkinson Brothers & Co. were made insolvent.151  
 
Throughout the Australian colonies, many other Western merchants took the 
opportunities to avail themselves of trade with China in the 1860s and 1870s. From 
Western Australia, following the re-opening of the sandalwood trade to China in the late 
1850s to northern Queensland and the Northern Territory of South Australia, where, by 
the late 1870s, trade was brisk with China, merchants organised both imports from and 
exports to China. Viewing the correspondence records for JM&Co. and AH&Co. shows 
that a large number of Australian firms were involved in trade with China. Between the 
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two China firms, no less than 200 individual Australian merchant firms corresponded 
about trade.152 
 
The Australian merchant class of the nineteenth century included more than just the 
European mercantile firms. The Chinese were well represented. However, there were 
only a few that stood out as formative merchants, involved in overseas ventures, during 
the second half of the century. In Melbourne, were Lowe Kong Meng and Louis Ah 
Mouy and in Sydney was Mei Quong Tart.153 These merchants not only represented 
their community but also became prominent members of Western-based institutions. 
More importantly, they helped to bridge the cross-cultural boundaries that existed 
between Westerners and the Chinese in the major ports of colonial Australia.154 
 
Lowe Kong Meng was one of the first Chinese merchants in Victoria. Meng arrived as a 
miner of gold and without success, travelled to India. He returned in 1853155 and a year 
later created the company Kong Meng & Co.156 as an importer of Chinese products.157 
Meng was well educated. Prior to arriving in Victoria Meng had learnt to speak English 
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and French fluently.158 This allowed Meng to open his trade circles to include numerous 
merchant houses in ports throughout Asia and the Indian Ocean.159 Meng also had a 
fleet of vessels including the Joshua Bates, a vessel that made numerous journeys 
between Hong Kong and Melbourne in the 1860s and 1870s.160 Meng’s dealings until 
the late 1860s were primarily with the local Chinese, such were the items he imported. 
By the late 1860s, Meng became involved in tea importation from China, predominantly 
owing to the declining Chinese market.161  
 
Meng was well known for his connection to the Europeans in Victoria and other parts of 
Australia. From the early 1860s, Meng’s business included working with both Chinese 
and Westerners. 162  He was connected to local businesses and political elite in 
Victoria.163 Along with fellow Chinese merchant Louis Ah Mouy, Meng was one of the 
founding shareholders of the Commercial Bank of Australia.164 Further, Meng became a 
member of the Royal Society of Victoria.165 The position Meng held within the 
European circles of Victoria allowed him to become a well-respected member of that 
colony. 
 
Louis Ah Mouy was also a prominent merchant in Melbourne. Ah Mouy was not 
specifically an importer as was Meng, though he did become involved in the 
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distribution of tea, rice, opium and Chinese oil.166 Ah Mouy arrived in Melbourne in 
1851 and was the first Chinese to engage in the tea business a year later.167 The firm Ah 
Mouy and Company was created for this purpose.168 From 1865, Ah Mouy commenced 
monthly shipments of gold to Galle, which continued for the remainder of the 1860s 
and throughout the 1870s. Lowe Kong Meng was also involved in the same practice. 
Gold sent by Chinese merchants to China was primarily for the payment of goods to be 
delivered to Australian ports.169 Shipments to Galle were transhipped on P&O steamers 
and, eventually, transferred to Hong Kong.170 
 
Mei Quong Tart was a Sydney Chinese merchant engaged in the tea and silk trade.171 
His commencement as a merchant was from 1881 and thus lies outside this study. 
However, there are similarities with Meng and Ah Mouy and their relationship with the 
Western elite that require some exposure. Tart arrived in NSW, aged nine, in 1859 and 
became well known in the small town of Braidwood, NSW, where he grew up under the 
tutelage of of a prominent Western family.172 Through his gold finds in the area, Tart 
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attained sufficient wealth to consider travelling to Sydney in 1874 with the view of 
establishing a mercantile business there. It took Tart nearly a decade of travelling to and 
from ports in China and elsewhere before he became involved as a merchant.173 
 
These three Chinese merchants were a bridge between the Chinese Australians and 
Westerners in Australia. Like Meng, Tart spoke English very well and was educated and 
as with Ah Mouy, Tart had been successful at the gold fields. All three also had 
Western brides and were accepted into the circles of the Western elite.174 While being 
educated and wealthy was of an advantage, Tart, Meng and Ah Mouy also knew how to 
use their social skills to place themselves as equals to the Western elites. Thus, when 
required, they were valuable spokespersons for the Chinese Australian community. 
 
Mercantile connection with England 
 
Firms in Australia and those in the UK had strong mercantile connections. The 
connections were developed in various ways. A firm in England organised for 
individuals to emigrate to Australia and set up agencies or businesses aligned with the 
UK firm. Secondly, a member of a firm in Australia chose to travel to England to set up 
an agency of the Australian firm. Finally, a firm in Australia aligned itself with one in 
England that it believed would perform business for them. Through each connection, 
the ability to provide financial assistance and other services in England as well as to 
organise freight of goods from England to Australia was viewed as vital for the 
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Australian companies. The London companies acted as both a trader for the import and 
export of goods between the UK and Australia as well as a conduit for the trade 
between China and Australia. 
 
London merchant company Robert Brooks & Co. was an example of a firm organising 
an agency in Australia. In Brooks’ case, as has been stated above, the connection was 
through requesting Robert Towns to travel Sydney. Brooks was a leading London 
merchant in most aspects of England – Australia trade. This was specifically the case 
for the wool trade from Australia.175 Brooks had worked with Towns in the 1830s and 
by 1842, sent Towns to Sydney to take over as his agent from Ranulf Dacre. At that 
time, Dacre had generated severe debts under Brooks’ name.176 Towns continued to rely 
on Brooks for financial support throughout the remainder of his tenure as head of 
Robert Towns & Co.177 Throughout the period of the 1860s and 1870s, Brooks 
continued to be involved in the England – Australian trade while also providing firms 
such as Robert Towns & Co. with assistance for finances and banking.178  
 
The line between which company were the agents and which were the primary, or lead, 
firm became blurred by the mid-1850s. This was certainly the case for the relationship 
between Robert Brooks & Co. or Robert Towns & Co. As Frank Broeze noted in his 
biography of Towns, “Brooks remained the London agent and financier of the Sydney 
firm.”179 That Brooks was labelled the agent for an Australian firm shows that an 
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alteration in the status of relationships between London and Australian firms occurred, 
one where a tendency towards equality existed. London firms as agencies for firms 
elsewhere in the world was not unusual and, throughout the history of mid-nineteenth 
century British – Australia trade relationships, it was quite common for the London firm 
to not only be an agency but have its origins with an existing Australian firm. Two such 
firms were the leading importers of wool into England and were also representatives of 
a number of firms engaged in the China – Australia trade. 
 
James Alexander and W. L. M. Redfern formed a partnership that had existed since at 
least the 1840s. At that time, they had purchased a set of leases for rural properties in 
the northern country region of colonial Victoria and were extremely interested in the 
wool trade.180 They noted the importance of England as a financial hub with their wool 
dealings. Thus, by 1850, the firm Redfern Alexander & Co. (RA&Co.) had opened an 
office in London.181 Only a year later, RA&Co. were already one of the two biggest 
importers of wool from Australia and New Zealand.182 Their strength as one of the lead 
wool importers was to continue well into the 1870s.183 Along with the importation of 
wool, RA&Co. became involved on the committees, as Directors, for a number of 
financial and mercantile institutions, based in London.184 In doing so, RA&Co. had 
developed a strong and sound base to provide representation for various firms based in 
either Australia or New Zealand whether for trade between Australia and the UK or 
Australia and China. These included their own, related firms, RA&Co. in Melbourne 
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and Gilchrist and Alexander in Sydney as well as numerous other agencies in various 
ports, most of whom were supplying wool to England.185 Further, the Australasian 
Steam Navigation Company (ASN) chose RA&Co. to be their representative in England. 
As early as 1852, ASN had requested of RA&Co. to obtain new steamers for the 
Australian maritime firm and RA&Co. continued to contribute in such a way until the 
mid-1860s.186  
 
By the mid-nineteenth century, another firm entered the wool trade and, within a short 
period, became the leading importer of that product to the UK.187 From the mid-1850s, 
the company Dalgety Du Croz, of London, were merchants with agencies in Melbourne, 
Geelong and Launceston.188 On 1 January 1866, the firm Dalgety Du Croz and Co. was 
formally included as part of a “Partnership” group of firms. These included the London 
firm, the Melbourne firm Dalgety, Blackwood & Co., Dalgety, Ibbotson and Co. in 
Geelong and Du Croz, Nichols and Co. in Launceston.189 The company’s founders were 
Frederick G. Dalgety and Frederick A. Du Croz, the latter from Tasmania.190 By the 
1870s, the company had extended its reach to include agencies in Western Australia for 
the export of wool.191 Unlike RA&Co., Dalgety Du Croz & Co. were not connected to 
numerous financial institutions. They were, though, well recognised merchants in 
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London with Dalgety a member of various important mercantile committees relating to 
Australia.192 
 
Frederick Parbury’s situation as an agent to a firm in Australia has similar traits to those 
of RA&Co. and Dalgety Du Croz & Co. Parbury was attracted to Australia, arriving in 
Sydney in 1829. Parbury immediately set up a successful firm.193 In 1837, Parbury 
became part of the firm Lamb, Parbury & Co.194 While in Sydney, Parbury was placed 
on the board of various institutions, attaining for both himself and his company a strong 
reputation among commercial circles.195 Parbury made a number of trips back to the UK 
and in 1847, Parbury and his family departed Australia for good.196 Following his return 
to London, Parbury set up an agency of Lamb, Parbury & Co. in London, named F. 
Parbury & Co., to manage the monetary duties of the company in relation to 
transactions with firms from other countries. As with James Alexander, Parbury gained 
acceptance to the boards of a number of financial and commercial institutions in 
London that related to Australia, including as one of the first two Directors of the 
London branch of the Commercial Banking Company of Sydney in 1859.197 His 
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195 SMH 15 August 1843: 3; “Law Intelligence.” SMH 14 March 1844: 2. Parbury was also one of the 
trustees of the estate of the failed company of Henry and Joseph Moore. 
196 “A Fashionable “Exit”.” Sydney Chronicle 3 March 1847: 2. Parbury and family departed Sydney for 
London per Sir George Seymour on 1 March 1847. 
197 “Money Market.” Daily News 9 August 1859: 8. 
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position in London thus allowed Parbury to deal with such firms as AH&Co. and 
JM&Co. on behalf of Lamb Parbury & Co. as well as other agencies of that firm 
throughout the Australian colonies.198 
 
London companies under the control of foreign firms was not solely the domain of 
Australian firms. Matheson & Co. of London was wholly owned by JM&Co. The firm 
was constituted in 1848 when James Matheson returned to London to take over from the 
partnership that was the firm Magniac and Jardine.199 In the early years of this 
incarnation of the firm, the company was involved as the London agent for JM&Co. and 
Jardine Skinner & Co. of Calcutta as well as ship chartering. However, by the 1860s the 
firm altered its direction towards becoming interested in international venture capitalist 
investments and merchant banking.200 For Australian merchants, Matheson & Co. 
became the primary point of monetary transfer when performing transactions with 
JM&Co. in Hong Kong. 
 
Institutions 
 
Merchants located in the Treaty Ports of China, the ports of the colonies of Australia 
and those in India, England, Singapore and other ports were all linked. Transport and 
communications provided the connection. Improvements in technology eventually 
brought the individual global entities, the merchant houses, closer. The nineteenth 
century was one of significant global innovation: technological and organisational 
improvements in international transport and communications; integration of markets 
                                      
198 For items of correspondence, see: F. Parbury & Co. Baker Old: RAOU P224 Baker Library, Harvard 
University, Cambridge, MA, USA. 
199 Connell, "Jardine Matheson & Company.”: 100, 101. 
200 Connell, "Jardine Matheson & Company.”: 100; Geoffrey Jones, Merchants to Multinationals: British 
Trading Companies in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries.  Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002: 
57. 
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across countries; advances in international finance; increasing international demand for 
products; specialisation of production across national boundaries; and a global monetary 
exchange market; all within a period of inconsistently timed economic ruptures and 
discontinuities. Following the mid-nineteenth century gold rushes of Victoria and New 
South Wales, Australian colonial merchants and entrepreneurs were both keen to 
partake and to take advantage of these innovations. The trade with China during the 
1860s and 1870s allowed for a group of merchants throughout the various Australian 
colonies to invest in and capitalise on the developing global economy, one of great 
promise. 
 
The financial institutions that worked within the global multilateral trade systems were 
founded in London. By the 1860s foreign merchant houses, mostly based in London, 
converted into intricate and complex financial institutions. While acting for overseas 
merchants, they performed a number of tasks that included bills of exchange, foreign 
exchange and the provision of credit. The credit was guaranteed by the London houses 
with payment on maturity although facilitated by discounting.201 Many were joint stock 
banks, and institutions that had existed in Great Britain since the early seventeenth 
century.202 These banks evolved, merged and created branches. Thus, by the mid-
nineteenth century, the British banking sector had consolidated to an extent that they 
could work with the complexities of multilateral trade. 
 
British institutions were intrinsically aligned with Australia during the first half of the 
nineteenth century. Australian colonies were under the control of British decisions.203 
                                      
201 Jones. Multinationals and Global Capitalism: 23. 
202 Herbert Heaton. Economic History of Europe.  New York: Harper & Brothers, 1948: 323: 332-3. The 
BEIC used joint stock funds to pay their servants from 1600 while a few of the new colonies along the 
east coast of the United States were funded by joint stock companies in the early seventeenth century. 
203 McLean, Why Australia Prospered: 50. 
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Australians had similar banking systems,204 came under the gold standard205 and used 
British currency, the pound sterling.206 By mid-century, semi-autonomous independence 
was attained through self-government. 207  Colonial financial institutions had also 
evolved and consolidated from overseas control to local ownership. 208  These 
institutional alterations, together with the ties to Britain, gave Australian merchants the 
impetus to expand their trade horizons. Those ventures included Asia and, specifically, 
China. 
 
From 1861 to 1889, colonial Australia’s aggregate economy grew by 4.8% per annum, 
comparing favourably with other developed economies at that time.209 To maintain this 
continual growth, technological advancement was essential. Over the decades following 
the 1850s Australia became part of the global technology machine with advancements 
in transport, communications and agrarian, mining and manufacturing equipment. These 
led to increased capital accumulation, profits and then further investment.210 The gold 
industry assisted with the advancement. The alterations to methods of gold mining were 
later transferred to the other mining sectors.211 However, more importantly, the gold 
industry of the 1850s and 1860s gave impetus to Australia’s colonial economic growth 
through the investments in institutions derived from the exports of gold. 
                                      
204 S. J. Butlin, Foundations of the Australian Monetary System 1788-1851. Sydney: Sydney University 
Press, 1953: 118, 195, 496; Geoffrey Jones, Multinationals and Global Capitalism: From the Nineteenth 
to the Twenty-First Century. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005: 23; Simon Ville, "Colonial 
Enterprise." In The Cambridge Economic History of Australia, edited by Simon Ville and Glenn Withers. 
202-21. Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2015: 206. 
205 McLean, Why Australia Prospered: 46; Pinkstone and Meredith, Global Connections: 33; Kenwood, 
A. G., and A. L. Lougheed. The Growth of the International Economy 1820-1960.  London: George Allen 
& Unwin, 1971: 117. 
206 McLean, Why Australia Prospered: 46; Butlin, Australian Monetary System: 143; William Ashworth, 
A Short History of the International Economy 1850-1950.  London: Longmans, 1961: 168; Kenwood and 
Lougheed, International Economy: 123-24. 
207 Jakob B. Madsen, "Australian Economic Growth and Its Drivers since European Settlement." In The 
Cambridge Economic History of Australia, edited by Simon Ville and Glenn Withers. 29-51. Melbourne: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015: 37. 
208 Sinclair, The Process of Economic Development in Australia: 98-99. 
209 McLean, Why Australia Prospered: 67. 
210 Madsen, “Australian Economic Growth.”: 44. 
211 Madsen, “Australian Economic Growth.”: 40,43. 
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The mineral boom created many alterations to the mechanisms of colonial Australia’s 
growth. Key to this growth were the modifications to institutional frameworks, 
including a more sophisticated financial system, free-market systems or similar and the 
enhancement, in some colonies, or establishment, in others, of self-governmental 
rule.212 Complementary to these were the improvements in the infrastructure required, 
including transport and communications.213 
 
Self government derived for the colonies the ability to determine their commercial 
policies. These differed throughout Australia. Victoria chose protectionism while New 
South Wales encouraged free trade and the other colonies installed the levying of duties 
for revenue purposes.214 Self government also meant the evolution of new legislation, 
both in response to the gold industry and its effects as well as altering some of the 
British legislation that was by then out of date and not relevant for the new prosperous 
economies.215 These included taxes, duties and other money-raising mechanisms as well 
as the distribution of those funds to develop infrastructure. 
 
The continuing enhancement of infrastructure through government funding was vital for 
the development of the various colonial economies. While some elements of 
infrastructure were privately owned, many were converted to be under governmental 
control.216 Road and rail continued to be improved and although trains were government 
owned, firms like Cobb and Co. were increasingly important in road transport.217 
Shipping remained the realm of private companies, yet port construction and 
                                      
212 Madsen, “Australian Economic Growth.”: 37; Sinclair, Economic Development in Australia: 104. 
213 Pinkstone and Meredith, Global Connections: 6. 
214 Kenwood and Lougheed, International Economy: 79. 
215 Ville, “Colonial Enterprise.”: 210. 
216 Henry Ergas, and Jonathan Pincus. "Infrastructure and Colonial Socialism." In The Cambridge 
Economic History of Australia, edited by Simon Ville and Glenn Withers. 222-44. Melbourne: 
Cambridge University Press, 2015: 225. The NSW government took over all wharves by the mid-1870s. 
217 Ville, “Business Development.”: 29. 
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maintenance were aspects of government spending that increased after 1850. Dredging, 
modernising facilities for loading and unloading and specialisation to cater for specific 
cargoes were each part of this development.218 Finally, government spending on the 
laying of telegraphic cables from the late 1850s and through to the late 1870s assisted in 
creating for entrepreneurs immediate and accurate information which led to better 
opportunities for profit and investment.219 
 
The rapid growth, following the gold discoveries had enduring effects on the private 
sector as well as providing governments with funds. The expansion of trade, both 
exports and imports, led to the creation of numerous new firms, each involved in one or 
more of the aspects of the various institutional duties.220 This was further encouraged 
through few restraints of trade coupled with the available exploitation of natural 
resources.221 These mercantile houses performed various services although they were 
predominantly involved in commodity brokering and as commission agents. However, 
diversification over numerous services, including as agents for insurance, financial 
services or shipping companies was also common. Other houses even delved in to ship-
owing.222 For some entrepreneurs, ship-owning generated profitable returns that were 
better than the average domestic enterprise and thus, by the 1870s, specialised shipping 
firms emerged throughout colonial Australia to compete with the established Australian 
and foreign firms already invested in the transport of goods, mail and people.223 Thus, 
for the post gold-boom period of the 1850s, there was much promise and profit for 
entrepreneurs who took advantage of colonial Australia’s trade relationships. It was in 
                                      
218 Ashworth, International Economy: 69, 71. 
219 Ergas and Pincus, "Infrastructure and Colonial Socialism.": 229; Boyce and Ville, Modern Business: 
60-61. 
220 Ville, “Colonial Enterprise.”: 205. 
221 Sinclair, Economic Development in Australia: 100. 
222 Ville, “Colonial Enterprise.”: 206-7. 
223 Gordon Boyce, and Simon Ville. The Development of Modern Business. New York: Palgrave, 2002: 3; 
Ville, “Business Development.”: 29. 
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this environment that the China – Australia trade relationship and all those involved, 
whether in Australia, China or other foreign ports, of the 1860s and 1870s was built on. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
GREAT HIGHWAY TO THE NORTH 
 
Australian historian Geoffrey Blainey stated that Australia was remotely located from 
its main markets and thus suffered, as his well-known book is titled, from “the tyranny 
of distance”.1 Blainey was concerned about the isolation of Australia to the foreign 
markets of England and Europe, particularly in the nineteenth century. This distance 
was exacerbated by the fact that almost all international travel to Australia was by sail. 
Further, Blainey put forward that in the nineteenth century Australia’s dependence on 
Britain made her an imitation of the home country in many ways, and the fact that the 
continent was geographically located at the “end of Asia’s tail” seemed irrelevant to 
Blainey.2 That is, Blainey advanced a belief of isolation from the rest of the world, 
including Asia. 
 
The resulting effect of the isolation was that maritime technology played barely a small 
part in colonial Australia’s international trade relations prior to the mid-1870s. While 
early versions of steamers were already plying the trans-Atlantic routes as well as 
making trips to China, Australia’s external contacts remained primarily the domain of 
sail.3 For the connection between East Asia and Australia during this period, all bar the 
rare exception were completed by sail. Yet, by the commencement of the 1880s, all 
trade from China to Australia was concluded using steam vessels. 
                                      
1 Geoffrey Blainey, The Tyranny of Distance: How Distance Shaped the World. Melbourne: Sun Books, 
1966. 
2 Blainey, The Tyranny of Distance: 316. 
3 Except for the inclusion of P&O mail steamers from 1852. Ngaire Douglas, and Norman Douglas, "P 
and O's Pacific." Journal of Tourism Studies 7, no. 2 (1996): 3. 
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The sudden transition was a result created from the choice of a route through the Torres 
Strait. Technological advancement in maritime transport played an important role. 
However, it was overshadowed, in the respect of trade between China and Australia, by 
the development of the Torres Strait route. From 1873, that route became the norm for 
journeys between China and the eastern colonies of Australia, replacing the long treks 
that took vessels around Western Australia (WA) or out into the Pacific Ocean. The 
shorter distance and the use of steamers created for merchants significant improvements 
in their dealings as part of the China-Australia trade network. This chapter focuses on 
the search for a connection to Asia through the Torres Strait and how that led to a 
stronger trade relationship between the eastern colonies of Australia with China. 
 
The current chapter investigates questions relating to the Torres Strait route. What was 
the importance of choosing this route in comparison to the sailing routes prior to 1873? 
What part did the advancement of maritime transport technology play in creating a base 
for the transition from sail to steam on the journeys between China and eastern 
Australia? What efforts were employed to open up this route prior to 1873 and who, in 
1873, were successful in positioning the Torres Strait as the primary option for travel 
and trade between China and eastern Australia? The above questions provide a clear 
understanding of the importance of the Torres Strait route to the overall Australia-China 
trade relationship after 1873. 
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Pre-1860 maritime transport: Square-rigged vessels and the flow of trade 
 
Noel Butlin stated that 1860 to 1891 was a period of great boom for colonial Australian 
economies.4 Butlin’s findings, however, bely the fact that during the period trade to and 
from colonial Australia was hampered by the slow take up of marine technological 
advancement. This was particularly the case for the routes between China and Australia. 
Throughout the 1860s and from much earlier, the flow of most shipping between China 
and Australia, as it was to most of the rest of the world, was as much defined by the 
trade winds and the ocean currents as it was by freight costs.5 The time taken for travel 
between origin and destination also suffered from these same factors. 
 
The choice of sail over steam in the earlier years of the 1860s had less to do with 
technology than with cost and the goods being transported. Douglass North argues that 
sail dominated the long trans-oceanic routes where minimal freight rates were 
prominent.6 This was also the case for the China – Australia route. Prior to 1870, the 
costs for the use of a steamer were always higher than sail as they carried the overheads 
of coal usage. Included were the requirement to pause at coaling stations to reload the 
bunkers and, owing to the size of the boilers, a loss of significant cargo space.7 Early 
                                      
4 Noel Butlin, Investment in Australian Economic Development 1861-1900. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge 
University Press, 1964: 8-15. 
5
 More recent investigation of the ocean currents and trade winds appear to suggest that alternate routes 
from China to Sydney and Melbourne via Australia’s eastern coast may have been quicker yet there is an 
assumption that traditional notions of using routes similar to those taken by shipping from Great Britain, 
Europe and India may have defined the choice of travel via the westerly option. For information on the 
geography of the Australian oceans, see: William Morphet, and Jürgen Symanzik, "The Circular 
Dataimage, a Graph of High-Resolution Circular-Spatial Data." International Journal of Digital Earth 3, 
no. 1 (2010): 47-71; Wasyl Drosdowsky, and Mark Williams, "The Southern Oscillation in the Australian 
Region. Part I: Anomalies at the Extremes of the Oscillation." Journal of Climate 4 (1991): 619-38; G. H. 
Halligan, "The Ocean Currents around Australia." Journal of the Proceedings of the Royal Society of New 
South Wales 55 (1921): 188-95. 
6 Douglass North, "Ocean Freight Rates and Economic Development 1750-1913." The Journal of 
Economic History 18, no. 4 (1958): 537-55. 
7 Frank W. Geels, "Technological Transitions as Evolutionary Reconfiguration Processes: A Multi-Level 
Perspective and a Case-Study." Research Policy 31, no. 8-9 (2002): 1265-66; Charles K. Harley, "British 
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large steamers were also more expensive to build and required larger crews.8 Building 
larger ships created larger cargo holds but at the expense of having to carry more coal to 
power the vessels. The problem was eventually overcome with the design of new 
maritime steam engines, those that took a higher pressure and thus also used more 
refined boilers, condensers and screw propellers.9 The delay in the development of the 
design until the end of the 1860s, when coupled with the type of freight, meant that 
freight on steam ships was faster, but more expensive than sail, especially for long 
distance journeys.10  
 
Travel between China and the Australian colonies prior to 1880 was thus also generally 
by sail. The square-rigged sailing vessels that plied the China – Australia route rarely 
altered in description, except through the inclusion of iron in their construction.11 Yet 
for the China-Australia route, the monotony of lengthy journeys was well accepted by 
colonial merchants as a fait accompli at that time. In a way, there was an expectation of 
delay in their travels and only rarely were merchants at the destinations concerned about 
a ship’s late arrival. A three to four month trip time was quite acceptable from Hong 
Kong to Melbourne.12 This delay was further exacerbated by Australia’s isolation from 
and reliance on the building docks of England and Scotland.13 Thus, sail, together with 
older steamers, were commonly seen around Australia throughout the period and only 
                                                                                                                
Shipbuilding and Merchant Shipping: 1850–1890." The Journal of Economic History 30, no. 1 (1970): 
263-64. 
8 Harley, “British Shipbuilding.”: 264. Harley states that a steamship of the same size as a sailing ship 
cost 50 percent more to build and required 50 percent more crew. 
9 Geels, “Technological Transitions.”: 1267. 
10 Gerald S. Graham, "The Ascendancy of the Sailing Ship 1850-85." The Economic History Review New 
Series, 9, no. 1 (1956): 75. 
11 Geels, “Technological Transitions.”: 1263-70. Geels discusses the transition from sail to steam as a 
case study. 
12 The Mosquito, a brig, took four months and eight days to sail from Hong Kong to Melbourne as late as 
1878. “Shipping Intelligence.” The Argus 11 November 1878: 4.  
13 Harley, “British Shipbuilding.”: 262; Max E. Fletcher, "From Coal to Oil in British Shipping." Journal 
of Transport History n.s. 3, no. 1 (1975): 1.  
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through foreign companies were the more advanced engine steamers attending 
Australian ports.14 
 
Table 2.1. Ships arriving in Victoria and NSW from ports in China including Hong 
Kong, 1876-1885.15 
To: Victoria NSW 
From: China Hong Kong China Hong Kong 
Year Sail Steam Sail Steam Sail Steam Sail Steam 
1876 16 7 9 1 11 0 11 23 
1877 12 1 6 5 12 1 8 15 
1878 16 0 9 3 7 2 7 26 
1879 9 1 2 5 17 2 8 18 
1880 3 5 2 3 3 5 0 27 
1881 3 10 0 16 6 6 0 31 
1882 4 10 1 18 6 5 0 31 
1883 0 6 0 24 7 6 0 31 
1884 0 9 9 32 0 3 0 53 
1885 0 6 1 28 0 4 0 37 
 
Sail maintained a stronghold on the transport of goods between China and Melbourne 
until the late 1870s. For example, in 1873 twenty vessels arrived from Hong Kong into 
Melbourne. Of those only one was a steamer, the Otago, although she made her journey 
completely under sail.16 Each and every vessel took the route that past Western 
Australia with all but one traversing the Sunda Strait. Similar results occur in 1878, 
where 12 vessels arrived in Melbourne from Hong Kong. Of those, only three were 
steamers; each from Eastern and Australian Mail Steam Company’s (E&A) fleet. The 
other nine were all square-rigged vessels that took the western route while the steamers 
all travelled through the Torres Strait. 17 To the Melbourne merchants during the 1860s 
and 1870s, thus, was an acceptance that sail remained the primary method of transport 
between China and that port. However, shipping records post 1880 show that the sail 
                                      
14 The Australian maritime environment consisted of sail and old steam vessels mixed with the rare, 
newly-built steamers from the UK, purchased by firms that had the finance to invest in these. 
15 SR VIC 1876-1885, SR NSW 1876-1885. The statistical records for years prior to 1876 did not delineate 
between sail and steam. 
16 Most early steamers were hybrids of square rigged vessels with boilers implanted to improve distance 
and travel time. A discussion on this is provided later in this chapter. 
17 “Inward Shipping Reports.” VPRS 38 Public Records Office Victoria, Melbourne. Routes obtained 
from “Shipping Intelligence.” The Argus for the various dates. 
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vessel on the China to Melbourne route had all but disappeared. Table 2.1 demonstrates 
the point of transfer from sail to steam for vessels travelling from China to Victoria was 
in 1880 and for China to NSW a few years later.  
 
Figure 2.1. Early sail routes taken between China and Australia,. 
 
 
The path that square-rigged vessels took from China to Australia was what sea captains 
saw to be the quickest, shortest and safest route. Figure 2.1 displays the two options, the 
eastern and western routes. For the western option, the journey from China to 
Melbourne or Sydney would see the captain charting a course south to the Java Sea 
before breaking through the Indian Archipelago18 and to the Arafura Sea via the Sunda 
Strait that separates the East Indies islands of Sumatra and Java. A long journey 
followed, rounding Cape Leeuwin on the south-western tip of Western Australia. 
Occasionally vessels would land at King George Sound (Albany) for provisions and 
                                      
18 This was the term used at the time for the Netherlands East Indies. 
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access to Western Australia. The ships then took advantage of the continuous westerlies, 
labelled the “Roaring Forties”19 on their journey towards Melbourne. Some shipping to 
Sydney ventured south of Tasmania prior to heading north to that port.20 This choice of 
by-passing the Bass Strait, a shorter route, became popular as it avoided the tidal flows 
of the shallower strait that affected the general movement of the westerlies in the 
strait.21 The eastern route was somewhat simpler, though it favoured travel to Sydney or 
New Zealand over that to Melbourne. Vessels would make their way out to the Pacific 
and through Melanesia before eventually heading south-west towards the east coast of 
either Queensland or NSW and then to Sydney. The primary difference between the two 
routes was a lack of possible intermediary ports on the Pacific route and thus long travel 
times without sighting land. A conclusion here is that the sailing vessels taking the 
Pacific route would have required larger stores or, perhaps, been larger vessels in 
tonnage with more sails for quicker speed so as to reduce the time away from land. 
 
Figure 2.1 also shows that vessels heading north, that chose a coal charter to China from 
NSW, took one of four routes. A treatise by Lieutenant Lizard of the H.M.S. Challenger 
in 1876 outlined the four possible options that coal traders, primarily square-rigged 
vessels, selected for their journey to China. The document presents the options of the 
“outer,” “middle,” “inner” and “Torres Strait” routes and concluded that from October 
to March shipping should take the middle route while during the other months, the inner 
route or the Torres Strait route would be preferable. The inner route took vessels to the 
Solomon Sea where they continued north either via the channel between Bougainville 
and Choiseul Islands or between New Britain and New Ireland. The middle route passed 
                                      
19 The Roaring Forties were an unobstructed path around the world between the southern latitudes of 40° 
and 50°. 
20 “Shipping.” The Sydney Morning Herald 26 April 1860: 4. Note the section explaining the route taken 
by the Eagle. 
21
 Halligan, "Ocean Currents”: 191. 
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east of the Solomon Islands to avoid the seasonal cyclonic weather and then north-west 
to the Caroline Islands prior to heading for their destinations. Shipping involved a 
journey from five weeks to two months depending on the winds.22  
 
Figure 2.2. Tonnage of vessels arriving with cargo in Victoria and NSW from all ports 
in China, 1860-1880 (tons).23 
 
 
The direction of shipping from China to Australia during the 1870s altered. Prior to 
1875, charters for shipments from Hong Kong or the Chinese ports directed the vessels 
to Melbourne primarily. Figure 2.2 shows that after 1875 the predominant port of 
disembarkation of cargo became Sydney. That is, vessels were being directed along a 
route which meant arrival in Sydney first. By 1875 that route was via the Torres Strait. 
What is also of interest is the surprisingly large tonnage arriving in NSW ports in 1860 
                                      
22 “Route between Australia and China.” The Sydney Morning Herald 24 May 1875: 4. Each of the 
options traversed east of the Barrier Reef. Viewing shipping records for other years, the average time 
taken was two months with some vessels suffering a journey of well over three months. Viewing the 
shipping records for 1864, the average trip to China (all ports) was 62 days. 
23 SR VIC 1860-1880 and SR NSW 1860-1880. A note that there was no data for the year 1868 in relation 
to the tonnage of those vessels with cargo destined for Victoria. However, as each of the years around that 
year’s data showed no vessels arriving in Victoria in ballast from China, I have taken the total tonnage for 
vessels arriving from China to equate to the amount of tonnage for those with cargo. 
0"
5000"
10000"
15000"
20000"
25000"
30000"
35000"
40000"
45000"
50000"
18
60
"
18
61
"
18
62
"
18
63
"
18
64
"
18
65
"
18
66
"
18
67
"
18
68
"
18
69
"
18
70
"
18
71
"
18
72
"
18
73
"
18
74
"
18
75
"
18
76
"
18
77
"
18
78
"
18
79
"
18
80
"
To
nn
ag
e'
'to
ns
'
Year'
"Victoria"
"NSW"
 83 
and the continued tonnage throughout the period leading up to 1875. The data further 
shows that NSW retained its position, over the two decades, as an important port of 
entry for China’s goods. 
 
Figure 2.3. Tonnage of vessels departing with cargo from Victoria and NSW to China, 
1860-1880 (tons).24 
 
 
Figure 2.2 also demonstrates that imports into Victorian and NSW ports were about the 
same, though with the variances already explained. By contrast, Figure 2.3 shows that 
the tonnage of vessels with cargo departing from NSW ports was overwhelmingly 
larger than that from Victorian ports. That is, Victoria had very few commodities of 
interest to export to the Chinese ports. What NSW provided to the importers at the 
Chinese ports was coal. Chapter 3 will discuss the prominence of coal as an export 
commodity from NSW to China. For the period until the late 1870s, almost all vessels 
departing from either Sydney or Newcastle for Chinese ports contained coal in their 
holds. 
                                      
24 ibid. 
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Differences existed for other inter-colonial ports. Fremantle, in Western Australia, was 
serviced purely by sail vessels to and from China throughout the 1860s and 1870s.25 
Sydney and the Queensland ports, in contrast, paint a completely different picture. Their 
choice of steam communication with China came earlier, from 1873 after the 
commencement of the E&A mail service.26 Port Darwin, though only entering the China 
trade in the late 1870s, was also connected through steamers.27 Thus, from the 1870s 
steam shipping played an important role in trade relations between China and the 
northern and eastern Australian colonies. To understand why, a historical context needs 
to be constructed.  
 
Australia’s early steam adventures  
 
The development of steam usage in vessels plying Australian waters fits within two 
time periods, split by the technological advancement of maritime engine design by the 
late 1860s. Technological advancement led to alterations in ship design. The new 
steamers allowed for the organisation of more accurate trip times and timetabling.28 In 
                                      
25 SR WA 1871-1880. Shipping records show no steamers travelling from WA to China or from China to 
WA during the period of the 1860s and 1870s. 
26 The E&A mail service, and its steamers, initially chose a route to Sydney, which was later extended to 
Melbourne. There were other companies involved, as discussed later in this chapter, yet none of these saw 
any requirement to travel to Melbourne from a Chinese port. “Trip of the Flintshire.” The Queenslander 2 
May 1874: 9. 
27 Port Darwin was a free port for most of the 1870s and thus there are little, if no statistics regarding 
shipping and interchange. Viewing the SR SA and comparing that to the shipping records from Port 
Darwin, extracted from the local newspaper, develop an understanding that the SA government chose not 
to include any Northern Territory data in their statistics. The data and comment here has been obtained 
from information obtained through the local newspaper. Owing to the lateness of the entry in to the China 
trade, and the fact that Port Darwin was on the route between Queensland and Singapore and thus China, 
meant that the primary, if not only, method of transport was by steamers. The shipping records I have 
formulated show no sailing vessels making the trip between a Chinese port and Port Darwin in the 1870s. 
28 W. A. Sinclair, The Process of Economic Development in Australia. Melbourne: Cheshire, 1976: 8; 
Brian Pinkstone, and David Meredith, Global Connections: A History of Exports and the Australian 
Economy. Canberra: Australian Government Publishing Service, 1992: 31-32; Paul Battersby, 
"Timetabling Globalization: Technology, Travel and Peripheral Integration." In The Sage Handbook of 
Globalization, edited by Manfred Steger, Paul Battersby, and Joseph Siracusa. 347-62. London: SAGE 
Publications, 2014: 347-48. It should be noted that the sizes of crews were only marginally affected when 
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turn, mail, goods and passenger transfer was quicker, leading to improvements in 
international commerce. Distance was tamed, the world was shrinking and a new stage 
of globalisation commenced.29  
 
Steam travel in Australia emerged in tune with the development of the various 
Australian colonies. The first steam journey in Australian waters was the Surprise on 1 
June 1831 from Sydney to Parramatta.30 From the earliest steamers of the 1830s to the 
large firms of the 1850s and 1860s, the vessels were mainly found performing 
Australian inter-colonial routes, leaving international travel to the global companies 
including Peninsular & Oriental (P&O). Further, for Australia, steamers provided a 
service, generally, to the “upper end of the market” which included mail and high-end 
freight.31 In the early days of the NSW colony, lengthy travel was made using new 
roads or by sail to other ports. Later, inter-colonial travel and trade remained the haven 
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of maritime transport, since all the capitals were ports.32 The introduction of steam 
shipping in NSW during the 1830s reduced travel times, improved communication and 
thus was a boon for commerce. Sail, though, retained preference for non-perishable 
trade, including coal, wool, grain and similar products. 
 
Numerous companies became involved in inter-colonial trade along the Australian coast 
during the first three decades of maritime steam travel in Australia with some extending 
to foreign lands. The Hunter River Steam Navigation Company was founded in 1840 to 
service the NSW coast. 33  In March 1851 the company altered its name to the 
Australasian Steam Navigation Company (ASN). Others followed, including the 
Tasmanian Steam Navigation Company (1845), the Launceston Steam Navigation 
Company (1852), the Sydney and Melbourne Steam Packet Company (1853) and the 
Howard Smith and Sons line (1854).34 These maritime firms each played an important 
role in the movement of cargo between the ports throughout the east coast of Australia, 
from Hobart Town to what would later become the colony of Queensland.  
 
 
Technology and the transition to steam 
 
The period of the late 1860s and the 1870s saw a major transformation in ocean-going 
transport. From the early years of steam through to the 1860s, ocean steam navigation 
only generated a gradual improvement in fuel efficiency and thus on the longer routes 
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sail was retained as the preferred option.35 However, the primary breakthroughs in 
marine technology took place initially in 1864 with Randolph and Elder’s compound 
reciprocating marine engine36 and, a few years later in 1869, when a treatise on modern 
screw propulsion was published by N. P. Burgh.37 These discoveries were considered a 
turning point for the economic viability of ocean-going steam ships as coal usage was 
significantly decreased. The result of the technological advancements was that steam 
maritime transportation became a strong competitor to sail vessels for many ocean-
going long-haul routes.38 
 
The introduction of the compound engines in the late 1860s, though, did not halt the 
voracious appetite of the engines of the steamers. Sail continued to be used to 
supplement steam usage. These were composite vessels using both steam and sail power, 
many of which were modified barques, some with wooden hulls and others, later, with 
iron hulls.39 There were three primary reasons for the existence of sail on a composite 
vessel: providing assistance when the next coal bunkering station was too far, given 
unfavourable wind and sea conditions; when the engines broke down; and to assist 
vessels when there was a strong favourable wind, thus allowing a reduction of fuel 
consumption.40 Composite vessels were still being built well into the 1870s. Figure 2.4 
displays the composite vessel s.s. Brisbane, built on the Clyde River in Scotland in 
1874 specifically for the Singapore – Sydney mail route via the Torres Strait. The s.s. 
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Brisbane was 1,503 gross tons, nearly 86m long, iron hull, twin-compound engines, 
brig rigged and a clipper bow.41 
 
Figure 2.4. R.M.S.S. Brisbane (1874-1881).42 
 
 
The steamer played an important role in the international China tea trade, overhauling 
sail by the 1870s. The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 was integral in altering the 
mind-set of the merchants such that eventually the composite racing clippers that had 
fought against each other for the fastest trip to England, were in the 1870s year by year, 
being crowded out of the trade.43 The vast array of steamers, through sheer numbers, 
were creating lower freight rates and hence by the late 1870s clippers had all but been 
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driven from the China tea trade.44 Together with new telegraphic communications, it led 
to the demise of many business interests in China, particularly American.45 English 
traders, including JM&Co. and Butterfield Swire and Co., were more successful in their 
trading and thus were able to sustain and work with such an upheaval. They continued 
to play a stronger part in the China – Australia trade relationship beyond the mid-1870s. 
 
The above analysis, though general to the China trade, provides a basis for an 
understanding of how technology affected the maritime trade relationship between 
China and the Australian colonies. Steamers thus offered advantages over sail and 
through gradual improvements in technology, specifically in the late 1860s, steamers 
became a viable, more economical option than sail. They had the ability to overcome 
routes that appeared dangerous to the sail vessels as well as those where wind direction 
was important. Steamers were thus placed in a positive light when it came to evaluating 
a trade-off between cost and time taken to travel the China – Australia route. The 
technology created better, bigger and faster vessels that presented a maritime company 
with the opportunity to fulfil their trade contracts in a shorter time and thus maximise 
their own profits. That is, the increase in transportability, or the ability to move items,46 
became significant to merchants. Technology was one of a number of factors that 
allowed steam to supplant sail in the Australian maritime theatre. It provided for and 
encouraged the search for an optimum maritime route between China and Australia. 
                                      
44 Max E. Fletcher, "The Suez Canal and World Shipping, 1869-1914." The Journal of Economic History 
18, no. 4 (1958): 561. 
45 Ernest R. May, and John King Fairbank, America's China Trade in Historical Perspective: The 
Chinese and American Performance. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986: 262. Augustine 
Heard & Co. collapsed as an entity in April 1875. Robert W. Lovett, "The Heard Collection and Its 
Story." The Business History Review 35, no. 4 (1961): 571. Lovett advanced a number of reasons for the 
failure of AH&Co. including the “taking over of trade by the Chinese” Lovett also states that a number of 
Chinese friends created a new business, Heard & Co. yet without success. There is evidence that the firm 
Heard & Co. continued to exist until at least March 1877 as they were consignees of coal from Sydney 
until the Joyce Phillips arrived in Shanghai on 3 March, 1877. “Shanghai Shipping Intelligence.” The 
North China Herald and Supreme Court and Consular Gazette 8 March 1877: 36. 
46 Jean-Paul Rodrigue, Claude Comtis, and Brian Slack, The Geography of Transport Systems. Abingdon, 
UK: Routledge, 2006: 2. See also James E. Rauch, "Networks Versus Markets in International Trade." 
Journal of International Economics 48 (1999): 7-35 for a discussion about transportability. 
 90 
 
Nevertheless, the square-rigged sail vessel did continue to be part of Australia’s trade 
with numerous countries around the world. As Gerald Graham points out in his defence 
of sail over steam in the second half of the nineteenth century, “even after the opening 
of the Suez Canal, much of the traffic to the Bay of Bengal, the East Indies and 
Australia was still carried by the sailing ship.”47 The most well-known example was that 
of the Cutty Sark which, after it was no longer required along the London -Australia-
China-London route by the mid-1870s, altered to be part of the wool clippers that took 
their produce from Australian ports to England.48 As shall be discussed in Chapter 3 
(coal) and Chapter 4 (sandalwood), sail continued to play an important role until the 
latter part of the nineteenth century for Australia’s bulk exports. 
 
 Search for an optimum route 
 
Merchants and seafarers alike were involved in a continuous search for optimal 
shipping routes both to reduce distance and time. The Torres Strait was seen by 
merchants and ship’s masters as significantly shortening the journey from Asian ports to 
eastern Australia. Through that they noted the indisputable economic advantages.49 The 
combination of various factors assisted and led to the opening of and continual usage of 
the Torres Strait route as an option to trade with East Asia. Small craft had ventured the 
treacherous strait for centuries, perhaps millennia. Almost immediately following 
European settlement on the eastern Australian coast, these Europeans ventured to 
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attempt the route for trade purposes. Inexperience on the part of ship’s captains of the 
Torres Strait led to many accidents, from as little as slight damage from hidden reefs or 
rocks to complete ship wrecks and loss of life.50 However, the overwhelming desire by 
NSW and, later, Queensland politicians, fuelled by postal and mercantile considerations, 
to create an alternative, shorter link to East Asia and the UK, meant that the Torres 
Strait option was never far from their government’s minds. 
 
The passage through the Torres Strait had significance long before and immediately 
after the creation of European settlement in Australia. The first European to discover the 
Torres Strait was Luis Baéz De Torres, in 1606.51 The passage was viewed by ship’s 
masters as the shortest route to the East Indies and thence to India for those travelling 
across the Pacific.52 The first merchant vessels that traversed the Torres Strait from 
Sydney to India were the Shah Hornuzeer and Chesterfield in 1793 and they were to be 
followed by numerous others.53 It was normal practice for vessels, on their return 
journey to England, to make their way to India to collect cargo for the English market. 
Generally, the ships would sail close to the southern coast of Australia until they 
rounded Cape Leeuwin and entered the Indian Ocean. However, in the winter, these 
southern winds were too strong and thus shipping chose an option that journeyed past 
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the northern coast of New Guinea.54 What the Torres Strait offered was a shorter 
passage for these returning vessels. Governor King of New South Wales was interested 
in investigating the Torres Strait route when he sent the Mersey in 1804 to obtain 
supplies from Ceylon. The trip was ill-fated with only a few of the crew surviving a 
shipwreck attempting the passage.55  
 
The Mersey was not the first or the last loss of a vessel in the Torres Strait. The Torres 
Strait held numerous dangers including hidden reefs and rocks and, in the earliest days 
of European settlement, the threat of attack by islanders and natives from New Guinea 
and the Cape York region.56 Figure 2.5 demonstrates just how dangerous and complex 
the strait was for navigation. During the opening half of the nineteenth century, 
expeditions were held to map out the Torres Strait.57 Of these, a few, Captains 
Mackensie, Longmuir and Ashmore, were common sights in the Torres Strait during the 
1830s and 1840s. Mackensie also traded with the Far East.58 However, by the mid-
1840s a combination of work done on the Fly, Bramble and Rattlesnake created 
extensive surveys of the straits such that mariners could then negotiate the passage with 
greater confidence.59 By the 1840s a number of vessels traversed the passage,60 even the 
steamer Victoria on a journey from Sydney to Singapore in 1843.61 Taking steamers 
through the Torres Strait from Singapore and thus on to Sydney now appealed to 
                                      
54 G. W. Earl, "Steam Route through the Torres Straits." The Journal of the Indian Archipelago and 
Eastern Asia 5 (1851): 490. 
55 Allan McInnes, "Dangers and Difficulties of the Torres Strait and the Inner Route." Journal of the 
Royal Historical Society of Queensland 10, no. 4 (1978-79): 54. 
56 McInnes, "Dangers and Difficulties”: 48-50. For a discussion on the shipwrecks of the Torres Strait, 
see: Peter Illidge, Coleman Doyle, and Peter Gesner, "An Assessment of Selected Shipwrecks in Torres 
Strait and Far North Great Barrier Reef." Memoirs of the Queensland Museum, Cultural Heritage Society 
3, no. 1 (2004): 347-61; Kaye, Torres Strait: 34. 
57 R. G. Ledley, "Early Torres Strait and Coast Pilot's Service." Journal of the Royal Historical Society of 
Queensland 5, no. 5 (1957): 1267-68; Kaye, Torres Strait: 15, 33. 
58 Ledley, "Early Torres Strait and Coast Pilot's Service.": 1267-68. 
59 Earl, “Steam Route through the Torres Straits.”: 493.  
60 Kaye, Torres Strait: 33n40. Kaye states that there were 32 vessels that took on the Torres Strait 
passage in 1848 and upwards of 80 vessels by 1862. 
61 Foley, River Pilots: 16. 
 93 
captains and merchants alike. Nevertheless, when taking into account the requirement 
for coaling stations so as to eliminate the excessive use of cargo holds to store coal for 
the boilers, the choice to use steamers on a route through the Torres Strait was checked, 
given that the journey was not a financially viable proposition.62 
 
Figure 2.5. The Torres Strait. 
 
 
 
 
Early steam attempts 
 
The completed and published extensive surveys generated initial considerations of using 
the Torres Strait as a feasible option for steam communication by the late 1840s and 
early 1850s.63 Neither of two such attempts were successful. At that time, India was the 
primary port of consideration for both communications with Britain and for trade. In 
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1847 a company was created, the India and Australia Steam Packet Company. The 
company tendered to transfer mail from Sydney to Singapore via the Torres Strait, yet 
owing to a lack of capital, the venture failed without a single vessel completing a 
journey.64  
 
A few years later, in 1851, the First Report from the Select Committee on Steam 
Communications with India, &c. was presented to the House of Commons, Great 
Britain on 5 June of that year. The Committee’s purpose was to: 
Inquire into the existing Steam Communication with India and China, and into the 
Practicability of effecting say Improvement therein; and also into the best mode of 
establishing Steam Communication between England, India, China, Australia, 
New Zealand, or any of them, as well as say Points upon the several Routes 
between them.65 
 
Three options were presented for steam routes between England and India and thence to 
the Indian Archipelago, Australasia and China. One, “The Indian Route,” involved the 
Overland Mail route between Alexandria and Suez and thence via the Red Sea to Point 
de Galle on the southern tip of Sri Lanka. From that distribution centre, steamers would 
travel through the Torres Strait before progressing south to Sydney.66 The advantage of 
this route was the meeting in Singapore with the mail to China and the rest of the Indian 
Archipelago, the latter through Dutch transport.67  
 
The Committee, however favoured and thus recommended a route from Point de Galle 
to Singapore and thus via Cape Leeuwin and south of the Australian continent.68 The 
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choice of opening the Torres Strait route for regular communications and thus trade had 
been denied. As John Foley, in his book on reef pilots, succinctly summarised the 
position by the mid-nineteenth century, 
Gradually, but inevitably, opposition to the Torres Strait route itself crumbled. 
The economic advantages were indisputable and increasingly obvious. But a 
nucleus of antagonists continued to agitate against the route, often quite 
effectively, well into the 1860s.69 
 
Queensland and the Torres Strait route 
 
The attempt to open the Torres Strait for trade and communications returned in the 
1860s and 1870s. What altered in the process was the participation of the newly formed 
Queensland colonial government. When, in 1859, Queensland became a formal colony 
it inherited the coastline that was part of the Torres Strait.70 Mail, trade and immigration, 
at the time, all passed through Melbourne and possibly Sydney, causing unacceptable 
delays to Queensland merchants and to the government. Thus, Queensland merchants 
and parliamentarians had a significant vested interest in creating a regular route for 
shipping through the Torres Strait. Over the first two decades of Queensland’s existence 
there were three attempts at solving this dilemma.  
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As early as 1860 the Queensland colonial government opened the possibility of 
venturing via the Torres Strait for its mail and commerce.71 That proposal gained 
currency when the ship Herald had completed its new survey of the outer route, east of 
the Coral Sea where the oceans were without dangerous reefs. The new government 
also proposed opening up a port in the Gulf of Carpentaria with a cable line to Timor.72 
The NSW government was approached by its Queensland counterpart to become part of 
the proposal and they showed some favour in the possibility of alternate arrangements 
to the P&O service.73 However, the financial viability of the venture caused significant 
concerns for the NSW government and thus they chose to remain with what they had 
available at the time.74 An editorial from the Sydney Morning Herald (SMH) in Sydney 
stated, emphatically, that the Torres Strait route will never be picked up by the southern 
colonies and thus Queensland would have to go it alone. The editorial stated that the 
advantages of providing a link with the “marts of commerce in the East” through the 
connections with Singapore and the rest of the Indian Archipelago were countered by 
the financial constraints of the new colony. Queensland, the editorial warned, “cannot 
afford to be lavish of its income at starting.”75 
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In 1866, the first regular steam service through the Torres Strait was completed. On 9 
January 1866 the screw steamer s.s. Souchays departed Moreton Bay and stopped at 
Bowen, Somerset, Kupang and thence travelled to Batavia.76 The creation of the venture 
met with numerous stumbling blocks, its enactment with financial disaster and its 
completion at the end of 1866 without renewal. The purpose, though, remained the 
same as previous attempts, to provide an alternate, more efficient, cost effective and 
quicker route for mail and trade with Great Britain.77 
 
The initial inclinations of the Queensland government were brought to the attention of 
its nearest neighbour, NSW. NSW was also considering other options than P&O for 
mail delivery to England. The two colonies maintained correspondence which included 
a proposal by a company titled British and Eastern Steam Company to run a route from 
London to Hong Kong with a branch through the Torres Straits to Queensland and 
NSW.78 For Queensland, obtaining financial assistance from NSW was seen as crucial 
to affording the new route. However, NSW eventually withdrew their support and 
signed a new contract with P&O.79 
 
The Governor of Queensland, Sir George Bowen also put the matter of using the Torres 
Strait for steam communication to the Secretary of State for the Colonies in England, 
Edward Cardwell. Cardwell then contacted the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury to 
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view their opinion of assisting in the funding of such a venture’s subsidy. The expectant 
rebuttal was delivered. The Commissioners did not “feel themselves justified in 
rendering any assistance from Imperial funds towards the establishment of a line of mail 
packets by the route in question, in addition to the existing line of packets via Ceylon 
and Cape Leuwin.” A second attempt was made to the Lords Commissioner, which was 
also dismissed.80 
 
The authorities in the Netherlands East Indies were also enthusiastic to encourage a new 
line of communication. Enclosed within a letter received in Sydney in August 1865 was 
a prospectus from the Java representatives. It detailed the incitements of the project as: 
“first, a natural desire to make Java a centre of commerce; secondly, a desire to find in 
Australia a market for Javan produce; and thirdly, a desire to increase the maritime 
importance of Holland in the Eastern seas.”81 Thus, while Queensland was soliciting a 
new and better mail route, as a side effect it found in the Dutch a willing participant in 
the broadening of trade. More importantly, the Dutch authorities presented a possible 
partner to assist financing the costs for the new route. 
 
Without support from NSW or Great Britain, the fledgling Queensland government 
chose to set their own path. A select committee from the Queensland colonial 
government was formed in early May 186582 and recommended a bi-monthly service, 
for a period of twelve months, to travel between Port Denison, or similar, and Batavia.83 
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One option put forward was from Batavia through Mr. Henry Oliver Robinson, who 
held the contract for the inter-colonial mail service of Netherlands East Indies,84 but this 
was rejected owing to the desire to stop at a large number of ports.85 Eventually, a 
tender process was held86 and, through that, the Souchays was chartered by the 
Queensland colonial government from the Melbourne company Woodville, Jarret and 
Co., at a cost of £5280.87 
 
The cost of running the service, for the Queensland colonial government, became 
untenable. Even with the proposed assistance by the Netherlands India government,88 
there was a blow out of costs. In June 1866, the service was passed to a private firm, 
Bright Brothers, of Brisbane.89 At that time the cost for running the Souchays had been 
£7,422 8s. 8d., that being under the assumption that the Netherlands India government 
would contribute £3,750. The cost of the new service was £2,300 per month.90 For 
Bright Brothers, the new service was also financially unsuccessful. Bright Brothers 
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assumed the lease of the Souchays, replacing it with the Hero for the three remaining 
journeys. As with the Queensland government, Bright Brothers were unable to realise 
the full risks involved. On the second journey to Batavia the Hero required £1,100 of 
repairs and, together with the remainder of the expenses, the company believed, midway 
through the contract, that they were due an overall loss of £3,400.91 
 
The Queensland government chose not to extend the contract in 1867, though not 
because of past losses. The reason was that the Queensland colonial government was 
caught up in the financial crisis that related to the fall of the Overend-Gurney Bank in 
England.92 The crisis created a domino effect on a number of other banks, significantly 
the Agra and Masterman’s Bank and the Union Bank where the Queensland 
government’s accounts were kept and debentures were sought.93 Thus, as it was now 
financially unfeasible to continue the service, the decision was made in August 1866 to 
maintain the Bright Brother’s contract for only three trips during the remainder of the 
year and not to renew or to offer any new contract for a permanent service.94 
 
The venture by the Queensland government was not commercially successful. There 
was minor trade with Java, predominantly rice to Queensland and gold specie in return. 
No trade with China existed as there was no attempt to take advantage of existing 
connections between Batavia and Singapore or China.95 Nevertheless, there was an 
important increase in the turnover of postal communications with the UK. The proof 
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that a viable steam route could exist from the eastern colonies of Australia through to 
the Indian Archipelago via the Torres Strait gave clear evidence that with better 
finances a more permanent contract could be brought into action. The service, though, 
could not be fulfilled by a government. This was pointed out by Queensland 
parliamentarian Mr. Dalrymple in his speech to the Queensland Legislative Assembly 
mid-year stating that “(A) private company, accustomed to maritime pursuits, would 
undoubtedly conduct the service with more benefit to the public purse than the 
Government could do.”96 Looking to the future, the Queensland Postmaster-General 
ventured that “I do think that before long they will see that a very effective mail service 
can be secured by this route.”97 In seven years his optimism would be rewarded. 
 
A permanent route to China 
 
The development of a permanent steam communication route through the Torres Strait 
came into being in early 1873. One year later that was extended to China. The reasoning 
had not altered since the 1866 venture; it was to develop a shorter time for mail to be 
sent to and received from England and Europe together with a dissatisfaction with the 
P&O contract already in existence and supplying the southern colonies. One trigger for 
the re-emergence of the discussion on the Torres Strait route was the similar 
dissatisfaction in Victoria98 and NSW99 of the contract in existence with P&O by their 
respective mercantile bodies.100 The only other options for a mail service were via 
America or a possible Torres Strait route. NSW favoured a service via San Francisco 
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and invited Queensland to join them.101 Yet, discussions between Queensland and NSW 
were fruitless, the concerns primarily related to speed of steamers.102 The impetus had 
been quashed and Queensland was left, again, to go it alone with the Torres Strait 
route.103 
 
Similar to the 1866 venture, the process to create the service was both lengthy and 
complex. A Committee was initially created in April 1872. Through the Committee, the 
Queensland government agreed to a contract with the Netherlands India Steam 
Navigation Company (NISN) on similar terms to what existed with the 1866 venture.104 
The NISN eventually stated that they could not satisfy the agreement and the contract 
was terminated in October 1872.105 At the same time, a London firm, Mactaggart, 
Tidman & Co. (MT&Co.) showed interest. Informing the Agent-General of Queensland, 
Richard Daintree, MT&Co. stated that their object was “to connect and develop the 
trade between India, China, and Australia, as well as ensure a quick and regular postal 
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communication between Brisbane and this country,”106 this country being England. That 
is, unlike the NISN option which was centred on the Netherlands East Indies region, 
MT&Co. was a mercantile company that viewed the broader markets of East Asia and 
thus specifically the commercial gains the route offered as a supplement to delivering 
the mail. 
 
A tender in January 1873 formalised the process of selection and with only MT&Co. 
and NISN offering worthwhile submissions, MT&Co. were awarded the contract.107 
Thus, on 21 February 1873, Daintree informed MT&Co. that they were successful and 
that a solicitor would draw up the agreement for all to sign.108 The initial contract was 
signed on 18 April 1873 by a group of merchants in connection with MT&Co. and the 
Agent-General for Queensland.109 Following four months of discussion, the Postmaster 
General was instructed by the British government, on 16 August 1873, to sign the 
“Articles of Agreement,” thus formalising the contract. The contract, to the chagrin of 
the Queensland government, meant that the steamers would also travel to Sydney.110 
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To satisfy the contract, a new international maritime company was formed by MT&Co. 
and other merchants. Along with MT&Co partners William Mactaggart and Paul 
Frederick Tidman, the latter also connected to Tidman, Balfour and Co. of Batavia, 
were added James Guthrie, partner of Guthrie and Co. of Singapore and James 
Henderson, partner in Scott, Henderson and Co. of Sydney, Australia. The group had 
also co-opted the services of Bright Brothers and Co. in Brisbane to act as agents 
there.111 Thus was formed the Eastern and Australian Mail Steam Company. E&A was 
registered in London, with a capital of £150,000, on 3 May 1873 and with the objects 
to: 
convey passengers, goods, merchandise, mails, troops, and treasure, by sea or 
river, to and from Singapore, Java, Queensland and Sydney, and to and from such 
other places as the Company may from time to time determine upon, and to 
transact all business usually transacted by Ship Owners; to acquire or enter into 
contracts with the Governments of Queensland and New South Wales for the 
carriage of mails, or any other Colony, State or Country; to build, purchase, or 
hire ships or vessels, coal hulks, receiving ships, lighters, warehouses, houses, 
land, cattle or live stock, merchandise or treasure, and to charter or hire, sell or let, 
or otherwise employ or dispose of such ships or vessels, warehouses, houses, land, 
cattle, live stock and merchandise, and generally to transact all such business, and 
do all such things as are incidental or conductive to the attainment of the above 
objects.112 
 
E&A immediately set about to purchase and lease steamers. Their first steamer, Sunfoo, 
was purchased for £38,000113 and departed London on 27 September 1873 bound for 
Singapore and Brisbane. During the following month, the Jeddah, Tom Morton and 
Flintshire were each chartered.114 The Flintshire was the second vessel placed in service 
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following the Sunfoo.115 During the period of the contract, a number of vessels were 
built for E&A at various docks in Glasgow, Newcastle and Sunderland. They were the 
Somerset, Normanby, Brisbane, Singapore, Bowen, Queensland and Menmuir.116 
 
The service commenced on 19 November 1873 when the Sunfoo departed Singapore 
with the English mails and other items bound for Queensland and Sydney.117 Her first 
journey was outside the guidelines of the contract, instead landing only at Batavia 
where an additional 100 tons of cargo was collected.118 The Sunfoo arrived in Moreton 
Bay, Brisbane in the early hours of Saturday 13 December 1873 carrying five 
passengers for the through journey to Sydney and 150 tons of goods for Brisbane made 
up predominantly of sugar, rice and tea from Batavia and tapioca, sago and pepper from 
Singapore.119 The Sunfoo then departed from Brisbane on 15 December 1873, arriving 
in Sydney within two days. There she unloaded more cargo, similar in both size and 
type to that in Brisbane together with some items to be transhipped to Melbourne.120 
The Sunfoo also brought mail from Singapore to Sydney.121 She departed Sydney on 1 
January 1874 with the outgoing mail, after having been cleaned and re-painted.122  
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The success of the first journey of the Sunfoo led E&A to fulfil their desire to open up 
the trade to include China. At the Extraordinary General Meeting of Shareholders, held 
in London on 6 January 1874, a resolution was proposed and passed to extend the line 
to China and Melbourne.123 The decision was relayed to Singapore such that, upon 
arrival, the Sunfoo should continue her journey to Hong Kong. Extending the route to 
China was considered of vital importance to E&A. 
 
That maiden journey by the Sunfoo would be its last, a portent to the disasters that were 
to befall the company’s vessels over the following five years. On its journey north the 
Sunfoo ran aground near Bowen. When it arrived in Singapore the vessel was deemed 
unsuitable for further service until repaired.124 The Benton was leased for a once only 
return journey, travelling from Batavia to Sydney with mail from Singapore and then 
returning to Singapore with mail for England and China.125 Following repairs in 
Singapore, the Sunfoo continued her journey north to open up the new market of Hong 
Kong. Unfortunately, she struck a rock near Reef Island, a short distance from Hong 
Kong, on 10 March 1874 and became a total wreck. The passengers, the mail and some 
luggage were saved.126 For E&A, the Sunfoo would only be the first of a number of 
accidents that occurred to its fleet during the mail contract. Other ships to suffer damage 
or sink were the Flintshire, Jeddah, Bowen, Singapore, Normanby and the 
Queensland.127 
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The incident of the Sunfoo did not alter the ambitions of E&A as the company 
continued to use Hong Kong as a terminus and from there, first with the Jeddah and 
then the Flintshire, also moved its southern terminus to Melbourne.128 Throughout the 
period of the contract, E&A serviced all the required Queensland ports as well as 
Singapore and Hong Kong with the odd journey to Foochow to collect tea.129 The 
contract would remain in place, though with a number of alterations, until its expiry 
after seven years of service in November 1880. 
 
The extension of the termini to China and Melbourne proved a success, at least during 
the early years of the mail contract. In a report, dated 29 June 1874, the shareholders of 
E&A were informed that the steamers departing China for Australia had to “shut out” 
cargo at Hong Kong and Singapore due to an overwhelming demand.130 Three months 
later, in another report, the Board of E&A stated “the extension of the line to China and 
Melbourne has largely increased the prospects of revenue, and it fully justifies the 
employment of additional capital, in the extension of the company’s fleet.”131 
 
The China – Australia route provided E&A with one specific hidden advantage over its 
competitors, the intrinsic link between the mail contract and trade. A relationship that 
existed, and one not often drawn upon by historians, was the effectiveness of the mail 
subsidy on the trade. These mail contracts, though, provided benefits to the maritime 
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firms involved. For the firm, the subsidy of the contract assisted in reducing the 
transport costs and for the merchants at the ports there was the guarantee of regular 
shipping services. In India, for example, the British India Steam Navigation (BISN) 
company provided local connections to the P&O services from Britain and when new 
tenders were invited for other connections, the company knew “what an edge a mail 
contract gave the firm holding it over competing steamer concerns.”132 However, while 
in competition an advantage was attained when coupled with a mail subsidy, adding the 
benefits of trade was also vital. When viewing an option to take up a mail subsidy for 
the Zanzibar to India link, BISN noted that American merchant interests had a near-
monopoly on the trade between the two countries. Hence commercial realities kerbed 
any enthusiasm for BISN to embrace a mail subsidy for that route.133  
 
The route and contract taken up by E&A had similarities, differences and advantages 
over the BISN situation. Firstly, there was no initial competition between the East Asian 
ports of China and nearby countries directly with Australia’s eastern colonies. That is, 
the fact that no regular service went through the Torres Strait was the fundamental 
reason for the development of the new service by E&A. Secondly, prior to the contract, 
almost all travel by sea between China and the Australian colonies was done by the 
square-rigged type of vessels with extremely few, if any, by steam, thus giving a new 
steam service an advantage. Previously, goods for the trade did not require fast 
transmission as they were not perishable and thus merchants considered that the lower 
freight cost outweighed the speed element. Thirdly, Clause XXV of the contract with 
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the Queensland government waived all port costs in Queensland waters. 134  The 
elimination of port costs in Queensland waters placed E&A well ahead of their 
opposition, each of whom suffered “frustrating burdens” at the various levies imposed 
and inspired through colonial rivalries.135 These advantages created for the merchants of 
colonial Australia a more enticing option to transport their goods faster and more 
regularly than if they had to charter steamers. The other problem was that there were 
few, if any, ocean-going steamers in Australian waters available for charter as most 
belonged to international maritime firms. 
 
The contract with E&A did not exclude the addition of ports to the service. The 
extension to Hong Kong and Melbourne were clear examples. Various ports along the 
northern coastal region of Australia were also included. Two were synonymous with the 
Chinese and gold and thus attracted not only E&A but other maritime firms to service 
those ports. In northern Queensland the discovery of productive goldfields on the 
Palmer River, near Cooktown, created a “rush” of prospectors, including many from 
China. Port Darwin, the northerly port of the Northern Territory of South Australia, 
opened its port to Chinese immigration in December 1877 and thus from that point on 
E&A serviced both Cooktown and Port Darwin along their normal route. 
 
Cooktown lies at the mouth of the Endeavour River in far north Queensland and is the 
first port of call after rounding the Torres Strait and entering the Inner Passage.136 
Cooktown was a substantial contributor to the China trade in terms of both passengers 
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and cargo for E&A during the period of the contract.137 The port was not part of the 
original service. Yet new commercial advantages redefined the route with Cooktown as 
a major stopover for E&A and other shipping companies in the mid-to-late 1870s. The 
success of the goldfields drew vessels replete with Chinese immigrants to Cooktown. 
From early 1875 until the end of 1877 over 20,000 Chinese arrived by boat from Hong 
Kong into Cooktown.138 While E&A was not solely responsible for this influx, it was a 
regular and significant contributor. Cooktown offered E&A additional cargo and 
Chinese miners for the journeys between Cooktown and Hong Kong. The port’s 
merchants imported Chinese goods, whether these were rice, opium, joss sticks or other 
commodities. 139  On the return trips primarily gold was carried back, its portion 
unknown.140 In return, E&A offered the Chinese a regular return service between 
Cooktown and China, one that other shipping companies struggled to provide without a 
supplementary cargo to assist in paying for the journey. The fact that Cooktown opened 
its doors to the Chinese migrant workers gave the company impetus to push for more 
vessels travelling the route and thus the purchase of quicker and bigger steamers for the 
mail contract.141 The ability to use Cooktown helped E&A to pay its costs and also 
                                      
137 For a discussion on Cooktown and the Palmer River goldfields, see Robert Ormston, "The Rise and 
Fall of a Frontier Mining Town: Cooktown 1873-85." PhD. University of Queensland, 1996; Kevin Rains, 
"Intersections: The Overseas Chinese Social Landscape of Cooktown, 1873-1935." PhD. University of 
Queensland, 2005. Noreen Kirkman, "From Minority to Majority: Chinese on the Palmer River Gold-
Field, 1873-1876." In Race Relations in North Queensland, edited by Henry Reynolds. Townsville: James 
Cook University, 1993. 
138 The total amount is unknown, though well over 20,000 arrived, an amount calculated using shipping 
records in the two Cooktown newspapers – The Cooktown Herald and Cooktown Courier. Many also 
arrived from various ports south, including Melbourne, Sydney and Queensland towns. 
139 The two newspapers contained detailed import and export lists of goods and merchants involved. For 
example, the Bowen on 2 March 1876 brought to Cooktown rice, sugar, sausages, rope, wine, cuttle-fish, 
crackers, sugar candy, olive seed, cakes, string, china ware, ducks, medicine, opium and paper. 
“Shipping.” Cooktown Courier 4 March 1876: 2. 
140 “Export of Gold per Brisbane s.s.” Cooktown Courier 15 December 1875: 3. There was no duty or tax 
on the export of gold from Queensland. The decision not to declare the amount of gold being exported in 
unknown and perhaps relates to that which is declared to the Chinese in Hong Kong when the transport 
vessel arrived at that port. 
141 The vessels purchased and placed on the route during the period of the contract were: s.s. Brisbane 
(1874), s.s. Somerset (1874), s.s. Singapore (1874), s.s. Bowen (1874), s.s. Queensland (1875) and s.s. 
Menmuir (1878). 
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allowed the port itself to thrive. To a degree, a symbiotic relationship existed between 
Cooktown and E&A, through the Chinese migrant workers.142 
 
Port Darwin was an isolated port for South Australia. At the same time as the Palmer 
River goldfields were opened, gold was discovered inland of Darwin at Pine Creek.143 
Initially only Europeans mined the gold, arriving from the south by ship. In 1874, 187 
Chinese were brought by the South Australian government to Darwin as indentured 
labourers, most remaining after their two years of service concluded.144 However, the 
population of Darwin dwindled in the mid-1870s as more people departed than arrived. 
To counter this problem, the South Australian government debated about Chinese 
immigration to Port Darwin.145 Eventually, in late 1877 the first Chinese arrived from 
Hong Kong to Darwin aboard the s.s. Charlton.146 As with Cooktown, Darwin became 
an accessible market for E&A and others to provide a maritime service to China.147 
 
 
                                      
142 In the early years of the service and its connection with Cooktown, the service of E&A was successful. 
The fourth half-yearly report, dated 29 June 1875, stated that the connection to Hong Kong was one 
reason for this success. The ability to stop with cargo, both human and goods, at Cooktown was a bonus. 
Brisbane Courier 3 September 1875: 2. 
143 David Carment, "Writing the Mining History of Australia's Northern Territory: Past Themes, Current 
Research and Future Prospects." Journal of Northern Territory History 7 (1996): 2; Geoffrey Blainey, 
The Rush That Never Ended: A History of Australian Mining. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 
1969: 90-96. 
144 Eric Rolls, Sojourners: Flowers and the Wide Sea St Lucia, Queensland: University of Queensland 
Press, 1992: 267-78; “Arrival of Coolies.” Northern Territory Times and Gazette 8 August 1874: 2. 
145 The matter was discussed in the South Australia Parliament in 1876 and later as it was in the editorials 
and other items in both Adelaide and Port Darwin newspapers. See, for example: “House of Assembly. 
Wednesday, September 13: Immigration.” South Australian Register 14 September 1876: 6; “House of 
Assembly. Friday, November 3: Northern Territory Immigration.” South Australian Register 4 November 
1876: 6; “The Northern Territory and Chinese Immigration.” South Australian Register 3 January 1877: 6. 
146 The s.s. Charlton arrived from Hong Kong on 12 December 1877 with 90 Chinese. It had, a few 
months prior stopped in Port Darwin on a journey from Hong Kong to Cooktown enquiring about the 
option of providing Chinese immigrants from Hong Kong. “Shipping.” Northern Territory Times and 
Gazette 18 August 1877: 2; “Shipping.” Northern Territory Times and Gazette 22 December 1877: 1.  
147 The first E&A vessel to arrive was the s.s. Normanby from Hong Kong on 12 March 1878 with 137 
Chinese. “Shipping.” Northern Territory Times and Gazette 16 March 1878: 1. 
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The success of E&A in extending its route to Hong Kong was an impetus for three other 
companies to become involved in the China-Australia trade prior to 1880.148 Though 
numerous private ventures and individual charters existed between China and Australia, 
it was not until after E&A’s initial move into the market that other shipping companies 
became involved specifically on the route. Of the three, two originated from Hong Kong. 
They were Hop Kee and Co. and Kwong Hing Cheung and Co. The third was the 
Australasian Steam Navigation company (ASN). 
 
Figure 2.6. Steam routes from China to Australia for three shipping companies (1873-
80). 
 
 
The Chinese firms became major competitors for E&A on the China – Australia route. 
Hop Kee and Co. leased a number of fast steamers to perform a shuttle service between 
Hong Kong and Cooktown with occasional journeys to Newcastle to collect a freight of 
                                      
148 A fourth, George R. Stevens & Co. line joined the route from May 1880 which, as it is at the latest 
part of the period under study, I have chosen to omit from the work. 
 113 
coal for the return journey.149 Hop Kee and Co provided the transport for the first 
Chinese from China to arrive in Cooktown.150 The Adria, a P&O ship, was leased by 
Hop Kee and Co. for four months for the sole purpose of taking Chinese to Cooktown 
and then loading with coal from Newcastle on the return journey to Hong Kong.151 The 
Adria arrived at Cooktown on 20 March 1875, which was also marked by the arrival, 
only 90 minutes later, of the E&A steamer Brisbane. Together, the two vessels brought 
with them 754 transient Chinese gold miners to that part of north Queensland.152 Soon 
the second Hong Kong-based company, Kwong Hing Cheung and Co., which was 
managed by Mr. Leung Ah Yon, commenced a service between Hong Kong and 
Cooktown.153 The two companies continued to be involved in the Hong Kong – 
Cooktown route throughout the late 1870s and both extended their routes to include 
Port Darwin from 1878 onwards when that port finally allowed Chinese immigration.  
 
Hop Kee and Co. was also interested in investing in Australia. The South Australian 
government offered £5,000 for any company that could produce 500 tons of exportable 
sugar in the Northern Territory.154 Hop Kee and Co. offered to set up a sugar plantation 
with the intention of providing up to 500 Chinese coolies to work the fields. The offer 
                                      
149 Card 279537, Carl Smith Collection, HKPRO.  
150 There is an assumption that the Chinese in China were informed of the new gold rush in northern 
Queensland by their compatriots in Australia. The time taken to organise themselves meant that they were 
unable to take advantage of a vessel travelling past that port until the departure of the Adria and Brisbane. 
151 Memorandum for the Board, 8th March 1875. P&O/3/11, Reports from Managing Directors to Board 
1874-77, Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Records, National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, 
England; Cooktown Courier 27 March 1875: 2-3; The Hong Kong Times, Daily Advertiser, and Shipping 
Gazette 22 February 1875: 1. Noreen Kirkman, “From Minority to Majority”: 249n37 states that the s.s. 
Victoria was the first vessel to arrive from overseas. The Cooktown Courier 6 February 1875: 2 clearly 
states in its description that the vessel left from Sydney as do numerous newspapers from New South 
Wales. The Victoria did carry Chinese, and they may have arrived into Sydney from overseas, but the 
Adria was the first vessel to specifically arrive from overseas to the port of Cooktown. 
152 Cooktown Courier 27 March 1875: 2. 
153 Card 54635, Carl Smith Collection, HKPRO. The company has also been identified as Ah Yon and 
Co. 
154 “House of Assembly.” South Australian Register 15 October 1875: 6. “Northern Territory of South 
Australia.” Northern Territory Times and Gazette 11 August 1877: 1. 
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was not accepted and thus potentially the first investment by a Chinese-based firm in 
Australia did not take place.155 
 
ASN entered into competition with E&A and the two Chinese firms in late 1877, 
choosing, primarily, to lease steamers.156 Only one, the Ocean, was owned by ASN 
while six other steamers plied the route for the ASN.157 ASN wanted to capitalise on the 
lucrative Asian markets and the ability to take advantage of the transport of Chinese 
between China and Cooktown.158 However, to challenge the established E&A with their 
subsidised line and the two low-cost Chinese companies with their Chinese crews, 
required cost minimisation by ASN.159 ASN decided to replace their Australian seamen 
with lower-paid Chinese. That led to a revolt by Australian seamen against ASN and 
eventually a strike, initiated by the Seamens’ Union, at the end of 1878. In response, the 
Queensland government, backed by the unions, chose to halt the use of Chinese labour 
on “Australian run ships”160 and eventually imposed new immigration restriction Acts 
that were to be repeated throughout the Australian colonies. These became the catalyst 
                                      
155 “The Northern Territory.” Adelaide Observer 6 April 1878: 17. An attempt was also made to bring 
Japanese coolies by a western merchant to develop a sugar plantation. “House of Assembly.” South 
Australian Register 15 November 1877: 7. 
156 “Trade with China,” Cooktown Herald and Palmer River Advocate 3 November 1877: 2. 
157 This has been deduced through the names of the steamers and their past record together with the fact 
that ASN records do not show ownership of the vessels. These were the Thales, Charlton, Mecca, 
Zamboango, Athol and Crusader.  
158 As demonstrated in Figure 2.8, there was a sudden increase in imports and exports relating to China, 
especially related to the Queensland market. These statistics were available to ASN and replayed in the 
newspapers. Ronald Parsons, A Pioneer Australian Steamship Company: A History of the Hunter's River 
Steam Navigation Company and the Australian Steam Navigation Company, Including a Fleet List 
Lobethal, S. A. : Ronald Parsons, 1970: 47-48. The ASN chose in March 1878 to extend their route to 
Port Darwin. Cooktown was also the farthest most port along the Queensland coast that the ASN serviced. 
S. E. Stephens. "The Endeavour River and Cooktown." Queensland Heritage 2, no. 2 (1970): 23. 
159 It is of note that the “official history” of ASN neglects to include, or pass it without much note, the 
venture to China even though it generated such a significant incident in both the history of the company 
and of Australia. See: F. H. Trouton, F. H. Handbook and History of the Australasian Steam Navigation 
Co. Sydney: J.L. Holmes & Co., 1884. 
160 The strike did not affect the vessels of either E&A or the two Chinese companies, each of which 
employed Chinese seaman, Thus, only those vessels leased or owned by an Australian firm (ASN in this 
case) were involved in the strike. The emphasis is the author’s. 
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for development of the 1901 Immigration Restriction Act and the policy of “White 
Australia.”161 
 
Effects of the trade  
 
The consequence of the permanent Torres Strait service to Singapore and China for the 
eastern Australian colonies and especially Queensland was quite noticeable. One major 
factor, as shown in Figure 2.2, was the alteration of primary destination for vessels 
arriving from China in Australian ports. That was from Melbourne to Sydney. For the 
Queensland mercantile community, the effect on trade with China was significant. The 
work by E&A to open up new markets for the Queensland merchants created, by the 
end of the 1870s, a vibrant trade relationship with China. Figure 2.7 displays the sudden 
increase of shipping between China and Queensland after 1874.  
 
Figure 2.7. Shipping between Queensland and China, 1860-1880 (number of vessels).162 
 
                                      
161 For a lengthy review of the 1878-79 Seamen’s Strike see: Ann Curthoys. "Conflict and Consensus." 
In White Are Our Enemies? Racism and the Working Class in Australia., edited by Ann Curthoys and 
Andrew Markus, 48-65. Sydney: Hale and Monger, 1978; Phil Griffiths. "The Heroic Shameful Role of 
Labour: Mythology in the Making of White Australia." In Legacies 09 Conference. Toowoomba, 
Queensland, 2009; Pauline Kneipp. "The Seamen's Strike 1878-1879: Its Relation to the White Australia 
Policy." ANU Historical Journal 1, no. 2 (1965-66): 14-18. 
162 SR QLD 1860-1880. 
0"
10"
20"
30"
40"
50"
60"
70"
80"
90"
18
60
"
18
61
"
18
62
"
18
63
"
18
64
"
18
65
"
18
66
"
18
67
"
18
68
"
18
69
"
18
70
"
18
71
"
18
72
"
18
73
"
18
74
"
18
75
"
18
76
"
18
77
"
18
78
"
18
79
"
18
80
"
N
um
be
r'o
f'V
es
se
ls
'
Year'
"Shipping"Inwards"
"Shipping"Outwards"
 116 
 
Figure 2.8. Value of trade between China and Queensland 1860-1880 (£ sterling).163 
 
 
Table 2.2. Shares of shipping and trade between China and Queensland, 1873 and 1880 
(percentages).164 
 1873 1880 
% international inwards shipping 3.3 28.7 
% international outwards shipping 0.0 25.9 
% of value of international imports 1.0 12.5 
% of value of international exports 0.0 13.1 
 
 
Similarly, Figure 2.8 demonstrates that the value of trade between Queensland and 
China also increased significantly after 1874, emphasising the little access to the 
Chinese markets prior to the 1873 contract between E&A and the government. To 
further put this in the context of the overall international trade for Queensland, Table 
2.2 demonstrates the difference between 1873 and 1880 when viewing both the 
shipping and the trade statistics. By 1880 over a quarter of all international shipping and 
over an eighth of all international trade for Queensland was with China. In such a short 
time, trade with China had blossomed and the principal instigator was E&A and their 
steamers shuttling between China and Australia. The advantages gained from 
developing the mail contract were exploited by the merchants of Queensland. 
                                      
163 ibid. 
164 SR QLD 1873, 1880. 
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The introduction of steam-driven international shipping to the China – Australia route, 
together with the competition between first three and then four shipping companies, 
created new trade opportunities for the merchants in both China and the eastern 
Australian colonies. E&A had the most to gain as its vessels were travelling to 
Melbourne which was still a distribution point for a number of other colonies. JM&Co. 
began using the service, instead of the sail vessels, from the mid-1870s and many other 
merchants followed.165 E&A vessels, as with a number of the steamers from Hop Kee 
and Kwong Hing Cheung, also collected coal to be taken to China. Thus, as was shown 
earlier in Table 2.1, the number of sail vessels on the route from China to Australia 
diminished to zero by the early 1880s. This is more stated for the route to Sydney than 
for the Melbourne route. The fact that steamers were now prominent on the China to 
Australia route and that most would have taken the Torres Strait route also corroborates 
the fact that vessels from China chose Sydney as their destination over Melbourne. The 
second effect, as shown in Table 2.1, was a lull at the end of the decade in shipping 
from China to Melbourne.166 Nevertheless, by 1881 shipping resumed along the China 
to Melbourne route. The primary difference then was that all vessels were steamers.  
 
It should also be noted that all trade between Western Australia and China, continued to 
be performed on sailing ships throughout the period. The Blue Books from 1878 
onwards separate sail and steam in their shipping statistics and these show that there 
were no steamers travelling between Fremantle and China in either direction.167 Even by 
                                      
165 JM&Co. commenced using steam powered vessels to transport tea to Australia from the beginning of 
1864 and thence only rarely employed sail vessels instead. JMA A6/23 to A6/26. 
166 One possible reasoning may lay with the Victorian government crisis of the late 1870s. See Alfred 
Deakin, The Crisis in Victorian Politics 1879-1881 Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 1957. 
167 SR WA 1878-1880. 
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1896, there were no steam vessels travelling between WA and China.168 Thus, for the 
period leading to 1880, the migration from sail to steam, generated primarily through 
the mail contract and its related competition for the eastern route, was specific to the 
eastern colonies. The victory of steam over sail, though inevitable, however was not 
complete until the end of the century.169 
 
Concluding comments 
 
The China – Australia route through the Torres Strait provided an opportunity for 
international shipping in Australia’s eastern waters to change from sail to steam. John 
Hutchins argues that foreign subsidies, predominantly British, had little or no effect on 
international trade, such was the growth in production post 1860 of iron and steam 
sailing ships. 170 The isolation of Australia created an exception to this general rule. As 
Blainey states, Australia was remotely located from its main markets and thus suffered 
from the tyranny of distance. The opening of the Torres Strait route brought Australia 
much closer to China and other parts of Asia. It showed merchants, predominantly those 
in Australia, that there was an opportunity to take advantage of, both in terms of new 
technology in marine architecture as well as geographical adjacency. 
 
Australian merchants and governments strived to locate the most direct route for 
shipping to take from the eastern colonies to ports in Asia and thus towards England. 
This endeavour drove numerous attempts to locate the optimum route, a journey that 
meant traversing the Torres Strait. The development of the compound engine gave this 
                                      
168 SR WA 1896: Part IV:117. In the 1896 Statistical Register it was stated that there were eight vessels 
that departed from Western Australia towards either Hong Kong or China. All were sailing vessels. There 
were no vessels arriving from Chinese ports to Western Australia during that year. 
169 Bach, The Australian Station: 141. 
170 John Hutchins, "One Hundred and Fifty Years of American Navigation Policy." The Quarterly 
Journal of Economics 53, no. 2 (1939): 244. 
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dream impetus. It allowed for quicker travel between Singapore and the eastern 
Australian coast. It also eventually created economical advantages for both shippers and 
merchants when compared to sail. When the Queensland colonial government strove to 
open this route as part of a new link for their mail and commerce, they were initially 
greeted by failure in the ventures and admonishment from the other colonies. In 1873 
that all changed. That year was the breakthrough for the development of continuous and 
regular travel through the Torres Strait, a new service that catered for all of eastern 
Australia’s colonial needs. 
 
A number of effects were created by the opening of permanent and regular travel 
through the Torres Strait. The most prominent was the promotion of steamers over 
square-rigged vessels on the journeys from China to Australia. During the 1860s and 
most of the 1870s, sail remained the mode of transport between China and Australia. 
The opening of the Torres Strait route meant that by the early 1880s, steam 
overwhelmed sail on that route. From that point on, there were few, if any, square-
rigged vessels travelling from China to Australia. Secondly, the Queensland economy 
attained a boost, not only owing to a new method of the transport of mail, persons and 
goods from various parts of Asia, but through the development of Cooktown and its 
links to China. Towards the end of the 1870s, at the height of the gold diggings at the 
Palmer River, Cooktown was only behind Brisbane as a revenue producing town in 
colonial Queensland.171 Thirdly, for the ports of Sydney and Melbourne, the ability to 
attain tea and other goods from China at a quicker speed also assisted in providing a 
more economical market in those ports. Finally, although they were not supposed to be 
part of the mail contract, the ability for those in Sydney and Melbourne to send and 
                                      
171 SR QLD 1877: 52. From 1874 to 1876, Cooktown provided the second highest value (in pounds 
sterling) for exports from Queensland, only behind Brisbane. In 1877, Cooktown exported total was just 
below that for Rockhampton. 
 120 
receive mail from China much quicker than if that was to travel via Galle became an 
advantage for both the government and the merchants of the ports. 
 
The development of the permanent route via the Torres Strait and its connection to the 
markets of China cannot be separated from the mail contract between E&A and the 
Queensland government. For Queensland, mail became intrinsically linked with the 
development of the eastern route. Mail contracts were essentially a two-part process 
made up of an alliance between the delivery of mail and the company’s transportation 
of passengers and freight. The mail steamers were expected to carry cargo to 
supplement their travel. This placed a constraint on the traders in that the vessels were 
set to a timetable for the mails and any goods not on board at the time of departure 
would be left for the following ship.172 However, the very nature of mail subsidies 
allowed for market penetration into areas and routes that otherwise would have been 
provided with a poor quality of service. Further, as maritime historian Frank Broeze 
stated, the “very political nature of the process of awarding mail contracts and subsidies 
which went with them introduced an array of external influences into the shipping scene 
which could seriously interfere with the ordinary market forces at work.”173 That was 
definitely the case for the eastern route through the Torres Strait and its relationship to 
the advancement of the maritime industry on that route. 
 
The part played by Mactaggart Tidman & Co., initially, and thence E&A cannot be 
underestimated. Their determination to extend the route beyond that specified by the 
Queensland government both opened up Asian markets to Queenslanders and allowed 
                                      
172 Robert Greenhill, "Trans-Oceanic Mail Contracts: A Case Study in Nineteenth-Century Privatization 
and Deregulation." In Transport Regulation Matters, edited by James McConville, 55-77. London: Pinter, 
1997: 59. 
173
 Broeze, "Distance Tamed.": 2. It is of note that Broeze neglected the E&A contract in his analysis 
leaving a single intimation that the contract prior to that of BISN in 1881 (the E&A contract) was 
disappointing for the Queensland government. See Broeze. "Distance Tamed.": 10.  
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merchants in the ports of Sydney and Melbourne to take advantage of the mail contract 
route to deliver their goods faster. E&A promised to provide a regular carriage service 
for mail, cargo and passengers between the Asian ports of China and Singapore with 
Australia’s eastern coast and this they delivered. As such, E&A’s route decisions moved 
Australian trade with China into the new world of steam. Consideration should also be 
made to what may have transpired had the NISN option been taken up. Through a lack 
of competition with steam, sail usage on the China to Australia route could have 
continued for some time into the remainder of the nineteenth century as it did for the 
wool clippers that took their produce to the British market.174 
 
The mail contract between E&A and the Queensland government was not renewed in 
1880. The demise of the contract was a by-product of the need by E&A to continue the 
service to Sydney to take advantage of the markets there and the determination of the 
Queensland colonial government to populate their colony through immigration from the 
UK. When E&A submitted its tender for a new contract, the stipulation to continue to 
Sydney was a point that the Queensland government no longer accepted.175 The 
discussions between Queensland and NSW as regards a contribution to the new mail 
contract via the Torres Strait was not yet agreed upon and the Queensland government 
thus terminated discussions with E&A. Within a short time BISN put forward an option 
to not only deliver the mail from London to Brisbane but also to include the transport of 
migrants. That contract was agreed upon on 6 May 1880.176 The government, however, 
                                      
174 R. V. Jackson, "The Decline of the Wool Clippers." The Great Circle 2, no. 2 (1980): 87-98. It will be 
shown in Chapter 3 that sail continued to be used by coal-laden vessels travelling to China, though by 
1880 steamers provided a valid competition. 
175  Morning Bulletin 14 February 1880: 2; “Memorandum Relative to the Establishment and 
Maintenance of the Torres Straits Mail Service.” 2 September 1880 Copies of Minutes of the Executive 
Council, and Telegrams between the Government and Contractors, in Reference to the New Mail Service 
between London and Queensland. QVP 1880: 1030. 
176 “The Mail Contract.” The Queenslander 9 October 1880: 469; “Memorandum Relative to the 
Establishment and Maintenance of the Torres Straits Mail Service.” 2 September 1880 Copies of Minutes 
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stated that they had been pleased with the performance of the E&A contract in that the 
company carried out its duties “to the full satisfaction of the Postmaster-General.”177  
The Eastern and Australian Mail Steam company held a special meeting on 22 July 
1880 with the intention to wind up the company voluntarily as the company was no 
longer involved in the mail contract.178 That resolution was passed and on 10 August 
1880 the new company, Eastern and Australian Steamship Company Limited, was 
formed.179 The new E&A continued to service the route from Melbourne, Sydney and 
Brisbane to parts of Asia that included China, Philippines and Japan. More new 
steamers were purchased for these routes.180 The BISN service, however, was altered to 
take a route between Aden and Brisbane with no stop at Singapore, the mail to be 
collected at Aden.181 Thus, any contact with the East had been removed from the mail 
contract. It was left to companies like E&A to maintain the trade connection.  
 
Finally, there appears to have been an undisclosed, predetermined belief among the 
British authorities in favour of maintaining the usage of maritime routes via Cape 
Leeuwin. This belief created continuous conflict with attempts at opening up the Torres 
Strait route. For a number of decades leading up to 1873, shipping from Britain had 
chosen the quicker route towards Melbourne, taking advantage of the westerly winds. 
The choice of Melbourne to be the primary point of entry into Australia thus became 
fixed in the minds of those at the Admiralty. Further, when it came to an 1872 statement 
                                                                                                                
of the Executive Council, and Telegrams between the Government and Contractors, in Reference to the 
New Mail Service between London and Queensland. QVP 1880: 1029-42. 
177 “Memorandum Relative to the Establishment and Maintenance of the Torres Straits Mail Service.” 2 
September 1880 Copies of Minutes of the Executive Council, and Telegrams between the Government 
and Contractors, in Reference to the New Mail Service between London and Queensland. QVP 1880: 
1029. 
178 “Special Resolution “That the Company be wound up voluntarily.” Eastern and Australian Steamship 
Company Limited BT 31/1851/7270 The National Archives, Kew, UK. 
179 “Memorandum of Association.” Eastern and Australian Mail Steam Company BT 31/2682/14364 The 
National Archives, Kew, UK. 
180 “Shipping.” The Sydney Morning Herald 9 October 1880: 4. See Olsen, Lion of the China Sea for a 
fuller description of the future of the company post-1880. 
181 “Letter from H. Buxton Forman (for the Secretary) to General Post Office.” 15 September 1881 
Queensland Mail Service via Torres Straits POST 29/305B Royal Mail Archives, London. 
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by the Lords Commissioner of the Treasury, the favourite option and thus funding was 
still to travel via Cape Leeuwin and thus to Melbourne over and above the other 
options.182 Admiralty was always concerned about the risks of travel through the Torres 
Strait and thus did not believe in that route and found any excuse to avoid its usage. 
That is, the effect of Melbourne as the major port of that time defined the international 
shipping routes for Australia for a period prior to 1873. The work by E&A and the 
Queensland Government altered that belief. 
  
                                      
182 “Circular Despatch from the Earl of Kimberley.” 14 August 1872 (No. 1) Papers and Correspondence 
relating to Proposals for a New Postal Service with the Australasian Colonies on the Termination of the 
Present Contract with the Peninsular and Oriental Steam navigation Company at the End of the Year 
1873 QVP 1873: 1219. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
THE LITTLE BLACK ROCK OF NEW SOUTH WALES 
 
Australia’s reliance on coal as a source of energy, both for domestic use and as an 
export to numerous ports around the world, has continued unabated for over two 
centuries. Stumbled upon by some of the earliest convicts to New South Wales (NSW), 
the little black rock1 provided a boon for that colony in its early days, specifically as a 
viable export commodity throughout the second half of the nineteenth century. From the 
early 1860s, the coal mining industry of NSW expanded greatly. The coal mined in the 
colony of NSW, during the 1860s and 1870s, was exported to markets throughout the 
world. NSW coal reached such ports as Port Natal in South Africa and Portland, Maine, 
on the east coast of the United States of America.2  The two principal overseas 
destinations were New Zealand and China.3 Thus, for those who worked and managed 
the collieries of the Hunter Region north of Sydney and the Bulli and Bellambi coal 
fields south of the colony’s capital and those who shipped the coal overseas, the little 
black rock provided worthwhile profits.  
 
The importance of coal to the world cannot be understated. W. Stanley Jevons declared 
the second half of the nineteenth century to be the “Age of Coal.”4 The rise of the 
steamship both for naval and commercial interests required constant scientific 
                                      
1 I have taken this label for coal from a recent article in the Guardian. Bob Briton, “Coal’s last gasp.” 
Guardian (Sydney) No. 1703 23 September 2015: 5. 
2 For a complete list of ports where NSW coal was exported to, see Appendix 4. 
3 China, in this instant, encompasses Hong Kong. Australian colonial government records tended to 
merge statistics for Hong Kong within a general China classification and thus, throughout this Chapter, 
unless otherwise stated, China will cover all Treaty Ports, plus Hong Kong. 
4 Walter Stanley Jevons, The Coal Question: An Inquiry Concerning the Progress of the Nation and the 
Probable Exhaustion of Our Coal-Mines. London: Macmillan & Co., 1865: viii. 
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improvements in the engines that drove these metal vessels.5 However, while the new 
versions of boilers and furnaces created faster ships, they also made easier, simpler and 
more economical usage of the coal that took its place as the workhorse of steamer 
shipping. Thus, as Jevons stated in 1865: “Coal, in truth, stands not beside but entirely 
above all other commodities.”6 Coal was the primary material of energy, not only for 
water-borne transport but also nearly everything that was done on land as well. NSW’s 
place in the world’s coal industry was only minor at the commencement of 1860s, an 
annual production of barely a third of a single per cent of that of Great Britain.7 Yet, its 
prominence as an exporter of coal in East Asia, and particularly China, developed 
throughout the 1860s and 1870s to eventually overtake the previous dominant exporter 
to China, that being Great Britain. By the end of the 1870s, the landscape of coal 
imports into China had altered dramatically. Not only had NSW broken Britain’s 
stranglehold on coal exports to China, but so had other nations, including Japan. 
 
The Chinese ports were havens for competition where complex market structures 
existed and where the NSW companies struggled to find a market for their products. 
Numerous hindrances were placed before the commission agents of Hong Kong and 
Shanghai, the two dominant ports of entry for overseas coal, as they tried to gain the 
best for the NSW exporters. Freight rates, inferiority of NSW coal to Welsh coal and 
later to the cheaper Japanese and Formosan coal, together with over-supply were only a 
subset of the problems that beset NSW’s portion of the overall Chinese coal trade. For 
the NSW coal exporters, as much as their representatives in China, overcoming these 
                                      
5 Ramon Knauerhase, "The Compound Marine Steam Engine: A Study in the Relationship between 
Technological Change and Economic Development." The Journal of Economic History 27, no. 4 (1967): 
616; Ramon Knauerhase, "The Compound Steam Engine and Productivity Changes in the German 
Merchant Marine Fleet, 1871–1887." Journal of Economic History 28, no. 3 (1968): 390; Charles K. 
Harley, "British Shipbuilding and Merchant Shipping: 1850–1890." Journal of Economic History 30, no. 
1 (1970): 262-63. See also discussion in Chapter 2. 
6 Jevons, The Coal Question: viii. 
7 Jevons, The Coal Question: 252. 
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adversities amidst intense competition became a building block in the development of 
their maturity as international merchants. By 1880, these merchants had established 
their reputation as traders in the NSW - China coal trade, that reputation extending to 
the general Asian economy of the nineteenth century. 
 
For some historians, like K. H. Burley, NSW coal shipping to China was nothing more 
than an assumed requirement for shipping on their return journey to Britain.8 Termed by 
Burley as “back trade,” it came out of the need to find a load to return to England, 
whether direct from Australia or via another port, including Hong Kong or Shanghai.9 
The transport of NSW coal, Burley further declared, was for tramp shipping, vessels not 
requiring speed. Burley replayed a commentary in the Newcastle (NSW) newspaper of 
1864, which stated that vessels at that time enquired for freight, lest they travel to China 
in ballast in the view of “procuring loading for Great Britain.”10 The desire for the 
“back trade” thus defined the needs of the ship’s captains once they had unloaded their 
cargo in an Australian port. Burley sums up his findings by stating that in the mid-1860s 
even “with the decline of exports to China, however, the part played by N.S.W. coal 
shipments to the Asian sector remained essentially that of providing freight-earning 
cargo for vessels which otherwise would have cleared in ballast.”11 
 
Burley completely overlooked the part various elements, including coal companies, 
exporters, importers, commission agents and others, played within the NSW coal export 
industry. Each of these elements were vital for the NSW coal trade to China. Thus 
                                      
8 K. H. Burley, "The Overseas Trade in New South Wales Coal and the British Shipping Industry, 1860-
1914." The Economic Record 36, no. 75 (1960): 394-95. 
9 Burley, “The Overseas Trade”: 401. 
10 NCHRDN 10 February 1864: 2. 
11 Burley, “The Overseas Trade”: 402. 
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understanding what each role the elements played is important in analysing why NSW 
coal fulfilled that need and how the remittances were made.  
 
Contrary to Burley’s statement, the amount of coal traded from NSW to China was not 
insignificant. It surpassed the two major coal exporters to China at the time - Great 
Britain and Japan. Further, coal as an export commodity from NSW to China provided a 
significant proportion of the export trade from NSW to international ports for the 1860s 
and 1870s. The coal traded to China was used both to power steam engines and as fuel 
for furnaces to develop iron and other products. NSW coal also attained a strong 
reputation, such that by the 1870s the British Royal Navy commonly mixed it with 
Welsh coal or used it directly. The trade of coal from NSW to China was a rather 
complex arrangement affected by numerous factors, both internally and externally to 
NSW and one which provides much value to an understanding of the overall trade 
relationship between Australia, as a whole, and China. 
 
The analysis of the NSW coal trade of the 1860s and 1870s generates a number of 
questions that are put forward throughout this chapter. First, why did China require such 
a large amount of coal and how did NSW producers and traders situate themselves to 
meet this demand? Next, do the statistical data of the coal trade divulge a more 
expansive analysis of the trade? Thirdly, how can the statistical data be better explained 
through the qualitative material available, including correspondence and government 
official documents? Finally, how were the remittances in relation to the coal trade 
completed? Using archival materials, the chapter analyses the general trade and offers 
an explanation of the role of coal from New South Wales within the larger trade 
relationship between China and the Australian colonies. This chapter, thus, queries 
Burley’s conclusions. 
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China’s demand for coal 
 
Coal was an important commodity delivered regularly to China from various foreign 
ports.12 Yet, what is unusual for this specific item is that the consumption of the 
steaming coal, and a portion of the coking variety, was not for Chinese end users per se, 
but for Western companies based in China for use in their own steamers or those vessels 
the Westerners chartered. The Chinese had little need, or interest, for steaming coal 
above what they already procured from their own mines.13 The first steamer built in 
China was the Huanghu in 1865.14 Further, the first Chinese owned steam shipping 
company, the China Merchants’ Steam Navigation Company (CMSN), was only 
established in 1872.15 Thus, there was little or no demand for steaming coal by the 
Chinese in the 1860s and for a good portion of the 1870s.16 
 
Western firms held an important role in defining the requirements of importing foreign 
coal into the Treaty Ports of China. During the 1870s, British and American shipping 
made up over 80 per cent of all ocean-going and coastwise traffic in Chinese waters.17 
Firms such as JM&Co., Russell & Co., Trautmann & Co. and others competed with 
                                      
12 Robert Hart, "China. Trade Statistics of the Treaty Ports, for the Period 1863-1872." Shanghai: 
Imperial Maritime Customs Press, 1873. (Compiled for the Austro-Hungarian Universal Exhibition, 
Vienna, 1873): 28-29. For example, in 1872, coal as a single import commodity was only behind opium, 
cotton and wool. That said, it was only between 1% and 2% of the total value of imports. 
13 Jenny Huangfu Day, "From Fire-Wheel Boats to Cities on the Sea: Changing Perceptions of the 
Steamships in the Late Qing, 1830s-1900s." Australasian Journal of Victorian Studies 20, no. 1 (2015): 
60. Day concludes that the Chinese were inquisitive of the usages of steam yet took decades following the 
Opium Wars before they took advantage of it. 
14 Hsien-Chun Wang, "Discovering Steam Power in China, 1840s - 1860s." Technology and Culture 51, 
no. 1 (2010): 47-51. 
15 Kwang-Ching Liu, "Steamship Enterprise in Nineteenth-Century China." The Journal of Asian Studies 
18, no. 4 (1959): 436. 
16 There was no railway in China until a line from Wusong to Shanghai was opened in 1876. Railways 
were seen as a threat by the literati to the established order of transporting goods to inner-China. Richard 
C. Rapier, Remunerative Railways for New Countries; with Some Account of the First Railway in China. 
London: E. & F. N. Spon, 1878: 19; Percy Horace Kent, Railway Enterprise in China: An Account of Its 
Origin and Development. London: Edward Arnold, 1907: 13; Shellen X. Wu, Empires of Coal: Fueling 
China's Entry into the Modern World Order, 1860-1920. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2015: 
13. 
17 Han Qing, "Western Steamship Companies and Chinese Seaborne Trade During the Late Qing 
Dynasty, 1840-1911." International Journal of Maritime History 27, no. 3 (2015): 538. 
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each other for the lucrative Yangtze River trade as well as the coastal routes between 
Hong Kong and Shanghai.18 Overseas shipping companies, including P&O and the 
Pacific Mail Steam Ship Company, similarly relied on available imported coal reserves 
when their steamers arrived in the Treaty Ports.19 The other major contributors to coal 
imports were the governments of the foreign powers that maintained concessions in 
China.20 The interests of the governments lay in the development of a combination of 
their military, political and commercial concerns in the East Asian region.21 NSW coal 
was imported for each of these parties and, to a lesser extent, by the Chinese throughout 
the two decades of the 1860s and 1870s. 
 
By the 1860s, coal usage in Chinese waters grew at a rapid rate. Interest in improving 
transport speeds along common passages and the increasing use of steam ships drove 
the requirement for coal and sustained an influx of coal to the primary ports. The 
development of the Yangtze River trade through the opening of the Treaty Ports along 
the river from the late 1850s created new routes for steamers, as a replacement for junks, 
to ply.22 As soon as the port of Hankow was opened to foreign trade, foreign steamers 
became the major carriers of merchandise, both for local and international trade.23 
When combined with the existing coastal trade and the increasing tonnage of shipping 
for international trade, together they advanced the gradual change from sail to steam in 
                                      
18 Howard W. Dick and S. A. Kentwell, Beancaker to Boxboat: Steamship Companies in Chinese Waters. 
Canberra: The Nautical Association of Australia Inc., 1988: 3-5; For a list of those founded prior to 1882, 
see: Liu, "Steamship Enterprise”: 435. 
19 Letter from JM&Co. to Henry Moore Esq., 21 September 1861 General Letters from Shanghai JMA 
C46/21. P&O used steaming coal from the Bellambi mines. 
20 Letter from JM&Co. to Thacker Daniell & Co., 1 May 1860 Letters to Europe JMA C11/27. 
21 Shinya Sugiyama, Japan’s Industrialisation in the World Economy: 1859-1899: Export, Trade and 
Overseas Competition. London: Athlone Press, 1988: 170. 
22 Joseph Earle Spencer, "Trade and Transshipment in the Yangtze Valley." Geographical Review 28, no. 
1 (1938): 116-18. 
23 William T. Rowe, Hankow: Commerce and Society in a Chinese City, 1796-1889. Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 1984: 85-86. 
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the Chinese waters.24 While the coastal and river trade were directed by the movement 
of goods locally, a number of external factors increased the appearance of steamers in 
Chinese waters. The opening of the Suez Canal in 186925 and the trans-national railway 
across the United States26 in the same year created an eventual new influx of steam 
shipping for both the transport of goods and delivery of mail to the ports of the world.27 
Coal from NSW helped feed this ever increasing appetite of new steamers that traversed 
between the Treaty Ports and overseas destinations. 
 
The British Royal Navy was a major consumer of coal imported into China. Located 
primarily in Hong Kong, though also venturing to other ports in China, the British Navy 
required high-quality coal, coal that burnt to a maximum energy per ton, did not 
deteriorate when bunkered and burnt cleanly thus avoiding continuous cleaning of 
engines.28 The Navy had, up to the early 1870s, worked with primarily Welsh coal, 
considered the “best steam-coal in the world”.29 Maintaining the Navy was essential for 
the protection of Britain’s, and through that Australian, trade and commerce.30 However, 
by the 1860s and 1870s, a need for a reduction of costs altered the view of the 
Admiralty in Britain as to the makeup of the coal to be used by the British Navy in East 
Asia. Certain coal from the mines of NSW became more popular and part of a mixture 
with Welsh coal used by the Royal Navy in China.31 Thus, in a sense, the coal delivered 
                                      
24 Wang, “Discovering Steam Power”: 45-46; Bert Becker, "Coastal Shipping in East Asia in the Late 
Nineteenth Century." Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society Hong Kong Branch 50 (2010): 245. 
25 Max E. Fletcher, "The Suez Canal and World Shipping, 1869-1914." The Journal of Economic History 
18, no. 4 (1958): 558-59. 
26 John H, Kemble, "The Transpacific Railroads, 1869-1915." Pacific Historical Review 18, no. 3 (1949): 
332; E. Mowbray Tate, Transpacific Steam: The Story of Steam Navigation from the Pacific Coast of 
North America to the Far East and the Antipodes, 1867-1941. London: Cornwall Books, 1986: 23. 
27 Sugiyama, Japan’s Industrialisation: 172-73. 
28 Steven Gray, "Imperial Coaling: Steam-Power, the Royal Navy and British Imperial Coaling Stations 
Circa. 1870-1914." PhD. University of Warwick, 2014: 141. 
29 Gray, "Imperial Coaling”: 156. 
30 Donald M. Schurman, Imperial Defence 1868-1887. London: Frank Cass, 2000: 24. 
31 Schurman, Imperial Defence: 29-31. 
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by Australian vessels to the Royal Navy was being used, in some cases, by the Navy for 
the protection of the very same coal deliveries. 
 
The port of Shanghai, by the 1860s, attained a prominent position for coal imports. At 
that time, the major exporters of tea and other goods, including silks, for the British and 
American markets were companies based in Shanghai. 32  Shanghai’s geographical 
location gave the city a strong position as a transition port. Based at or - at that time - 
near the mouth of the Yangtze River meant further trade was thus available inland for 
the goods imported into Shanghai and similarly for goods shipped to Shanghai from 
such ports as Hankow, Chenkiang and Nanking heading for overseas markets.33 Further, 
the Chinese foundries in Shanghai required increasing amounts of quality coking coal 
which was produced by both mines in America and New South Wales.34  Thus, 
merchants in Shanghai were importers of both Australian steam and coking coal. 
 
The other element of steamer traffic in China was that of the river trade. Primarily, the 
steamers of the Yangtze River trade consumed coal obtained from the mines of northern 
China. That coal was transported to the primary trading port along the Yangtze River, 
Hankow.35 Unlike coal imported into Shanghai, the northern Chinese coal was not used 
for steamers traversing the coastal and international waters. It was seen as unaffordable, 
owing to a combination of high transport costs and heavy government taxation.36 Thus 
                                      
32 I base this assumption on the fact that exports of tea and silk from China were nearly all from Shanghai 
and not from the southern ports. See Prices Current AH P945 Cartons 31-33. 
33 Hart, "China. Trade Statistics” – Shanghai: 6; W. L. G. Smith, Observations on China and the Chinese. 
New York: Carleton, 1863: 124. At that time Shanghai was small in size and not located on the Yangtze 
River, but connected through the port of Woosung. 
34 T. L. Kennedy, "The Establishment of Modern Military Industry in China 1860-1868." Bulletin of the 
Institute of Modern History, Academica Sinica (1974): 796. 
35 Rowe, Hankow: 58. 
36 Elspeth Thompson, The Chinese Coal Industry: An Economic History. London: Taylor and Francis, 
2003: 8. Commercial Reports from Her Majesty’s consuls in China, Japan, and Siam 1865-66. House of 
Commons, no. 3940 (1867) London: Harrison and Sons, 1867: 100-1. 
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the coal delivered to Hankow was used for river traffic only.37 That usage varied 
throughout the 1860s and 1870s. Initially, during the period of instability owing to the 
Taiping Rebellion of the 1850s and early 1860s, only foreign steamers could traverse 
the river safely.38 Following the retaking of Nanking from the Taipings in 1864, junks 
became the preferred method of transport of goods along the river, primarily for cost 
reasons, thus relegating the steam traffic to rare services.39 However, by 1871 Chinese 
shippers started to dominate the Yangtze trade route. Following the opening of a branch 
of the CMSN in Hankow, trade altered such that the Chinese steamships were able to 
eventually lure native traffic away from CMSN’s foreign competitors.40 Thus, the 
Chinese merchants progressively asserted control over steam navigation on the Yangtze 
River, and, in consequence, their requirement for local coal for this route as opposed to 
coal imported into Shanghai increased. By the end of the 1870s, steamers plying the 
Yangtze River almost exclusively used Hankow coal.41 
 
The requirement for foreign coal in China by the Chinese was for coking purposes. Iron 
and nonferrous metal production in China had been in existence for centuries prior to 
1800. The Chinese had mined local coal deposits to fire the furnaces.42 By the mid-
nineteenth century, Chinese furnaces were becoming more prevalent and opportunities 
to investigate foreign variants of coal presented themselves, particularly for furnaces 
                                      
37 China. No. 2 (1871). Commercial reports from Her Majesty’s consuls in China. 1869-70. HoC no. 
C.317 (1871): 6. 
38 Rowe, Hankow: 86-87; Kemp Tolley, Yangtze Patrol: The U.S. Navy in China. Annapolis, MD: Naval 
Institute Press, 1984: 18. Kwang-Ching Liu, Anglo-American Steamship Rivalry in China 1862-1874. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1962: 13-14. 
39 Rowe, Hankow: 86-87; Reports from the Foreign Commissioners at the Various Ports in China for the 
Year 1865. House of Commons, no. 3823 (1867) London: Harrison and Sons, 1867: 126-27. Liu, Anglo-
American Steamship: 67.  
40 Rowe, Hankow: 87. 
41 China. No. 3 (1880). (Trade reports.) Commercial reports from Her Majesty’s consuls in China. 1879. 
HoC, no. C.2718 (1880): 148. 
42 See: Joseph Edkins, "The Bituminous Coal Mines West of Peking." Journal of the North China Branch 
of the Royal Asiatic Society 4, no. 243-50 (1867); Thos. W. Kingsmill, "Notes on Some Outlying Coal-
Fields in the South-Eastern Provinces of China." Journal of the North China Branch of the Royal Asiatic 
Society n.s.3 (1866): 94-106. For a discussion on the Chinese use of steam power and their furnaces, see: 
Wang, "Discovering Steam Power in China.": 31-54. 
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located near Shanghai.43 One significant reason for the increase of coal-using industries 
in China was the establishment of a modern military industry.44 The uprising of the 
Taipings (1851-65) together with the Second Opium War required Chinese leaders to 
consider new options for the defence of the Empire.45 By 1861, the understanding of the 
Chinese government was to move towards an industry that supported military 
development, whether that was steam craft or ordnance.46 The creation of the Kiangnan 
Arsenal in Shanghai in 1865 was a result of these concerns and that arsenal required 
good quality coking coal.47 Coal from the Illawarra district was one option, another was 
anthracite imported from America.48 During the 1860s and 1870s, Australian coking 
coal gained a strong foothold in this market, significantly due to its lower cost 
compared with American coal but also due to its quality. 49  Chinese coal was 
increasingly too expensive to ship from the rural areas to these foundries. 
 
The timing of the arrival of coal to the Chinese ports varied. While the British Navy was 
not constrained by seasonal requirements, those steamers involved in delivering the teas 
from the opening of the season to Great Britain were.50 Thus, as these vessels arrived in 
Chinese waters in the first half of the year, high quality coal was needed at that time.51 
This seasonal alteration to the coal market did not affect Australian coal shipments to 
any great extent. Thus, as JM&Co. remarked to the Newcastle merchant R. H. Grierson, 
                                      
43 Kennedy, "Modern Military Industry.": 792-803;  
44 Shannon R. Brown, and Tim Wright, "Technology, Economics, and Politics in the Modernization of 
China's Coal-Mining Industry, 1850-1895." Explorations in Economic History 18 (1981): 62-63. 
45 Kennedy, “Modern Military Industry”: 781-84. 
46 Kennedy, “Modern Military Industry”: 787. 
47 Kennedy, “Modern Military Industry”: 803-7; Brown and Wright. “Technology Economics”: 73. 
48 Anita B. Rice, "The Pacific in American Economic Policy. 1860-1880." Masters, University of Kansas, 
1921: 16, 22; Reports from the Foreign Commissioners at the Various Ports in China for the Year 1865. 
House of Commons, no. 3823 (1867) London: Harrison and Sons, 1867: 126-27. 
49 In the regular communication between JM&Co. and their agents in Australia, the price of the different 
varieties of coal showed Sydney as less than American at all times. 
50 The tea export season was from May to April. A discussion of the tea trade to Australia is provided in 
Chapter 5. 
51 China. No. 1 (1875). Commercial reports from Her Majesty’s consuls in China. 1873. House of 
Commons no. C.1130 (1875) London: Harrison and Sons, 1875: 147. 
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“as respects the best time for shipping the demand is pretty constant throughout the 
year.”52 
 
Organisation of the coal trade 
 
Figure 3.1. Views from Newcastle, ca. 1860.53 
 
 
It was common for ships from other inter-colonial and international ports to arrive in 
Newcastle and Sydney in search of a charter to transport coal.54 The number of vessels 
in the ports of Sydney or Newcastle in search of a charter for coal varied. Figure 3.1 
shows a time when the Newcastle docks were full of vessels. Other vessels were already 
                                      
52 Letter from JM&Co. to R. B. Grierson Esq., 27 July 1863 Letters to India JMA C10/55. 
53 “Views of Newcastle.” ca. 1860. SLVIC: H141646. 
54 “The Coal Trade of Newcastle.” NCHRDN 21 January 1862: 2. 
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affixed to a contract prior to their arrival. They were either chartered in Melbourne or 
were owned by merchants or companies involved in the coal trade.55  
 
The companies involved in the transactions at the docks were commonly shipping 
agencies. They obtained the coal from the mining companies, having paid the pit cost of 
the coal. Numerous Western firms in Shanghai and Hong Kong imported coal from 
these shipping agencies.56 AH&Co. and JM&Co., for example, dealt with many of the 
shipping agents in both Sydney and Newcastle. Charles Stokes of Newcastle and Henry 
Moore of Sydney, became close associates of JM&Co. and, in Stokes’ case, was as the 
“agent” for JM&Co. in Newcastle.57 Robert Towns & Co. of Sydney was also involved 
as a coal shipping agent, among his other extensive mercantile work, with numerous 
entities in Hong Kong, including the Pacific Mail Steam Ship Co. and Russell & Co.58 
Mining companies themselves were sometimes shipping agents. In Sydney, the Bulli 
Coal Company of the Illawarra district for example exported coal to various 
destinations, including China.59 In a number of situations, the captain of a vessel would 
also be the shipping agent, thus taking responsibility for freight costs and insurance.60 
 
The process of acceptance of coal in China was quite different to the organising of 
charters and loading of coal through agents or similar. Commission agents in China, 
                                      
55 Burley, “The Overseas Trade.”: 397. Burley states that practically all vessels arriving in NSW came 
from other inter-colonial ports. Burley discounts all the vessels arriving from New Zealand, the Pacific, 
China via the Pacific and the Americas. 
56 In Shanghai, the company Frazar & Co. was the main importer of NSW coal throughout the 1860s and 
1870s. Russell & Co. were also a big participant in the NSW coal import industry to Shanghai. Frazar & 
Co. do not have any records for NSW coal importation in their archives and I have not seen any records 
from Russell & Co. on the trade of NSW coal to Shanghai. 
57 Janette Holcomb, Early Merchant Families of Sydney: Speculation and Risk Management on the 
Fringes of Empire. London: Anthem Press, 2014: 235-36. 
58 Frank Broeze, "Australia, Asia and the Pacific: The Maritime World of Robert Towns." Australian 
Historical Studies 24, no. 95 (1990): 229. Broeze, strangely, dismisses any connection with the coal trade, 
though mentions one abortive shipment to China. 
59 “Shipping.” SMH 4 January 1871: 4. The Amphrite sailed on 6 January 1871 for Hong Kong with 173 
tons coal. The Bulli Coal Co. were the agents. 
60 “Shipping.” SMH 24 December 1872: 4. The Fairlie departed Sydney for Shanghai on 24 December 
1872 with 275 tons coal, Captain Ebernethy agent. 
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including JM&Co., AH&Co., Russell & Co. and others, received the coal from the 
vessels and then sold it to local customers. These customers were primarily shipping 
companies or the masters of individual steamers that had received a charter and were in 
search of coal for fuel. The commission agents in China had one significant competitor, 
the shipping companies themselves. In some cases, these shipping companies chose to 
receive their coal direct to the steamer. Throughout the 1860s and 1870s, they would 
transact the coal “off ship” or from “ship’s side,” thus avoiding the costs of lightering to 
and from land as well as storage in godowns and commission.61 This method generated 
problems for the commission agents who, with a diminished number of customers, were 
either left with excess stock in their godowns or, the opposite, a paucity of stock that 
was required by new arrivals. 
 
Each problem was significant for the commission agents in China. In the first case, 
excess stocks without buyers meant it was harder to clear the godowns and thus the 
requirement to offer lower prices. As JM&Co. remarked to his Newcastle agent, Charles 
Stokes, the then depressed market created declining rates and the reason was said to be 
“principally owing to the fact that lately nearly all the large steamboat companies have 
imported for their own requirements, thus leaving the ordinary shippers little chance of 
walking off their consignments.”62 Thus, the inability to clear new stocks arriving, 
coupled with the diminishing number of customers created an uncertain market which, 
in some cases, rarely offered good prices on open sale.63 The second case had a contrary 
effect, one that existed owing to a lack of stocks. On occasion, when imports were on 
                                      
61 Letter from JM&Co. to Henry Moore Esq., 29 December 1860 Letters to Europe JMA C11/28; Letter 
from JM&Co. to R. H. Grierson Esq., 27 July 1863 Letters to India JMA C10/55; Letter from JM&Co. to 
Charles Stokes Esq., 2 February 1869 General Letters from Shanghai JMA C46/7; Letter from JM&Co. 
to T. W. Binney Esq., Secretary, Newcastle Wallsend Coal Co., 23 February 1864 General Letters from 
Shanghai JMA C46/4. 
62 Letter from JM&Co. to Charles Stokes Esq., 2 February 1869 General Letters from Shanghai JMA 
C46/7. 
63 Letter from AH&Co. to Messrs Beilby Scott & Co., 22 July 1864 Bound Correspondence: Letters sent 
by A.H.&Co., Hong Kong to Pacific AHA II C 1 v518. 
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the “account of consumers,” only a small amount of stock was available for sale.64 The 
sales direct to the steamer companies left stocks un-replenished. This created a demand, 
at certain times, for the various varieties of coal, including from NSW. In the early 
1870s the price of coal increased dramatically in Hong Kong from $9.50 in April 1871 
to $14 by January 1872, specifically owing to the lack of stocks.65 Such were just some 
of the effects of the various factors within a complex coal trade. 
 
Coal mines of New South Wales 
 
The coal mines of NSW produced two varieties of coal. The more common, found 
throughout the coal districts of NSW, was steaming coal. Specifically, the Hunter River 
region with its safe port of Newcastle provided the bulk of the steaming coal that was 
then exported to ports located in the other colonies and markets throughout the Pacific 
and along the Indian and west Atlantic Oceans.66 The other variety was coking coal. 
Although sometimes used on steam vessels for their propulsion, coking coal’s primary 
function was to provide an energy source for furnaces involved in manufacturing iron 
and similar products.67 Most, if not all of the NSW coking coal was obtained from the 
mines of the Illawarra region, south of Sydney.68 
 
                                      
64 Letter from JM&Co. to Charles Stokes Esq., 27 April 1871 Letters to India JMA C10/61. 
65 Letter from JM&Co. to Charles Stokes Esq., 27 April 1871 Letters to India JMA C10/61; Letter from 
JM&Co. to Charles Stokes Esq., 17 August 1871 Letters to India JMA C10/61; Letter from JM&Co. to 
Charles Stokes Esq., 14 Spetember 1871 Letters to India JMA C10/61; Letter from JM&Co. to Charles 
Stokes Esq., 17 October 1871 Letters to India JMA C10/61; Letter from JM&Co. to Charles Stokes Esq., 
14 November 1871 Letters to India JMA C10/61; Letter from JM&Co. to Charles Stokes Esq., 10 
January 1872 Letters to India JMA C10/61. The price increased from $9.50 in April to $9.75 in August, 
$10 in September, $10.50 in October, $12 in November and between $13 and $14 in January 1872. 
66 For a complete list of destination of New South Wales coal, see Appendix 4. 
67  Paul Graham, Sally Thorpe, and Lindsay Hogan, "Non-Competitive Market Behaviour in the 
International Coking Market." Energy Economics 21 (1999): 197. 
68 Clifford M. Zierer, "Industrial Area of Newcastle, Australia." Economic Geography 17, no. 1 (1941): 
41; Helen Hughes, The Australian Iron and Steel Industry 1848-1962. Melbourne: Melbourne University 
Press, 1964: 14. Some was also mined in Newcastle and the Western (Lithgow) mines. Edward Combes, 
"The Industries and Commerce of New South Wales." Journal of the Society of Arts 34 (1886): 697-98. 
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Figure 3.2. Map of NSW showing the location of coal fields, 1860-1880. 
 
 
Coal deposits had been uncovered in various districts of NSW throughout the nineteenth 
century and, by 1880, significant mining of coal took place in regions to the north, south 
and west of Sydney, the colony’s capital.69 From the Queensland border through the 
valley of the Hunter River to the Illawarra district, new fields were regularly opened 
throughout the century. The initial discovery of coal was made, earlier in 1791, close to 
the ocean and near the opening of the Hunter River.70 Later, coal was also found in the 
Illawarra71 and Van Diemen’s Land.72 Most of the earliest coal was transported to 
                                      
69 For a description of where the fields are located, see: Adrian C. Hutton, "Geological Setting of 
Australasian Coal Deposits." In Australasian Coal Mining Practice, edited by R. Kininmonth and E. 
Baafi. 40-84. Carlton, VIC: The Australasian Institute of Mining and Metallurgy, 2009. 
70 Robin Gollan, The Coalminers of New South Wales: A History of the Union, 1860-1960. Melbourne: 
Melbourne University Press, 1963: 3. 
71 Gollan, The Coalminers: 3; Henry Lee, "The Development of Coal Trade in the Wollongong District of 
New South Wales, with Particular Reference to Government and Business, 1849-1889." PhD. University 
of Wollongong, 1993: 5; William A. Bayley, "Discovery of Coal in Illawarra: Coal Cliff." Illawarra 
Historical Society Bulletin (September, 1971): 294-95. 
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Sydney to be consumed there. Yet, by the turn of the nineteenth century shipments were 
made to Calcutta.73 Coal production and exports were sporadic and small and, not until 
the emergence of the Australian Agricultural Company (AAC), founded in 1824, was 
there any significant mining of coal in the Newcastle region for either domestic or 
foreign use.74 The AAC held a monopoly, through an Act of the British Parliament, on 
the industry until 1847,75 taking legal action against any potential competitors.76 
Following the close of the monopoly, a number of other companies commenced mining 
throughout NSW.77 One company that became a force in the industry from the 1850s 
onward was that of J. and A. Brown.78 Expansion into other fields located south and 
west of Sydney as well as inland along the Hunter River continued thereafter.79 Figure 
3.2 shows the location of various mines in NSW that produced coal during the 1860s 
and 1870s. 
 
                                                                                                                
72 A. J. Hargraves, History of Coal Mining in Australia. Melbourne: The Australasian Institute of Mining 
and Metallurgy, Illawarra Branch., 1993: 1; David Francis Branagan, Geology and Coal Mining in the 
Hunter Valley 1791-1861. Newcastle History Monographs. Newcastle, NSW: Newcastle Public Library, 
1972: 11. 
73 Zierer, "Industrial Area of Newcastle, Australia”: 31; Christopher Schmitz, "The First Hundred and 
Twenty Years of New South Wales Coal Mining: A Statistical Survey." Reference Australia 2 (May, 
1988 1988): 1. 
74 Schmitz, “First Hundred and Twenty Years”: 3. Schmitz includes a table showing that the average 
annual coal production in NSW was 1,200 tons for 1805-19, 7,500 tone for 1820-39, 92,400 tons for 
1840-59 and 949,000 tons for each year through 1860-79. 
75 Bill for granting certain Powers and Authorities to Australian Company of London for Cultivation and 
Improvement of Waste Lands in Colony of New South Wales. Bill number: 325, Parliamentary Session: 
1824. House of Commons, 18 May 1824; J. F. Atchinson, "Port Stephens and Goonoo Goonoo - a 
Review of the Early Period of the Australian Agricultural Company." PhD. Australian National 
University, 1973: 15-18; G. F. Davidson, Trade and Travel in the Far East, or, Recollections of Twenty-
One Years Passed in Java, Singapore, Australia, and China. London: Malcolm and Madden, 1846: 205; 
Zierer, "Industrial Area of Newcastle, Australia”: 33. 
76 Frank R. E. Mauldon, A Study in Social Economics: The Hunter River Valley, New South Wales. 
Melbourne: Workers' Educational Association of N.S.W. in conjunction with Robertson & Mullens, 
1927: 57-58. The AAC initially chose not to interfere with “pot-hole” pits but when J. & A. Brown 
wanted to open new mines, AAC took them to the Supreme Court and won to stop them. 
77 Schmitz, “The First Hundred and Twenty Years of New South Wales Coal Mining”: 7. See Appendix 5 
for a list of coal mine companies involved in the coal trade. 
78 J. W. Turner, "J. & A. Brown and the Overseas Trade in New South Wales." Economic Record 43, no. 
4 (1967): 588. 
79 Schmitz, “The First Hundred and Twenty Years of New South Wales Coal Mining”: 2. 
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The quality of steaming coal from the different mines of NSW varied. The best coal 
suited the vessels that required speedy travel, including the naval vessels and the fast 
steamers with the opening season’s teas for their journey to England.80 However, in the 
general circumstance, NSW steaming coal was found to work better with the steamers 
that were satisfied with making distance more than time, typically tramp steamers. 
These tramp steamers carried bulk goods and thus were not expected to deliver under 
any timetable.81 Another source of request for NSW steam coal was from companies 
involved in providing a regular steam service, particularly those in Australian or nearby 
waters.82 
 
Australian coking coal was found at the collieries of the Illawarra district. The mines of 
the Bulli and Bellambi companies were two of the dominant producers of the coking 
coal in the 1860s and 1870s and both took advantage of the trade with China to cover 
any potential losses with the steaming kind.83 The Bellambi Coal Company commenced 
overseas exports in 1857 and the Bulli Coal Mining Company in 1863.84 Initially, coal 
from the Bulli company was shipped to various ports in India, California and China. 
However, in these early years of the company, only through China was any profit 
                                      
80 These vessels not only required more powerful boilers with larger heat release rates of their furnaces, 
but also within a smaller amount of space. The ability to raise the boiling temperature of water increased 
the pressure and thus the production of steam. Some NSW coal, as will be evidenced from tests discussed 
later in this chapter, could perform this duty sufficiently for naval vessels. Prabir Basu, Cen Kefa, and 
Louis Jestin, Boilers and Burners: Design and Theory. New York: Springer, 2000: 9; James H. Milton, 
and Roy M. Leach, Marine Steam Boilers. London: Butterworths, 1980: 6, 10, 15. 
81 Becker, "Coastal Shipping in East Asia": 245. 
82 Gordon de L. Marshall, Maritime Albany Remembered: Les Douglas Et Al. Kalamunda, WA: Tangee 
Pty Ltd, 2001: 1, 66; P&O used the Kingfisher as a coal hulk for King George Sound (Albany) from 1860 
to 1885 and the Larkins from 1853 to 1876. 
83 The Coal Cliff mine commenced shipping coal to Sydney in January, 1878 with 100 tons about the 
Eagle. The mine was also considered to provide good quality steaming, melting and coking coal. Edgar 
Beale, "Events in the History of Coal Cliff and Its Colliery." Illawarra Historical Society Bulletin (July, 
1959): 192-95. 
84 Schmitz, "The First Hundred and Twenty Years of New South Wales Coal Mining”: 42, 52; “Coal 
Mining at Bulli.” The Sydney Mail 18 October 1873: 498; William A. Bayley, "Bellambi as a Coal Port." 
Illawarra Historical Society Bulletin (June, 1960): 223. 
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created, such was the desire for and confidence in the quality of Australian coking coal 
by the importers in China.85 
 
Figure 3.3. The Bulli Coal Mining Company’s Mine at Bulli.86 
 
 
Coal from the Illawarra district, in the 1860s and 1870s, had to be shipped to Sydney or 
Newcastle prior to its export overseas. This was because of the lack of a safe harbour 
for vessels in the region, the inability to create a wharf long enough to allow for 
sufficient draught for large vessels87 and no railway line to Sydney.88 Without any 
                                      
85 “The Bulli Coal Mining Company: 6th Half-yearly Report to 31 December 1864.” SMH 24 February 
1865: 5. 
86 “The Bulli Coal Mining Co.’s Mine.” The Sydney Mail 18 October 1873: 498. 
87 Bayley, "Bellambi as a Coal Port”: 224. 
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shelter, vessels loading along the Illawarra coast were exposed to storms and heavy 
swells that pounded the coastline. The coal companies created jetties with tram lines 
traversing the trestles to the deep water. However, they too were prone to damage from 
storms.89 Figure 3.4 demonstrates how much these jetties jutted out into the exposed 
ocean. Hence, when bulk transport was not required, it was small vessels that loaded up 
 
Figure 3.4. The Bulli Coal Mining Company’s Jetty, Bulli.90 
 
 
to 500 tons of coal and travelled the short distance to Sydney where the coal was 
transhipped to larger ships.91 In the case of a demand for bulk transport, larger, 
independently-owned carriers, some with contacts to the Newcastle coal mining 
                                                                                                                
88 Brian Rogers, "Illawarra Coal Shipping: Some Operational Aspects." Illawarra Historical Society 
Bulletin (October, 1985): 60. 
89 “Coal Mining at Bulli.” The Sydney Mail 18 October 1873: 498. 
90 “The Bulli Coal Mining Co.’s Jetty, Bulli.” The Sydney Mail 18 October 1873: 499. 
91 The Bellambi and Mount Keira mines developed tramways by 1862 taking up to 200 tons of coal to 
Sydney. Reports received from Her Majesty’s secretaries of embassy and legation respecting coal. With 
an appendix, and reports as to coal production in British colonies. HoC, no. 3759 (1867): 115. 
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companies, were used.92 The Bulli company’s first vessel was the Waniora in 1863.93 In 
1873, another steamer was added to the fleet, the Bulli, with the two carting coal to 
Sydney on alternate days.94 The Bellambi Coal company used a number of small vessels. 
In 1858 the Nightingale, the company’s first vessel, carried 55 tons of coal to Sydney. 
By 1860, the fleet was six vessels in size.95 In a small number of cases, coal was 
shipped to Newcastle for transhipment to China.96  
 
The importance and favourability of NSW coking coal for Chinese consumption was 
commonly advertised by Western merchants in Shanghai and Hong Kong to coal 
shippers in Sydney and Newcastle. In 1865, JM&Co. advised their coal agent in Sydney, 
Henry Moore, that both Bellambi and Bulli coal “command higher prices” than 
Newcastle coal and that the Chinese have found it very good for smelting purposes.97 
Later, the companies Nicholls Brothers of Sydney and Messr Charles Stokes of 
Newcastle were informed by JM&Co. that the coking coal had “considerable favour 
with the Chinese” and that the Chinese buyers were thus active in the trade.98 Further, 
Augustine Heard & Co. explained to Messrs Beilby & Scott of Sydney that there was an 
improved demand for bituminous coal with sale prices up to ℑ12 per ton.99 The coal 
was advertised by JM&Co. as “Sydney coal” differentiating it from Newcastle coal and 
owing to the fact that nearly all vessels with coking coal departed from Sydney. 
 
                                      
92 Rogers, "Illawarra Coal Shipping”: 62. 
93 Rogers, "Illawarra Coal Shipping”: 61. 
94 “Coal Mining at Bulli.” The Sydney Mail 18 October 1873: 498. 
95 Bayley, "Bellambi as a Coal Port”: 224. 
96 “Bringing Coal to Newcastle.” Empire 14 February 1865: 4. 
97 Letter from JM&Co. to H. Moore Esq., 7 October 1865 General Letters from Shanghai JMA C46/4. 
98 Letter from JM&Co. to Nicholls Brothers, 22 November 1867 General Letters from Shanghai JMA 
C46/4; Letter from JM&Co. to Nicholls Brothers, 14 April 1868 General Letters from Shanghai JMA 
C46/6; Letter from JM&Co. to Charles Stokes Esq., 11 April 1872 General Letters from Shanghai JMA 
C46/11. 
99 Letter from AH&Co. to Messrs Beilby Scott & Co., 29 April 1865 Bound Correspondence: Letters 
sent by A.H.&Co., Hong Kong to Pacific AHA II C 1 v519. 
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Coal export from New South Wales 
 
Figure 3.5. Export destinations of NSW coal, 1863-1880 (annual averages, tons).100 
 
 
The overseas markets for NSW coal were located in ports along the Indian, Pacific and 
Western Atlantic Oceans. From South Africa to western Malaysia, from Japan to Chile 
and to destinations as far as Boston, coal from NSW was consumed in numerous parts 
of the world.101 Of the exported coal, New Zealand, the United States of America and 
China accounted for more than 70 per cent, as Figure 3.5 displays. The graph shows 
Hong Kong and China separately to indicate that, on average, the export of coal to both 
destinations was the same. However, this chapter will demonstrate that there were 
significant differences in how much coal was exported from Sydney or Newcastle to 
Hong Kong or China. Further, China was, for all matters, just Shanghai as exports to 
other ports in China were minimal and thus, in size, irrelevant. When combined, the 
average exports for Hong Kong and China exceeded those to the United States of 
America. Finally, the tenth and most popular country of destination was Russia, 
                                      
100 SR NSW 1863-80. The Russian data refers to the port of Petropavlovsk located on the Kamchatka 
peninsular.  
101 SR NSW 1863-80. A complete list of destinations is provided in Appendix 4. 
0"
20000"
40000"
60000"
80000"
100000"
120000"
Ne
w"
Ze
ala
nd
"
Un
ite
d"S
tat
es"
Ch
ina
"
Ho
ng
"Ko
ng
"
Bri
=s
h"I
nd
ia"
Du
tch
"Ea
st"
Ind
ies
"
Ph
ilip
pin
es"
Sin
ga
po
re"
Jap
an
"
Ru
ssi
a"
Av
er
ag
e'
Co
al
'T
on
na
ge
'p
er
'Y
ea
r'
Export'Countries'
 145 
specifically the port of Petropavlovsk, located on the peninsula of Kamchatka. Maritime 
historian Frank Broeze stated that Petropavlovsk, just like Guam, was often used as a 
destination of convenience to hide the true destination of the vessel.102 If true, then the 
data of the coal stated as destined for Petropavlovsk should be distributed to other 
destinations, including China.103 
 
Newcastle and Sydney became the two major ports for the export of coal. The town of 
Newcastle, located at the mouth of the Hunter River, was considered a safe port for 
square-rigged vessels. 104  The map provided in Figure 3.6 shows how Newcastle 
Harbour provided shelter for shipping. The port catered for the mines of the Hunter 
Valley, though most were, initially, within only a short distance of Newcastle (Figure 
3.2).105 As a transient port for goods, Newcastle took quite some time to resemble a 
town. One description, given in the 1860s, was as “miserable” and containing a single 
sandy street “lined with drab tin and wooden shops and houses.”106 Figure 3.7 displays 
the small town in 1865 as a line of houses along one or two streets that ran parallel to 
the port’s harbour facilities. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                      
102 Frank Broeze, "British Intercontinental Shipping and Australia, 1813-1850." Journal of Transport 
History n.s.:4, no. 4 (1978): 191. However, there is some evidence of a port there being involved in trade. 
AH&Co. was the consignee for the Halle Jackson that arrived in Shanghai from Petropavlovsk on 8 July 
1864 with sundries having departed the Russian port on 30 May 1864. The Halle Jackson then returned to 
Petropavlovsk, departing Shanghai on 22 July 1864 with sundries and AH&Co. as the consignee. 
“Shipping Intelligence – Arrivals.” North China Herald 9 July 1864: s1; Shipping Intelligence – 
Departures.” North China Herald 23 July 1864: s1. 
103 During this period, there was always a concern where the true destination of vessels departing 
Australian ports was. Tracing the travels of each vessel is not a trivial task. Nevertheless, the Sydney 
newspapers, on occasion, provided arrival information from the China ports. 
104 Combes, "Industries and Commerce.": 697. 
105 Most of the original mines were within a few miles of the port of Newcastle. 
106 Zierer, "Industrial Area of Newcastle, Australia.": 33. 
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Figure 3.6. Map of Newcastle harbour.107 
 
 
 
Sydney, on the other hand, was a well-established city by the 1860s. The population had 
risen to over 55,000.108 A number of wharves had been created on both sides of the 
harbour. They were primarily for commercial use, with many of those located nearest 
the city centre owned by the major merchant firms including Henry Moore and Robert 
Towns. Coal was brought to the wharves in Sydney by small steamers from the 
Illawarra and transhipped to larger vessels. Coal from the western mines near Lithgow 
in the Blue Mountains arrived by rail to Sydney.109 The city’s wharves, thus, were a 
hive of activity with coal, one of the primary commodities loaded on to the large 
square-rigged vessels for export. 
                                      
107 “Map showing the entrance to Newcastle harbour.” 1849-1874 Steam Ship Lines, Docks, Freight 
Charges, etc. AH II A18 C31 f. 41. 
108 “Census 1861.” NSWVP LA 1861-62: 1350. 
109 Aedeen Cremin, "The Growth of an Industrial Valley: Lithgow, New South Wales." Australian 
Journal of Historical Archaeology 7 (1989): 35-37 
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Figure 3.7. Newcastle and harbour, 1865.110 
 
 
The demise of the monopoly held by the AAC in 1847 created opportunities for many 
new companies to broach the industry.111 While numerous small ventures came and 
went, some larger companies became important in the international export of coal.112 By 
1880, thirteen companies were strongly involved in the coal export industry, of which, 
practically all were exporting coal to China.113 
 
The exploitation of coal deposits in the Hunter Valley region near Newcastle was 
significant. While those mines in the southern and western districts only slowly  
 
 
                                      
110 “View of Newcastle and harbour.” The Illustrated Sydney News 16 March 1865: 8. 
111 Zierer, "Industrial Area of Newcastle, Australia”: 33. 
112 A list of firms with their commencement year of production is provided in Appendix 5. 
113 “Export of Coal.” NMH&MA 3 January 1880: 8. The Saturday editions of the NMH&MA included the 
week’s export of coal, tabulated with the tonnage of coal matching the destination. 
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Figure 3.8. Average annual coal production for the three regions of NSW, 1860-1880 
(‘000 tons).114 
 
 
Figure 3.9. Sales of NSW coal by destinations, 1860-1880.115 
 
                                      
114 Schmitz, "The First Hundred and Twenty Years of New South Wales Coal Mining”: 12. This 
document contains numerous tables of which I have summarized into graphs. The data was obtained from 
the mining companies and not from the government statistics. The three regions are defined by their 
geographical position in relation to Sydney. 
115 Christopher Schmitz, Output and Employment in the New South Wales Coal Industry, 1805-1923.  
Melbourne: Australian Reference Publications, 1988: 21. 
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increased their output, output from the northern mines rose at a very fast rate (Figure 
3.8). The continuous opening of fields and improvements of rail carriage of the coal to 
the Newcastle port allowed for this expansion.116 Yet, even with the increase in 
production at the mines, the distribution of the coal between local, inter-colonial and 
overseas consumption remained broadly similar throughout the 1860s and 1870s 
(Figure 3.9). For the overseas markets, the exports were between 20 and 25 per cent. 
Hence, the increase in the tonnage of coal delivered overseas rose at the same, or close 
to the same, rate as production. 
 
Figure 3.10. Average prices of NSW coal by region of origin, 1860-1880 (shillings per 
ton).117 
 
 
The price of coal, as it was excavated from the mines, also differed between the three 
regions. Figure 3.10 shows significant volatility during the 1860s for the southern and 
western regions’ mine prices. Yet, by the commencement of the 1870s, distinct trends 
and some sense of stability occurred for all regions with the coal from the Newcastle 
and Hunter Valley region settling as the most expensive at around 12/- to 13/- per ton 
                                      
116 Zierer, "Industrial Area of Newcastle, Australia”: 46; Schmitz, Output and Employment: 2. 
117 Schmitz, Output and Employment: 22-23. 
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from the pit entrance. Finally, as is evident, there is little or no correlation between the 
amount of production and the price at pit entrance. 
 
Coal had a strange and special place within the trade relationship between New South 
Wales and China. On the vessels trading to China, coal was the primary commodity, 
more often the only commodity on board. Rarely was space in the holds given to other 
commodities. The haulage of coal to China from NSW was important to the shipping 
industry in the 1860s and 1870s. Burley’s commentary suggests that vessels travelling 
to China from NSW were occasionally full of coal and that travelling in ballast was 
common practice when a load of coal was unavailable. However, analysing shipping 
records yields different conclusions.118 The two decades of the 1860s and 1870s can be 
dissected into three periods when viewing shipping voyages from NSW to China. In the 
earliest, up until 1865, a few vessels travelled to China in ballast, though at that time the 
amount of coal exported from NSW was minimal.119 From the mid-1860s until the mid-
1870s all vessels travelling to China took a load of coal. Only in extreme rare cases was 
a vessel specifically chartered in China and thus could not wait until a coal shipment 
was available to be loaded. Finally, the steam era was heralded by the traversing of 
E&A’s and others’ steamers through the Torres Strait route, as discussed in Chapter 2. 
A larger percentage of vessels from the mid-1870s sailed to China without coal, though 
more than likely also not in ballast. Further, by the late 1870s, coal shipments, and trips, 
to China fell away. 
 
                                      
118 The author holds a complete list of all vessels that departed from NSW for ports in China, 1860-1880. 
See Appendix 6 for a summary of this data. 
119 To summarise, 1861 had four vessels in ballast; 1862 had seven, 1863 and 1864, three each and 1865, 
only 1. There were no vessels heading to China in ballast from 1865 until approximately 1875. Some of 
the above may not have been in ballast as I was unable to locate information about their cargo or whether 
they were declared as travelling in ballast. The data for shipping in and out of Hong Kong shows similar 
results with a number of vessels arriving in ballast prior to the mid-1860s but then only the rare vessel 
arriving in ballast after the mid-1860s. Appendix 7 shows the number of vessels arriving and departing 
Hong Kong with cargo and in ballast in relation to Australia and New Zealand from 1860-1880. 
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Figure 3.11. Exports from NSW to China by commodities, 1863-1880 (£’1000).120 
 
 
Coal, together with gold, were the two primary commodities exported from NSW to 
China, when measured by value. Their export was intrinsically linked. While the coal 
industry was the exclusive domain of Western merchants, Chinese merchants were 
primarily the gold exporters from NSW, specifically from Sydney.121 Prior to the mid-
1870s, when a regular steam service to China became available, the Chinese relied on 
the coal vessels to transport their gold. During the 1860s and 1870s, coal and gold 
accounted for, on average, 80 per cent of the total value of all exports to China from 
NSW; coal represented 45 per cent and gold 35 per cent. Other goods exported during 
the period included recycled metals, sandalwood and bêche-de-mer.122 However, it is 
                                      
120 SR NSW 1863-80. For tabulated data, see Appendix 8. 
121 Viewing shipping records showing the manifests of the shipments exported to China, the Chinese in 
New South Wales were the only exporters of gold. For example the Euphrates departed Sydney in April 
1864 with “1452 ozs, 10 dwts gold, 1 box shipped by Chinese” and “238 ozs. gold, shipped by Chinese.” 
– “Shipping Gazette.” The Sydney Mail 2 April 1864: 10; “Shipping Gazette.” The Sydney Mail 9 April 
1864: 9. 
122 “Shipping.” SMH 9 May 1868: 6. The Felix Bernabo’s manifest for Hongkong was: 80 bags beche-
de-mer, Beilby and Scott; 20 bags beche-de-mer, 63 packages provisions, F.G. Lender and Co.; 8 tons 10 
cwt sandalwood, R. Towns and Co.; 422 tons coal, T. G. Sawkins; 133 pieces lead, 57 packages old 
copper, 4 cases nails, 6 cases glass, 20 cases horse-shoes, 31 bundles old-iron, On Cheong; 63 bundles 
metal, 25 boxes nails, 11 casks horse-shoes, 5 casks glass, 1 cask sandalwood, Sum Kum On; 16 oz. 13 
dwts. gold, Chen War; 123 oz. 10 dwts. gold, An Gew; 5 oz. gold, Sam Loong; 1 oz. 18 dwts. gold Sam 
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noteworthy that at the end of the 1870s the export of these secondary goods to China 
diminished to almost nothing. Figure 3.11 exhibits the position of coal, gold and other 
commodities within the overall trade between New South Wales and China for the 
period from 1863 to 1880.  
 
Figure 3.12. Unit prices of exported coal from NSW by export destination, 1863-1880 
(£ / ton).123 
 
 
The unit price of exported NSW coal followed a similar pattern to the amount exported. 
As demonstrated in Figure 3.12, a slow decline throughout the 1860s and into the early 
1870s was followed by a rapid increase in price in 1873 and then another initially slow 
then rapid decline towards the end of the 1870s. In comparison with the tonnage 
exported (Figure 3.13) the increase around 1873 and the decrease at the end of the 
1870s are mirrored. Other periods, however, do not match. There is also a single-year 
lag, certainly from 1872 onwards, between the two graphs. Consequently, pricing 
appears to have been affected by demand, rather than that demand was driven by the 
                                                                                                                
Ashew. The lead imported was commonly used for the lining of tea chests. China. No. 12 (1870). 
Commercial reports by Her Majesty’s consuls in China. 1869-70. House of Commons, no. C.212 (1870) 
London: Harrison and Sons, 1870: 3. 
123 SR NSW 1863-80. 
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pricing for coal exported to China. Thus, the analysis of Figures 3.12 and 3.13 indicates 
that the price of coal at the dock did not affect exports.  
 
Figure 3.13. Export of coal from NSW to China, 1863-1880 (tons).124 
 
 
There are three distinct depressions in the export of coal to China. These are from 1869 
to 1871, in 1876 and from 1878 onwards. When combining Figure 3.13 with the overall 
exports of coal for the same period as per Figure 3.14, what transpired for the export to 
China also did so for all other exports. Thus, the peaks and troughs are not specifically 
related to events in China, but either in Australia or throughout the world. There are 
several reasons for the changes in the exports to China, including price movements, 
competition with other country’s exports and external factors not related to either China 
or Australia but affecting the quantity of shipping available. These effects are 
investigated in more detail later in this chapter.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                      
124 SR NSW 1863-80. 
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Figure 3.14. Coal exports from NSW, total and to China, 1863-1880 (tons).125 
 
 
The amount of transport available to coal exporters was related to the export of coal to 
China. Figure 3.15 shows the number of vessels travelling to China from NSW. The 
troughs and peaks, for the period 1863 to 1880 are comparable to those appearing in 
Figure 3.14, though the peak for vessels in 1868 is more pronounced. Thus, there was 
sufficient shipping available, at most times, when an excess of coal existed for export. 
Figure 3.16 complements this trend. It shows the average amount of coal per vessel 
delivered to China from NSW. That is, even though the average amount of coal per 
vessel increased over time, the types of vessels were able to satisfy the demand. The 
technological enhancements over time to all vessels whether sail or steam driven 
allowed larger capacity ships being employed on the voyage.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                      
125 SR NSW 1863-80. 
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Figure 3.15. Vessels departing from NSW for China, 1860-1880.126  
  
 
Figure 3.16. Average amount of coal per vessel from NSW to China, 1860-1880.127 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                      
126 Data derived from Sydney and Newcastle shipping records of the period. See Appendix 6 for 
summary. 
127 Sydney and Newcastle shipping records. For completeness, these graphs are extended to include 
1860-62. The Blue Books do not have specific and complete data for China for these early years. 
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Figure 3.17. Coal exported from Sydney and Newcastle to China, 1860-1880 (tons).128 
 
 
Figure 3.16 defines an overall trend of increasing exports to China, yet with variances 
from the linear trend less dramatic to that provided in Figure 3.13. To assist in 
explaining the difference, the data of Figure 3.16 is dissected into its elements – the two 
export ports of Sydney and Newcastle. Figure 3.8 showed that production from the 
northern coalfields, where Newcastle was the port of export, was higher than that of the 
Illawarra and Western mines which used Sydney as the port of export. Further, coal 
exported from Newcastle was purely the steam variety while from Sydney both the 
steam and coking types were shipped. Any expected similarity between the production 
of coal and the tonnage exported from Sydney and Newcastle to China is non-existent. 
Figure 3.17 shows alternate export patterns for Newcastle and Sydney. Newcastle coal 
exports to China tended upwards over time. In contrast, Sydney coal exports were 
declining from the latter 1860s. However, the Sydney exports counter the fact that 
production was increasing at the same time, as shown in Figure 3.8. Thus, from the late 
1860s there appears an altered preference for Newcastle coal over Sydney coal in the 
                                      
128 Sydney and Newcastle shipping records. 
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Chinese markets. One reason was the increasing production of coal in the Newcastle 
area as compared to that from the Illawarra and West Sydney coal producing regions. 
 
Figure 3.18. Coal exported from Newcastle to Hong Kong and Shanghai, 1860-1880 
(tons).129 
 
 
Figure 3.18 shows the coal exported from Newcastle to Hong Kong and Shanghai. It 
indicates that the gradual growth of exports from Newcastle was driven by exports to 
Hong Kong. Thus the demand for Newcastle coal drove the decisions of Newcastle coal 
exporters to Hong Kong. On the other hand, in Shanghai, the demand slackened to 
become almost inconsequential by the commencement of the depression of the latter 
1860s, except for a brief attempt to revitalise the trade in 1873 and, partially, in 1877. 
The previous graphs all show a tendency for a drop-off at the end of the 1870s while, 
strangely, the Newcastle data counters that trend with an apparent increase in 1880 for 
exports to Shanghai and, especially, Hong Kong.130 
 
                                      
129 Sydney and Newcastle shipping records. 
130 I believe there was a sufficient likelihood that this was nothing more than a correction towards a 
general upwards trend of exports throughout the period. 
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Figure 3.19. Tonnage of coal exported from Sydney to Hong Kong and Shanghai, 1860-
1880 (tons).131 
  
 
Figure 3.19 demonstrates that the destinations for coal exports to China from Sydney 
were significantly different to that from Newcastle. For the Sydney coal exporters, 
Shanghai was the dominant destination for their coal. One reason was that Sydney 
primarily exported the coking variety of coal which was popular in Shanghai, but not in 
Hong Kong. The peaks of Sydney exports to Hong Kong occur approximately when 
troughs exist for Newcastle exports, especially after 1870. Sydney steaming coal may 
have been used to supplement the exports from Newcastle when less Newcastle coal 
was available to cater for the demand in Hong Kong. 
 
Quality of New South Wales coal 
 
Australian coal exported to the China markets was initially considered inferior to that 
from Wales and the northern mines of England. From the earliest deliveries, the NSW 
variant was “found too brittle and dusty to render it well adapted for steam purposes.”132 
                                      
131 Sydney and Newcastle shipping records. 
132 Letter from JM&Co. to Henry Moore Esq., 27 December 1859 Letters to Europe JMA C11/27 
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During 1859, a sample of NSW coal was sent for tests in Hong Kong by the British 
authorities of that port. Their report showed that the coal examined was “not favourable 
as it burns with a large hard white residue.”133 The trial hence had detrimental effects on 
the sale and price of the NSW coal, making it almost unsaleable in 1860.134 Such was 
the character of the coal delivered that year from NSW, one Chinese buyer in Hong 
Kong broke his purchasing contract, complaining about the quality.135 The distaste for 
the quality of NSW coal was further enhanced through the prejudices of the English 
press of 1861.136 Thus, by the early 1860s, NSW coal was sold in China at a much 
lower value to that of the two British varieties. 
 
Performing tests on coal was commonly completed by the Admiralty in London to view 
options on what was best for their naval fleet throughout the world.137 A major test of 
“Australian coal” was performed in 1862 with mixed results. Of the seven mines that 
provided samples, three, all from the Newcastle region – AAC, Wallsend and Minmi – 
were considered equivalent to that from England while the other four – Tomago and 
Four Mile Creek of the Newcastle region and Bellambi and Mount Keira of the 
Illawarra district – were poor or very inferior with evaporative power low and the 
quantity of ash high.138 These test results were criticised in the Australian press. The 
tests were considered, for the Illawarra coal, to have been completed in furnaces and 
machinery that was not suitable for Illawarra coal.139 In an 1863 letter penned to the 
                                      
133 Letter from JM&Co. to Henry Moore Esq., 26 January 1860 Letters to Europe JMA C11/27 
134 Letter from JM&Co. to Captain Brunell, 25 October 1860 Letters to Europe JMA C11/28 
135 Letter from JM&Co. to Henry Moore Esq., 26 November 1860 Letters to Europe JMA C11/28. 
136 “The Coal Trade of Newcastle.” NCHRDN 21 January 1862: 2. 
137 Tests on Australian coal had taken place since as early as 1847, primarily in the nature of a 
replacement for Welsh and northern English coal for the Naval stations in the Western Pacific. John 
Bach, The Australia Station: A History of the Royal Navy in the South West Pacific, 1821-1913.  Sydney: 
New South Wales University Press, 1986: 220. 
138 Australian coal. Return, showing the result of the recent experiments under the direction of the 
Admiralty, as to the value for naval purposes, of Australian coal. HoC, no. 337 (1862). See Appendix 9 
for a copy of the results. 
139 “Illawarra Coal.” NCHRDN 26 November 1862: 4. 
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Newcastle newspaper, Sir David Cooper, a well-respected merchant and 
parliamentarian of NSW, criticised the report exclaiming numerous apparent errors in 
the tests and results. Cooper hoped that the results of the experiments “will soon be 
obliterated by the practical reports of her Majesty’s ships on the Australian station.”140 
Further, in a report to Admiralty in 1863, the Government Examiner of Coal Fields, Mr. 
W. Keene, countered the test results when he stated he believed that “Australian coal 
excels average English north-country coal in power and evaporation; for one pound of 
our coal evaporates more water than a pound of English coal.”141 
 
The promise of equal quality coal obtainable closer to the depots of East Asia and thus 
relatively lower freight costs led Admiralty to consider the usage of NSW coals within 
her vessels plying the East Asian territories. In an 1863 report to the British House of 
Commons, one option was put forward by Commodore Seymour following 
communications with the Directors of the Australian Steam Navigation Company. As 
the coals from Newcastle and Bellambi, those mostly procured for the British naval 
fleets of the south Pacific region,142 were apparently unsuited for Far East British Navy 
squadron’s furnaces, a conversion of their furnaces would be required.143 Based on 
information from the chief engineer of the Australian Steam Navigation Company, J. 
McArthur, the cost was estimated at £500, either done in Britain or in Australia.144 
While detailed plans were provided to Admiralty the idea never came to fruition. 
 
                                      
140 “Australian Coal.” NCHRDN 28 March 1863: 4. 
141 Reports received from Her Majesty’s secretaries. HoC, no. 3759 (1867): 111-12. 
142 “Australian Agricultural Company.” MMHRGA 25 October 1862: 4. The report of the Annual 
Meeting stated that P&O had accepted a tender for 10,000 tons of coal and the “Lords of Admiralty have 
sent out orders that New South Wales coal shall be used in her Majesty’s ships on the Pacific and 
Australian stations.” 
143 Australian coal. Copy of Commodore Seymour’s report upon experiments made with Australian coal 
at Sydney, in 1862. HoC, no. 159 (1863): 1-2. The report notes the usage on the Niger and the Caetlagon. 
144 Australian coal.. HoC, no. 159 (1863): 2. 
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The choice to consider altering the furnaces on the Royal Navy fleet is explained by the 
fact that the boilers on ships were different throughout the maritime world. Not only 
were certain engines built for faster and more efficient performance, but also to work 
productively with the type of coal that would be best used with that combination of 
boilers and furnaces, especially on the China to England run.145 Coal exports from 
Sydney struck such a problem in Hong Kong in 1864. JM&Co. explained that the coal 
may work well in various steamers in Australia, “but a good deal depends on the 
furnaces, and all we can say is that the Canton River Steamers found them 
unsuitable.”146 NSW merchants were, however, exporting small steamers, no longer 
viable to be used in Australian waters, to China for use in the river and coastal trade.147 
Thus one consideration was that a portion of the Australian coal purchased at Hong 
Kong in the early 1860s was actually for these old Australian steamers. 
 
Coal from NSW, though, was accepted by the various mail steam companies. The 
steamers of Messageries Impériales Company, Peninsular and Orient and Company, 
Australian Steam Navigation Company and the Pacific Mail Steam Ship Company all 
burned coal from Newcastle.148 However, in 1867 at least, Australian freight costs 
created a problem for P&O such that they found “it cheaper to bring English coals to 
King George Sound than to ship them coastwise from Sydney.”149 
 
                                      
145 China No. 2 (1871). Commercial Reports from Her Majesty’s Consuls in China. 1869-70 HoC no. 
C.317 (1871) London: Harrison and Sons, 1871: 6. The report stated that “Cardiffs are only used by 
steamers not adapted for burning other kinds..” 
146 Letter from JM&Co. to Henry Moore Esq., 25 August 1864 Letters to India JMA C10/56. 
147 A number of steamers were sold in China for the local trade. For the Champion and Prince Albert 
respectively: Letter from JM&Co. to T. and H. Carter & Co., 30 April 1861 Letters to Europe JMA 
C11/29; Letter from JM&Co. to TH Clough & Co., 26 July 1862 Letters to Europe JMA C11/30. 
148 Reports received from Her Majesty’s secretaries. HoC, no. 3759 (1867): 100. Sydney merchant 
Robert Towns was the Australian agent for coal being sent to both Hong Kong and San Francisco to 
supply the PMSS vessels. See: Letter from R. Towns & Co. to Allan W. Lane, President, Pacific Mail S.S. 
Coy, 24 February 1871 Foreign Letter Book no. 14 RT Item 20. 
149 Reports received from Her Majesty’s secretaries. HoC, no. 3759 (1867): 100. 
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British Freight costs also posed a problem, and to more than just the importers of coal in 
China. By the early 1870s, the high cost of transporting British coal to East Asia was 
reaching a point where other options were required. This problem was further 
compounded when shippers noted that Welsh coal suffered when it was exposed to the 
conditions of the tropics. As late as 1872, Welsh coal was combined with English coal 
for use in the East Asian region.150 Yet, just one year later, Admiralty chose economic 
prerogatives over speed when they took the results from earlier tests and replaced the 
more reliable British coal with NSW coal.151 The NSW coal, however, was still not of 
the quality required to power fast vessels alone and thus, more often than not, a mixture 
of Welsh and Newcastle was created for the Royal Navy.152 One advantage NSW held 
was that the coal from other overseas mines – located in Japan, Formosa and Labuan153 
– were either deemed unsatisfactory or insufficient for naval use.154 Even so, the need 
for NSW coal in 1872 and 1873 provides one reason for the increase evident through 
these years as shown in Figure 3.18. 
 
NSW coal was further put to trial between 1876 and 1877.155 However, this time the 
NSW variety was to be compared not only with that from Wales but also those now 
obtained from Japan, local Chinese and the island of Labuan.156 The tests found that 
Newcastle coal was still inferior to Welsh as it created an excess in consumption to 
                                      
150 Navy (use of Coal), Copy of all general orders issued by Admiralty to the fleet since 1850, restricting 
the use of coal in Her Majesty’s ships. HoC, no. 192 (1872): 6. The report stated: “The Welsh smokeless 
coals hither to supplied, since 1867, exclusively to Her Majesty’s ships, readily falls to pieces, both in the 
bunkers of ships, and especially when stored in tropical climates, and the small coal so produced is almost 
entirely wasted.” 
151 Gray, “Imperial Coaling”: 160. 
152 Naval (trial of coal). Return of all experiments made by the Admiralty on coal and patent fuel since 
the date of the last return, the 9th of March 1876; and, copy of any correspondence having special 
reference to the relative value of various coals and patent fuels. HoC, no. 397 (1877): 4-5. 
153 For a detailed description of coal in Formosa, see: James W. Davidson. The Island of Formosa Past 
and Present. London: MacMillan & Co., 1903: 476-91. For Labuan, see “Labuan.” The Singapore Free 
Press and Mercantile Advertiser 5 September 1864: 1. Japanese coal is discussed in a following section 
of this chapter. 
154 Gray, “Imperial Coaling”: 161-62; Bach, The Australian Station: 220. 
155 Naval (trial of coal). Return of all experiments. HoC, no. 397 (1877): 4-8. 
156 The Trial did not differentiate between coal from Formosa or from northern China. 
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evaporate water.157 Nevertheless, for steamers with compound engines, they consumed 
a comparative amount of NSW coal to Welsh coal. Coal from Bulli also performed well 
but was not considered viable to be combined with Welsh coal.158 Newcastle coal 
remained better in quality than each of the three other Asian types, thus ratifying the 
decision by Admiralty of 1873 to use Newcastle coal for the British Navy in China.159 
The proposition put forward in the report for British naval vessels was thus set to be 
two-thirds Welsh and one-third Newcastle mix. 160  The decision provides further 
evidence why Newcastle coal was favoured over Sydney coal when exported to Hong 
Kong. 
 
Competing with Japan 
 
The trials of 1875 and 1876 involved a number of other exporters of coal to China with 
advantages over Australian coal. The development of the Japanese coal industry by the 
late-1860s created great pressure on the traditional British and Australian coal imports. 
To a lesser extent was the influence of the Chinese mines on the Shanghai market, 
whether from within China itself or from Formosa. The closeness to the Chinese 
markets for Japanese and Formosan coal created, for importers, lower transport costs. 
Figure 3.20 demonstrates that coal from Japan and Formosa was sold at a lower price to 
that from NSW, Britain or America. Such was the strength of the Japanese coal 
exportation market that by the 1880s, they became the leading coal exporter to Shanghai. 
  
                                      
157 Naval (trial of coal). Return of all experiments. HoC, no. 397 (1877): 6-7. 
158 Naval (trial of coal). Return of all experiments. HoC, no. 397 (1877): 7. 
159 In only one case, that being for the class of steamers with simple jet condensers and twin screw 
engines was Japanese coal found slightly more productive. 
160 Navy (trial of coal). Return of all experiments. HoC, no. 397 (1877): 7. 
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Figure 3.20. Sale price of imported coal in Shanghai, 1869-1876 (ℑ per ton).161 
 
 
The Japanese coal industry had a bigger impact on the Shanghai market than the market 
in Hong Kong in the period leading to 1880. The industry had existed under 
government control for many decades prior with some sporadic shipments to Shanghai 
in the early 1860s.162 Following the abolition of the Japanese government monopoly in 
1865, Japan’s coal exports to Shanghai were initially rather small, though of good 
quality.163 In the early years of commercial trade in coal, Japan’s contribution rose 
rapidly from zero in 1865 to 9,373 tons in 1866 and 22,523 tons in 1867. The price 
varied little; between ℑ6 and ℑ8 per ton.164 By 1869, the total arrivals of coal reached 
58,281 tons.165 Over the decade of the 1870s, coal from the Takashima and other mines 
                                      
161 Data from the correspondence from Jardine Matheson to various Australian merchants. General 
Letters from Shanghai JM C46/8 to C46/21. 
162 For example, the Remy Hooper arrived in Shanghai from Nagasaki with a shipment of coals on 28 
April 1860. “Arrivals.” NCH 5 May 1860: 72. 
163 Commercial Reports from Her Majesty’s consuls in China, Japan, and Siam 1865. HoC, no. 3707 
(1866): 85. 
164 Commercial Reports from Her Majesty’s consuls in China, Japan, and Siam 1865-66. HoC, no. 3940 
(1867): 102; Commercial Reports from Her Majesty’s consuls in China, Japan, and Siam 1866-68. HoC, 
no. 4079 (1866-68): 111. It should be noted that coal was being imported to Shanghai from both Japan 
and Formosa in 1861. For example, the Anna Maria arrived from Nagasaki with coals on 18 May 1861 
and the Adriatic from Keelung with coals for JM&Co. on 14 July 1861. “Shipping Intelligence. Arrivals.” 
NCH 18 May 1861: 80, “Shipping Intelligence. Arrivals.” NCH 20 July 1861: 116, 
165 China. No. 2 (1871). Commercial reports. HoC, no. C.317 (1871): 6. For a breakdown of the imports 
of foreign coals for the period from 1865 to 1870, see Appendix 10. 
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in Japan began to overwhelm their competitors in the Shanghai market. The transition 
from English to NSW to Japanese supremacy continued through the late 1860s and into 
the early 1870s. JM&Co. recognised the concern of Japanese coal dominating the 
Shanghai market, stating that in a letter to Newcastle coal shipping company Bingle 
White & Co. in 1873.166  
 
 
The low price of Japanese coal in the 1870s together with its quality and continuous 
supply created a further impediment to NSW imports than what the British coal had 
previously generated. Similarly, the large imports of Japanese coal generated an excess 
in stocks and thus put downward pressure on the British and NSW coal prices.167 For 
the Shanghai market, the price of Sydney or Newcastle coal was commonly ℑ2 per ton 
higher than Japanese. Upon the recovery of the NSW coal exports of 1872, the gap rose 
to ℑ4. The price of Japanese coal tended to remain constant throughout the 1870s, as 
shown, partially, in Figure 3.20.168 Cheaper Japanese coal thus became appropriate for 
the coastal and nearby international trade of China. This was most prominent during the 
downturn of world trade in mid-1873 where purchasing cheaper coal was financially 
prudent.169  
 
Japan attained prominence in the coal market of Hong Kong by the 1880s.170 Japanese 
suppliers attempted to impose themselves on the Hong Kong market not long after the 
opening of their coal mines to private enterprise in the mid-1860s. Figure 3.21 shows 
  
                                      
166 Letter from JM&Co. to Bingle White & Co., 20 November 1873 General Letters from Shanghai JMA 
C46/15. 
167 Letter from JM&Co. to Charles Stokes Esq., 22 April 1869 General Letters from Shanghai JMA 
C46/7; Letter from JM&Co. to Bingle White & Co., 28 June 1873 General Letters from Shanghai JMA 
C46/14. 
168 Sugiyama, Japan’s Industrialisation: 176. 
169 Letter from JM&Co. to Charles Stokes Esq., 31 May 1873 General Letters from Shanghai JMA 
C46/14. 
170 Sugiyama, Japan’s Industrialisation: 182. 
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Figure 3.21. Vessels arriving in Hong Kong from coal exporting nations, 1862-1880.171 
 
 
Figure 3.22. Average minimum and maximum price of NSW coal in Hong Kong, 1860-
1874 ($).172 
 
 
peaks during the late-1860s corresponding with the decrease in NSW coal exports 
shown in Figure 3.13. Viewing Figure 3.21 in comparison to Figures 3.15 to 3.19 
                                      
171 Hong Kong Blue Book for the Year … (1862-80) Hong Kong: Govt. Printer, (1863-81). The data for 
1877 was unavailable and a linear extrapolation has been used. 
172 Prices Current, Carton 31 AHA MSS 766 1782-1913 P945. 
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reveals that the movement of vessels from Japan appears to complement that from NSW. 
This conclusion is bolstered by viewing the price of NSW coal in Hong Kong, as shown 
in Figure 3.22. It is clear that the depression in prices for NSW coal in Hong Kong 
mirrors the spike in imports from Japan and the arrival of Japanese vessels carrying coal.  
 
However, the growth of imports from Japan into China was not continuous. Relations 
between the Ch’ing government of China and the Meiji government of Japan were 
strained throughout the 1870s. As such, any incidents caused by friction in China – 
Japan relations generated possible positive effects for NSW coal exports as Japanese 
coal became scarcer in China, was withheld for military purposes or had its price 
increased by the Japanese government. For example, the 1874 Mudan Incident relating 
to Formosa and issues leading up to the formal Japanese annexation of the Ryūkyū 
Islands in 1879 impeded imports of Takashima coal, which in turn influenced the 
import market in Shanghai and other ports.173 The effects, though nominally for a short 
period, allowed NSW coal exports to Shanghai to increase. In this case, the removal of 
Japanese imports from the Chinese markets was explained to the NSW merchants by the 
Shanghai commission agents that it would “no doubt cause an increase in the value of 
other descriptions, and lead to speculation.”174 The effect is noted in Figure 3.21 which 
shows a fall in arrivals of Japanese vessels to Hong Kong in 1874 and a corresponding 
rise in Australian vessels. Further, the price of Japanese coal in Shanghai rose in the 
second half of 1874 (Figure 3.20). Yet, there is no upward trend for the other varieties 
of coal, indicating that the incident actually had little effect in the Shanghai coal market. 
Without extended data, a similar effect in Hong Kong cannot be confirmed, though 
Figure 3.22 shows a small price rise of NSW coal in 1874. The British, however, in 
                                      
173 For a concise discussion of the Mudan Incident, see Edward H. House, The Japanese Expedition to 
Formosa. Tokyo, Edward H. House, 1875. 
174 Letter from JM&Co. to Messr. R. B. Wallace Esq., 22 Aug 1874 General Letters from Shanghai JM 
C46/17 
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protecting their own trade interests in Formosa, intervened and a peaceful solution was 
found.175 JM&Co. lamented to their contacts in Newcastle that the “probability of the 
export of coal from Nagasaki being stopped is at an end.”176 The opportunity for NSW 
coal exporters to gain an advantage in the market in China disappeared as a result. 
 
Britain and New South Wales coal prices 
 
The second external factor affecting the value of NSW coal came from Great Britain. 
The importation to China of British coal, from both Wales and the northern coalfields, 
influenced NSW coal prices through the value of the coal from Britain and the amount 
in stock or suspected to arrive. The fact that the coal from Wales and northern England 
was considered by ship’s captains and steam ship companies in China as superior for 
use over all other varieties created a situation where buyers would speculate upon 
arrivals. Given news of future deliveries from Great Britain, buyers in China paused 
their purchases of NSW coal and other varieties in the hope that the new deliveries from 
Britain were expected forthwith.177 Thus, with NSW coal unsaleable, its market price 
decreased.178 By contrast, when news arrived stating that there would be little or no 
prospect of new deliveries from Great Britain as was the case in the mid-to-late 1860s, 
the price of NSW coal, as with other varieties, would rise.179 
 
                                      
175 Davidson, The Island of Formosa: 123-69. 
176 Letter from JM&Co. to Messr. C. Stokes Esq., 19 Nov 1874 General Letters from Shanghai JM 
C46/18; For the agreement and contract between China and Japan, see: House, Japanese Expedition: 204-
6 and Davidson, Island of Formosa: 164. 
177 Letter from JM&Co. to Messrs Bingle & Co., 29 July 1872 General Letters from Shanghai JMA 
C46/12. 
178 Letter from JM&Co. to Charles Stokes Esq., 20 April 1871 General Letters from Shanghai JMA 
C46/11. 
179 Letter from JM&Co. to Thomas H. Barlow Esq., 27 April 1867 Letters to India JMA C10/57. From 
1866 to 1867 coal imports from Great Britain to Shanghai fell by a third, from 60,705 tons to 40,900 tons. 
Commercial Reports HoC, no. 4079 (1866-68): 110. 
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The size of the stock of British coal also had severe effects on the trade of NSW coal. 
During the early-1860s, supplies of British coal were excessive, creating a large stock in 
Chinese ports and thus a decline of prices for all varieties of coal.180 This was more 
prevalent in Hong Kong, where the trade-off between the lower price of NSW coal and 
the quality of the British coal approached equilibrium. Even so, at that time buyers of 
coal still believed that British coal use was more economically viable.181 However, from 
1867, supplies from Britain to Hong Kong diminished, thus providing a promise of 
higher prices to NSW merchants.182 With the steamers from Britain arriving more often 
in Shanghai than in Hong Kong, carrying coal for sale, the supplies of British coal in 
Hong Kong dwindled, allowing for an eventual gain for NSW suppliers.183  
 
The size of coal stocks in Hong Kong and Shanghai created various pressures on the 
price of NSW coal. For Shanghai, Figure 3.20 confirms this variance. As the price of 
Welsh coal remained high from 1871 onwards, the English price fell by only ℑ2 while 
both Sydney and Newcastle suffered a drop of nearly ℑ4 each after the pre-1871 rise. 
For Hong Kong, the price data in Figure 3.22 are less conclusive, though there are rises 
in 1867 and, more so, in 1871 of NSW coal prices.  
 
Nevertheless, NSW suppliers rarely took advantage of the knowledge of the price and 
stock variances and particularly suffered in Shanghai. Through a lack of instant 
communication, notably in the 1860s and early 1870s,184 they sent numerous shipments 
                                      
180 Letter from JM&Co. to Henry Moore Esq., 4 June 1860 Letters to Europe JMA C11/27. 
181 Letter from JM&Co. to Messrs Prost Kohler & Co., 31 October 1863 Letters to India JMA C10/55. 
182 Letter from JM&Co. to Henry Moore Esq., 31 March 1867 Letters to India JMA C10/57. 
183 The steamers that arrived from Britain were intending to return with tea and silks. The British used 
the Shanghai tea and silk markets in preference to the Fuzhou or Hong Kong markets. This has been 
deduced through the shipments to Britain for the period. Prices Current, Carton 31 AHA MSS 766 1782-
1913 P945. 
184  The first telegraph connection to Australia was connected in 1872 and prior to that all 
communications relied on letters by sea transport. Peter Putnis, "The Early Years of International 
 170 
of coal from NSW without knowing the level of stocks. Having added to an already 
overstocked market, coal prices, now deflated, could barely cover the cost of freight.185 
Thus, it was usual for coal to be sold at a loss.186 
 
One reason for the deterioration of the volume of coal exports from Britain to Shanghai 
in the early 1870s was industrial action at the British mines. Britain was suffering from 
coal strikes, those in the early 1870s being both severe and successful.187 The strikes 
created a positive effect on NSW coal prices. By mid-1872, prices in Shanghai had 
reached a turnaround, the improvement due to speculative demand having switched 
from British to NSW and others. The reason was a consequence of the telegraphic 
advice from England relating to the increasing cost of coal in Britain due to colliery 
strikes.188 Prices in Hong Kong for NSW coal immediately jumped from a low of $6.40 
per ton to $14 per ton upon receipt of the news from England, as Figure 3.22 shows. A 
lesser, though similar, effect was found in Shanghai, as Figure 3.20 shows.189 One 
specific reason for the lesser effect in Shanghai was that coking coal was the primary 
import from NSW, so that any change in the amount of steaming coal imported from 
Britain would not alter coking coal imports. While unlikely to be the turning point for 
the NSW coal trade to Hong Kong, the British coal strikes provided an impetus for 
                                                                                                                
Telegraphy in Australia: A Critical Assessment." Media International Australia, Incorporating Culture & 
Policy no. 129 (2008): 140. 
185 Letter from JM&Co. to Charles Stokes Esq., 3 April 1869 Letters to India JMA C10/5; Letter from 
JM&Co. to Capt. Baron, Barque “Adriatic”, 23 November 1862 General Letters from Shanghai JMA 
C46/3. 
186 As an example: Letter from JM&Co. to James Lawrence Esq., 18 August 1869 Letters to India JMA 
C10/59. 
187 The 1860s and 1870s were replete with strikes at coal mines throughout the English midlands and 
South Wales. Roy Church, Alan Hall, and John Kanefsky, The History of the British Coal Industry. Vol.3, 
1830-1913 : Victorian Pre-Eminence. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1986: 662-5, 670, 673, 682, 703. Alan R. 
Griffin, The British Coalmining Industry: Retrospect and Prospect. Buxton: Moorland Publishing Co., 
1977: 89. 
188 Letter from JM&Co. to Messr. Bingle & Co., 29 July 1872 General Letters from Shanghai JMA 
C46/12; Letter from JM&Co. to Messr. Bingle & Co., 13 February 1873 General Letters from Shanghai 
JMA C46/13. 
189 See also: “Coal.” Newcastle Chronicle 28 September 1872: 4. 
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NSW coal suppliers and the coal mining companies to increase their prices, production 
and exports to China at that time. 
 
Australian demands 
 
Coal strikes were not isolated to England and Wales. The Newcastle fields of NSW also 
felt the consequences of numerous stoppages throughout the 1860s and 1870s. They 
were as disruptive to the Australian coal export industry as were those of the early 
1870s in England to their industry. The strikes not only halted exports but also caused 
alterations in the pricing of coal from the pits. Most, if not all, strikes took place at the 
various Newcastle mines, not in the Illawarra, and their effects related mainly to the 
export of coal from Newcastle.190 The stoppages were generally in relation to demands 
for higher wages or reductions of working hours. 
 
Figure 3.23. Export prices of NSW coal, 1860-1880 (shillings per ton).191 
 
 
                                      
190 The Illawarra coal mines tended not to be affected by the Newcastle strikes. There was a strike by the 
miners of a few Illawarra collieries for higher wages in 1865. “Strike amongst the Miners.” Sydney Mail 
11 November 1865:2. 
191 Schmitz, Output and Employment: 23-24. 
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The early 1860s were years of dramatic disruption. Not long after the formation of a 
union to represent the miners,192 the most extensive and bitter industrial dispute in the 
history of NSW took place.193 The halt in mining for an eight-week period in 1861 had 
a significant impact on the amount of coal extracted during those two months.194 When 
production resumed in October, most vessels had left Newcastle harbour searching for 
charters elsewhere.195 Towards the end of 1862 the miners went on strike again, causing 
further problems for coal exporters.196 The two strikes, as noted by the AAC, created a 
“feeling of uncertainty” within the minds of many importers overseas.197 Nevertheless, 
there was little effect on production from 1860 to 1862, as Figure 3.8 shows, and with a 
small effect on pricing as Figure 3.23 reveals. 
 
In the 1870s, miners and coal companies were involved in a new series of strikes. The 
result of these disruptions, not just altered conditions and pay for the miners but also led 
to a “vend”, an agreement to limit production and trade between five of the leading coal 
companies in the Newcastle district.198 Each strike was different, whether for shorter 
hours,199 to halt terminations200 or for more pay,201 yet each created a breakdown of 
                                      
192 E. O. G. Shann, "Economic and Political Development 1860-1885." In Australia: The Cambridge 
History of the British Empire, Volume Vii, Part I, edited by Ernest Scott. 296-323. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1988: 572; Greg Patmore, Australian Labour History. South Melbourne: 
Longman Cheshire, 1991: 58; Gollan, The Coalminers: 27. Gollan admits the date of commencement of 
the union is a “matter of dispute” but considers that a formation of an organization that was a union took 
place in 1860. 
193 Gollan, The Coalminers: 36-38. 
194 “The Coal Trade.” SMH 6 November 1866: 2-3. The article includes a table of the amount of coal 
exported coastwise or inter-colonial and international and the increase or decrease from the previous year. 
The author uses the decrease of 27,896 tons in 1861 to 1860 as being attributed to the strike (lockout) of 
that year. 
195 “The Coal Trade of Newcastle.” NCHRDN 21 January 1862: 2. 
196 Gollan, The Coalminers: 40. 
197 Australian Agricultural Company. Report to the Half-yearly meeting London: J. J. Metcalfe, AAC/AR 
February, 1863; Australian coal. Copy of Commodore Seymour’s report upon experiments made with 
Australian coal at Sydney, in 1862. House of Commons, no. 159 (1863). 
198 Gollan, The Coalminers: 14-16; See also Grant Fleming. "Collusion and Price Wars in the Australian 
Coal Industry During the Late Nineteenth Century." Business History 42, no. 3 (2000): 47-70. 
199 Monthly Reports, 1869-1874 DLMSQ 316 AAC/MR 25 January 1873, 22 February 1873. 
200 Monthly Reports, 1869-1874 DLMSQ 316 AAC/MR 8 August 1870; Gollan. The Coalminers: 51-52; 
Timothy A. Coghlan, Labour and Industry in Australia: From the First Settlement in 1788 to the 
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production and thus a short supply of coal for overseas delivery. However, the strikes 
also occurred during the period when NSW coal producers were enthusiastic to take 
advantage of a Chinese market where the price of NSW coal was increasing.202 Thus, in 
combination, the prices of coal both from the pits and in the Hong Kong and Shanghai 
markets rose as eventually did production and the export to China. Further, on 1 January 
1873 the five primary companies, each involved in coal exports to China, agreed to fix 
the amount of coal produced by each colliery as part of a vend.203  Within six months 
the coal price had increased from 11s to 14s per ton.204 The increase was dramatic, as 
shown in Figure 3.23, and the value of coal almost reached levels comparable to that of 
the beginning of the 1860s. By controlling the pit price of coal, the mining companies 
also affected the export price at the docks and thus the profits of the shipping agents in 
the coal industry. In 1880 the vend collapsed, although it re-formed in 1881 and 
functioned until 1893.205 
 
The strikes in the Newcastle area had little effect on the production and export of coal 
from the Illawarra region. The fact that the Illawarra region’s exports to China were of 
the coking variety was the primary reason. As has been noted in Figure 3.10, the price 
of coal from the southern region did not increase until 1876. When compared to the 
price in Shanghai of Sydney coal (Figure 3.20), it is evident that during 1870-1876, 
exporters from Sydney should have achieved significant profits. That conclusion would 
                                                                                                                
Establishment of the Commonwealth in 1901. 4 vols. Vol. 3, London: Oxford University Press, 1918: 
1426. 
201 Monthly Reports, 1869-1874 DLMSQ 317 AAC/MR 13 March 1873. 
202 Letter from JM&Co. to Henry Moore Esq., 26 March 1873 Letters to India JMA C10/62. 
203 Gollan, The Coalminers: 51. The five companies divided up the market on the basis of the expected 
production for each year, given what had transpired in the pits of the previous year. If a company 
exceeded that estimate, they contributed to a fund that supported the companies in the vend that were 
unable to fill their quota. The five companies were AAC, Newcastle Wallsend Coal Company, Waratah 
Coal Company, J and A. Brown and Co-operative Coal Company. J. W. Turner, Coal Mining in 
Newcastle, 1801-1900. Newcastle History Monographs No. 9. Newcastle: Newcastle Region Public 
Library, 1982: 85. 
204 Gollan, The Coalminers: 14, 51. 
205 Gollan, The Coalminers: 14. 
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be based on constant freight and charter rates. The rates, though, altered significantly, 
tending upward, and much of the profit was eaten into when obtaining charters.206 When 
the price of Illawarra coal increased in 1876 while the Shanghai prices were slowly 
decreasing, those profits shrunk significantly.  
 
Demise of interest in late 1870s. 
 
Interest of NSW coal in the markets of China decreased by the late 1870s. By the end of 
the decade, two of the main firms that dealt with NSW firms had either ceased trading 
altogether or were no longer trading in coal from NSW. Japan’s coal exports into the 
Shanghai market had a strong influence on all coal import pricing.207 The graphs in this 
chapter show a downward trend in NSW’s exports of coal to China following a period 
of strength in the market in the mid-1870s, the very time imports of Japanese coal 
increased.  
 
The influx of Japanese coal imports into China, by 1875, significantly altered the 
landscape of the Shanghai coal industry for the remainder of the decade and after. In a 
commercial report to the Houses of Parliament of Britain in 1877, Walter Henry 
Medhurst, Her Majesty’s Consul in Shanghai, warned that coal extracted from the 
“native” mines of Japan and Formosa was “slowly but surely forcing English and 
Australian coal from the market.”208 Thus, the interlude of improved imports was short-
lived. The quality of coal from the Takashima mines was improving and some of the 
shipments from NSW in the mid-to-late 1870s were found to lack the quality of the 
                                      
206 The freight/charter rates dropped in 1869 and 1870 to about 10s. per ton of coal. Towards the end of 
1870 these rates commenced an upward climb, reaching as high as 40s. per ton in September 1872 before 
returning to between 25s. and 30s. per ton at the end of 1873. See Appendix 11 for the Sydney freight 
rates to Hong Kong and Shanghai between June 1865 and March 1874. 
207 Sugiyama, Japan’s Industrialisation: 176. 
208 China. No. 1 (1877). Commercial reports by Her Majesty’s consuls in China. 1875-76. House of 
Commons, no. C.1665 (1877): 23. 
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previous years.209 This combination led to prominent merchant JM&Co. to depart from 
the coal trade, both in Hong Kong and in Shanghai.210 Even an attempt, in 1877, to enter 
the market by a Queensland coal exporter was met with a lack of interest by JM&Co..211 
From 1878, JM&Co. perceived that it would be impossible to revive coal exports to 
China to their previous levels.212 Another Western commission agent heavily involved 
in the coal trade, AH&Co., terminated trading in China altogether in 1875.213 Their 
strength in the coal market prior to 1876 and the number of exporters connected to 
AH&Co. in NSW may explain the drop in exports of Newcastle coal in 1876, as shown 
in figure 3.17. That is, while shippers searched for new importers in China they 
exported their coal to other markets. Thus, with little profit available for both suppliers 
and commission agents, it was left to those with smaller margins or a sense of adventure 
to continue the trade. 
 
One other reason for the demise of coal trade to China from the second half of the 1870s 
was the effect of the vend, running in the Newcastle area from 1873 until the end of the 
decade, on the profits of the shipping merchants. When the prices of coal exported from 
NSW to China (Figure 3.12) are compared with the value of the sales of NSW coal in 
China, particularly in Shanghai (Figure 3.20), the profit margin decreased over time. 
While the price in Shanghai increased in 1871 to around ℑ10 per ton, it decreased from 
                                      
209 Letter from JM&Co. to Messrs. Henry Moore Esq., 11 June 1875 Letters to India JMA C10/63; Letter 
from JM&Co. to Messrs. Bingle White & Co., 8 July 1876 General Letters from Shanghai JMA C46/21. 
210 Letter from JM&Co. to Charles Stokes Esq., 8 April 1875 General Letters from Shanghai JMA 
C46/18; Letter from JM&Co. to Messrs. Bingle White & Co., 3 July 1875 General Letters from Shanghai 
JMA C46/26. 
211 Letter from JM&Co. to Messrs. Unmack Heussler & Co., 14 August 1877 Letters to India JMA 
C10/65. There appears to be no previous export of coal from Queensland to China through the records of 
letters from the merchants in Brisbane and other ports. Coal was extracted in Queensland from the time of 
its creation as a new colony. 12,327 tons were obtained from the Ipswich field. E. F. Dunne, "Brief 
History of the Coal Mining Industry in Queensland." Journal of the Royal Historical Society of 
Queensland 4, no. 3 (1950): 319. 
212 Letter from JM&Co. to Messrs. Bingle White & Co., 10 October 1878 General Letters from Shanghai 
JMA C46/26. 
213 Robert W. Lovett, "The Heard Collection and Its Story." The Business History Review 35, no. 4 
(1961): 571. 
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then on throughout the remainder of the decade. Meanwhile, the large profits attained in 
1871 and 1872 by the shipping agents when pit prices were just over 8s per ton initially 
turned into a significant loss in 1873, after prices rose significantly owing to the vend. 
The difference in selling price in Newcastle to that in Shanghai decreased each year 
thereafter. The much lower profit margin no doubt deterred many NSW coal shipping 
agents from either venturing into or continuing in the trade with China by the end of the 
1870s. 
 
Coal shippers from NSW had, by the mid-1870s, changed the direction of their coal 
shipments. While the amount of coal delivered to China decreased by the end of that 
decade, exports to both South America and North America increased dramatically.214 
Before the end of the century, Chile and California became primary importers of NSW 
coal. In his work on the Pacific coal trade, Michael Clark reports that between 1876 and 
1896, imports of NSW coal to San Francisco rose from 88,552 tons to 319,593 tons and, 
for the same period, exports to Chile from NSW rose from a mere 480 tons to a massive 
348,583 tons.215 With the expanding economies of California, Chile and Peru in the 
1880s, “Newcastle became the busiest port in Australia with about fifteen sailing ships 
loading coal each month for the industries and coaling stations of western America.”216 
In contrast, the overall interest of NSW in the Asian markets decreased from 43 per cent 
of its coal exports in 1876-80 to just 19 per cent by 1896-1900.217 
 
                                      
214 Burley, “Overseas Trade”: 396. Burley attributes one reason for the increase in trans-Pacific coal 
shipments to be the prevailing winds encouraging vessels to head in that direction. 
215 Michael Clark, "'Bound for Callao!' The Pacific Coal Trade 1876 to 1896: Selling Coal or Selling 
Lives? Part 1." The Great Circle 28, no. 1 (2006): 30. 
216 Clark, “'Bound for Callao!”: 31. Clark does warn us that vessels bound for Valparaiso, Chile arrived 
awaiting orders for a true destination and thus, again, what is found in the statistical records for NSW as 
coal to Chile, possibly was incorrect The rise of the Nitrate fertilizer trade from various ports along the 
western South American coast would have seen a need to transship the coal to these venues from 
Australia. For a discussion on the nitrate trade, see: M. B. Donald, "History of the Chile Nitrate Industry - 
Ii." Annals of Science 1, no. 2 (1936): 193-216. 
217 Sugiyama, Japan’s Industrialisation: 211. 
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This section closes with an example of how the external factors discussed here 
combined to affect the prices of coal in China and how complex the coal market in 
China was. At the end of 1871 and into early 1872 there was a rare scarcity of shipping 
space for coal shipments in Newcastle.218 That led to an increase in freight rates and 
lesser shipments of coal to Hong Kong.219 Strikes in Great Britain at the same time 
resulted in both a higher cost of coal from the pit as well as higher delivery costs from 
Britain to Hong Kong.220 Together with the Newcastle problem, these generated a 
shortage of coal stocks in China, where demand forced prices to increase.221 In April 
1872, large shipments of coal from Formosa arrived. The new arrivals filled the stocks 
of steaming coal in Hong Kong and reduced Hong Kong coal prices.222 The news of low 
stocks in Hong Kong, which took some time to reach the coal exporting ports, generated 
a number of shipments “from all quarters” which, in turn, put further downward 
pressure on coal prices in Hong Kong.223 The price of coking coal from Sydney in both 
Hong Kong and Shanghai remained unchanged.224 However, in Sydney there was a 
resulting effect. The preference of vessels to charter for coal at Newcastle meant less 
shipping available in Sydney and the continuation of rising freight costs.225 When the 
first shipments of Sydney coking coal did arrive, that in turn lowered the value of 
coking coal such that, as JM&Co. remarked, “with the high rates of freight now ruling 
we fear shipments from your side must lose heavily.”226 While the above provides a 
                                      
218 Letter from R. B. Wallace & Co., 28 November 1871 Correspondence: Business Letters: Australasia 
JMA B6/3. Wallace stated that demand for tonnage to both Hong Kong and Shanghai was “great” with 
rates offered at 38/- per ton for Hong Kong and 46/- per ton for Shanghai. 
219 See Appendix 11. Freight rates continued to rise through to 1872, especially for coal from Sydney. 
220 Letter from JM&Co. to R. B. Wallace & Co., 21 February 1872 Letters to India JMA C10/61. 
221 By March 1872, sales of Newcastle coal in Hong Kong were at $14 per ton (Figure 3.22).  
222 Letter from JM&Co. to Charles Stokes Esq., 11 April 1872 General Letters from Shanghai JMA 
C4611. 
223 Letter from JM&Co. to Charles Stokes Esq., 17 April 1872 Letters to India JMA C10/62. 
224 Letter from JM&Co. to Charles Stokes Esq., 11 April 1872 General Letters from Shanghai JMA 
C46/11; Letter from JM&Co. to Messr Bingle, 29 July 1872 General Letters from Shanghai JMA C46/12. 
225 See Appendix 11. 
226 Letter from JM&Co. to Charles Stokes Esq., 19 December 1872 General Letters from Shanghai JMA 
C46/13. 
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clear example of how different external forces effect the coal market in China, the 
example also shows the market’s complexity as well as the continuous risks merchants 
sending coal to China had. 
 
Transactions and remittances 
 
The movement of coal to China from NSW suffered from a series of impediments or 
set-backs. However, sales continued and remittances were completed. Burley provides a 
lengthy discussion on the organisation of the trade. Using AAC records, predominantly, 
Burley summarises the trade:  
During the early years of trade expansion coal was marketed in a number of 
ways. Consignments were made on colliery or on ship account. Overseas 
consumers were supplied on direct orders, or on orders received through the 
consumer’s consul in Australia, or via overseas or local agents.227 
 
Burley’s précis of the trade provides a background for how AAC treated shipments and 
the complexity involved in payments. It also provides an inkling to the fact that the coal 
markets in China had little structure and that with multiple variants of transactions, the 
commission agents worked with each on an individual basis. That is, transactions varied 
significantly, from remittances direct to the Australian-based merchants to remittances 
through London. In other cases, the ship’s captain was provided with the draft by a 
merchant in NSW on the coal shipment or the value was advanced by a China-based 
commission agent towards a return cargo of tea, sugar or rice. 
 
Firms with agencies in London, or elsewhere in Britain, frequently carried out the 
financial side of their transactions in England. That is the participation of the NSW 
exporter and the China-based importer was only through the handling of the coal and 
                                      
227 K. H. Burley, "The Organisation of the Overseas Trade in New South Wales Coal, 1860 to 1914." The 
Economic Record 37, no. 79 (Sep., 1961): 372. 
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the initial purchasing and selling. The remittances and other charges were organised 
between the London firms. For example, the London firm, F. Parbury & Co., as the 
agent of Melbourne firm Parbury Brothers, were involved in organising coal shipments 
to China and tea shipments in return to Australia.228 In their negotiations with AH&Co., 
F. Parbury & Co. dealt with AH&Co.’s agents in London, Charles A. Fearon, 
exchanging remittances and other drafts either in pounds sterling or in American 
bonds.229 As such, F. Parbury & Co. and Fearon were the principals in the transaction 
process between the firms in Australia and China. The initiation, negotiation and 
completion of contracts all took place in London. 
 
London firms also became involved in the trade of coal using either NSW or China-
based companies to organise the shipments. Though not connected directly with the 
Australian firm, the London firm believed that profits could be accomplished, even with 
the numerous commissions to be extracted along the way. In late 1873, Messrs Sir John 
Pirie & Co. of London instructed two Newcastle shipping merchants to dispatch three 
vessels to arrive in Hong Kong from NSW with coal. The first two were the Berar and 
the Fontenaye under the control of Messrs R. B. Wallace & Co. of Newcastle.230 The 
third was the Craigie Lee which was sent by Bingle White & Co., also of Newcastle.231 
Each was consigned to JM&Co. in Hong Kong which then remitted the draft of the 
proceedings from the sales to the London firm.232 The London firm also paid a 
commission direct to the NSW firms through their representative in London. 
 
                                      
228 In 1871, for example, Parbury Brothers were involved as coal agents in no less than five shipments of 
coal to China. For tea instructions, see Letter from F. Parbury & Co. to AH&Co., 6 May 1870 FPC. 
229 Letter from F. Parbury & Co. to AH&Co., 2 June 1871 FPC. 
230 Letter from Messr. R. B. Wallace & Co., 31 October 1873 Correspondence: Business Letters: 
Australasia JMA B6/3. The two vessels were chartered at 30s. per ton. 
231 Letter from JM&Co. to Henry Moore Esq., 31 March 1867 Letters to India JMA C10/57. 
232 Letter from JM&Co. to R. B. Wallace Esq, 31 December 1873 Letters to India JMA C10/63; Letter 
from JM&Co. to Bingle White & Co., 28 January 1874 Letters to India JMA C10/63. 
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Alternatively, London firms were transit points for requests. In 1871, JM&Co. 
contacted the London firm, Messrs. Wm. McDonald & Co., asking them to contact 
George King in Sydney with an indent of two loads of coal, one to Hong Kong and one 
to Shanghai.233 King showed concern about the situation in NSW at that time owing to 
increasing freight rates due to a shortage of vessels available for coal transports.234 
Freight rates in the NSW ports had increased considerably over the previous year.235 
Yet, with Hong Kong prices high (Figure 3.22), JM&Co. pushed for the completion of 
the order.236 At the same time, JM&Co. requested similarly for James Henty to organise 
for the Adelheid to depart for Newcastle and then travel to either Hong Kong or 
Shanghai on JM&Co.’s account. The preference at this time was for New Lambton 
coal.237 
 
The AAC was a preferred supplier for JM&Co.’s shipments of coal in the early 
1860s.238 The example of the Ettrick in the Introduction of this study demonstrates how 
JM&Co. worked with AAC. JM&Co. were involved in numerous shipments of AAC 
coal to China. The process for the orders were completed under the account of JM&Co. 
with the cost of the coal to be charged by AAC to Matheson & Co. in London.239 At the 
time of the early 1860s, AAC did not have much competition in the Hunter Valley 
                                      
233 Letter from JM&Co. to George King & Co., 17 October 1871 Letters to India JMA C10/61. 
234 Letter from George King & Co. to JM&Co., 29 December 1871 Correspondence: Business Letters: 
Australasia JMA B6/3. 
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Adelheid eventually travelled to Hong Kong, Charles Stokes as the shipping agent in Newcastle and with 
a load of New Lambton coals. 
238 Letter from JM&Co. to Capt. James Banks, 26 December 1860 Letters to Europe JMA C11/28. 
JM&Co. states that “of the New South Wales coal a preference is given here to that from the Australian 
and Agricultural Copper Co. Mines.”  
239 Letter from JM&Co. to Edward C. Merewether Esq., General Superintendent of the Australian 
Agricultural Company, 11 February 1864 Letters to India JMA C10/56.  
 181 
region. Further, AAC coal had a reputation for being of a quality that was as good if not 
better than the English coal, as the 1862 Admiralty trials found.240 Thus, JM&Co. 
commonly requested of their representatives in Sydney and Melbourne to forward 
vessels to Newcastle for collection of AAC coal for the China markets. 
 
Figure 3.24. The Australian Agricultural Company’s Mine.241 
 
 
The captains of a number of vessels occasionally acted as agents in NSW when the coal 
was loaded onto their vessels. The sales from the shipments were remitted either 
directly to the captain or forwarded to a merchant in NSW whom the captain was 
representing. That merchant regularly owned the vessel. The Mary Hamilton, for 
example, transported 333 tons of coal for Parbury Brothers from Sydney to AH&Co. 
                                      
240 Australian coal. Return. HoC, no. 337 (1862). 
241 “The Australian Agricultural Company’s Coal Mines, near Newcastle.” The Sydney Mail 24 January 
1874: 112. 
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Hong Kong in 1871.242 A draft, drawn on AH&Co., of £50 was created in Australia by 
Parbury Brothers and presented upon arrival by the captain.243 A further draft of £200 
was received from London, reducing the payment to the captain of the profit.244 
Payments to captains of vessels of the proceeds of the sales of coal were not 
uncommon; that of the Albyn’s Isle in 1870 is another example.245 
 
Payments were not always made through financial means. Payments in kind were 
common, predominantly in tea, rice and sugar for coal. JM&Co. kept accounts with 
merchants whom they considered trustworthy. Henry Moore, of Sydney, was a common 
supplier of coal to China. He also transported, on the same vessels, sandalwood246 and 
bêche de mer.247 The remittance was per instructions of Moore “for investment in teas at 
the earliest opportunity.”248 In other cases, the remittances from coal sales in Hong 
Kong and Shanghai would be pooled by a Hong Kong commission agent into one 
account in Hong Kong to be used for future shipments of tea, or other commodities to 
Sydney or elsewhere.249 Nicholls Brothers, of Sydney, had a similar agreement. They 
exported coal to both Hong Kong and Shanghai, and used the proceeds to cover the 
costs of shipments of rice to Sydney.250 However, unlike Moore, who had a good 
relationship with JM&Co., Nicholls Brothers were not satisfied with their exchanges 
                                      
242 “Shipping Gazette.” The Sydney Mail 18 March 1871: 86. 
243 “Insurance for £50 draft.” 1871 Ship Mary Hamilton AH II B C-S-10 f.8. 
244 “Account for Mary Hamilton.” Account Current, Aug. 1870 – July 1871 Hong Kong AH I A 9 v. 87. 
245 “Account for Albyn’s Isle.” Account Current, Aug. 1870 – July 1871 Hong Kong AH I A 9 v. 87. The 
London draft would have been by F. Parbury & Co. 
246 “Commercial.” Empire 15 August 1862: 5; “Vessels in Harbour.” Sydney Mail 16 August 1862: 5. 
The Revely departed from Sydney on 20 August 1862 for Hong Kong with 580 tons of coal and 60 tons 
of sandalwood. The coal and sandalwood agent was Henry Moore. The shipping agent was Gilchrist Watt 
& Co. 
247 “Commercial.” Empire 23 October 1862: 5; “Vessels in Harbour.” Sydney Mail 18 October 1862: 5. 
The Amalia departed Sydney on 25 October 1862 with 550 tons of coal and 54 bags of bêche de mer. The 
coal, bêche de mer and shipping agent were Henry Moore. 
248 Letter from JM&Co. to Henry Moore Esq., 1 October 1861 Letters to Europe JMA C11/29; Letter 
from Henry Moore. to JM&Co., 27 July 1861 Correspondence: Business Letters: Australasia JMA B6/3. 
249 Letter from JM&Co. to Henry Moore Esq., 25 August 1860 Letters to Europe JMA C11/28. 
250 Letter from JM&Co. to Messrs. Nicholls Bros. & Co., 31 October 1867 Letters to India JMA C10/58. 
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and in 1868 terminated their accounts with JM&Co., moving to the firm Messrs. 
Bourjan Hubener & Co. on Hong Kong.251 
 
James Henty, the agent for JM&Co. based in Melbourne, also ventured into the coal-
for-tea business. In a shipment of 1868, coal was sent by Henty to Shanghai on Henty’s 
own vessel, the Francis Henty. The coal was delivered to AH&Co. for sale with Henty 
directing the remittance to be collected by JM&Co. and then used to pay for a load of 
tea on the Francis Henty for Melbourne on joint account with JM&Co.252 In another 
episode a decade later, Henty exported coal to Shanghai through the Halton Castle.253 
Unfortunately, the vessel broke her moorings in Shanghai and collided, while adrift, 
with two other vessels. The cost of repairs to the other vessels was left to be collected 
from the captain through a series of charters for coal from Nagasaki to Shanghai. The 
captain, though, chose to abscond from Shanghai with debts remaining and leaving both 
JM&Co. and Henty to sort out the payments and other problems.254 Following that, 
Henty chose no longer be involved in the coal trade. 
 
Another method of payment was by direct, or semi-direct, remittances to the merchants 
in Australia. In 1869, James Lawrence of Melbourne organised a shipment of coal per 
the Harriet Ewing to JM&Co. at Hong Kong.255 Lawrence requested that JM&Co. 
                                      
251 Letter from Messrs. Nicholls Bros. & Co. to JM&Co., 22 April 1868 Correspondence: Business 
Letters: Australasia JMA B6/3. 
252 Letter from JM&Co. to James Henty & Co., 13 October 1868 General Letters from Shanghai JMA 
C46/6. Invoice for 10464 packages of tea per Francis Henty, 30 November 1868, for James Henty on 
joint account with the shipper, JMA A6/19. Invoice for 600 boxes of tea per Francis Henty, 30 November 
1868, for James Henty on joint account with the shipper, JMA A6/19. 
253 Letter from James Henty & Co. to JM&Co., 13 April 1878 Correspondence: Business Letters: 
Australasia JMA B6/3. 
254 There was lengthy correspondence relating to this vessel and its captain. The ship eventually went to 
Adelaide to load for London but it is unknown whether Henty was able to secure the £700 owed from the 
captain. The captain’s brother, who owned the vessel paid out the creditors in Shanghai for 68% of what 
was owed. For the latter, Letter from JM&Co. to James Henty & Co., 6 May 1879 General Letters from 
Shanghai JMA C46/27. 
255 Letter from JM&Co. to Messrs. James Lawrence Esq., 11 January 1869 Letters to India JMA C10/59. 
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transfer the proceeds to James Henty, in Melbourne.256 The vessel arrived in a market 
that was highly depressed and, even with half the godown charges waived, the proceeds 
of the shipment left a loss of $1,452.257 Thus, JM&Co. asked Lawrence to pay Henty 
the balance, the sum of £334.2.5. While the venture proved disastrous for Lawrence, the 
event showed that by using the primary agent of JM&Co. in Melbourne, Henty, 
Lawrence was able to carry out direct financial transactions with JM&Co. 
 
Concluding comments 
 
The importance of New South Wales as a supplier of steam coal to China in the 1860s 
and 1870s is undeniable. During these two decades, NSW coal was considered equal or 
close to equal in quality to English coal and second only to Welsh coal. That meant that 
when the two British coal variants were unavailable, NSW coal gained preference in 
China over the various Asian varieties. The coking coal, primarily from the Illawarra 
collieries, was also considered of best quality by the Chinese who used the coal for their 
foundries, particularly those in and near Shanghai. Yet, specific trends occurred with the 
exports such that Newcastle steaming coal found preference in Hong Kong while 
“Sydney” or Illawarra coal was important for the Shanghai market. Thus, coal played an 
important role in the trade relationship between NSW and China. 
 
The trading of NSW coal to China suffered from a number of issues, from within China 
as well as Japan and Great Britain. Changes in stocks in ports in China particularly, 
significantly affected the process of trading NSW coal and the ability of the merchants 
in the Chinese ports to sell that product. The growing imports of Japanese coal from the 
mid-1870s onwards flooded the markets in China and, together with the lower prices of 
                                      
256 Letter from JM&Co. to James Henty. & Co., 11 January 1869 Letters to India JMA C10/59. 
257 Letter from JM&Co. to Messrs. James Lawrence Esq., 18 August 1869 Letters to India JMA C10/59. 
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this coal, reduced the profitability of the coal trade for both Australian and Western 
merchants in China. Further, strikes in Britain and the need for the best and cheapest 
quality coal for the fast steamers meant that NSW coal was continuously tested for its 
ability to perform with the newest boilers. These tests showed some successes and by 
the mid-1870s Newcastle coal was mixed with Welsh coal to obtain the best 
performance at the optimum price.  
 
In NSW exporting merchants had concerns about how profitable the coal trade was. The 
collieries in Newcastle, and to a lesser extent the Illawarra, suffered from a series of 
strikes for various reasons. These created disruptions to the export trade of coal.  
Further, a group of companies in Newcastle created a vend in 1873 to manipulate 
supply and therefore prices and exports in their favour. With freight rates high and sales 
prices of coal in both Hong Kong and Shanghai falling, the profits of coal merchants 
diminished which, in turn, drew many merchants away from the coal trade.  
 
New South Wales companies involved in the trade also demonstrated the use of 
alternative payment methods. Some companies became involved in bilateral barter trade 
where the remittance from the sale of coal was used to secure a return cargo of tea, 
sugar or rice. Businesses in Great Britain, mostly in London, were also heavily involved 
in the coal trade of NSW and the payment system. Many NSW coal merchants were 
connected with these London firms and organised for remittances to be paid to the 
London firms so that these firms could organise shipments from England of goods for 
Australian ports. London merchants were also involved in the trade for their own sake 
and thus requested the NSW coal merchants to fulfil orders of coal while others were 
instructed by a Western company in China to act on their behalf in putting the request to 
the NSW companies. In other cases, captains of vessels would, either for themselves or 
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through a company in NSW, organise their own charters and shipments and finally, in 
the rare case, direct financial transactions between individuals in Australia and the 
Western firms in China allowing for a quicker, less complicated payment system. 
However, by the early to mid-1880s, the bulk of all NSW coal orders, whether to China 
or other overseas ports, emanated from London.258 
 
Contrary to the thesis of Burley, who painted a picture of the NSW coal trade to China 
as of little relevance, this chapter shows that the trade was important to many and 
involved a complex set of relationships and forces that created involved markets within 
the Chinese waters as well as risk evaluation by NSW coal merchants. This trade 
satisfied China’s need and contributed considerably to the overall trade relationship 
between Australia and China during the 1860s and 1870s. 
 
                                      
258 Burley, “Organisation of Overseas Trade.”: 376. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THE WOOD OF THE WEST 
 
The world-wide sandalwood trade to China pre-existed white settlement of Australia,1 
yet by the nineteenth century Australians were to play an important role in the wood’s 
delivery to China. From the commencement of the nineteenth century, Australian 
merchants obtained sandalwood from the South Sea Islands2 and transported the wood 
to China through the port of Sydney. Those merchants, including Simeon Lord, Robert 
Towns and Co., and others viewed with great interest the opportunities the product 
offered as payment for tea and other goods from the ports of Asia including Canton, 
China.3 When the stock of sandalwood in the south Pacific dwindled, new wood was 
discovered in Western Australia (WA). By the 1860s and 1870s, WA sandalwood 
became a primary export to China from the Australian colonies, behind coal.4 The 
supplies of wood were almost endless and its export from WA is still, though heavily 
controlled, in place today.5 
                                      
1 One of the earliest recorded instances of exportation of sandalwood took place in the late fifth century. 
Buddist monks sent a tribute to the Qi court in China. John Miksic, Singapore and the Silk Road of the 
Sea, 1300-1800. Singapore: National University of Singapore Press, 2013: 45-6. 
2 The term “South Sea Islands” was used by the governments of the time to define those islands of the 
South Pacific. The term is found in all government documents, including statistical records, and thus will 
be used here. 
3 For the South Seas’ sandalwood trade, see: Dorothy Shineberg, They Came for Sandalwood: A Study of 
the Sandalwood Trade in the South-West Pacific 1830-1865. Melbourne: Melbourne University Press, 
1967; and D. R. Hainsworth. "In Search of a Staple: The Sydney Sandalwood Trade 1804-09." Business 
Archives and History 5 (1964-65): 1-20. For Robert Town’s impact on the trade, see: Frank Broeze, 
"Australia, Asia and the Pacific: The Maritime World of Robert Towns." Australian Historical Studies 24, 
no. 95 (1990): 221-38; and A. G. King, Looking Backward over 100 History-Making Years, to 1842: A 
Tribute to a Pioneer. Sydney: Smith and Darling, 1942. 
4 Coal, as discussed in Chapter 3, was the primary Australian export to China, a large portion of which 
entered at Shanghai. For example, in 1869, coal provided over 52% of all Australian exports to Shanghai 
and sandalwood covered roughly the remainder. China No. 2 (1871). Commercial Reports from Her 
Majesty’s Consuls in China. 1869-70 House of Commons, no. C.317 (1871) London: Harrison and Sons, 
1871: 39. 
5
 For an overall analysis of the WA sandalwood trade to date, see: O. W. Loneragan, "Historical Review 
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The sandalwood trade was a vital industry for WA during the second half of the 
nineteenth century. The industry created employment for many individuals from the 
farmers who harvested the wood to the carriers transporting the wood to the ports and 
through to the export merchants. The merchants were important as they organised the 
export of the sandalwood, including such matters as procuring charters, loading, 
insurance and communications with importers at foreign ports. The work of the 
merchants created trade with such ports as Singapore, Hong Kong and Shanghai which, 
in turn, provided goods in return for WA. 
 
The movement of WA sandalwood to the foreign ports was via a route that proceeded 
north to Shanghai. Shanghai was the most favoured port for WA wood and the ports, 
including Singapore and Hong Kong, were thus transition only. Many merchants were 
involved along this route north to Shanghai, at each of the intermediary ports and at 
Shanghai. WA merchants thus had a choice to trade directly to Shanghai or to choose 
one of the intermediary ports. With so many factors involved, the trade of sandalwood 
from WA to China was complex. 
 
Investigating the WA sandalwood trade to China poses a number of questions. Was 
there a specific route to Shanghai and how was that route employed? How was the 
sandalwood transported to China and what impediments lay in the way of successful 
transport? Who were the merchants involved in the trade? Through these merchants, 
what market forces did they create on the sandalwood trade and what strategies were 
                                                                                                                
of Sandalwood (Santalum Spicatum): Research in Western Australia, Research Bulletin No. 4." Como, 
WA: Department of Conservation and Land Management, 1990; Pamela Statham, "The Sandalwood 
Industry in Australia: A History." In Symposium on Sandalwood in the Pacific. Honolulu, Hawai'i, 1990; 
Pamela Statham, "The Australian Sandalwood Trade - Small but Significant." Discussion paper 
(University of Western Australia) 87, no. 09 (1987): 1-36; Len Talbot, "Wooden Gold: Early Days of the 
Sandalwood Industry." Forest Focus 30 (1983): 21-32; and Matthew Tonts, and John Selwood, "Niche 
Markets, Regional Diversification and the Reinvention of Western Australia's Sandalwood Industry." 
Tijdschrift voor economische en sociale geografie 94, no. 5 (2003): 564-75. 
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put in place to counter the forces? Finally, how were the WA merchants remitted for 
their parcels of sandalwood? Through interpreting a combination of statistical records 
with various correspondence, the current chapter answers these questions and provides 
an explanation of how the sandalwood trade fitted within the trade relationships 
between Australia and China during the 1860s and 1870s. 
 
The sandalwood tree 
 
Figure 4.1. Santalum Spicatum (Australian Sandalwood tree).6 
 
 
Sandalwood is a slow-growing tree found in various parts of the South Asian, South 
East Asian, Pacific and Australian regions. There are approximately 18 species of the 
genus Santalum, each a hemi-parasite as they grow using host trees to obtain their 
nutrients.7 The Indian species Santalum album (Santalaceae) from the Mysore Kingdom 
                                      
6 M. Fagg, Santalum Spicatum Australian Plant Image Index, Australian National Botanic Gardens, 
dig.1084. 
7 S. C. U. M. P. Subasinghe, "Sandalwood Research: A Global Perspective." Journal of Tropical Forestry 
and Environment 3, no. 1 (2013): 1 
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and the Malabar Coast was considered by consumers throughout the world as being the 
finest quality. The wood from India had been harvested for approximately five 
millennia. India led the world in extracting the oil from the wood for perfumes and 
medicines.8  
 
Uses of sandalwood were numerous. Depending on the size, the colour, aroma and 
quality of the wood, it was used to produce articles as large as desks to as small as 
inlaid boxes or ornaments. Yet, this practice of crafting the wood into luxury artefacts 
was rare with the greater portion of the sandalwood, instead, ground into incense for 
religious and ceremonial uses.9 The size of the wood was also important with the larger 
diameter logs attracting higher prices in the markets of Singapore and China than the 
smaller offcuts. Parcels of sandalwood of less than 10 logs per picul (133 1/3 lbs) were 
reputed the best. These larger logs were considered optimum for presentation as 
offerings. The smaller pieces, either logs or chips, were ground into powder and sold to 
and used by the poorer people as religious offerings.10 Thus, the most superior quality 
wood had both a large size and strong aromatic qualities. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                      
8 A. N. Arun Kumar, Geeta Joshi, and H. Y. Moham Ram. "Sandalwood: History, Uses, Present Status 
and the Future." Current Science 103, no. 12 (2012): 1408; Edward H. Schafer. The Golden Peaches of 
Samarkand: A Study of T'ang Exotics. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1963: 136-38. 
9 Shineberg. They Came for Sandalwood: 1; Statham. “The Australian Sandalwood Trade.”: 1. 
10 Shineberg. They Came for Sandalwood: 1; The prices given in reports from merchants based in 
Singapore, Hong Kong and Shanghai discerned a difference between large wood and small wood, large 
wood attaining a higher selling price; One picul in weight equated to 133 1/3 lbs. 
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Figure 4.2. Sandalwood producing areas in WA, 201611 
 
Four species of sandalwood currently exist in WA.12 Of these, only one, Santalum 
spicatum is commercially exploitable. Figure 4.2 shows that S. spicatum grows 
predominantly in the southern parts of WA, from the south-west coastal regions, north 
                                      
11 Sandalwood Forest Products Commission Western Australia http://www.fpc.wa.gov.au/sandalwood 
accessed 5 July 2016. There are also known sandalwood plantations in the north-west of WA near the 
town of Kunumurra.  
12 The four Santalum species are: S. spicatum, S. acuminatum, S. murrayanum and S. lanceolatum. 
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to Shark’s Bay and east into South Australia.13 In the early days of the colony, the 
harvesting was restricted to the land that was within easy carriage of the coast from 
where it could be transported. Although there were no controls in gathering the wood 
and an unregulated market, the sandalwood forests withstood their continuous 
dismantlement while thousands of tons of the wood were exported annually from the 
1860s onwards.  
 
Early trade of sandalwood 
 
The trade of sandalwood has a history that extends into at least the past two millennia. 
For example, tributes including sandalwood statues were presented by the Buddhist 
monks of Funan to the Qi Court in China in the late 5th century14 and similarly a tribute 
was sent to the Tang court from further south in the East Indies in 647.15 At that time 
India was the primary producer and trader of sandalwood with their product distributed 
to ports in both the Mediterranean in the west and to China in the east.16 Prior to 
Western settlement, Timor was recognised by the Chinese as an island yielding vast 
quantities of sandalwood and, from the early fifteenth century, vigorous trade took place 
between Timor and China.17 By the early sixteenth century, Portuguese merchants 
became involved in the trade of sandalwood from east Timor, the Lesser Sunda Islands 
and, especially, Sumba. The sandalwood was traded to the Portuguese port of Macao.18 
                                      
13 Other varieties of Santalum have been found along the far north coast of WA, but these were not 
involved in any export at the time and were used by the local indigenous population. 
14 Miksic, Singapore and the Silk Road of the Sea, 1300-1800: 45-6. Funan was the region located in 
South East Asia around the Mekong Delta. 
15
 Schafer, Golden Peaches of Samarkand: 136. 
16
 William E. Hillis, "Introduction and Historical Background." In Natural Products of Woody Plants I, 
edited by John W. Rowe, 1-25. Berlin: Springer-Verlag, 1989: 8. 
17 Andrew McWilliam, "Haumeni, Not Many: Renewed Plunder and Mismanagement in the Timorese 
Sandalwood Industry." 1-21. Canberra: Resource Management in Asia-Pacific Program, Australian 
National University, 2001: 3 The harvesting, transport and trade of sandalwood on the island was 
controlled by the native kings in each region. 
18 John Villiers, "The Vanishing Sandalwood of Portuguese Timor." Itinerario 18, no. 2 (1994): 86. 
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Towards the end of the eighteenth century and through into the early nineteenth century, 
Western traders expanded the reach of sandalwood harvesting to include the islands of 
both the North and South Pacific.  
 
The harvesting of these other districts where sandalwood was produced were each 
terminated by the 1870s or earlier thus allowing WA sandalwood to emerge as the 
predominant variety of the wood sold in China by the 1870s. In Hawaii, then known as 
the Sandwich Islands, sandalwood was traded to China from 1791.19 By the early 1830s, 
over-harvesting together with diminished prices in Canton, owing to other sandalwood 
imports, saw a halt in the trade.20 By 1870, the Indian government had concerns of 
maintaining an export market for sandalwood. The needs of the domestic market were 
not being met and thus the Indian government halted exports.21 Competition for other 
sandalwood in the China markets led to the termination of the Netherlands India 
sandalwood trade. Portuguese farmers and merchants in Timor found that profitability 
from parcels of sandalwood was negligible. Thus, by the 1870s, these farmers and 
merchants began producing and exporting coffee as an alternative to sandalwood.22 
 
                                      
19 Linda W. Pratt, and Charles P. Stone, Alteration of Native Hawaiian Vegetation : Effects of Humans, 
Their Activities and Introductions. Honolulu: University of Hawaii, Cooperative National Park Resources 
Studies Unit, 1990: 38; Patrick V. Kirch, and Marshall Sahlins, Anahulu : The Anthropology of History in 
the Kingdom of Hawaii. Vol. 1, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992: 58. The trade of sandalwood 
was initially a royal monopoly. By the mid-1820s, over-harvesting led to a scarcity of sandalwood and at 
that time Boston merchants became involved to counter the shortage of specie in New England. Pratt and 
Stone. Alteration of Native: 38; Marshall Sahlins, "The Political Economy of Grandeur in Hawaii from 
1810 to 1830." In Culture through Time: Anthropoligical Approaches, edited by Emiko Ohnuki-Tierney. 
26-56. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1990: 32, 35; Harold W. Bradley, The American Frontier 
in Hawaii: The Pioneers 1789-1843. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1968: 60, 118; Jennifer 
Fish Kashay, "Agents of Imperialism: Missionaries and Merchants in Early-Nineteenth-Century Hawaii." 
The New England Quarterly 80, no. 2 (2007): 285; Kirch, and Sahalin, Anthropology and History of 
Hawaii: 58, 65. 
20 Bradley, The American Frontier: 67, 117; Pratt and Stone, Alteration of Native: 39. In the mid-1820s, 
the price of Hawaiian sandalwood in Guangzhou was between $10.50 and $14 per picul. By 1830, 
Hawaiian sandalwood sold for a mere $1.50 per picul. 
21 Statham, “The Australian Sandalwood Trade.”: 10; Talbot, “Wooden Gold.”: 25; Ezra D. Rashkow, 
"Perfumed the Axe That Laid It Low: The Endangerment of Sandalwood in Southern India." The Indian 
Economic and Social History Review 51, no. 1 (2014): 53, 55. 
22 Villiers, “Vanishing Sandalwood.”: 93; “Items from the Java Papers.” Straits Times and Overland 
Journal 13 July 1873: 5. 
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Australia’s initial connection with sandalwood came about not long after European 
settlement. Following the discovery of sandalwood in Fiji in 1804, the first shipment 
arrived in Sydney in April 1805.23 A small portion was sold for local consumption by 
Asiatic seamen,24 the remainder transhipped to Canton.25 Sandalwood was transported 
to China mostly through American vessels that had landed in Sydney.26 In a few cases 
the sandalwood was sold in Canton for a “quantity of Teas and other Goods.”27 To the 
Sydney merchants who received the sandalwood, the ability to trade it in Canton for 
Chinese cargo was most beneficial and created profitable commerce.28 Although the 
forests of Fiji had been stripped of sandalwood by 1816, other islands in the region soon 
became a source of the product including Marquesas Islands, Isle of Pines, Loyalty 
Islands, New Caledonia and parts of the New Hebrides.29 Following the dismantling of 
the British East India Company’s monopoly over British-run trade in the East in 1834, 
Australian merchants became strongly involved in the sandalwood trade.30 Shipments of 
South Pacific sandalwood, through Sydney, continued until, as Dorothy Shineberg 
stated that, in her analysis of Pacific region, “the sandalwood trade as such was dead by 
1865.”31 
 
                                      
23 John McNeill, "From Magellan to Miti: Pacific Rim Economies and Pacific Island Ecologies: Since 
1521." In Studies in the Economic History of the Pacific Rim, edited by Sally M. Miller, A.J.H Latham, 
and Dennis O. Flynn. 72-93. London: Routledge, 1998: 78; Ian C. Campbell, A History of the Pacific 
Islands. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1989: 61; Hainsworth, “Search of a Staple.”: 3. 
Hainsworth believes that Simeon Lord was responsible for this first venture of sandalwood to Australian 
shores. 
24 “Sydney.” SGNSWA 23 March 1806: 2. 
25 For example, the King George in 1808. “Sydney.” SGNSWA 24 July 1808: 2. 
26 A large number of American vessels landed in Sydney to trade or obtain fresh supplies. Many were 
involved in the whaling and seal-skin industries of the Southern Ocean. Others were en route to Canton. 
For example, according to shipping records in the Sydney Gazette and New South Wales Advertiser for 
1805, five vessels arrived from the American east coast ports. In 1806 two departed for China while 
another returned from China. 
27 “Proclamation.” SGNSWA 13 July 1806: 1. 
28 Hainsworth, “Search of a Staple.”: 2. 
29 Shineberg, They Came for Sandalwood: 7-9. 
30 Shineberg, They Came for Sandalwood: 6-7. 
31  Shineberg, They Came for Sandalwood: 9. Evidence exists of continuous shipments by both 
Westerners and Chinese throughout the period from Sydney to Hong Kong, though in much smaller 
amounts than prior to 1864 and also less than those from WA. 
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Thus by the 1860s, two important developments were to affect the WA sandalwood 
merchants. The first was the reduction to near elimination of any competition in 
sandalwood exports to China. The second involved a degree of knowledge among the 
early Australian sandalwood traders that was most likely passed to the WA merchants 
by their Sydney counterparts.  
 
WA and sandalwood pre-1860 
 
WA’s initial connections with China were incidental, though very noticeable. The 
establishment of the Swan River Colony in 1829 provided a new port of call for 
shipping in the Indian Ocean. Renamed WA three years later, the colony’s development 
required trade and immigration. When the BEIC monopoly was abolished by the UK 
Parliament in 1834, it had profound effects on all traders throughout the Australian 
colonies.32 In an article in the local paper of Perth, the editor explained the effects of 
such a transition in Asia and Australasia. He relayed a speech by the member of the 
British House of Commons, Charles Grant, who stated in 1833, in relation to the East 
India Company: “That it is expedient that all his Majesty’s subjects be at liberty to 
repair to the ports of the empire of China, and to trade in tea and all other productions of 
the said empire.”33 WA was now in the “same boat” as every other British colony in 
appreciating the opportunities of trading with China.  
 
The colony of WA, in the 1830s, had limited resources for trade. As a new colony, WA 
relied on the issue of Treasury Bills to cover the costs for all imports. Most goods 
                                      
32
 Sandra Tweedie, Trading Partners: Australia and Asia 1790-1993 Sydney: University of NSW Press, 
1994: 14-15; Francis E. Hyde. Far Eastern Trade: 1860-1914. London: Adam & Charles Black, 1973 2. 
C. H. Philips, The East India Company 1784-1834. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1961: 287. 
33 “East India Question.” Perth Gazette and Western Australian Journal 23 November 1833: 187. The 
item was part of an article found in the London newspaper Spectator 15 June 1833. Grant was also known 
as Lord Glenelg and was, at that time, President of the Board of Control of the BEIC. Philips, East India 
Company: 338. 
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arrived in WA, having originated from New South Wales, Van Diemen’s Land and 
England. On occasions, a vessel arrived at Fremantle from China. For example, the 
Caledonia landed at Fremantle on 20 September 1839, following its trip from China and 
Timor, with 15 tons of coffee, six tons of rice, 2000 chests of tea and other sundries.34 
As such, the lack of locally produced goods to trade became a concern for the WA 
colonial government. In 1843, Governor John Hutt opened the WA parliament 
exclaiming the need to find an export commodity to replace the then used specie or the 
issuing of extra Treasury Bills.35 One solution to the problem lay with exporting 
sandalwood. 
 
The possibilities of the sandalwood trade were understood during the early period of 
WA’s colonial existence. Indian and Chinese labourers, indentured to assist with the 
development of the colony,36 noted the logs used as firewood being sandalwood. In her 
study of WA sandalwood, Pamela Statham suggests that these workers “recognized the 
commercial potential of the wood.”37 Further confirmation of the potential for the 
development of a sandalwood export industry came from explorer Ensign Dale in 
1832.38 Yet neither generated any interest from WA merchants or the government at the 
time. 
 
                                      
34 “Shipping Intelligence.” Perth Gazette and Western Australian Journal 21 September 1839: 150. 
35 Talbot, "Wooden Gold.": 22; “The Governor’s Speech.” Swan River News and Western Australian 
Chronicle 2, no. 1 (1 January 1844): 6. 
36 Anne Atkinson, "Chinese Labour and Capital in Western Australia, 1847-1947." PhD. Murdoch 
University, 1991: 2. Atkinson states that she believed those in WA were connected to those who had 
migrated to the new colony. Statham mentions that there were indentured Chinese. Statham, “Sandalwood 
Industry in Australia.”: 27. 
37 Statham, “Sandalwood Industry in Australia.”: 27. 
38 W. B. Kimberly, History of West Australia: A Narrative of Her Past Together with Biographies of Her 
Leading Men. Melbourne: F. W. Niven & Co., 1897: 59; Statham, “Australian Sandalwood Trade.”: 5. 
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The first export of native sandalwood from WA took place in 1845 with shipments to 
Mauritius, Singapore and, possibly, India. 39  A year later, James A. M. Moulton 
chartered the Paul Jones to take sandalwood direct to China.40 While the wood sold for 
a very good price in Canton, about £30 per ton, Moulton was killed following a mutiny 
on the Paul Jones and the proceedings from the sale never made it to WA.41 
 
The trade of sandalwood accelerated in the late 1840s, bringing a good return to the 
farmers and settlers.42 The trade receded into a short abeyance in the early 1850s, re-
emerging in the second half of that decade. In 1848, for example, a combined 1,335 tons 
was exported to ports as exotic as Lombok, Mauritius, Batavia and Madras as well as at 
least a dozen trips to Singapore and two to Hong Kong.43 A portion of the sandalwood 
                                      
39 Inquirer 9 July 1845: 2; “The Western Australian Journal.” Perth Gazette and Western Australian 
Journal 1 November 1845: 2; Perth Gazette and Western Australian Journal 5 April 1845: 2. There is 
contention as to any trip to Bombay in 1845 with sandalwood. Len Talbot states that four tons were 
transported to the “Far East” and sold for $20 per ton. Pamela Statham states that the government 
schooner Champion transported a “quantity” to Bombay, returning “early in 1845.” WA newspapers 
show that local merchant C. D. Ridley met the WA governor, John Hutt, in January 1845 enquiring about 
selling sandalwood to Bombay merchants. The Champion departed Fremantle, WA on 7 February 1845, 
returning on 24 May 1845. There is no clear evidence that any sandalwood was carried on this trip. Talbot, 
“Wooden Gold.”: 22; Statham, "Sandalwood Industry in Australia.”: 27-28; Inquirer 22 January 1845: 3; 
“To the Editor.” Inquirer 26 February 1845: 3; “Shipping Intelligence.” Inquirer 12 February 1845; 
“Shipping Intelligence.” Inquirer 28 May 1845: 2; The statistical records for 1845 show 11 tons of 
sandalwood exported at a value of £110. Colony of Western Australia, Year ending 31st December 1845 
Perth: Government Printers, 1846: 124. 
40 “Sandal Wood for China.” Perth Gazette and Western Australian Journal 31 January 1846: 2; 
“Shipping Intelligence.” Inquirer 11 February 1846: 2. 
41  Inquirer 17 February 1847: 3; “The Western Australian Journal.” Perth Gazette and Western 
Australian Journal 23 January 1847: 2. Reports, materialised a year after the vessel had sailed, stated that 
the cargo fetched upwards of $9 per picul, or about £30 per ton, which provided a handsome profit for 
Moulton. On the Paul Jones’ return journey, Moulton took over as captain when the original captain 
departed the vessel. Moulton then took on two Malay seamen, a Briton and his young Malay servant. One, 
the chief Malay, a “Macassarman” by the name of “Roeta,” chose to mutiny, eventually killing the British 
passenger, Moulton and his mate and ordered the others to sail for Makassar. Roeta, however, was shot 
by Moulton in the exchange. A few days later the Paul Jones was taken back by the two remaining 
Englishmen and Roeta put in chains. Before they were rescued, Roeta died of his own wounds, all those 
dead also having been given a watery funeral. The ownership of the vessel and its cargo were eventually 
part of proceedings in the Court of Justice at Sourabaya. “Government Notification.” The Singapore Free 
Press and Mercantile Advertiser 19 October 1848: 1. 
42 J. S. Battye, ed. The Cyclopedia of Western Australia. 2 vols. Vol. 2. Adelaide: Hussey and Gillingham 
Ltd, 1912: 286. 
43 Statham, "Australian Sandalwood Trade."  In Appendix II, Statham uses the Western Australian Blue 
Books to obtain figures for volume and value of sandalwood exports. These figures do not match up with 
those obtained from viewing the shipping records in the two newspapers of the time. While the 
newspaper data is generally lower, in 1847 it is higher and while the Blue Books show no exports in 1852, 
two ships did travel with an export of sandalwood. Further, the Blue Books show that in 1845 only four 
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shipped to Singapore that year was then transhipped to China.44 In the following year, 
the total value of sandalwood exports diminished slightly, but then, with new taxes, tolls 
and licensing installed by the WA colonial government, exports dwindled. 45  A 
depression of sandalwood prices in China caused further angst to the WA sandalwood 
merchants, which dulled their interest in the trade.46 There were at least six departures 
in 1850 and eight in 1851. The amount of sandalwood dispatched, though, was only a 
mere 230 tons for each year. In 1852, only two ships took on the commodity, one to 
Singapore and one to Mauritius, totalling 39 tons.47 The trade lay dormant for only two 
years, a single shipment in May 1855 seeing the commencement of further exports.48 
Shipping information from the various Perth newspapers during the years from 1856 to 
1860 reveals that almost all shipments of sandalwood from WA during those years were 
to Singapore.49 
 
The re-commencement of sandalwood exports from WA to China was delayed until 
1860 and experienced some setbacks in its initial stages. The Fremantle firm T. & H. 
Carter & Co. corresponded with JM&Co. in Hong Kong with the view of transporting a 
sample of the WA variety of sandalwood to Hong Kong for sale.50 The Hong Kong firm 
encouraged the plan and provided details of the market which it stated was “firm” even 
                                                                                                                
tons were exported yet I have explained above that three ships, one to Mauritius and two to Singapore 
took sandalwood with them. Thus there is some question as to the accuracy of the Blue Book data. 
44 “Report on the Market.” The Singapore Free Press and Mercantile Advertiser 7 September 1848: 4. 
The article mentions that the sandalwood from the Hawk was transshipped to China. 
45 Talbot, “Wooden Gold.”: 24; Statham, “Australian Sandalwood Trade.”: 7-8. 
46 The sale value of sandalwood was sufficiently high enough to attract heavy exports from WA. This 
created an oversupply and thus a drop in prices which, when accompanied by the taxes applied by the 
WA Governor, created a disincentive to continuing in the trade. Statham, “The Sandalwood Industry.”: 
29; Talbot, “Wooden Gold.”: 24.  
47 A full list of all vessels travelling with sandalwood from WA is available from the author. For a 
summarised version, see Appendix 12. In this list, it is noted that there were shipments in 1852, 1855 and 
1856 countering the statistical records and thus the literature that state there was none. 
48 “Shipping Intelligence.” Inquirer 16 May 1855: 2. 
49 Of 28 known shipments, one in 1857 was to Batavia and one small shipment of 5.5 tons in 1859 to 
London. See Appendix 12 for a summary of shipments.  
50 Letter from T. & H. Carter & Co. to JM&Co., 11 May 1860 Correspondence: Business Letters: 
Australasia JMA B6/3. 
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though two vessels had recently arrived from Sydney with sandalwood.51 The brig 
Kestrel was chartered by T. & H. Carter & Co. and departed from Fremantle, with 171 
tons of sandalwood aboard, on 8 July 1861, arriving in Hong Kong on 18 August 
1861.52 Upon arrival, the sandalwood was tested by a number of principal merchants in 
Hong Kong and found to be of “inferior description called ‘New Island’ as 
distinguished from the best called ‘Old Island’, worth from perhaps 50 to perhaps 100 
per cent more.”53 A portion of the goods were sold in Hong Kong and the remainder in 
Canton.54 On the return journey, the Kestrel brought tea, rice and sugar for the Western 
Australians under the consignment of T. & H. Carter & Co.55  
 
Preference in China 
 
The decreasing supplies of sandalwood, by the early 1870s, from the traditional markets 
of India, Timor and the South Sea Islands, created a new preference and acceptance for 
the WA variant. However, this preference was not the same throughout the ports of 
China. Chinese merchants in Hong Kong continued to favour sandalwood from the 
traditional ports and rarely purchased wood from WA unless they were speculating on 
sales in Shanghai through transhipment to that port. Yet at Shanghai, the opposite was 
the case. Sandalwood from the South Sea Islands was unsaleable while the buyers at 
                                      
51 Letter from JM&Co. to T. & H. Carter & Co., 6 July 1860 Letters to Europe JMA C11/27. 
52 “Shipping Intelligence.” The Inquirer and Commercial News 17 July 1861: 2; Letter from JM&Co. to 
T. & H. Carter & Co., 24 August 1861 Letters to Europe JMA C11/29. The Kestrel may have been 
purchased by the Carter company as it was used thereafter for many years by that company for travel 
between Sydney, Fremantle, China and Mauritius. The Kestrel was declared in the local newspaper as 
travelling to Singapore and not Hong Kong and thus, possibly, likewise in the customs records creating 
an error in the statistics relating to the trade to China for that year. 
53 Letter from JM&Co. to T. & H. Carter & Co., 24 August 1861 Letters to Europe JMA C11/29. 
54 Letter from JM&Co. to T. & H. Carter & Co., 24 September 1861 Letters to Europe JMA C11/29. 
55 The inventory consisted of 1595 packages of tea, 600 bags of rice and 400 bags of brown sugar. 
Invoices to Captain Davis, Kestrel and T. & H. Carter & Co. 18 September 1861 Invoices of Hong Kong 
Office JMA A6/12; “Shipping Intelligence.” The Perth Gazette and Independent Journal of Politics and 
News 10 January 1862: 2. 
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that port showed a preference for the WA wood.56 That is, as WA sandalwood 
progressed north, Hong Kong was primarily a transition port towards Shanghai and not 
one where the good was only sold for consumption.  
 
The choice of destination in China as with the sales themselves were also governed by 
seasonality. Although WA sandalwood was generally used for incense, the primary 
times when sales would be best made were not during the major festivals but in late 
Spring and late Autumn. While the largest consumption took place during the Chinese 
New Year of January or February,57 the best time for sales remained prior to the 
festival.58 In a letter to George Glyde in 1872, JM&Co. explains the then position of 
selling sandalwood in Shanghai. 
It is important that shippers of sandalwood be aware that the consumption in the 
North of China is limited and that one of the guarantees to successful business is 
to keep the trade as much as possible in few hands on this side. The months of 
largest demand are usually April, May and June, and again during October, and 
November, and the market is capable of taking 50/60000 piculs per annum from 
all sources.59 
 
Therefore, it seems plausible that WA merchants were able to organise their shipments 
to Shanghai when the trade was at its, expected, best at that port and use the other ports 
south along the route at other times. However, this was not the case. Viewing the 
shipping records, there does not appear any clear regimen relating to the departure dates 
when considering specific destinations. They appear random.60 
 
                                      
56 Henry Moore attempted to sell sandalwood in Shanghai in 1869 only to be informed by JM&Co. 
“South Sea Island sandalwood is more largely saleable in the South of China than at this port.” The parcel 
was unsold in Shanghai and eventually shipped to Hong Kong for sale. Letter from JM&Co. to H. Moore, 
5 January 1869 General Letters from Shanghai JMA C46/7; Letter from JM&Co. to H. Moore, 2 
February 1869 General Letters from Shanghai JMA C46/7; Letter from JM&Co. to H. Moore, 2 March 
1869 General Letters from Shanghai JMA C46/7. See also: Letter from JM&Co. to J. H. Monger Esq., 3 
November 1872 Letters to India JMA C10/62. 
57 Letter from JM&Co. to H. Saw Esq., 4 January 1871 General Letters from Shanghai JMA C46/10. 
58 Letter from JM&Co. to J. H. Monger Esq., 11 April 1872 General Letters from Shanghai JMA C46/11. 
59 Letter from JM&Co. to G. Glyde and Son, 21 November 1872 Letters to India JMA C46/13.  
60 See Appendix 13 for a tabulation of monthly numbers of departures to China, 1860-1880.  
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Taking sandalwood to China – the China route 
 
Figure 4.3. The China route. 
  
 
The destinations for WA sandalwood during the 1860s and 1870s varied significantly. 
According to the WA newspapers and government statistical records, the wood was 
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shipped to Singapore, a few ports in China, England, Batavia, India and the eastern 
Australian colonies.61 The predominant ports were Singapore, Hong Kong and Shanghai. 
Singapore and Hong Kong were transition ports where sandalwood was transhipped 
north towards Shanghai. The northerly direction of the trade of sandalwood, as shown 
in Figure 4.3, I have labelled the “China route.” In this section, the three questions of 
where did the sandalwood go along the route, who was involved in transhipping to each 
port and why did it take that route are answered. 
 
Sandalwood was transported from WA to China using various routes. These routes 
included stopovers at ports where the wood was bought, sold and transhipped further 
north towards its final destination. A portion of the wood was shipped via Singapore 
and Hong Kong. Ports in India, as noted, were occasionally used as an intermediary 
prior to the wood eventually being delivered to China. Sydney was another port of 
transhipment for sandalwood towards China. Singapore, though, was the primary 
transition port. 
 
Figure 4.4 demonstrates that Singapore and ports in China were the predominant 
destinations for the export of sandalwood from WA during the 1860s and well into the 
1870s. Together, they accounted for, on average, 90 per cent of all WA sandalwood 
exports. The chart reveals that there was no consistency in the proportion of sandalwood 
being exported to these ports. In some years the shares of Chinese ports exceeded that 
of Singapore. 
 
 
 
                                      
61 SR WA 1860-80. 
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Figure 4.4. Destinations of sandalwood exported from Western Australia, 1860-1880 
(cumulative percentages)62 
 
 
 
Figure 4.5. Share of sandalwood in total exports to Singapore and China from WA 
(percentages).63 
 
                                      
62 Statistical Tables relating to the Colonial and Other Possessions of the United Kingdom. [Parts VII to 
XVII – 1860 to 1881] London: G. E. Eyre and W. Spottiswoode [1862-1885].  
63 SR WA 1860-80. 
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Conversely, for Singapore and China, sandalwood provided the bulk of all exports from 
WA during the 1860s and 1870s. Although Singapore imported other goods from WA 
for transhipment, including horses and on rare occasions also wool,64 sandalwood 
maintained its position as the dominant item exported from WA. Similarly for the 
Chinese ports, the merchants of WA ventured into the export of numerous other 
products, some of value yet none that would sustain exports. These included animals, 
bêche-de-mer, lead ore and guano.65 Figure 4.5 shows sandalwood as a percentage of 
exports from WA to Singapore and China. In the case of Singapore, the average for the 
two decades is approximately 70 per cent while for China, that same average is nearer 
90 per cent. What Figures 4.4 and 4.5 do not reveal is that Singapore and Hong Kong 
were not final destinations, but ports of transhipment towards Shanghai. 
 
Table 4.1. Total quantities of Sandalwood, in tons, imported and re-exported in foreign 
boats for Shanghai, 1868-1872.66 
Year 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 
Import from Foreign Ports 41,210 74,326 46,941 35,442 59,262 
Import from Treaty Ports 993 816 79 80 226 
Re-Exports to Foreign Ports 2 239 16 210 8 
Re-Exports to Treaty Ports 36,857 40,183 36,581 41,955 49,602 
Shanghai Consumption 5,344 34,720 10,423 -6643 9878 
% for local consumption 12.7 46.2 22.2 -18.7 16.6 
 
 
The sandalwood that arrived in Shanghai also was not generally for the consumption in 
the local market but for re-export to other parts of China. The data in Table 4.1 
                                      
64 In 1871, 9,535 lbs. of wool was exported from WA to Singapore. SR WA 1871: 58. 
65 For example, SR WA 1875: 62-63 shows that 51 horses, four cows and a quantity of lead ore was 
exported to China. 
66 Robert Hart, China. Trade Statistics of the Treaty Ports, for the Period 1863-1872 Shanghai: Imperial 
Maritime Customs Press, 1873: Shanghai: 9, 11, 13, 15. The data is for foreign registered vessels as there 
appears to have been little or no data kept for Chinese junks and other vessels that transshipped the wood 
from Hong Kong and other ports. The data varies slightly with that in Table 4.1 for the years 1870 to 
1872; the reason is unknown. The negative consumption figure for 1871 occurs as some sandalwood is 
kept in stock awaiting sale or transshipment and is thus carried over to the following year’s figures. 
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demonstrate that a significant percentage of the sandalwood imported to Shanghai was 
on-sold to the other Treaty Ports between 1868 and 1872. The “Foreign Ports” 
mentioned in the table included Singapore and Hong Kong. A portion of the re-export 
included that by Western commission agents, including JM&Co., who searched for 
better markets, including Chenkiang and Hankow, to sell the sandalwood.67 By the mid-
to-late 1870s, JM&Co., commonly split parcels between sales in Shanghai and 
Chenkiang, normally attaining a higher selling price in the latter port than in Shanghai.68 
Numerous reasons drove JM&Co. to source buyers in outlying ports. They included the 
need to counter the low prices offered by Chinese importers or the need to respond to a 
flooded local sandalwood market. 
 
The other port of transition, as mentioned above, was Sydney. Specifically, one 
merchant firm, T. & H. Carter & Co., used this route until 1868. The Kestrel, returning 
from China in January 1862, was sent on to Sydney.69 Its cargo included 84 tons of 
sandalwood with the expectation to “find its way thence to some part of China.”70 That 
first shipment in 1862 was transhipped by R. Towns & Co., in Sydney, to Paterson, 
Simon & Co., of Singapore, per the Royal Saxon.71 A second shipment, later in 1862, 
from WA per the Kestrel was forwarded directly to Hong Kong. H. Moore chartered the 
Revely, loading it with a large tonnage of coal and the “Australian sandalwood” 
collected from the load of the Kestrel.72 In Hong Kong, the sandalwood was received by 
                                      
67 JM&Co. used agents in these ports. Letter from JM&Co. to G. Shenton Esq., 1 March 1871 General 
Letters from Shanghai JMA C46/10; Letter from JM&Co. to B. Mason Esq., 8 Spetember 1870 General 
Letters from Shanghai JMA C46/9. 
68 Letter from JM&Co. to G. Shenton Esq., 4 January 1872 General Letters from Shanghai JMA C46/11. 
69 “Shipping Intelligence.” The Inquirer and Commercial News 5 February 1862: 2. 
70 Letter from T. & H. Carter & Co. to JM&Co., 24 January 1862 Correspondence: Business Letters: 
Australasia JMA B6/3. 
71 “Shipping.” SMH 20 May 1862: 4; Letter from R. Towns & Co. to Paterson, Simon & Co., 19 May 
1862 Letterbook No. 5 RT 307/12. 
72 Invoice of Sandalwood shipped by Henry Moore aboard the Revely, 14 August 1862 Invoices from 
Australia JMA A8/66/1; Invoice of Coals shipped by Henry Moore aboard the Revely, 7 August 1862 
Invoices from Australia JMA A8/66/1. 
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JM&Co. to sell there.73 The primary reason for using Sydney instead of Singapore or a 
Chinese port for T. & H. Carter & Co. was the expected return cargo for WA, paid for 
through the sale of the sandalwood. The trade of sandalwood to Sydney was a lucrative 
venture for T. & H. Carter & Co.. For the Sydney merchants, the WA sandalwood 
replaced the dwindling stocks of South Pacific sandalwood, allowing extra cargo for the 
vessels travelling to Singapore or China.74 
 
Chinese transhipment 
 
The use of Singapore and Hong Kong as intermediary ports for transactions in the 
purchase and sales of sandalwood was prevalent among the Chinese merchants 
operating in those ports. The Chinese were the primary handlers of the sandalwood in 
the intermediary ports. Their work created concerns for the western merchants based in 
China. From Hong Kong, JM&Co. described the sandalwood trade as one that was 
placed in “too many” hands, that being the number of transhipment points along the 
China route. In a letter to Perth merchant George Shenton, dated 7 July 1876, JM&Co. 
discussed the brief history of Hong Kong sales. 
In former years we used to receive consignments for the wood, but we believe 
consumption in the south of China is only small and our correspondents have for 
some time past been directing their ventures to Shanghai. On the other hand we 
believe it to be perfectly true that the sandalwood shipped to the Straits 
eventually finds its way to Hong Kong and ultimately to Shanghai or the other 
Northern Ports. We cannot call to mind a consignment to foreign hands direct 
from your port, within the past 2 years, and yet the sales reported to have taken 
place on this market within that period amount to 3500 Tons !! Whether that 
quantity has really been shipped to Singapore you will be able to judge. The 
                                      
73 “Shipping.” SMH 21 August 1862: 4; Letter from H. Moore Esq. to JM&Co., 17 July 1862 
Correspondence: Business Letters: Australasia JMA B6/3; Letter from JM&Co. to H. Moore Esq., 30 
October 1862 Letters to India JMA C10/55. 
74 A number of Sydney merchants were involved in the sandalwood trade. Specifically Robert Towns & 
Co. and Ferguson, Webb & Co. imported sandalwood from New Caledonia and then exported it to Hong 
Kong or Shanghai, the former the primary port. For example, Ferguson, Webb & Co. imported 27 tons of 
sandalwood from New Caledonia per the Syranos in 1866 and then immediately exported it per the Ellen 
Southard to Hong Kong. “Shipping Gazette.” Sydney Mail 25 August 1866: 10; “Shipping.” SMH 30 
August 1866: 4. 
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Singapore Chinese do, we know, import largely and sell to the China Chew 
Hongs, those connected with the Northern traders. Shanghai quotations of Tls. 
3.4.5, less duty, equals $4.16 ppc and while prices there have been much higher, 
our quotations you will notice, have values about $3.70 @ $4.00 ppc. In 
Singapore the price is now quoted $3.30 @ $3.50 ppc and if it will pay Chinese 
to remove the article to Hong Kong and thence to Shanghai we think it should 
pay shippers to direct the whole of their stocks to Shanghai.75 
 
Table 4.2. Total quantities of Sandalwood, in tons, imported in foreign boats for Tianjin 
(Tientsin) and Fuzhou, 1868-1872.76 
Year 1868 1869 1870 1871 1872 
Tianjin: Import from Foreign Ports 141 1,226 147 795 220 
Tianjin: Imports from Treaty Ports 4 29 184 19 35 
Fuzhou: Imports from Foreign Ports 862 1,912 1,457 2,157 2,170 
Fuzhou: Imports from Treaty Ports 8 0 253 139 17 
 
The position the Chinese held within the transhipment of sandalwood along the China 
route is revealed through the statistical records from both WA and the China Treaty 
Ports. The statistical records of WA together with correspondence from JM&Co. reveal 
that the sandalwood exported directly to China was delivered to either Hong Kong or 
Shanghai with the rare shipment arriving in either Canton or Amoy. Separately, viewing 
the trade statistics of the Treaty Ports, other ports than those mentioned in the WA 
records show an import of sandalwood from foreign origins.77 Table 4.2 shows data for 
the two ports of Tientsin and Foochow. The foreign ports in Table 4.2 are presumed to 
be primarily Singapore and Hong Kong, where the Chinese traders performed the 
transshipment. Further, the term “foreign boats” in the header suggests that the Chinese 
traders were taking advantage of Western traders’ vessels that were travelling to the 
ports of Foochow and Tientsin. The data in Table 4.2 when matched with the records of 
                                      
75 Letter from JM&Co. to G. Shenton Esq., 7 July 1876 Letters to India JMA C10/64. “ppc” = per picul. 
76 Hart. China. Trade Statistics: Tientsin: 9, 11-13, Foochow: 9, 11-13. 
77 Hart, China. Trade Statistics. Hart divides his book into sections for each port. For ports other than 
Shanghai, there is evidence of imports from foreign origins which would have been provided by Chinese 
merchants. 
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WA indicate that sandalwood was traded from the major transhipment ports to many 
Treaty Ports by the Chinese. 
 
 
Role of Singapore 
 
Singapore was a prominent shipping destination for WA sandalwood for a number of 
reasons. Singapore was the nearest entrepôt of the British Empire and one commonly 
accessed by Chinese merchants who were the primary purchasers of various products 
from Australians.78 The port’s geographical position also opened it up to continuous 
shipping to and from the Chinese ports as well as many other ports.79 Located off the tip 
of the Malay peninsula, Singapore provided a centre-point for trade arriving from all 
directions, whether the East Indies, China and other north-east Asia countries, through 
the Malacca Straits or from the south through the Sunda Strait. Thus, for WA, 
Singapore was a convenient and major trading centre. Singapore offered a significantly 
wider variety of merchandise for importation than would the Chinese ports. In return, as 
well as sandalwood the island was also a port for the importation of horses from WA, 
most on their way to India and Batavia.80 Hence, strong connections existed between 
firms based in Singapore and other countries throughout the extended Asian region, 
including those in China,81 and through these intermediaries to merchants in WA. 
                                      
78 Chiang Hai Ding, A History of Straits Settlements Foreign Trade: 1870-1915. Singapore: National 
Museum, Singapore, 1978: 5, 51-53; Stephen Dobbs. The Singapore River: A Social History, 1819-2002. 
Singapore: Singapore University Press, 2003: 29-31. 
79 Ding, Straits Settlements Foreign Trade: 5, 37-8. 
80 By the mid-1870s, Singapore became the primary port for the export of horses from Western Australia. 
For a discussion on the equid trade throughout Asia, see: William Clarence-Smith, "Cape to Siberia: The 
Indian Ocean and China Sea Trade in Equids." In Maritime Empires: British Imperial Maritime Trade in 
the Nineteenth Century, edited by David Killingray, Margarette Lincoln, and Nigel Rigby, 48-67. 
Woodbridge, Suffolk, UK: Boydell Press, Boydell & Brewer, 2004: 56-57, 59, 63. 
81 Behn, Meyer & Co. of Singapore worked closely with Siemssen & Co. with offices in Batavia, Hong 
Kong and Shanghai. Douglas Earp, Behn, Meyer & Co. Arnold Otto Meyer. Translated by Heidi 
Hartmann. 2 vols. Vol. 1. Hamburg: Hans Christians Verlag, 1981: 52-3, 91-2. Siemssen & Co. were the 
major competitor to JM&Co. in Shanghai for the WA sandalwood trade and Behn, Meyer & Co. were 
instrumental in a number of transshipments of tea from China to Fremantle as well as providing the WA 
newspapers with the latest market advices from Singapore. 
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The relatively short distance to Singapore provided a number of advantages over 
transport links reaching all the way to ports in China. A quick turnover of the trips taken 
resulted in vessels obtaining further charters upon reaching Singapore, a better prospect 
than if the ship had arrived in the Chinese ports of Hong Kong or Shanghai. In addition, 
merchants in Perth and Fremantle were able to take advantage of other merchants who 
were involved in a regular shipping service between Fremantle and Singapore.82 WA 
merchants used these services to add their own export goods to the inventory of the 
vessel. Those vessels involved in trade between Fremantle and Singapore or Batavia 
tended to be small in size. Their masters recognised that the journey was short and 
lacked any dangers. One other advantage, early in the trade, was that the commission 
and godown charges were lower in Singapore than in the Chinese ports.83 Based on 
shipping records of the 1860s, the approximate average load of sandalwood per vessel 
to Singapore was 170 tons while for Chinese ports it was 300 tons per vessel.84  
 
Singapore was a vital cog in the movement of WA sandalwood to China. Tables 4.3 and 
4.4 demonstrate that sandalwood arriving in Singapore was, in fact, being transhipped 
to China. For 1873-1880 the statistical records of Singapore provide that the total 
amount of sandalwood imported to that port was 16,775 tons and that exported 17,282 
tons.85 Table 4.3 shows that a high portion of the sandalwood imported to Singapore 
arrived from Australia. By the 1870s, that sandalwood was exported from WA.86 Table 
                                      
82 For a list of regular transport between Fremantle and Singapore, see Appendix 14. 
83 Letter from H. Saw Esq. to JM&Co., 25 July 1865 Correspondence: Business Letters: Australasia 
JMA B6/3. 
84 The data is approximate as it only uses the available records of the newspapers from WA as well as the 
Singapore circulars that were reproduced in the WA newspapers. The total shipping based on these 
records did not always match those found in the Blue Books. It should also be noted that a regular service, 
though not assumed to be related to the sandalwood trade, existed between Port Walcott and Singapore.  
85 Straits Settlements Blue Books (1873-1880) Singapore: Government Printing Office, (1874-1881). 
Note that only the data from 1873 onwards was available at the National Archives of Singapore. The 
Statistical Tables for the years prior to 1873 of the United Kingdom House of Commons also do not 
include information for the trade of sandalwood. One ton = 20 cwt. 
86 This is deduced by the lack of sandalwood exported from any other Australian colony at the time. 
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4.4 shows that, for most years, a very high percentage of sandalwood was exported to 
China. The data, thus, provides clear evidence that sandalwood from WA was primarily 
a transient commodity within the Singapore markets and that China was, instead, the 
destination of sandalwood sent to Singapore. 
 
Table 4.3. Imports of Sandalwood in Singapore, 1873-1880 (cwts)87 
 
1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 
Australia 37,976 44,029 53,987 86,517 35,036 11,722 20,736 17,652 
Total 38,196 44,384 55,739 88,191 43,099 2,0265 23,123 22,515 
Australian % 99.4 99.2 96.9 98.1 81.3 57.8 89.7 78.4 
 
Table 4.4. Exports of Sandalwood from Singapore, 1873-1880 (in cwts).88 
Year 1873 1874 1875 1876 1877 1878 1879 1880 
China/HK 56,040 38,670 50,868 38,771 50,113 29,284 36,019 25,270 
Total 58,492 41,922 57,230 39,945 51,255 29,689 38,486 28,626 
China/HK % 95.8 92.2 88.9 97.1 99.8 98.6 93.6 88.3 
 
Significant, however, is that WA sandalwood was being transhipped and not being 
made available for local consumption in a number of the ports of entry, including 
Sydney, Singapore and Hong Kong. Even Shanghai was not the final destination for 
much that was received and sold in that port. The statistical information delivered in the 
Blue Books and similar registers, including that held by Customs, disguise the true 
nature of the sandalwood export trade from WA. The data divulges a variety of 
destinations, yet almost all of the wood eventually made its way to Shanghai along the 
China route.  
 
 
                                      
87 Straits Settlements Blue Books (1873-1880) Singapore: Government Printing Office, (1874-1881). 
88 Straits Settlements Blue Books (1873-1880) Singapore: Government Printing Office, (1874-1881). 
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Transporting sandalwood 
 
The transport of sandalwood along the China route suffered from a number of problems. 
The available transport options were the primary concern of the WA merchants. 
Sandalwood was the only item traded in bulk to China, as shown in Figure 4.5, and thus 
there was no competition for space on vessels. At the commencement of the 1860s, 
demand along the China route and supply from WA was constrained by a shortage of 
available transports. At that time merchants, like T. & H. Carter & Co., employed 
methods to overcome the problem. By the late 1860s, the number of vessels increased to 
cater for the demand. This section answers the questions of why there was a shortage of 
transports, how the problem was overcome and what else affected the transport of 
sandalwood along the China route. 
 
The ports of WA were small and isolated communities, including the colony’s capital, 
Perth. Thus, they required only minimal imports. That is, there was little requirement 
for the continuous large importation of goods that were necessary for the established 
ports of the eastern colonies of Australia. That meant there were few large vessels 
arriving in the early 1860s with cargo and thus available for chartering to take 
sandalwood to Singapore or China. Those vessels that arrived, including the convict 
transports to WA, and that were unencumbered by an existing charter, were guaranteed 
a charter with sandalwood. 
 
The population of WA created only a small requirement for a return shipment of teas 
and other goods from China. Those vessels under charter to Singapore or China from 
WA with sandalwood obtained further charters, many returning to the UK, at their 
destinations. The transport of tea fell to WA merchants, a journey rarely completed 
 212 
more than once per year. For example, WA merchant firm J. & W. Bateman’s brig 
Laughing Wave performed the single WA to China return trip for each of the years 1871 
to 1875, only once being accompanied by the Rose, that vessel also performing the 
route solely in 1870.89 For some years during the 1860s and 1870s, no vessels arrived 
from China and thus no tea also came direct from China.90 Tea for WA was also 
commonly procured from either Singapore or the eastern colonies.  
 
Vessels with low tonnage, as noted above, were used for the shorter journey to 
Singapore or Batavia, many part of a regular trade service. The vessels carried cargoes 
of under 100 tons of sandalwood. Initially, in the early 1860s, the Guyon and New 
Perseverance were the only two ships that were regularly involved in the trade of 
sandalwood to the South East Asian ports. Over the following years no less than eight 
vessels took on a regular return trip to either Singapore or Batavia with sandalwood. 
Many of these continued on the route until the late 1870s.91 The WA merchant company 
J. & W. Bateman chose to assemble a fleet of vessels, some purchased and others built 
in WA.92 Many of Bateman’s vessels, other than the Laughing Wave, were involved in 
the sandalwood trade to Singapore.  
 
Vessels arriving in Fremantle from England also became involved in the regular trade to 
both Singapore and China. In the early period, prior to 1860, these ships, having 
unloaded their cargo in Fremantle, were often available for charters. Though mostly 
                                      
89 For a complete list of all vessels arriving in Fremantle from Chinese ports, see Appendix 15. 
90 There were no arrivals from China in 1860, 1864-65 or 1878. The Blue Book for 1878 shows an import 
of tea of 310 lbs. from China though it also shows no vessels arriving from a Chinese port. SR WA 1878: 
62, 78. 
91 See Appendix 14 for a full list of those vessels performing the regular trade with Singapore and 
Batavia and the years they were involved. 
92 Frank Broeze, "Western Australia until 1869: The Maritime Perspective: Part 2." Journal of the Royal 
Western Australian Historical Society 8, no. 6 (1982): 104-107; Bill Walker, "Western Australia’s 
Coastal Shipping: Government Versus Private Enterprise Part One: 1863-1908." The Great Circle 30, no. 
1 (2008): 20. 
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only travelling to Singapore, India or Java, they provided a service for the WA 
merchants. What is unclear is who was directing where the sandalwood was taken in the 
years prior to 1860. That is, were the vessels travelling to the foreign ports where the 
sandalwood was to be delivered or were the sandalwood merchants taking advantage of 
a vessel heading to a certain port? By the mid-1860s, there was less uncertainty as ships 
from England regularly arrived in WA, knowing that they could obtain a charter for 
either Singapore or Hong Kong from where another charter could be procured for the 
return trip to England. The Hastings (6 trips, 1861-1877), Fitzroy (7 trips, 1867-1877) 
and Robert Morrison (6 trips, 1862-1876) were commonly seen in Fremantle 
throughout the 1860s and 1870s performing this triangular route.93 Such was the 
availability and need of vessels, that in a letter to London from one Perth newspaper, 
written in 1874, the Editor stated that even though a large tonnage had arrived “it is very 
significant as a proof of the growing activity of our export trade that no vessels in 
search of freight have visited us unsuccessfully, nor are likely to do so, provided that 
they are open to accept a charter at a reasonable figure.”94 
 
Vessels from Melbourne, a primary port for shipping into and around Australia, made 
their way to WA in search of a sandalwood charter. Perth firm Bickley and Company 
were prominent in enticing ships’ masters to travel from Melbourne to Fremantle with 
the potential of a sandalwood cargo to Singapore. Between 1865 and 1867 at least two-
thirds of the vessels lured to Fremantle from Victoria were organised by Bickley & 
Co.95 A decade later, Melbourne ship-broker S. De Beer reported that there was a 
demand for chartered shipping in WA to load sandalwood for Singapore or China ports 
                                      
93 Obtained from the various WA newspapers’ shipping records.  
94 “Our Letter Home.” Inquirer and Commercial News 25 March 1874: 3. Of the 83 vessels that departed 
WA with cargo, 13 went to China and 25 to Singapore. 
95 Obtained from shipping records of 1865 to 1867. Also, see the advertisement for the barques Douglas 
and Thomas Brown in The Perth Gazette and West Australian Times 26 October 1866: 1. 
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and merchant J. F. T. Hassell, also of Melbourne, advertised for charters to take 
sandalwood from King George’s Sound to China. 96  The influx of vessels from 
Melbourne further provided a small boon for WA, creating a healthy and guaranteed 
supply of goods from the eastern colonial ports.  
 
Accidents or disasters were not uncommon for vessels travelling along the China route. 
The Lady Elizabeth, for example, chartered together by the WA companies of J. H. 
Monger and G. Shenton for Shanghai, attempted to sail from Fremantle against a mid-
winter gale in 1878. A few days after departing she foundered on the reefs just to the 
west of Rottnest Island. The Lady Elizabeth was carrying one of the largest loads of 
sandalwood ever exported from the colony up to that date, 611 tons in total. While all 
aboard survived, the cargo went, initially, down with the barque. 97  However, it 
commenced surfacing and recovery was then being made by salvagers. The sandalwood 
departed Fremantle at a cost of £7 10s. per ton, but being waterlogged it was now only 
worth £5 15s. per ton.98 Notwithstanding, the total loss represented a considerable 
value.99 Of the 611 tons, 167 were eventually placed on the Janet which sailed three 
months later for Hong Kong and another 24 tons per the Laurel to Singapore in May, 
1879.100 
 
The quality of sandalwood, upon arrival in China, varied due to the method of storage 
during transit. Some parcels arrived in poor condition, mostly waterlogged following 
                                      
96 “Commercial Report.” The Inquirer and Commercial News 7 April 1875: 3; “Shipping.” The Argus 3 
February 1877: 1. 
97 “The Gale on Sunday.” Inquirer and Commercial News 3 July 1878: 3. 
98 “Miscellaneous Shipping.” Inquirer and Commercial News 17 July 1878: 2. 
99 One Perth newspaper quipped, that the “beach-combers and speculative boatowners” took advantage of 
the salvaging. What followed was a complex question as to the ownership of the wood which the same 
newspaper described as a vexed question that “will more than puzzle all the Philadelphia lawyers put 
together.” “Miscellaneous Shipping.” Inquirer and Commercial News 31 July 1878: 2. 
100 “Shipping Report.” Herald 19 October 1878: 2; “Shipping Report.” Herald 28 June 1879. 
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storms at sea or other reasons.101 These had to be sold at a lower value. Occasionally, 
damage occurred when the vessel sunk while unloading in a Chinese port. Such were 
the cases at Shanghai of the Farmingham102 and the St Francois103 respectively within a 
very short period towards the end of 1874. Individually, the damaged wood should have 
had a minor effect on the overall market. However, with both incidents taking place 
almost at the same time, the sandalwood sold for prices well below the nominal values 
at the time and in doing so, as JM&Co. explained, influenced the sandalwood market in 
a detrimental manner.104 
 
Sandalwood merchants 
 
The firms involved in the WA sandalwood trade fell into three categories. The 
merchants in WA created the supply of sandalwood and obtained charters to transport 
the wood along the China route. The Chinese, the second group, participated as 
transhippers in the intermediary ports. Other Chinese were buyers in Shanghai. The 
final group were the commission agents located in China, particularly Shanghai. 
 
The interest to participate in the sandalwood trade grew among WA merchants 
throughout the 1860s and 1870s. During these two decades, JM&Co.’s offices in Hong 
Kong and Shanghai dealt with no less than 21 companies, predominantly all in relation 
                                      
101 Letter from JM&Co. to J. H. Monger Esq., 25 November 1875 General Letters from Shanghai JMA 
C46/20. JM&Co. stated regards the Albert Victors’ sandalwood cargo, “the wood is exceedingly small, & 
bleached or weather beaten – the finest logs in the shipment had been stowed on deck and being damaged 
by salt water have been realised at auction stated as poor.” 
102 Letter from JM&Co. to Padbury Loton & Co., 29 October 1874 General Letters from Shanghai JMA 
C46/17. 
103 Letter from JM&Co. to G. Shenton Esq., 26 November 1874 General Letters from Shanghai JMA 
C46/18. 
104 Letter from JM&Co. to Padbury Loton & Co., 29 October 1874 General Letters from Shanghai JMA 
C46/17. 
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to providing sandalwood to China.105 The larger portion of the merchant group were 
based in either Perth or Fremantle, though a few were located north along the coast in 
Champion Bay at the port of Geraldton.106 Sandalwood was also exported from Albany, 
but Albany traders sent none of it to JM&Co. The sandalwood trade provided for these 
WA merchants their primary contact with China. 
 
Chinese merchants played multiple roles in the overall WA sandalwood trade. In the 
ports of Singapore and Hong Kong, the Chinese were buyers as well as exporters. The 
Chinese purchased sandalwood from importers, shipping agents representing WA 
exporters. The Chinese then transhipped the wood north towards Shanghai where they 
dealt with other Chinese importers. Those Shanghai-based Chinese then on-sold the 
sandalwood to merchants in other markets throughout China or, perhaps, in Shanghai.107 
Another entity, the compradors, also attained a level of influence in the sandalwood 
market. They were the intermediaries in the sandalwood trade between the Western 
merchant houses in China who they represented and the Chinese communities of 
merchants and hongs.108  
 
Chinese merchant networks, primarily familial, existed to assist with the movement of 
goods. The networks promoted transnational diasporic connections for the Chinese 
merchants. The creation of these networks involving those from Hong Kong, Canton 
and the Fukien ports with the communities of the Nanyang and elsewhere overseas has 
                                      
105 Obtained from the correspondence from merchant houses in WA to JM&Co. See Correspondence: 
Business Letters: Australasia JMA B6/3. 
106 There were 11 from Fremantle, two from Geraldton, one from York and seven from Perth. 
107 A discussion on the internal China trade by the Chinese has been provided in Chapter 1. 
108 C. G. F. Simkin, The Traditional Trade of Asia. London: Oxford University Press, 1968: 279; Yen-
Ping Hao, The Comprador in Nineteenth Century China: Bridge between East and West. Cambridge: 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1970: 2. 
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been well documented. 109  For those in Singapore, they not only successfully 
appropriated “the supplies of capital and new technologies that Europeans brought with 
them,” but continued their usage of maritime trade with China throughout the nineteenth 
century.110 Mark Frost, in his discussion on Nanyang networks, argues that these 
diasporic linkages began to impact on other parts of China by the later nineteenth 
century.111 That is, the movement was not just overseas but also within China. The 
Cantonese merchants migrated to various strategic locations including Shanghai.112 
Thus, pre-existing the first arrival of sandalwood into Singapore from WA was a 
highway of diasporic networks that allowed for an almost ready-made transfer and sale 
of goods from one port to another along the China route.  
 
The third group in the sandalwood trade were the Western commission agents. The port 
of Shanghai housed the offices of numerous agents. Yet, only two were specifically 
involved in the WA sandalwood trade for a lengthy period.113 They were JM&Co. and 
Siemssen & Co. During the 1860s and much of the 1870s the two companies went 
head-to-head in competition for and working with the WA sandalwood businesses, 
using different strategies. Each had their stable of WA merchants with whom they dealt, 
                                      
109 Adam McKeown, "Conceptualizing Chinese Diasporas, 1842 to 1949." The Journal of Asian Studies 
58, no. 2 (1999): 317, 319; Gungwu Wang, China and the Chinese Overseas. Singapore: Times 
Academic Press, 1991: 3-21. 
110  Mark Ravinder Frost. "Emporium in Imperio: Nanyang Networks and the Straits Chinese in 
Singapore, 1819-1914." Journal of Southeast Asian History 36, no. 1 (2005): 37. 
111 Frost. “Emporium in Imperio”: 31. 
112 McKeown. “Conceptualizing Chinese Diasporas”: 314. 
113 Others were briefly involved. Glover, Dow & Co. took sandalwood from J. H. Monger until the China 
firm fell into liquidation at the commencement of the 1870s. Letter from JM&Co. to J. H. Monger Esq., 4 
January 1872 General Letters from Shanghai JMA C46/11; Letter from J. H. Monger Esq. to JM&Co., 28 
January 1871 Correspondence: Business Letters: Australasia JMA B6/3. Russell & Co. took shipments 
from J. & W. Bateman on the Hannah Nicholson. Letter from JM&Co. to G. Shenton Esq., 8 September 
1871 General Letters from Shanghai JMA C46/10; Letter from JM&Co. to J. H. Monger Esq., 11 
October 1871 General Letters from Shanghai JMA C46/10. From 1860-1880, shipping records in the 
North China Herald (Shanghai), show only ten shipments of sandalwood to other companies than 
Siemssen or JM&Co. A number of shipments, however, arrived with the Captain as the importer or on 
order. Those other merchants were Frazar & Co. (1869), Gilman & Co. (1869), Morris, Lewis & Co. 
(1875), Butterfield and Swire (1877, 1879), Forrester, Lavers & Co. (1878, 1880), Gibb, Livingston & Co. 
(1879), Adamson, Bell & Co. (1879) and Fearon, Low & Co. (1879). 
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and the stables hardly overlapped. Figure 4.6 shows that the offices of both companies 
were adjacent, which suggests the possibility that some co-operation existed between 
them. However, as will be discussed below, the two firms competed vigorously in the 
sandalwood trade. 
 
Figure 4.6 Jardine Matheson & Co. (left) and Siemssen & Co. (right) in Shanghai, 
1880.114 
 
 
During the 1860s and 1870s, Siemssen & Co. received parcels from the Perth firms J. & 
W. Bateman & Co. and Padbury Loton & Co.115 Siemssen & Co. also had a near-
monopoly on the Western merchants based in Albany who, on a number of occasions, 
                                      
114  “Siemssen Co. and Ever Victorious Army Monument” Virtual Shanghai, Image 206 
http://www.virtualshanghai.net/Photos/Images?ID=206 accessed 7 July 2016. 
115 Padbury Loton & Co. commenced negotiations with Jardine Matheson in mid-1874. Letter from 
JM&Co. to Padbury Loton & Co., 24 March 1874 General Letters from Shanghai JMA C46/16; see also 
Letter from Padbury Loton & Co. to JM&Co., 6 November 1873 Correspondence: Business Letters: 
Australasia JMA B6/3. 
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shipped sandalwood to Shanghai.116 The choices and strategies of the WA, Chinese and 
Western merchants each had differing effects on the price of sandalwood in Shanghai. 
 
Market forces in the trade of sandalwood 
 
The fact that most of the WA sandalwood travelled along the China route to Shanghai 
provides for a compelling analysis of the market and the methodologies used by the 
various parties involved in the trade. Numerous market forces affected the pricing of 
sandalwood whether at an intermediary port or upon its arrival in Shanghai. The 
ramifications of sandalwood arriving damaged at the docks were noted above. The 
strategies of the merchants who sold and bought the wood influenced both the ability to 
sell the wood, and also its sale price. This section asks questions of what influences 
were placed on the trade by the merchants involved and what strategies were attempted 
to attain the best results from sales in Shanghai. 
 
By the 1870s, the position of WA merchants in the Asia-based, and possibly worldwide,  
sandalwood trade was so prominent that it resembled an oligopoly. At that time the 
almost elimination of competition could have created for them a seller’s market. In 
effect, they were able to choose which markets they wanted to commit their wood to 
and which should be left to run out of stock, so that they could manipulate sale prices. 
Their decisions were influenced by a combination of factors including the information 
arriving about sandalwood markets along the China route, the communication with 
merchants in those markets and the amount of sandalwood available for export. For 
                                      
116 I base this on the fact that there were shipments from Albany to Shanghai and that JM&Co. had no 
contacts in that port. There is also a possibility that Albany sandalwood merchants sent their sandalwood 
to Melbourne considering that Albany was a transition port for vessels travelling to Melbourne from ports 
both north and west. 
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example, a commercial circular would arrive from Singapore with news that stocks had 
been cleared and that dealers were awaiting new supplies.117  
 
The ability to manipulate the sandalwood market by WA merchants was evident in their 
dealings with the Chinese merchants, through intermediaries, in Singapore. When a 
shortage of sandalwood in Singapore occurred because of the WA merchants 
undersupplying that port or a sudden need for the Chinese merchants in Singapore to 
unload their stocks, the WA merchants had the power to control the flow and thus the 
pricing of new sandalwood to Singapore. The WA merchants, essentially, could request 
of their Singapore contacts to sell at the best price. As such, the WA merchants would 
cause a rise in prices, from Singapore to Shanghai. That is, as the Chinese in Singapore 
searched for a profit on their new purchases of sandalwood, they needed to ask for 
higher selling prices in Hong Kong and Shanghai, which in turn would increase the 
overall price of the product in those ports. Other sellers would note that the competition 
was requesting higher selling prices, which allowed them to raise their own prices. 
There is, however, no actual evidence that any attempt to influence the overall 
sandalwood market was purposefully implemented by the WA merchants. The fact that 
Singapore sandalwood prices for the early 1860s fell and remained at a low level even 
with stocks cleared, provides evidence that WA merchants rarely influenced the 
Singapore sandalwood market.118 
 
The ability of WA merchants to manipulate the market was constrained by the lack of 
immediacy in communications. International telegraph was not connected to Australia 
                                      
117 For example: “Home and Foreign Commercial Report –  Straits Markets.” The Inquirer and 
Commercial News 21 January 1874: 3. 
118 Throughout most of 1863 the stocks remained small yet prices for imported wood stayed at values 
well below that from the previous years. In November, 1863 the prices was $2.87 per picul, down from 
between $4.50 and $7.00 per picul at the commencement of 1860. The price fell further by the end of 
1864 to $2.25 per picul. “Overland Free Press Price Current.” SFP&MA 5 January 1860: 5; 7 November 
1863: 4; 22 December 1864: 6. 
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until 1872 and to Perth until 1877.119 But even with the telegraph connection in place, 
the cost of transmitting information was prohibitive, thus precluding its use for 
communicating pricing information along the China route to WA.120 Steam travel from 
WA to Singapore was also rare and any newspapers arrived at least a few weeks 
following their publication.121 Similarly, correspondence that was either transshipped at 
Singapore or, in some cases taken via Galle and Albany, reached Perth after a delay.122 
Thus, the WA merchants were at a disadvantage in relation to promptness of trade 
information when compared to the Chinese along the China route in Singapore or Hong 
Kong. 
 
The Chinese merchants in the sandalwood trade, as has been noted through the letter to 
George Shenton above, used strategies that aimed for a fast turnover with low margins. 
To maintain such margins, the Chinese merchants offered the best purchase price to the 
importing agents of the WA exporters in Singapore or Hong Kong. They then 
minimised the transport and storage costs so as to offer the best price to their buyers 
further along the China route. The Chinese merchants were thus able to undercut their 
competition, in the Western commission agents, when the sandalwood arrived in 
Shanghai. 
                                      
119 J. Wagstaff Blundell, Blundell's Manual of Submarine Telegraph Companies. London: J. Wagstaff 
Blundell, 1872: 54-6; Peter Putnis, "The Early Years of International Telegraphy in Australia: A Critical 
Assessment." Media International Australia, Incorporating Culture & Policy no. 129 (2008): 140. 
120 Putnis, “Early Years of International Telegraphy.”: 145. Putnis states that the cost for 20 words from 
London to Adelaide was £9/6/6. As all telegraph had to go via Adelaide, the cost to other colonies was 
much higher. This equated to five week’s wages of a working man. Geoffrey Blainey, The Tyranny of 
Distance: How Distance Shaped the World. Melbourne: Sun Books, 1966: 223-24. 
121 Even by 1875, reports from Singapore arrived a month late. The Chinese reports were also forwarded 
on by Singapore-based merchants. “Foreign and Commercial Report.” Inquirer and Commercial News 13 
January 1875: 3. Behn Meyer’s report of December 10 was published a month later. In the following 
month, Wm Spottiswoode & Co. of Singapore forwarded news from China as well as Singapore. 
“Commercial News.” Inquirer and Commercial News 10 February 1875:3. 
122 Commonly a letter would be delivered and answered approximately two to three months after its 
writing in China. For example, a letter from JM&Co. to G. Glyde & Sons was written on 19 December 
1872 and one received a reply on 1 March 1873. Letter from G. Glyde and Son to JM&Co., 1 March 
1873 Correspondence: Business Letters: Australasia JMA B6/3. Even in 1873, a letter sent from Perth 
took seven weeks to arrive. Letter from JM&Co. to J. H. Monger Esq., 20 February 1873 General Letters 
from Shanghai JMA C46/14. 
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The value of sandalwood in Shanghai defined the prices for the sale of the wood in both 
Singapore and Hong Kong. The Chinese buyers in these two ports were governed by the 
Shanghai sandalwood market in what price they could offer to incoming shipments. 
They were in the business of avoiding a loss and understood the relevant costs that 
would be incurred between the purchase of the product in the southern port and the 
eventual selling of the same in Shanghai, Hong Kong or any other Chinese port. Hence, 
when the market was becoming gradually depressed in Shanghai, a similar occurrence 
would take place in Hong Kong and thence in Singapore, though with a slight time lag. 
The fact that steamers were regularly performing the Singapore to Hong Kong and 
Shanghai route meant that information could travel to the Chinese merchants more 
quickly, allowing them to mould their decisions around the information at hand.123 
 
The consumers and retailers throughout China relied on the Chinese traders who 
purchased the sandalwood, whether “first hand” as per immediate arrival from Australia 
or “second hand” where the good was transshipped from at least one other port.124 As 
buyers, their strategy was three-fold; obtain the wood at the cheapest price, of the best 
quality and at a time of the year before the sales to consumers were about to peak.125 
Thus, not only were the dealers forcing prices lower but they were also using 
information through their networks to manipulate the market. If a large quantity was 
due to arrive, the dealers paused, awaiting the quality of the new product upon its 
arrival.126 At the same time they created and noted that any excess in stock would lead 
                                      
123
 For a discussion on the development of communications for the period, see: Mark Ravinder Frost, 
"Asia's Maritime Networks and the Colonial Public Sphere, 1840-1920." New Zealand Journal of Asian 
Studies 6, no. 2 (2004): 63-94. 
124 Rarely would the consumers have dealt with the Shanghai Chinese traders. More likely, the wood was 
traded through a supply chain of traders. Also, I have obtained no proof that WA merchants sold direct to 
Chinese in Shanghai but believe it cannot be discounted. If it did exist, the amount was probably 
insignificant. 
125 For example: Letter from JM&Co. to J. H. Monger Esq., 11 October 1870 General Letters from 
Shanghai JMA C46/9. 
126 Letter from JM&Co. to G. Shenton Esq., 28 June 1873 General Letters from Shanghai JMA C46/14. 
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to a “buyer’s” market. This action meant that, commonly, Western merchants were 
unable to clear much of their stock. They were therefore forced to advise their 
Australian contacts that, upon this delay, prices quoted had to be nominal.127 When the 
new parcels were presented in Shanghai, the Chinese buyers chose the finest items, in 
turn leaving a large quantity of lesser-quality sandalwood in storage.128 When stocks ran 
low at a time when consumer demand increased, the remaining parcels could be cleared 
much easier, thus creating a more promising market for any new stock.129 This latter 
situation assisted in creating sales at higher prices, thus also generating a sufficient 
profit margin to cover the additional cost of storage. 
 
The Cantonese merchant groups along the China route speculated on the sandalwood 
prices in Shanghai, thus creating further pressures of the market at that port.130 Those 
merchant groups from Singapore and Hong Kong, based on information provided, 
would procure sandalwood from WA sellers at a price that would give them a possibly 
small margin of profit. In some cases, this way of manipulating the market was done to 
excess and large shipments of WA sandalwood flooded the Shanghai market thus both 
reducing prices and eliminating the possible advantage of the speculators.131 As such, 
the speculations of the Chinese decreased the revenues derived from the product and led 
to either a delay in clearing first hand stocks or concessions to sell at lower prices. 
 
                                      
127 Letter from JM&Co. to G. Glyde & Son, 3 May 1873 General Letters from Shanghai JMA C46/14; 
Letter from JM&Co. to G. Shenton Esq., 28 June 1873 General Letters from Shanghai JMA C46/14. 
128 Chinese buyers in 1871 chose to purchase the more colourful and better quality sandalwood while 
stocks of the “inferior wood” remained unsold. Letter from JM&Co. to B. Mason Esq., 14 July 1877 
General Letters from Shanghai JMA C46/10. 
129 Letter from JM&Co. to G. Glyde & Son, 10 April 1873 General Letters from Shanghai JMA C46/14. 
130 Letter from JM&Co. to J. H. Monger Esq., 22 August 1876 General Letters from Shanghai JMA 
C46/21; Letter from JM&Co. to J. H. Monger Esq., 23 September 1876 General Letters from Shanghai 
JMA C46/22. 
131 Letter from JM&Co. to G. Glyde & Son, 15 January 1874 General Letters from Shanghai JMA 
C46/16. 
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Table 4.5. Sandalwood Imports into Shanghai, 1870-Oct, 1874 (piculs).132 
 
1870 1871 1872 1873 1874 
Overall 46,940 35,523 60,115 51,160 66,685 
from Hong Kong 8,380 14,451 30,471 29,706 18,444 
from Singapore 
 
680 5,749 
 
2,327 
 
The increased imports by the Chinese from the ports of Singapore and Hong Kong 
antagonised the Western commission agents. Such was the damage caused to the market 
in Shanghai, that JM&Co. delivered their frustrations in one letter to J. H. Monger. To 
the Shanghai house, the amount of sandalwood being presented in Shanghai through the 
other two ports was excessive. JM&Co. provided the information as a table, depicted 
here as Table 4.5. The table provides figures up to the end of October, 1874. 
 
The table shows that a significant amount of sandalwood was transhipped from other 
ports to Shanghai, which affected the selling price in Shanghai. Further, for the ten 
months to October, 1874, JM&Co. explained that only two-thirds of all sandalwood 
imported to Shanghai was directly from Australia. That is, of 66,685 piculs imported in 
1874, 43,156 arrived from Australia, 18,444 from Hong Kong, 2,327 from Singapore, 
19 from Amoy, 163 from Canton, 374 from Bangkok and 202 from Bombay.133 The 
fact that one third arrived through transshipment was an issue of concern for JM&Co.  
 
The Chinese merchants in Shanghai were also affected by a system of foreign structures 
and regulations used by the Western trading communities at that port or enforced by the 
Western authorities in the concessions in Shanghai. That led to order being imposed by 
the Chinese government on the Chinese merchants through the management of 
                                      
132 Letter from JM&Co. to J. H. Monger Esq., 29 October 1874 General Letters from Shanghai JMA 
C46/17. JM&Co.’s table showed no data for 1870 and 1873 for imports from Singapore. That is not to 
say that there were none. 
133 A more comprehensive version of the letter is provided in Appendix 16. 
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monetary flows, the development of insurance and Chinese maritime customs services, 
with their fixed tariffs.134 Thus the Chinese merchants of sandalwood in Shanghai faced 
a complex situation as they attempted to maintain their traditional mercantile strategies 
while being influenced and compartmentalised by the community of Western traders. 
 
The strategy implemented by Siemssen & Co. guaranteed them a commission on all 
transactions. The sale price was irrelevant to Siemssen & Co., as they obtained their 
commission through the amount of sales and not a percentage of the profit. Low prices 
guaranteed by Chinese buyers or sellers were often matched by Siemssen & Co. in order 
to clear their own stocks. JM&Co., in a letter to one of the WA merchants, summed up 
the problems that existed in the market when the competition was selecting low prices. 
 
The low prices which have been accepted by Cantonese Importers for their 
speculative purchases on the South, most of which found their way to this 
market, have almost entirely prevented sales from first hands, and on this 
occasion we cannot report any settlements on your a/c, either on this market or 
at Chinkiang. The above native consignments, as mentioned in our last, have 
been passing into consumers hands at prices ranging from 3.15 to 3.40 per picul 
and at the latter price Messrs. Siemssen & Co. are reported to have placed about 
1500 piculs of their consignments.135 
 
The actions of Siemssen & Co. created downward pressure on the price of sandalwood 
in Shanghai and thus affected the market in the other ports. For JM&Co., the effect was 
to force them to store their sandalwood in godowns awaiting the moment when “cheap” 
wood would be sold. Only then would prices, they believed, return to acceptable 
levels.136 That is, JM&Co. did not want to compete in the market when prices were low. 
The attempt to “force sales” at the lower price level by Siemssen was not financially 
                                      
134 Simkin, Traditional Trade: 279; Yao, The Comprador: 64-65, 133, 147-48. 
135 Letter from JM&Co. to J. H. Monger Esq., 23 September 1876 General Letters from Shanghai JMA 
C46/22. 
136 Letter from JM&Co. to G. Shenton Esq., 23 September 1876 General Letters from Shanghai JMA 
C46/22. 
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advantageous to the WA merchants whom they represented and only proved successful 
for Siemssen & Co. themselves.137  
 
JM&Co’s sale strategy was the opposite of Siemssen’s, which explains why the two 
came into conflict regularly. Working under the agreement of obtaining a commission 
based on profit, JM&Co. operated with and for the WA merchants. Thus, it was to the 
benefit of JM&Co. to push the price higher and to try to eliminate any hindrances that 
caused the opposite. Siemssen’s tactics became an impediment to that of JM&Co. In a 
series of communications with WA merchants, JM&Co. chided the tactics of its 
competitor. In mid-1877 JM&Co. wrote that the actions taken by Siemssen & Co. were 
“harassing to our endeavours to improve the value of sandalwood” and that only when 
the recommendation by JM&Co. to purchase Siemssen & Co.’s parcels was completed 
that it had “enabled us to advance the price of sandalwood considerably in this market 
as well as the distributing outpost of Chinkiang.”138 In another letter of the same date, 
JM&Co. lamented that while healthy demand existed and sales may have continued at a 
healthy price, when a parcel arrived for Siemssen & Co., sandalwood prices became 
depressed.139 
 
The two commission agents, hence, had alternate pay-off strategies. For Siemssen, their 
benefit was related to the amount of sales, such was their selling strategy. Yet, the 
choice of selling price could not drop below a level that would discourage the WA 
merchants from continuing as suppliers for Siemssen. To Siemssen, there was little 
                                      
137 JM&Co. confided information about Siemssen & Co. to both G. Shenton and J. H. Monger on a 
continuous basis and a strong picture of the, assumed, poor approach of the German firm to its duty to 
uphold the best practice for its partners in Western Australia becomes apparent. For example, JM&Co. 
admonishes Siemssen for trying to sell at “absurdly low currencies.” Letter from JM&Co. to J. H. 
Monger Esq., 23 November 1876 General Letters from Shanghai JMA C46/22. 
138 Letter from JM&Co. to G. Shenton Esq., 12 April 1877 General Letters from Shanghai JMA C46/22. 
139 Letter from JM&Co. to J. H. Monger Esq., 12 April 1877 General Letters from Shanghai JMA 
C46/22. 
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alternative choice and little aspiration to achieve any satisfactory improvement on the 
result of the sales. Each sale, whatever the price guaranteed Siemssen their commission. 
For JM&Co, the aspiration level, that point which provides a satisfactory alternative to 
the optimal solution, was different and higher.140 They attempted to find more optimal 
solutions that would guarantee better profits. However, as JM&Co. chose not to sell 
sandalwood when the result was only a small gain, instead waiting for better prices, 
they realised that the strategy incurred the extra costs of sandalwood storage in godowns. 
For JM&Co. the trade-off that operated between the cost of storage and the potential 
profit was one that not always resulted in an optimal outcome.141 Nevertheless, they also 
manipulated the market to their best advantage when the opportunity existed. 
 
One strategy not uncommonly employed by JM&Co. or Siemssen & Co. to counter the 
lower prices of the Chinese buyers was to pre-sell cargoes prior to their arrival. In early 
1873, a sale “for arrival” was made for George Shenton per the Antipodes at ℑ3.94 per 
picul in Shanghai. One sale just prior to the arrival of the Antipodes was for ℑ4 per 
picul. The decision to set a price, was based “on the condition that the quality and size is 
equal to our usual receipts” by JM&Co. and thus covered the contingency that the price 
may fall.142 In fact, just prior to the Antipodes arriving in Shanghai, the Charlotte 
landed its 450 tons of sandalwood and were asking ℑ3.96 per ton, but the Chinese 
buyers were only willing to pay between ℑ3.85 and ℑ3.9 per picul.143 The sandalwood 
did arrive in good order per the Antipodes and thus Shenton was afforded a better price 
than what was paid for the Charlotte’s stock. Similarly, in 1871, Siemssen & Co. 
                                      
140 For a fuller definition of aspiration levels, see: Herbert A. Simon, "A Behavioral Model of Rational 
Choice." The Quarterly Journal of Economics 69, no. 1 (1955): 111. 
141 Letter from JM&Co. to J. H. Monger Esq., 1 August 1874 General Letters from Shanghai JMA 
C46/17. 
142 Letter from JM&Co. to G. Shenton Esq., 31 May 1873 General Letters from Shanghai JMA C46/14. 
143 Letter from JM&Co. to G. Shenton Esq., 28 June 1873 General Letters from Shanghai JMA C46/14. 
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received a parcel of sandalwood on the Laughing Wave from J. and W. Bateman & Co. 
which was pre-sold for ℑ3.25 per picul, 5 candareens below the nominal rate.144 
 
The merchants in the sandalwood trade also attempted to create artificial price levels, 
either not allowing sales below a certain price or attempting to force the market up to a 
higher price. Perhaps not so in the case of Siemssen, but WA merchants asked JM&Co. 
on occasion not to sell the sandalwood under a certain price. That choice of price level 
was calculated by the very circulars sent by either JM&Co. or Siemssen and Co. and 
other information at hand. If the market suffered a depreciation of prices between the 
time that the information was forwarded and the sandalwood parcel arrived, the wood 
would remain in storage for long periods of time, occasionally up to one year or 
longer.145 It also meant that accounts for parcels could not be closed and that when the 
remittance came, the exchange rate for the pound sterling may have been at a lower rate, 
possibly cancelling out any gains.  
 
In Shanghai, JM&Co. made an attempt at price fixing. In 1874, the company believed 
the best price was between ℑ3.90 and ℑ3.95. To set this price, JM&Co. requested of the 
WA merchants to collude such that all new sandalwood shipments to arrive with a fixed 
requested price. As long as the collusion was successful, JM&Co. believed the result 
would be “raising the prices in this market.”146 The attempt was unsuccessful and no 
doubt it was to try to counter Siemssen & Co.’s strategy. However, the idea also did not 
factor in the transshipped wood from the south along the China route, which arrived “on 
                                      
144 Letter from JM&Co. to G. Shenton Esq., 11 August 1871 General Letters from Shanghai JMA 
C46/10. J. and W. Bateman & Co. were the shipping agents in WA although the newspapers stated that 
the vessel was only heading to Singapore. “Shipping Intelligence.” PGWAT 26 May 1871:2. There are 
100 candareens to the Tael. 
145 Letter from JM&Co. to J. H. Monger Esq., 30 June 1877 General Letters from Shanghai JMA C46/23. 
Monger was requesting his latest parcel to not be sold for less than ℑ4.50 although the market was 
somewhat lower at the time, leaving the parcel to be stored until a better market was available. 
146 Letter from JM&Co. to J. H. Monger Esq., 1 August 1874 General Letters from Shanghai JMA 
C46/17. 
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Chinese Account”147 to Shanghai or the “Outer ports,” including Ningbo.148 That wood 
arrived cheaper and was always going to be sold quicker. 
 
Remittances and other payments 
 
The process of remittances for the sale of sandalwood fell into two categories. The first 
fitted within a simple bilateral barter economy. The proceeds from the sale of the wood 
were diverted specifically for the purchase of commodities in China for WA. The 
second, and more complex, remittance involved the creation of drafts in London and a 
representative entity of the WA firm in England to receive these. Payment was thus 
made through a parent company, an intermediary finance company or a bank with a 
branch in both China and England. The funds remitted to England were likely used for 
the payment of goods being sent from England to WA, thus creating a triangle of trade. 
This latter choice, however, was not available initially at the reestablishment of the 
sandalwood trade in 1857.  
 
At the commencement of the 1860s, a lack of banking facilities in WA created 
complications for those involved and extra costs to the WA merchants.149 When the 
Kestrel arrived in Hong Kong in 1861, JM&Co. signalled that they were unable to remit 
directly or pass any drafts to T. & H. Carter & Co. as “there is no bank here that has an 
agency at Swan River.”150 To circumvent this problem, and considering that the indent 
for tea, sugar and rice was larger than the remittance for the sandalwood, Melbourne 
                                      
147 Letter from JM&Co. to J. H. Monger Esq., 16 June 1871 General Letters from Shanghai JMA C46/10. 
148 Letter from JM&Co. to T. & H. Carter & Co., 21 April 1870 General Letters from Shanghai JMA 
C46/9; Letter from JM&Co. to J. H. Monger Esq., 29 March 1871 General Letters from Shanghai JMA 
C46/10. 
149
 While small banks existed in Western Australia, including the Bank of Western Australia, there was 
no branch of any of the international banks. The Bank of Australasia existed from 1841-45. Noel Butlin, 
The Australian Monetary System 1851 to 1914. Sydney: J. F. Butlin, 1986: 395-401. 
150 Letter from JM&Co. to T. & H. Carter & Co., 24 August 1861 Letters to Europe JMA C11/29. 
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merchant James Henty & Co. was asked to become an intermediary, and to release 
documents, including the invoice and bill of lading, for the return trip of the Kestrel, 
“under hypothecation.”151 The documents were handed over and, through another 
intermediary, Bickley & Co. of Perth, the agent for Henty in that city, the appropriate 
payment was made.152 The Treasury Note was then passed back to Melbourne before 
being remitted again, this time to Matheson & Co. of London.153 An extra charge was 
included for the handling of the paperwork and processing of the payments, that being 
of one per cent of the total owed, which T. & H. Carter & Co. paid Henty.154 While not 
overly large, that one per cent was an extra charge generated owing to the lack of 
international banking agencies in WA or of T. & H. Carter’s lack of an existing account 
through an international bank at a branch in Sydney or Melbourne. 
 
The usage of England as a channel for the movement of funds became common practice 
for the sandalwood exporters by the latter part of the 1860s. As the WA merchants were 
entering the China markets they understood the problems of processing remittances. 
The example of T. & H. Carter & Co. in 1861 created for both new and established 
companies in WA a need to develop connections in England. Only a few worked with a 
parent firm in England. One was T. & H. Carter & Co. through Carter & Co. of 
London.155 Others chose brokers for the monetary transfers. The Bank of South 
                                      
151 Letter from JM&Co. to J. Henty & Co., 26 August 1861 Letters to Europe JMA C11/29; Letter from 
JM&Co. to J. Henty & Co., 27 August 1861 Letters to Europe JMA C11/29; Letter from JM&Co. to J. 
Henty & Co., 24 September 1861 Letters to Europe JMA C11/29. Hypothecation is a “species of pledge 
in which the pledger retained possession of the thing pledged,” or “the act of pledging a thing as security 
for a debt or demand without parting with the possession.” J. M. Lely, Wharton's Law-Lexicon: Forming 
an Epitome of the Law of England; and Containing Full Explanations of the Technical Terms and 
Phrases Thereof, Both Ancient and Modern. Including the Various Legal Terms Used in Commerce 
Business; Together with a Translation of Latin Law Marims; and Selected Titles from the Civil, Scotch, 
and Indian Law. 7th ed. Boston: Soule and Bugbee, 1883: 395. 
152 Letter from Bickley & Co. to JM&Co., 23 January 1862 Correspondence: Business Letters: 
Australasia JMA B6/3; Letter from T. & H. Carter & Co. to JM&Co., 24 January 1862 Correspondence: 
Business Letters: Australasia JMA B6/3. The exchange rate at the time was 4s/6d per $1 in Hong Kong. 
153 Letter from JM&Co. to J. Henty & Co., 30 October 1861 Letters to Europe JMA C11/29. 
154 Letter from JM&Co. to J. Henty & Co., 26 May 1862 Letters to Europe JMA C11/30. 
155 John Nairn, Walter Padbury: His Life and Times. Perth: North Stirling Press, 1985: 171. 
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Australia (London branch), Dalgety Du Cruz & Co. and J. McDonald & Co. were the 
primary recipients in London for the acceptance of remittances from JM&Co., 
representing most of the firms in WA.156  
 
Transferring remittances to London through drafts almost became common practice. By 
the 1870s, WA merchants were requesting at least a portion of their remittance to be 
sent to London.157 The drafts, though, were not always created on JM&Co.’s London 
connection, Matheson & Co., but through other companies including, for example, 
Rathbone Bros. & Co. in 1870.158 Most drafts were drawn on in London to cover the 
costs of other ventures; shipments to WA being the most likely primary reason. Some, 
however, were immediately transferred from China to the merchant in WA as was the 
case with George Shenton in 1871.159 
 
A few WA merchants chose to use the remittances through the sale of sandalwood as 
barter for shipments of goods from China. The example of the Kestrel discloses how 
sandalwood was used to partially pay for the tea, sugar and rice on the return trip. 
Sandalwood, hence, was a staple monetary credit for the WA merchants allowing them 
to cover the costs of shipments of tea back to Australia. Frequently, the value of the 
sales of the sandalwood, especially given the number of shipments made between 
individual tea purchases, exceeded the cost of a shipment of tea to WA or any 
                                      
156 For a full list of London banks and brokers connected to the Australian-China trade, see Appendix 17. 
I have not found any existing archives for these companies. 
157 Letter from JM&Co. to J. McDonald & Co., 29 August 1874 General Letters from Shanghai JMA 
C46/17. 
158 Letter from JM&Co. to J. McDonald & Co., 11 August 1870 General Letters from Shanghai JMA 
C46/9. 
159 JM&Co. organised for the remittance as a draft on the Bank of South Australia in London “to be 
credited to your acct with the Western Australian Bank” as per Shenton’s instructions. Letter from 
JM&Co. to G. Shenton Esq., 16 June 1871 General Letters from Shanghai JMA C46/10. 
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intermediary port, including Singapore or Melbourne.160 For some merchants, they 
chose to split their remittances between a tea purchase and sending the remainder as 
drafts to London. Further, as much of the remittance was taking place in Hong Kong, a 
portion was saved in Hong Kong  and placed in credit on the supplier’s account for the 
purpose of future tea purchases.161 
 
The sales of sandalwood were rarely immediate upon arrival in either Hong Kong or 
Shanghai and thus advances were made upon the expected sale of the wood.162 If a 
parcel of tea was to be shipped prior to the completion of the sandalwood sale then a 
pre-sale draft on the expectation of sales was used to cover the indent for the tea.163 This 
was not an expectation and required the WA merchant to make a specific request.164 
However, on the assumption that the wood would be sold in Shanghai, or a related port, 
and at the nominal rate that existed at the time, JM&Co. at Hong Kong evaluated the 
expected remittance and based their decisions of tea purchases on that. Similarly, 
advances on remittances to London could be made prior to the goods being sold as long 
as the goods had arrived or the relevant documents were present “protected by policy of 
                                      
160 Letter from JM&Co. to J. H. Monger, Esq. 29 August 1873 Letters to India JMA C10/62. York 
(W.A.) merchant J. H. Monger was sent an invoice for 140 packages of tea to be sent per s.s. China from 
China to Messrs Behn, Meyer & Co. of Singapore, that company then forwarding the tea to York. Charles 
Crowther of Geraldton and George Shenton of Perth organised for shipments of tea via Melbourne and 
through James Henty & Co. Letter from JM&Co. to C. Crowther Esq., 30 December 1874 Letters to 
India JMA C10/63; Letter from JM&Co. to C. Crowther Esq., 2 October 1874 Letters to India JMA 
C10/63; Letter from JM&Co. to G. Shenton Esq., 27 October 1875 Letters to India JMA C10/64; Letter 
from JM&Co. to G. Shenton Esq., 9 November 1875, Letters to India JMA C10/64. 
161 Letter from JM&Co. to G. Shenton Esq., 23 September 1876 General Letters from Shanghai JMA 
C46/22. Shenton organised for part payment to cover a shipment of tea and £1000 to be delivered to the 
Bank of South Australia as a draft on Matheson & Co. See also Letter from JM&Co. to G. Shenton Esq., 
11 April 1872 General Letters from Shanghai JMA C46/11 as well as the Statement of Account within 
Letter from JM&Co. to J. H. Monger Esq., 11 April 1872 General Letters from Shanghai JMA C46/11. 
162 As an example, J. H. Monger Esq. ordered tea to be sent prior to the usual shipment, to be discussed 
towards the end of 1873. The tea was sent to Singapore care of Behn, Meyer & Co., with the amount of 
$786 debited in Shanghai to J. H. Monger Esq.’s account. Letter from J. H. Monger Esq. to JM&Co., 16 
June 1873 Correspondence: Business Letters: Australasia JMA B6/3; Letter from JM&Co. to J. H. 
Monger Esq., 29 August 1873 Letters to India JMA C10/62; Letter from JM&Co. to J. H. Monger Esq., 
20 September 1873 General Letters from Shanghai JMA C46/15. 
163 Letter from JM&Co. to G. Shenton Esq., 15 April 1876 General Letters from Shanghai JMA C46/21. 
164 Letter from J. H. Monger Esq. to JM&Co., 23 April 1873 Correspondence: Business Letters: 
Australasia JMA B6/3. 
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insurance.”165 These advances were charged at an interest rate equivalent to five per 
cent per annum, until reimbursed.166  
 
Time was also relevant when related to the variance in the exchange rate with 
London.167 The pound sterling was the one standard currency that other currencies could 
be converted into and for Hong Kong that other currency was the Spanish dollar.168 For 
all correspondence from Hong Kong, JM&Co. concluded their letters with the then 
current exchange rate for drafts in England, based on the dollar. That rate would vary, 
sometimes to the disadvantage of the WA merchants who may then choose to delay 
payments. In one case, J. H. Monger wrote to the Shanghai office of JM&Co. to request 
that they “avail themselves of a more favourable moment for remittance so as to avoid 
the venture to be materially prejudiced by a low rate of exchange.”169 Thus, not only 
were the value of the goods negotiated but also when the remittance was completed for 
them. 
 
Concluding comments 
 
The sandalwood trade of WA delivers a clear example of the trade relationships that 
existed between China and just one of Australia’s colonies – WA – during the 1860s 
and 1870s. The relationship was important for the WA economy as it created an export 
market that was second only to wool while it also provided a method of payment for the 
                                      
165 Letter from JM&Co. to I. Brown & Co., 20 July 1871 Letters to India JMA C10/61. 
166 Letter from JM&Co. to Padbury Loton & Co., 6 June 1874 General Letters from Shanghai JMA 
C46/16. 
167 For example, in Sep 1871 the rate for 60 day 1st class drafts was 4s. 4 1/8d. per $. One year later that 
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14 September 1871 Letters to India JMA C10/61; Letter from JM&Co. to Henry Moore & Co., 4 October 
1872 Letters to India JMA C10/62. 
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 Butlin. The Australian Monetary System: 143. 
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purchase of tea and sugar as well as a supplement to goods purchased from England. 
For the Chinese along the China route and the Western commission agents in Shanghai, 
the relationship provided a new connection to the Australian markets.  
 
The path taken by the sandalwood was one that made its way from WA to Shanghai. 
Shanghai was the port of favour with the Chinese who wanted to purchase the 
sandalwood from the importers while the ports of Singapore and Hong Kong were 
transition ports. Thus, this route was in one direction, north to Shanghai and I have 
labelled it the “China route.” The main proponents of trade at these intermediary ports 
were the Chinese. They purchased the wood from other traders and then transhipped it 
north to the next destination. The WA merchants also played a role in the movement 
along the China route, as they chose which port to export the sandalwood to. However, 
their options were also constrained by the available transport options of which the WA 
merchants found various ways to overcome. 
 
The Shanghai sandalwood market was complex. It was affected by various market 
forces brought about by the Chinese in the ports along the China route as much as by 
the Chinese and Western commission agents in Shanghai. Each created positive and 
negative movements in the price of sandalwood upon its arrival in Shanghai. The 
Western commission agents instituted a number of methods and strategies to counter the 
forces placed upon the market, to varying success. 
 
The remittances for the parcels of sandalwood were performed somewhat similarly to 
that as shown in Chapter 3 with the coal trade. However, there were a number of 
significant differences owing to the nature of the sandalwood trade. There were few 
financial institutions in WA with connections to those in China. The need for tea and 
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other Chinese commodities was very small in WA. The nature of the sandalwood trade 
was that it existed within a complex and competitive market in Shanghai. That meant 
many packages of sandalwood were stored for large periods. The use of London 
merchants was also more common. The methodology thus shows partial similarity to 
the coal trade. Each of these created varying problems for remitting the proceeds from 
sandalwood sales to WA merchants, problems that were overcome. 
 
While there were numerous WA merchants across the ports of the colony, from Albany 
to Geraldton, and also many Chinese merchants in Asian ports, one Western firm 
emerged as a leader within the Shanghai market, the overall destination of most WA 
sandalwood. Jardine Matheson and Co. was instrumental in delivering the optimum 
prices for imports from WA. Their competition were the Chinese traders from the 
“south” - more often than not, Cantonese or Fukien - and the German firm Siemssen 
and Company. The latter employed a quick-sale strategy that created a buyers’ market. 
The Chinese, though, continued to supply the Shanghai sandalwood market with wood 
purchased from either Singapore or Hong Kong and sold at a low profit margin. 
JM&Co. always found a way to overcome the hurdles their competitors presented. In 
most cases JM&Co. eventually were able to obtain the prices they felt were best and 
most profitable. Thus to the majority of the WA sandalwood merchants, JM&Co. was 
the prime merchant in Shanghai for the trade of sandalwood throughout the period. 
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CHAPTER 5 
 
GOLD FOR ALL THE TEA IN CHINA 
 
You can talk of your whisky or talk of your beer, 
I’ve something far better waiting me here; 
It stands on that fire beneath the gum tree; 
And you cannot much lick it – a billy of tea.1 
 
The first stanza of the late nineteenth century folk song “Billy of Tea,” embodies the 
cultural and social traditions of the colonial Australian outback. It is the tea, boiled in 
the billy, over the camp fire and under a gum tree that appeals more to the bushman that 
does whisky and beer. With overtones of prohibition and temperance, the cup of tea is 
portrayed as the drink to refresh the weary. While Australia strongly maintained its 
imperial ties with Great Britain, its appreciation of tea, however, varied significantly to 
that of Britain. For those in the cities and towns, they sipped their tea. Yet in the 
outback, the jolly swagman “sang as he watched and waited ‘til his billy boiled.”2 Such 
was the fascination with the tea leaf in both city and country that Australians were 
entranced by tea. By the 1860s and 1870s, Australians were among the largest importers 
of tea. It is that connection that brings China’s exports into Australia’s realm of trade. 
 
The prime commodity imported from China by Australia’s colonies, during the 1860s 
and 1870s, was tea. China also held the mantle as the dominant supplier of tea for the 
Australians. China provided well over ninety per cent of all tea imports throughout 
those two decades. The supremacy that China had in the tea market, coupled with the 
fact that China was seen as uninterested in Australia’s main export commodities, 
                                      
1 “The Billy of Tea.” Native Companion Songster. Vol. 3, Brisbane: R. S. Hews & Co., 1889. 
2 Banjo Paterson, and Christina Macpherson, "Waltzing Matilda." 1895. 
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created an uneven trade balance between the two nations. Sandra Tweedie, in her book 
on Australia’s trade with Asia, concluded that “the trade advantage that China enjoyed 
with Australia was to continue until towards the end of the nineteenth century when 
Indian and Ceylonese tea exports began to erode China’s market in Australia.”3 
However, this bi-lateral narrative creates only a macroeconomic picture of the trade. It 
eliminates some of the fundamentals of the transactions that were common between 
merchants in China and Australia and, for that matter, other parts of the world. It tends 
to place in the background the extensive and complicated multi-lateral trade that took 
place. And, it neglects the numerous other entities that existed within the simple tea 
transaction. Dissecting the tea trade at the transaction level is, thus, important in 
providing a more comprehensive understanding of this element of the Australia – China 
trade relationship. 
 
The relationship that existed around the tea trade included firms within the China – 
Australia direct partnership. That relationship extended to the financial institutions of 
both Calcutta and London. It drew in firms from different countries, each with varying 
interests in the Australia – China tea transaction. These transactions, therefore, 
consisted of numerous parts. Most important were the indent, the payment and, if 
required, the remittance. In this chapter, these relationships and the part played by the 
financial transactions and remittances are discussed. The chapter answers the questions 
of who was involved, how they were involved and how the payments and remittances 
were completed. The chapter also ventures into a discussion relating to the joint-account 
transactions between China Treaty Port merchants and Australian merchants. The 
chapter specifically ventures to investigate those joint-account tea transactions that 
involved JM&Co. and firms in Australia where the remittances were completed with 
                                      
3 Sandra Tweedie, Trading Partners: Australia and Asia 1790-1993. Sydney: University of NSW Press, 
1994: 15. 
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transfers of gold to India. Thus, these transactions generate questions of who was 
involved, how these transactions were performed, what problems occurred and what 
were the benefits from such a type of relationship. The chapter finishes with a 
discussion on the sugar trade and how JM&Co., as a merchant and not a commission 
agent, invested in shipments of sugar to Australia. 
 
Tea for Australia 
 
Australians had a strong love for tea in the nineteenth century. Australia was a major 
importer of tea from China, though not to the extent as that to the UK. On average, 
between 12 and 13 million pounds of tea arrived per year from China for the Australian 
colonies during the 1860s and 1870s.4 From the time of the gold rushes, Australia had 
also became one of the top four countries of the world in tea importation.5 From the 
1860s extending to the end of the nineteenth century, Australians consumed the most 
tea per capita throughout the world.6 Australian’s fancy of the leaf was directed through 
a need to not only quench the thirst created by the climatic conditions of where they 
lived but also to continue the propagation of British imperial influence over the culture 
of colonial Australia.7 
 
                                      
4 This is a rough estimate based on the data from Prices Current AH P945 Cartons 31-33. This figure does 
not take into account any imports by Chinese merchants. Accurate figures are not available as the 
Statistical Records for some of the colonies have separate sections for tea released for sale with duty paid 
and tea warehoused. The latter includes the previous year’s warehoused tea. The Chinese also commonly 
listed tea as “sundries.” 
5 Geoffrey Blainey, The Tyranny of Distance: How Distance Shaped the World. Melbourne: Sun Books, 
1966: 202. 
6 Peter Griggs, "Black Poison or Beneficial Beverage? Tea Consumption in Colonial Australia." Journal 
of Australian Colonial History 17 (2015): 23. 
7 Melissa Dive, "Steeped in History: Afternoon Tea at Vaucluse House." Ideas in History 4, no. 2 (2012): 
2; Griggs, “Black Poisson.”: 24; Jessica Knight, "'A Poisonous Cup?' Afternoon Tea in Australian Society, 
1870-1914." Honours, University of Sydney, 2011: 14, 15. 
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The primary points of entry for tea from China were Sydney and Melbourne. Upon 
arrival the tea would either be released for auction, with the appropriate duty paid, 
warehoused in bond until a later release or transhipped to another colonial port in 
Australia or New Zealand. During the 1860s and 1870s, the volume of tea imported to 
Victoria was, on the whole, larger than that of NSW. The reason related to the route 
taken by tea vessels from China. As discussed in Chapter 2, the square-rigged vessels 
chose the route from China via Cape Leeuwin. Melbourne, thus, was the first major port 
of call. The effect of steam transport on tea from China did not take place until late in 
the 1870s. 
 
Black and green tea were imported into Australia from China in the 1860s and 1870s. 
At that time, the preference by Europeans in Australia was for black teas as they 
provided a thirst-quenching counter to the harsh hot climate of Australia.8 The choice 
could also be related to British influence. The earliest importations of tea to the UK 
were green teas.9 In the early eighteenth century Chinese green tea was half the cost of 
black tea and thus appealed to the masses of England.10 By the late eighteenth century, 
the tea price fell allowing British to afford black teas such that it became a staple of the 
British diet. A result of this alteration was the escalation of the demand for sugar and 
the use of the sweetener together with milk in the tea.11 Australians preferred both green 
and black teas initially. Mauritian sugar was commonly added to green teas in Van 
Diemen’s Land in the mid-nineteenth century.12 The 1860s saw a change in preference 
                                      
8 Griggs, “Black Poisson.”: 24; Sydney Cuncliffe, "British Imperialism and Tea Culture in Asia and 
North America, 1650-1950." Masters. University of Victoria, 2014: 15; Roy Moxham, Tea: Addiction, 
Exploitation and Empire. New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2003: 31. 
9 Helen Saberi, Tea: A Global History. London: Reaktion Books Ltd, 2010: 85-91. The first tea arrived in 
1645. 
10 Cuncliffe, "British Imperialism and Tea Culture.”: 16. 
11 Barbara Sanich, "History through the Lens of Food." In Eat History, Food and Drink in Australia and 
Beyond, edited by Sofia Eriksson, Madeleine Hastie and Tom Roberts. 1-18. Newcastle, UK: Cambridge 
Scholars Publishing, 2013: 11. 
12  Kaz Ross, "Imagined Futures and Forgotten Pasts: Tasmania's Asian Connections." Journal of 
Australian Studies 41, no. 3 (2017): 301. 
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to black teas, primarily in response to the adulteration of Chinese green teas.13 Thus, for 
Westerners in Australia, the preference was black tea over green tea during the 1860s 
and 1870s. The Chinese, however, continued to drink and prefer green tea.14 
 
Calculating the tea trade 
 
The traditional methodology for the investigation of trade relating to Australia has been 
through the use of statistics compiled by the individual Colonial Customs divisions.15 
As goods arrived, they passed through Customs and were recorded. While maintaining a 
record for statistical purposes was essential, collection of customs duties and any other 
taxes and payments were more important. Tea was one of the imported items that drew 
a tax and hence Customs kept complete records of all arrivals. The details were annually 
summarised and recorded in the Blue Books of each Colony. The details were also 
included within the abridged Statistical Tables that were presented to the House of 
Commons in England. 
 
 
 
 
                                      
13 Ross, "Imagined Futures and Forgotten Pasts.”: 303. 
14 For a discussion on the preferences of East Asians as opposed to other parts of the world for black or 
green tea, see: Peter C. Perdue, "Is Pu-Er in Zomia? Tea Cultivation and the State in China." Agrarian 
Studies Colloquium, Yale University (2008). 
http://agrarianstudies.macmillan.yale.edu/sites/default/files/files/colloqpapers/07perdue.pdf. (cited 5 
October 2017). Perdue states, on page 3, that for the present, “China produces both kinds, but exports 
most of its black tea and only part of its green teas. Black and green teas have almost entirely separate 
markets, with black teas dominant in Western Europe, India, and North America, and green teas dominant 
in East Asia and the Middle East. The Chinese state divides tea into three categories, reflecting the 
historical position of tea production in global politics. “Border teas” are brick teas consumed within the 
Inner Asian regions of China and in Central Eurasia, “green teas” are for domestic markets, mainly; and 
“black teas” serve foreign markets.” See also, Yujiro Hayami, "The Peasant in Economic Modernization." 
American journal of Agricultural Economics 78, no. 5 (1996): 1159. Hayami states that the unfermented 
green teas were the product of the peasants in China and thus also those who drank it. The miners, whom 
the Chinese merchants were servicing, were primarily from the peasant areas of Kwangtung.  
15 The statistics were displayed in the respective colonial Blue Books or Statistical Registers for each 
calendar year. The collection of tea statistics commenced in the 1830s. Griggs, “Black Poison”: 27. 
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Figure 5.1. Tea imported into NSW and Victoria in pounds (lbs.), 1864-1880.16 
 
 
The data in the Blue Books provide the amount of tea imported into NSW and Victoria 
from the various origins. The period chosen for analysis is from 1864 to 1880.17 The 
import data of tea to NSW and Victoria is presented in Figure 5.1. The solid lines 
represent the actual amount of tea imported to the two colonies for each year. The 
dashed lines represent the smoothing of the data. A three-year moving average centred 
on the middle year has been used in the smoothing process. The amount of tea imported 
per year into NSW and Victoria altered significantly each year. The randomness of the 
peaks and troughs shown in Figure 5.1 demonstrates this. The graphs give the 
impression that the trade was haphazard. One reason for the randomness relates to the 
period the data is collected. Tea arrived throughout the year. Most departures from 
China adhered to the yearly tea trade cycle from China.18 It was not unusual for late 
season tea shipments to be made. They occurred when there was sufficient demand in 
                                      
16 Statistical Tables relating to the Colonial and Other Possessions of the United Kingdom. (Parts VII to 
XVII). 
17 The reason for choosing 1864 as the initial year is that prior to 1864 China and Hong Kong were either 
combined under the label “China” or that Hong Kong became part of the grouping labeled “Other British 
Colonies” for the NSW statistics. 
18 The yearly tea trade cycle was from 1 June to 31 May of the following year. 
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Australia. That demand was also based on stocks. When stocks were high, imports 
dropped as opportunities for profitable sales were low. Competition between numerous 
merchants in the Australian ports also meant that stocks varied continuously. Reaching 
an optimum point for stock and deliveries was difficult. Thus the reason for the peaks 
and troughs. By applying a smoothing technique, the randomness is almost eliminated 
and trends emerge providing a clearer picture of tea importation to NSW and Victoria. 
 
The smoothed data in Figure 5.1 shows similarities for imports into NSW and Victoria 
to 1875. After 1875, the two graphs converge. The effect of the use of steamers as 
transport for tea is demonstrated by the convergence. To explain the rise in the late 
1860s and the following drop at the commencement of the 1870s, I only need to return 
to the discussions on the coal trade. Numerous influences affected the world markets at 
that time. In this case, the influences related to the need for teas in the UK as well as the 
amount of coal being provided for shipping for the trade. 
 
An alternate method of interpreting the tea trade from China to Australia is by viewing 
the export figures from China. Figure 5.2 provides the total amount of tea exported to 
Australia from China for the yearly tea trade cycles from 1861/62 to 1875/76. 
Similarities exist between Figures 5.1 and 5.2. A strong relationship exists between the 
exports from China and the imports to Victoria more than to NSW. This is evidenced by 
the peaks of 1868/69 and 1872/73. One reason for this observation may lie with the fact 
that shipping arrived in Melbourne first. That is, tea for NSW may have been 
transhipped at Melbourne instead of being sent direct to NSW. That could have resulted 
in a smoothing of the effects of the exports from China.19 It also could explain why the 
sudden changes to tea imports to Victoria mirror those of the exports from China. 
                                      
19 Tea commonly sat in warehouses prior to sale or transhipment. 
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Figure 5.2. Yearly tea trade cycles of exports of tea from China to Australia in pounds 
(lbs.), 1861/62-1875/76.20 
 
 
Figure 5.3. The share of tea in total imports into the Australian colonies from China, 
1860-1880.21 
 
 
Tea was the main export commodity from China to colonial Australian ports between 
1860 and 1880. Figure 5.3 shows tea as a percentage share of all exports from China to 
                                      
20 Prices Current AH P945 Cartons 31-33. These cartons are not part of the general AH collection, AH 
MS766 which are all on microfilm. The Prices Current circulars have not been digitized and are located in 
a set of boxes that require a special request for access. The circulars are from late in the 1859-60 season 
until the end of the 1875-76. At the conclusion of each season a summary was provided for that season 
and previous few. See Appendix 18 for a summary of the seasonal data. 
21 Statistical Tables relating to the Colonial and Other Possessions of the United Kingdom. (Parts VII to 
XVII). See Appendix 19 for complete figures. 
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Australia. Except for the surge in deliveries in the late 1860s, as also shown in Figures 
5.1 and 5.2, tea provided approximately 80 per cent of all exports from China to 
Australia. Other items imported in to Australia from China included fireworks, biscuits, 
candles, Chinaware, porcelain and sugar. 
 
Origins of tea 
 
Australia’s teas, imported from China, were purchased from a number of locations in 
China. The Prices Current circulars of Augustine Heard & Co. indicate that vessels 
regularly departed towards Australia from various ports, including Hong Kong, Amoy, 
Foochow and Hankow. The same circulars provide sparse evidence of any departures 
direct to any Australian port from Shanghai.22 The first three ports obtained their tea 
from the Fukien, Kwangtung and nearby southern provinces. From 1861, Hankow, 
located on the Yangtze River, became known among Westerners as a traditional market 
for teas from the nearby provinces in central and north China.23 Foochow was the 
primary export port for tea to Australia and by the late 1870s took over the mantle from 
Shanghai as lead exporter of Chinese teas to the world.24 The teas from the ports in 
Fukien province were handled through “agency houses” or “commission houses,” made 
up mostly of the Western businesses.25 They had their headquarters located in Hong 
Kong and thus, although Australian importers received their tea direct from Foochow, 
all transactions were made with the houses in Hong Kong. Principally, tea shipments to 
Australia were derived from markets located in the above four ports. Hankow tea was 
shipped on ocean-going sail vessels down the Yangtze River with either the first or 
                                      
22 Shanghai was a primary export port for tea shipped to both the U.K. and the United States. 
23 William T. Rowe, Hankow: Commerce and Society in a Chinese City, 1796-1889. Stanford, CA: 
Stanford University Press, 1984: 56. Hankow is now part of Wuhan. 
24 Robert Gardella, Harvesting Mountains: Fujian and the China Tea Trade, 1757-1937. Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1994: 62. 
25 Gardella, Harvesting Mountains: 55. 
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second crop of the northern season.26 It would take approximately a month to reach 
Shanghai, at the mouth of the Yangtze River, before the vessels continued on to either 
Melbourne or Sydney.27 
 
The teas from the four ports were, predominantly, of the black variety, namely a type of 
Congou, though some green teas were also exported. There were a number of variants 
of Congou. The Invoices of tea shipments to Australia show these as predicated by the 
title of “fine,” “finest,” and other superlatives. The definitions assisted in advertising the 
various levels of the quality of the tea.28 These strata of teas would also give rise to an 
understanding of the difference in the purchase price in Foochow. Plain congou was 
cheaper than fine which was of less value than finest. The higher quality tea was the 
“Kyshow” Congou that, to some merchants, was regarded as the “prince of teas” owing 
to its true Kyshow flavour. Other black teas imported included the various scented 
Pekoe teas as well as Caper, Oolong and Lapsang Souchong. Other green teas exported 
from China included Gunpowder and Imperial variants.29  
 
The quality of teas varied throughout the season in China. At the beginning of the 
season in China these teas would be of the best quality. As the season progressed, the 
quality of tea diminished. There was also a problem of tea adulteration. In a letter to a 
Sydney merchant house explaining the problem, JM&Co. stated: 
The admixture, to which you refer, of dust and old season's leaf with the new 
teas is very much to be deplored but it is one of those evils arising from the 
undue competition with which we meet in the tea market and which it is very 
difficult to eradicate.30 
                                      
26 Rowe, Hankow: 80, 130. Hankow also normally produced the first departures of the China tea season. 
27 The Albyn’s Isle took exactly one month from departure at Hankow to pass Shanghai. “Shipping.” The 
Age 12 September 1870: 2. 
28 See for example: Invoice for 9579 packages of tea per Great Britain, 14 January 1861, for Downie 
Murphey, JMA A6/12. 
29 For a summarised description of the teas, see: The Tablet 28 July 1866: 478; A more detailed 
description – John H. Blake, Tea Hints for Retailers in Two Parts. Denver: The Williamson-Haffner 
Engraving Company, 1903: 103-20. 
30 Letter from JM&Co. to Daniell King & Co., 14 September 1870 Letters to India JMA C10/60. 
 246 
Adulteration of teas by the Chinese sellers was a common practice, with the poorer 
green teas being tinged with various types of dyes, some considered poison.31 Many 
complaints were raised by the early colonists in Australia in reaction to the adulteration. 
This related both to the poor, dusty black teas as well as the adulterated green teas.32 
 
Two other origins of tea for the Australian markets were Shanghai and Canton. Neither 
of these ports appear in the statistical records for NSW or Victoria. The Shanghai and 
Canton markets provided mainly green teas. European Australian palates preferred the 
southern black teas. Thus, there were fewer requests in Australia for the tea sold in 
Shanghai.33 That meant the total number of packages for Australia were considered by 
commission agents in Shanghai as too small for one vessel to be devoted to the 
transportation of teas. The tea from Shanghai was shipped to either Foochow or Hong 
Kong prior to transhipment onto a vessel bound for Australia. Similarly, various 
varieties of green teas were purchased in the Canton tea markets. The teas were 
transported to Hong Kong. The teas were then placed on vessels that were to depart for 
an Australian port.34 Further, upon arrival at an Australian port, the colonial Customs 
regarded all of the cargo as a single element “tea,” not differentiating between black and 
green tea. In doing so, the recording of the tea assisted in masking the true origins of the 
tea. 
 
Japanese teas bound for Australia were also included amongst shipments from China. 
The Japanese Hyson green tea was in competition with the Chinese varieties. In one 
                                      
31 Victor H. Mair, and Erling Hoh, The True Story of Tea. London: Thames & Hudson, 2009: 190. 
32 Griggs, “Black Poison”: 40-41. 
33 By 1853, Shanghai had overtaken Canton as the major port for tea shipments. The Taiping Rebellion 
altered that preference. Later, Fuzhou attained a stronger position for exports as it had the Bohea tea. Mair, 
and Hoh, True Story of Tea: 232. In the 1860s and 1870s, the first teas for London departed from 
Shanghai. See Prices Current AH P945 Cartons 31-33. 
34 See for example: Invoice for 1090 boxes of tea per Golden Fleece, 26 December 1863, for James Henty 
& Co., JMA A6/14. 
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example in 1861, 1,067 packages of Japanese Hyson teas were transported from Fuzhou 
to Sydney on the Algemon, chartered by JM&Co. The Japanese Hyson tea was part of a 
large cargo. That cargo included 7,982 packages under joint account between JM&Co. 
and Thacker Daniell & Co. of Sydney. Also included were 375 packages for Smith 
Peate & Co. that Thacker Daniell & Co. delivered.35 A letter from JM&Co. to Thacker 
Daniell & Co., stated that the Hyson teas had “been sent down from Shanghai for 
shipment.”36 However, the invoice for the teas clearly declared that all 1,067 packages 
were from Japan.37 The above shows that, in some cases, tea believed to have arrived 
from China actually originated from Japan. The example also implies that Japan teas 
bound for Australia were transhipped at Shanghai and not shipped direct to Foochow or 
Hong Kong.38 
 
Buying tea 
 
There were various methods employed by colonial merchants in Australia to pay for the 
tea shipments. Four methods are discussed in the following sections. They are: bartering 
using a return commodity including coal and sandalwood; pre-payment of the tea direct 
from Australia; pre-payment using intermediaries in London who represent Australian 
firms; and sharing a transaction between a Treaty Port merchant and an Australian 
merchant through a joint-account transaction. The final method is of most importance. 
                                      
35 Invoice for 7982 packages of tea per Algemon, 12 August 1861, for Thacker Daniell & Co., JMA 
A6/12; Invoice for 375 packages of tea per Algemon, 12 August 1861, for Smith Peate & Co., JMA 
A6/12. 
36 Letter from JM&Co. to Thacker Daniell & Co., 26 August 1861 Letters to Europe JMA C11/29. 
37 Invoice for 1074 packages of tea per Algemon, 13 August 1861, for Thacker Daniell & Co., JMA 
A6/12. 
38 The consolidation of tea shipments, including Japanese tea, led to an anomaly in the colonial statistics. 
The customs officers treated all tea on a vessel from China as being Chinese tea. There was no separation 
of Japanese tea. This is evidenced by the statistics for tea imports to NSW and Victoria. There is only one 
instance, in 1867, of a tea shipment from Japan to NSW. Similarly, the statistics reveal no tea shipped 
from Japan to Victoria until 1880. While an anomaly of the import statistics, Japanese tea as a percentage 
of the total Chinese export to Australia was in all likelihood insignificant, though still worth noting. SR 
NSW 1867 and SR VIC 1880. 
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That method involved, in some cases, the movement of gold to Calcutta as a remittance. 
Further, these methods commonly overlapped.  
 
The choice of buying tea for sale in Australia was not exclusively the domain of 
Australian merchants, whether by themselves, through a London representative or 
through a joint-account transaction. In the extremely rare case the Treaty Port merchant 
chose to invest in a package of tea to be sent to Australia. Similar to how JM&Co. 
chose to invest in the coal trade as shown in the Ettrick example at the commencement 
of this thesis, JM&Co. also purchased tea and sent it to Australia on his own risk and 
account. In 1868, JM&Co. organised for 888 packages of tea to be sent to Sydney per 
the Minnie, under the consignment of Brown & Co. of Sydney and on account and risk 
of JM&Co.39 The tea reached a poor market in Sydney and was still unsold a year after 
it arrived.40 
 
Bartering 
 
Bartering was common for those merchants in the sandalwood and coal trades. As 
sandalwood and coal were the only two commodities of value to the importers of the 
Treaty Ports, only merchants of those trades could barter for tea. A brief description of 
the bartering of these commodities has been provided in Chapters 3 and 4. One example 
in Chapter 4 is of T. & H. Carter’s sandalwood shipment to China in 1861. The sales of 
the sandalwood paid for a portion of the cargo of tea and sugar bound for WA.  
                                      
39 Invoice of 888 packages tea per Minnie, 21 October 1868, consigned to Messrs. Brown & Co. on a/c 
and risk of Shippers. JM A6/19. The packages were shipped with a larger cargo of tea for Brown & Co. 
Letter from Messrs. Brown & Co. to JM&Co., 3 December 1868 Correspondence: Business Letters: 
Australasia JMA B6/3. 
40 Owing to a lack of documents, it is unknown as to how the remittance for the sales for JM&Co. were 
organised. Options include passing it through Brown & Co. of London, submitting a draft direct to 
JM&Co. in Hong Kong or having JM&Co. debiting Brown & Co.’s account. I believe it to be the latter. 
This was the only incident where JM&Co. ventured a shipment of tea on his own account and risk to 
Australia that I have found. 
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Other commodities were used for bartering in China. In Chapter 3, I mentioned that 
both gold and recycled metals were exported by Chinese merchants from Sydney to 
China. These goods were placed on vessels containing coal shipments destined for 
Hong Kong.41 The amount of gold shipped, as shown in Figure 3.11 of Chapter 3, was 
significant. Almost all of the gold was exported by Chinese merchants. Some of the 
gold may have been remitted as savings and the remittance was similar to the qiaohui 
performed by Chinese miners in California.42 The larger portion was sent by Chinese 
merchants as payment for goods imported. Gold was also shipped from Melbourne, 
though towards Galle on P&O steamers. In a memorial to the Victoria Chief Secretary, 
merchant Messr. King stated that, in 1859, Chinese merchant Lowe Kong Meng had 
shipped gold to China to pay for goods. Shipping gold direct to China from Melbourne 
was employed as the primary method for paying for goods until the mid-1860s. Figure 
5.4 shows that from the mid-1860s, the export of gold direct to China diminished slowly 
until it terminated in the mid-1870s. From that time, a number of Chinese merchants 
altered their philosophy to using Galle as an alternate venue for the exportation. Meng 
was one who shipped gold via Galle.43 The importation of recycled metals into China 
was different. While a portion may have been used for the creation of temple materials, 
some may also have been sold to those who were maintaining steamers and other metal-
clad vessels. 
 
 
                                      
41 The manifests from the shipping records of the period show specifically that the only gold being 
transported from Sydney to Hong Kong, with none to Shanghai, was completed by the Chinese. Recycled 
metals were also shipped by the Chinese although there are a few rare examples of Western merchants 
becoming involved in that trade. These manifests were attained from the various newspapers export lists.  
42 Elizabeth Sinn, Power and Charity: A Chinese Merchant Elite in Colonial Hong Kong. Hong Kong: 
Hong Kong University Press, 2003: 71-73. Other items transported included human remains, letters and 
personal effects. For a discussion on qiaohui, see Elizabeth Sinn, Pacific Crossing: California Gold, 
Chinese Migration, and the Making of Hong Kong. Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2013: 173-
75. 
43 Paul Macgregor, "Lowe Kong Meng and Chinese Engagement in the International Trade of Colonial 
Victoria." Provenance, no. 11 (2012). I will discuss this in more detail at a later stage of this chapter. 
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Figure 5.4. Export of gold to China from NSW, Victoria and Queensland, 1860-1880.44 
 
 
A second example of bartering is provided in Figure 5.5. WA merchant George Shenton 
sent a parcel of sandalwood to JM&Co. in Shanghai aboard the Tartar. Shenton gave 
instructions to JM&Co., Shanghai that the remittance be sent to JM&Co., Hong Kong. 
From the remittance, £1,250 was to be passed to the Bank of South Australia in London. 
The balance was to be put to Shenton’s account in credit with JM&Co., Hong Kong. 
There, the instructions were to use the account to pay for a purchase of tea to be sent to 
Perth.45 The £1,250 delivered as a draft to London, was for the purchase of goods to be 
exported to Perth from London.46 
 
 
 
                                      
44 SR NSW 1860-1880; SR VIC 1860-1880; SR QLD 1860-1880. 
45 Letter from JM&Co. to G. Shenton Esq., 11 April 1872 General Letters from Shanghai JMA C46/11; 
George Shenton Esq. in A/C Current with Jardine Matheson & Co. Shanghai, 6 April 1872 General 
Letters from Shanghai JMA C46/11; Letter from JM&Co. to G. Shenton Esq., 17 April 1872 Letters to 
India JMA C10/62. 
46 I have no ability to verify this although it is a fair assumption. WA received numerous shipments of 
goods from the UK. 
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Figure 5.5. G. Shenton sandalwood and tea transaction.47 
 
 
Cooktown, in the late 1870s, was a much clearer example of Chinese merchants using 
gold to pay for imports. Trade directly between Cooktown and Hong Kong was 
continuous owing to the regular steam vessels serving the port. There were at least a 
dozen Chinese merchants importing various goods, including tea, in Cooktown. For 
these merchants the method of payment would have been through the gold shipments. 
There were no other goods exported by the Chinese on vessels traveling to Hong 
                                      
47 George Shenton used two different London firms. The most popular was Manning & Co. The other was 
William Felgate & Co. In this example the name of the firm in London is unknown and I have adjudged 
that it was Manning & Co. The red dashed lines show the direction of finances, including drafts. The 
dotted and solid lines show the movement of goods. 
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Kong.48 As with Melbourne and Sydney, Cooktown demonstrated the strong connection 
between the export of gold and the import of various products by the Chinese merchants 
located in the Australian ports.  
 
Pre-payments 
 
The method of pre-payment by drafts was common. Drafts as an instrument of payment 
were provided prior to the purchase. Drafts were commonly on six months sight to run. 
That meant they were available to be withdrawn up to six months from when the draft 
was initially drawn. They could also be passed to or bought out by others in further 
transactions. The passing-on of drafts was also commonly completed at a discount. The 
discount depended upon the financial reputation of the issuer.49 Pre-payment by draft, 
thus, was found to be a convenient method for processing tea transactions. 
 
The pre-payment method may have been convenient, yet its overall processes could also 
become quite complex. Nevertheless, in its simplest form, an indent was sent from 
either London or Australia along with a draft on a common bank to pay for the indent. 
The tea was procured and placed on the next available vessel heading to the Australian 
port of destination. An Invoice and Bill of Lading for the purchaser in Australia was 
included, or sent separately, detailing the costs of the transaction and goods included. If 
an amount remained from the original draft, that was then transferred to the account 
between the two companies. Insurance was normally taken up by the Australian 
                                      
48 Gold from Cooktown was rarely recorded as the Chinese merchants commonly smuggled the gold to 
Hong Kong. Gold was not dutied by the Queensland government. The reasons why the Chinese chose 
smuggling is unknown. Robert Ormston. "The Rise and Fall of a Frontier Mining Town: Cooktown 1873-
85." PhD. University of Queensland, 1996: 159; Kevin Rains. "Intersections: The Overseas Chinese 
Social Landscape of Cooktown, 1873-1935." PhD. University of Queensland, 2005: 198-99. 
49 John A. James, "Payment Systems." In Handbook of Cliometrics, edited by Claude Diebolt and 
Michael Haupert. 353-73. London: Springer-Verlag, 2016: 357-58. 
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merchant whether in Australia, if that was possible, or in London, which was more 
common.50  
 
Direct pre-payment for tea shipments from China to Australian ports was normally 
reserved for one-off transactions by new merchant connections. When Simeon Comrie 
of Melbourne, in 1875, investigated the possibilities of commencing a tea trade with 
JM&Co., the latter requested that any order be “accompanied by a bank credit for our 
reimbursement of funds in due course.”51 Similarly, in 1872 the Perth Cooperative 
Society Limited requested JM&Co. to fulfil an indent for tea.52 JM&Co. stated that the 
customary practice was of “handing us a Bank Credit.” Without the bank credit the 
order was not fulfilled “as none of our local banks have agencies or branches at your 
port.”53 As both JM&Co. and Augustine Heard & Co. dealt with a standard group of 
merchants, direct pre-payment tea transactions tended to be rare. More common were 
the pre-payment transactions involving London firms on behalf of Australian merchants. 
 
The use of London or India further placed Australia within a global, multilateral trade 
environment. The payments involved a third party, or even more, and were frequently 
accepted by merchants. Drafts and bullion were common methods for balancing trade 
deficits as well as creating methods of payment for such goods as tea, opium and cotton. 
Samuel Saul summarises this monetary phenomenon for the period in and around the 
nineteenth century as: 
In its most simple form the transfer of precious metals provided the mechanism 
of settlement; later the use of bills of exchange greatly reduced the size of flows 
and during the last half of the nineteenth century the system works in a still more 
                                      
50 Maritime insurance was then covered in London by Lloyds.  
51 Letter from JM&Co. to Simeon Comrie Esq., 11 June 1875 Letters to India JMA C10/63. 
52 Letter from Perth Cooperative Society Limited to JM&Co., 13 August 1872 Correspondence: Business 
Letters: Australasia JMA B6/3. 
53 Letter from JM&Co. to Perth Cooperative Society Limited 3 October 1872 Letters to India JMA 
C10/62. 
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simple manner through fluctuations in the size of sterling balances held by 
foreign banks in London.54 
 
That is, there were any of a number of assorted methodologies employed for the process 
of payment. Further, numerous triangles, where these payment practices were employed, 
endured well prior to the mid-nineteenth century. The position of the British East India 
Company and trade between China, India and England provides a clear example.55 For 
JM&Co., Augustine Heard & Co. and a group of Australian merchants, usage of both 
London and India as intermediaries within a multi-lateral flow of goods and money 
became an important strategy to allow for the continuous trade of tea into Australia. 
 
Where Australia fits into the general multi-lateral trade paradigm is through its resource 
of gold. Takeshi Hamashita draws our attention to the nature of how the United States, 
particularly California following the opening of the gold fields in 1849, created for itself 
new avenues to cover the payment of tea by exporting bullion to Canton. The influx of 
gold from California to China also alleviated the latter’s responsibility for payments to 
India in either silver or gold for China’s purchases of opium. Where the United States 
thence entered the trade regime was to assist China, and in some way bypass England, 
when it came to a complicated multi-lateral trade involving tea, opium and other 
goods.56 When Australia became a gold exporter in the 1850s, it too gained access to 
this multi-lateral trade conference. Australia was no longer considered “trifling.”57 For 
many merchants outside of Australia, the Australian gold exports provided an alternate 
                                      
54 Samuel B. Saul, "Britain and World Trade, 1870-1914." The Economic History Review 7, no. 1 (1954): 
49. 
55 D. K. Fieldhouse, Economics and Empire 1830-1914. Ithica, NY: Cornell University Press, 1973: 213; 
For a comprehensive discussion on the banking and financial transactions involving China, India and 
England, see Michael Greenberg, British Trade and the Opening of China 1800-42. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 1969: 152-74. 
56 Takeshi Hamashita, Linda Grove, and Mark Selden, eds. China, East Asia and the Global Economy: 
Regional and Historical Perspectives. New York: Routledge, 2008: 120-21. 
57 Hamashita, et. al., China, East Asia: 121. 
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method of covering the trade between London, India and China, that being through 
either payments of gold to India or to Great Britain. 
 
Pre-payments were instigated through firms in London as it was the centre of world 
finance at that time. Hashamita puts forward, on several occasions, that much of the 
world’s finances were “centered on the money market in London.”58 The British Pound 
Sterling was the primary method of exchange for Western merchant houses in China. At 
the conclusion of all correspondence sent out of China by these merchants were the then 
current exchange rates between the local currency, whether dollar in Hong Kong or Tael 
in Shanghai, with the Pound Sterling.59 Further, all drafts drawn in London would be 
converted at these exchange rates. That allowed merchants in Treaty Ports to make an 
informed judgement as to the time of when it was best to make the exchange.  
 
The England-based firms provided the linkage between Australian merchants and their 
counterparts overseas. They were either partners or representatives of the Australian 
firms. With the centre of banking in London, they also provided a closer source to the 
international banks with branches in China and elsewhere. These ties became relevant 
and well-used during the 1860s and 1870s. The London firms assisted numerous 
Australian firms to establish and maintain their trade relationships with those in 
China.60 The following example of a tea transaction between 1860 and 1861 presents an 
overview of the usage of a draft on London and also what transpired from the indent 
stage to the final payments. 
                                      
58 Hamashita, et. al., China, East Asia: 121, 126, 128. 
59 As an example: “Exchange closes for the mail at 4/4½ for 4 Mo’s Bank bills and 4/5¼ for similar 
credits & proportionately higher for the longer term.” Letter from JM&Co. to Henry Moore Esq., 31 
October 1867 Letters to India JMA C10/58. Here JM&Co. is referring to the exchange between English 
currency and the dollar in Hong Kong. Thus, four shillings and four and one half pence equates to a dollar 
for four month’s bank bills. 
60 A discussion of the firms involved and the relationships between London and Australia was discussed 
in Chapter 1. 
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The London firm, Redfern Alexander & Co. (RA&Co.), requested of JM&Co. to 
organise a shipment of tea. If possible, the tea was to be delivered direct to the company 
Henty Learnmonth & Co. of Portland, Victoria. RA&Co. provided the draft for the cost 
of the teas.61 The order was for a variety of teas including the standard Congou, 
Kyshow Congou and Hyson Skin tea. The latter was to be obtained from Shanghai, 
either from local dealers or imported from Japan. The Hyson Skin, however, was found 
scarce in Shanghai at that time and thus unavailable for the shipment.62 The order was 
completed in Foochow by JM&Co.’s representative in that port. With no direct 
shipment to Portland available, the tea was sent direct to Melbourne per the Great 
Britain. The vessel departed Foochow on 6 January 1861.63 The Great Britain arrived in 
Melbourne and the teas to Portland were transhipped using the Queen and the Lady Bird. 
Henty Learnmonth & Co. reported that the teas were acceptable for the local market.64 
 
The financial process, as shown in Figure 5.6, illustrates the movement of drafts (red 
solid lines) and the deployment of invoices (green dashed lines). It was of a triangular 
form involving China, Australia and England. The process would have commenced 
with the company requesting the indent, RA&Co. in this example, through Matheson & 
Co. RA&Co. drew the draft, placed it upon a London bank and delivered the draft to 
Matheson & Co. As an intermediary, Matheson & Co. provided the finances to JM&Co. 
for the tea purchases. The original draft was passed on or another draft was drawn by 
                                      
61 Letter from JM&Co. to Henty Learnmonth & Co., 23 August 1860 Letters to Europe JMA C11/28. The 
letter only states that an order had been requested by the London company. I have made an assumption, 
based primarily on later correspondence relating to this order and other orders that all monetary 
transactions, drafts, etc., were made in London between Redfern Alexander & Co. and Matheson & Co.. 
There was no request by JM&Co. for payment of the tea made to Henty Learnmonth & Co.. A further 
assumption is that Henty Learnmonth & Co. would have sent remittances to Redfern Alexander & Co. to 
cover the sale of the teas. 
62 Letter from JM&Co. to Henty Learnmonth & Co., 29 December 1860 Letters to Europe JMA C11/28. 
63 Letter from JM&Co. to Henty Learnmonth & Co., 31 January 1861 Letters to Europe JMA C11/28. 
64 Letter from Henty Learnmonth & Co. to JM&Co., 22 March 1861 Correspondence: Business Letters: 
Australasia JMA B6/3; Letter from Henty Learnmonth & Co. to JM&Co., 22 April 1861 
Correspondence: Business Letters: Australasia JMA B6/3. The Great Britain arrived in Melbourne on 14 
March 1861. “Shipping.” The Age 15 March 1861: 4. 
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Matheson & Co. If the latter, that may have covered numerous indents. Once that draft 
had been guaranteed in Hong Kong, the purchase of the tea at Foochow was completed. 
Upon the finalisation of the tea purchases, JM&Co. then forwarded the invoice and the 
bill of lading. One copy was delivered to Henty Learnmonth & Co. and a second to 
RA&Co.65 The tea was sold in Victoria. Henty Learnmonth & Co. then transferred a 
portion of the amount derived from sales to RA&Co. to cover the original draft plus 
commission. A common bank in both London and Australia was used. At each stage 
commissions and other expenses were subtracted for the various firms involved in the 
transactions. 
 
Figure 5.6. Financial process chart relating to Henty Learnmonth order. 
 
 
The tea process in Figure 5.7 demonstrates its simplicity when compared to the 
financial part of the transaction. The indents, or requests, (purple solid lines) were 
initially made by RA&Co. and then by JM&Co. to that company’s offices in both 
Shanghai and Fuzhou. The movement of the tea (blue dashed lines), required an 
                                      
65 Letter from JM&Co. to Henty Learnmonth & Co., 31 January 1861 Letters to Europe JMA C11/28. 
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intermediary in James Henty & Co. of Melbourne to assist in transhipping the tea, when 
it arrived at that port, to Portland.66  
 
Figure 5.7. Tea process chart relating to Henty Learnmonth order.67 
 
 
The movement of correspondence attained somewhat more complexity. In Figure 5.8, 
numerous lines of communication existed. JM&Co. was in contact with all firms that 
were part of the transaction. They received the indent and draft from RA&Co. and 
Matheson & Co. of London. JM&Co. then communicated with their representatives in 
Shanghai and Foochow. Finally, JM&Co. informed James Henty & Co. and Henty 
Learnmonth & Co. of the shipment of tea. The dashed lines equate to the assumed 
correspondence that would have existed.68 For the tea order to have occurred, these lines 
                                      
66 Letter from JM&Co. to James Henty & Co., 31 January 1861 Letters to Europe JMA C11/28. 
67 Bold purple lines represent the direction of indents for tea. The dashed blue lines show the movement 
of the tea as it travelled from Foochow to Portland. 
68 Records for these are not available. However, there is a fair indication of what transpired based on the 
analysis of other correspondence. 
Redfern Alexander
LONDON
Jardine Matheson & Co.
SHANGHAI
Jardine Matheson & Co
HONG KONG
Jardine Matheson & Co.
FOOCHOW
Henty Learnmonth & Co
PORTLAND
James Henty & Co
MELBOURNE
Indent for tea
Indent for tea Indent for tea
Sh
ipp
ing
 tea
 to 
Au
stra
lia
Shipping tea to Portland
 259 
of correspondence were essential. Most conversations were two-way, though there were 
some that only required notification of an action.  
 
Figure 5.8. Correspondence flow relating to Henty Learnmonth order.69 
 
 
There are a number of points that can be extracted from this example. Most important 
was that the initial drafts were drawn on London. Through that is the recognition that a 
three-way – tri-lateral – transaction existed. As with the United States involvement in 
the India-China-London triangle, there is a similar trait present involving Australian 
merchant firms. That is, the income from the sales of the tea would have been used in 
London to cover the purchases of other goods being sent to Australia and these goods 
could have originated from other countries, for example cotton from the United States. 
To a certain extent, RA&Co. was a clearing house, involved with and representing 
                                      
69 Bold red lines are the general correspondence between JM&Co. and other firms. The dotted purple line 
represents the communication by the Foochow representative of JM&Co. to Henty Learmonth & Co. 
about the teas. The dashed blue lines show the correspondence between RA&Co. and Henty Learmonth 
& Co. The black thin lines show the communication by JM&Co. with their representatives in Shanghai 
and Foochow regards the purchase of tea. 
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numerous companies around the world and, in doing so, created numerous trade 
triangles.  
 
Joint-account tea transactions 
 
The other method of payment and remittance was through the joint-account tea 
transactions. A Treaty Port merchant and an Australian merchant shared the costs, risks 
and financial results of the transactions. That is, instead of acting as a commission agent, 
the Treaty Port merchant was investing in shipments of tea to Australia. In the next few 
sections, I answer the questions of who was involved in joint-account tea transactions, 
how were the transactions completed, where were the remittances sent and why there, 
what problems occurred and how these were overcome and what benefits came to the 
parties that participated in the joint-account tea transactions. The ability for joint-
account transactions to be carried out requires specific levels of trust. A lengthy 
discussion of how trust and networks work with joint-account transactions is provided 
in Chapter 6. 
 
The idea of investing, or risk taking in merchanting, which according to N. S. Buck was 
ever-increasing by the mid-nineteenth century, was not unusual for Western merchants 
in China. 70  The reason, as Stephen Lockwood puts succinctly, was monetary. 
“Commission business for principals in the West … involved minimum risk for the 
house, but it also involved minimum control and minimum profits.”71 Thus houses 
including Augustine Heard & Co., Russell & Co. and JM&Co. viewed the opportunities 
of selling goods on their own accounts and risk. However, without control of the 
                                      
70 Norman S. Buck, The Development of the Organisation of Anglo-American Trade 1800-1850. New 
York: Greenwood Press, 1968: 129-31. Merchanting is the act of selling goods. 
71 Stephen C. Lockwood, Augustine Heard and Company, 1858-1862; American Merchants in China. 
Harvard East Asian Monographs. Cambridge, MA: East Asian Research Center, Harvard University, 
1971: 31. 
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external market, losses were common. To counter the risk, “joint-account shipping” was 
developed whereby costs and profits were shared as was the risk. Commissions were 
still applied individually. By the beginning of the 1860s, numerous houses commenced 
joint-account shipping with Australian companies. AH&Co. was a leading exponent in 
this type of trade from, at least, 1861.72 By 1870 their dealings of tea to Australia with F. 
Parbury & Co., of London, were on joint-account.73 JM&Co. were also involved in 
joint-account transactions from the beginning of the 1860s. 
 
The particular group of Australian merchants who became consignees for JM&Co. were 
those most trusted by JM&Co. The merchants were located in both Sydney and 
Melbourne. The house of Messr. Henry Moore had been transacting with JM&Co. well 
prior to 1860. A second firm were the agents for JM&Co in Sydney. During the 1860s 
and 1870s the agents were Thacker Daniell & Co. (1860-64), Daniell King & Co. 
(1864-71) and George King & Co. (1871-80). James Henty & Co. was the only firm in 
Melbourne taking part in joint-account transactions with JM&Co.  
 
Augustine Heard & Co. were involved in joint-account transactions with a number of 
firms in Australia. Wilkinson Brothers performed joint-account tea transactions until 
1866. Parbury Brothers, in Melbourne, began joint-account transactions in the 1860s. 
Their transactions were organised from London through the parent firm F. Parbury & 
Co. Other companies, connected to F. Parbury & Co. also worked similarly with 
AH&Co. 
 
Firms based in countries other than China or Australia were involved on the periphery 
of joint-account transactions. F. Parbury & Co., as mentioned above, were one example. 
                                      
72 Lockwood, Augustine Heard: 34. 
73 See the discussion in Letter from F. Parbury & Co. to AH&Co., 2 June 1871 FPC and Letter from 
AH&Co., to F. Parbury & Co., 29 July 1871 FPC. 
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Matheson & Co. and other London firms provided drafts and received remittances. The 
Calcutta, India firm Jardine Skinner & Co. were also important to the process of joint-
account transactions involving JM&Co. Their contribution to the transactions will be 
discussed in depth shortly. Jardine Skinner and JM&Co. were related, both through 
blood and in connection with the London firm Matheson & Co.74  
 
The processes 
 
The process of a joint-account tea transaction varied between being either simple or 
somewhat complex. The process included the purchase, payment and remittance stages. 
In most cases an indent was supplied to the Treaty Port merchant for tea. Some were 
sent directly from an Australian merchant. Other indents arrived from London firms on 
behalf of the Australian merchant. In other cases, the order was initiated from the 
merchant in China. Similar to the transactions described earlier, the Treaty Port 
merchant sourced the tea and delivered it to the Australian merchant. While the 
purchase stage was similar between joint-account transactions, the payment and 
remittance stages differed significantly. In the case of Parbury Brothers, the inclusion of 
the London firm assisted in simplifying the overall process. That was not the case for 
joint-account transactions between JM&Co. and James Henty & Co. The following 
examples will explain both the simple case (Parbury) and the complex (Henty) case.  
 
 
 
                                      
74 Robert Blake, Jardine Matheson: Traders of the Far East. London: Weidenfeld & Nicholson, 1999: 
118-19; Stanley D. Chapman, Merchant Enterprise in Britain: From the Industrial Revolution to World 
War I. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992: 114-15; Stephanie Jones, Merchants of the 
Raj: British Managing Agency Houses in Calcutta Yesterday and Today. London: Macmillan Press, 1992: 
12. 
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Figure 5.9. Process of a tea order between Parbury Brothers and Augustine Heard & Co., 
on joint account.75 
 
 
The Parbury Brothers tea transaction was organised by their agent in London, F. 
Parbury & Co. Prior to the season commencing, F. Parbury & Co. informed AH&Co. of 
the amount of money to be spent on tea purchases. If AH&Co. believed that the time 
was good for purchases, they drew up to the amount on F. Parbury & Co. in bank drafts 
in Hong Kong. Those drafts were then placed on credit to AH&Co. in Foochow where 
the teas were purchased. As a joint-account transaction, 75 per cent of the shipment was 
covered by F. Parbury & Co. and 25 per cent by AH&Co. The tea was then shipped to 
Melbourne or Sydney or both ports. When the tea was sold, Parbury Brothers remitted 
the sales amount to F. Parbury & Co. in the form of bank drafts. F. Parbury & Co. then 
placed 25 percent of the drafts into AH&Co.’s account. Lastly, F. Parbury & Co. 
honoured the drafts that AH&Co. drew on them for the tea purchase to the extent of the 
credit account.  
                                      
75 The red dashed lines show the movement of drafts. The blue solid line shows the tea shipment and the 
green dotted line, the drafts forwarded to Foochow by AH&Co. to pay for the tea. 
LONDON
F. Parbury & Co.
HONG KONG
Augustine Heard & Co.
FOOCHOW
Augustine Heard & Co.
MELBOURNE
Parbury Brothers
Drafts Drawn
Drafts 
Honoured
1/4 tea 
(Augustine Heard & 
Co.)
3/4 tea 
(F. Parbury)
Drafts 
Forwarded for 
tea purchase
Remit as 
Bank Drafts
 264 
Figure 5.10. Financial process for a typical James Henty & Co. order of tea from 
Jardine Matheson & Co., on joint account.76 
 
 
Figure 5.10 shows the financial process for a James Henty & Co. joint account tea 
transaction with JM&Co.77 The financial portion of the transaction brings together firms 
from four different countries. A multi-lateral trade arrangement existed involving China, 
India, Australia and the United Kingdom. Figure 5.10 provides a detailed description of 
this process. Included were the agent of JM&Co., that being Matheson & Co. of London. 
Also participating was Jardine Skinner & Co. of Calcutta. To explain the transaction 
more succinctly, Figure 5.10 adds the layer of the accounts between the different firms. 
From the drafts through the tea purchases and to the remittance, each is balanced within 
                                      
76 The dashed green lines show the entries into each of the account books for the various parts of the 
transactions. The solid purple lines show the movement of tea and gold. The dotted red lines show the 
drafts that were obtained from London and then paid to London. 
77 See Appendix 20 for an example of an Invoice with detailed explanation. 
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the various accounts.78 To take the mapping further, there would have been an account 
between Jardine Skinner & Co. and JM&Co. to cover the payments made to Jardine 
Skinner by Henty. The above diagram was closely replicated with the other trusted 
Australian merchants. However, it also can be extended to a complex set of accounts 
between firms such as James Henty & Co. when they imported tea on behalf of a 
number of other firms.79 
 
The movement of finances was primarily on paper, as described in Figure 5.10. The 
initial payment for the tea purchases was provided by a single draft or multiple drafts, 
each for six months, drawn by JM&Co. upon Matheson & Co. for Henty. These were 
then credited to Henty’s account with JM&Co. whereby Henty was requested to honour 
them at maturity.80 To counter the drawn drafts was Henty’s portion of the cost of the 
tea, nominally half the overall cost. Matheson & Co. then debited an account with 
Henty to the value of the drafts. It is important to note that the drafts were not drawn 
from London until after the tea was purchased.81 Thus, unlike the pre-payment drafts, 
JM&Co. used their own funds or bartering to purchase the tea from the Chinese 
merchants at Foochow, Canton or other venues. In doing this there was an element of 
risk present with the drafts. To mitigate the risk, the financial transactions were 
arranged on the basis of mutual and reciprocal trust. 
 
The sales of the tea were then remitted in various ways. One half was owed to JM&Co. 
as part of the joint-account and thus the value was debited by Henty for their account of 
                                      
78 The account for Matheson & Co. with James Henty & Co. will ostensibly be the same as that of James 
Henty & Co. with Matheson & Co. 
79 As an agent for JM&Co., Henty was also the pivot for financial transactions relating to a number of 
merchants both in Australia and New Zealand. 
80 Letter from JM&Co. to James Henty & Co., 10 July 1874 Letters to India JMA C10/63. 
81 In correspondence, JM&Co. would normally value a new draft on Matheson & Co. to pay for the goods 
purchased. See, for example: following the purchase of tea to be shipped per Maria Elizabeth on joint-
account in 1870, JM&Co. informed Henty that they had “valued on our London friends for an additional 
sum of £3000 with the equivalent of which we credit you at the exchange of 4/5¾ ..” Letter from JM&Co. 
to James Henty & Co., 7 March 1870 Letters to India JMA C10/60. 
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JM&Co. These remittances were fulfilled through the delivery of gold to Jardine 
Skinner & Co. When the tea was sold, or during the selling process, remittances of gold 
to Jardine Skinner & Co. would then be credited to the JM&Co. account with Henty.82 
To cover the Henty portion of the sales, an amount equivalent to the drafts would also 
be paid to Matheson & Co., thus balancing out the account with that firm. That amount 
would be subtracted from the overall receipts from Henty’s portion of the sales, thus 
leaving a profit or loss for Henty. 
 
The diagram of accounts in Figure 5.10 shows a set of triangles, each involving multiple 
companies and multiple countries. That between Matheson & Co, JM&Co. and James 
Henty is evident. The assumption of a direct connection between JM&Co. and Jardine 
Skinner creates a second triangle when James Henty is added. The line between JM&Co. 
and James Henty is the join of the two triangles that, in turn, creates an example of a 
multi-lateral trade arrangement. While this work is investigating individual companies 
as opposed to countries, it is not hard to draw comparisons with the multi-lateral trade 
that was created through numerous trade triangles as described by Hamashita. 
 
Gold to Calcutta 
 
Remittances from joint-account transactions were sent to London, India and Australia. 
In previous chapters and above, I have already discussed the remittances to London and 
Australia. The following section concentrates on the portion of joint-account 
transactions that were sent to India. Figure 5.10 showed that the portion of joint-account 
transactions belonging to JM&Co. was delivered in the form of gold to Jardine Skinner 
                                      
82 For example, see: “Messrs. Jardine Matheson & Co. in account with James Henty & Co.” 27 January 
1875 Current accounts: Australia JM A8/48/1. Within this six month period, there were two deliveries of 
gold to Calcutta – Nubia on 7 September and Ceylon on 30 December. 
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& Co. at Calcutta. How did the remittance travel to Calcutta and why was Calcutta 
chosen are two questions that arise from this discussion. 
 
The method of remittance for JM&Co.’s portion of joint-account transactions was 
through the delivery of gold bars to Calcutta. The remittances were part of a general 
movement of bullion to India.83 India had been on a monometallic silver currency since 
Lord Dalhousie demonetised the gold currency of India in 1853.84 For trade, silver had 
to travel a great distance and at a heavy cost. Henry Macleod, in his 1898 treatise on 
Indian currency stated 
That the exclusive Silver standard and Currency of India rendered direct trade 
with Australia and other Gold producing districts impossible, and forced a 
country with abundance of Gold to traverse half the globe in search for Silver 
before she could pay for our commodities.85 
 
 
However, Figure 5.11 shows that in the early years of the 1860s a large amount of gold 
was exported direct from Australia to India. It was part of a general increase in gold 
exports to India at that time.86 Thus, in 1864, an attempt was made to re-introduce gold 
sovereigns as legal currency.87 At the time, gold bars were already being used by some 
India merchants to counter the deficiency of silver. The Indian merchants, as explained 
by Macleod, were “using Gold bars stamped by the Bombay Banks as a circulating 
Medium.”88 While India continued to import gold, the 1864 proposal was quashed in 
                                      
83 It is important to note, though not calculable, that bullion was also sent to Galle with its final 
destination being India, the gold being transshipped at the Ceylonese port. This is not included in the 
Australian data. 
84 Marc Flandreau, and Kim Oosterlinck, "Was the Emergence of the International Gold Standard 
Expected? Evidence from Indian Government Securities." Journal of Monetary Economics 59, no. 7 
(2012): 651. 
85 Henry D. Macleod, Indian Currency. London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1898: 20. 
86 The total imports of gold in value went from £4 millions in 1860 to £7 millions in 1863 and to just 
under £10 millions in 1865. Statistical Tables relating to the Colonial and Other Possessions of the 
United Kingdom. (Parts VII, X, XI) 
87 There is no evidence of a connection between Australia’s large export of gold to India and the 
movement in 1864 to re-introduce gold currency. 
88 Macleod, Indian Currency: 21. A greater portion of these bars would have been minted in Sydney. 
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the UK Parliament.89 India, by the end of the nineteenth century, eventually worked 
with a Gold Standard Reserve which was based in London.90 
 
Figure 5.11. Value of gold imported into India from Australia (in £), 1860-1880.91 
 
 
Australia’s contribution to India’s importation of gold was very large for the years 1863 
to 1865. The Statistical Tables provided by the UK government show that a large 
amount was imported by the Presidency of Bengal. That included Calcutta as a main 
port for imports. The remainder, though small when compared to that for Bengal, was 
sent to the Presidency of Bombay. In the year ending 31 March 1863, just over 75% of 
the gold imported into Bengal was from Australia. Figure 5.11 shows that following 
1865 the amount of gold exported from Australia to India declined to an almost 
insignificant figure. For 1880, only £8,041 of gold travelled from Australian ports to 
                                      
89 Sashi Sivramkrishna, "India's Failed Transition to a Gold Currency in the 1860s." Economic & 
Political Weekly L, no. 4 (2015): 49-50. 
90 Pierre van der Eng, "The Silver Standard and Asia's Integration into the World Economy, 1850-1914." 
Review of Asian and Pacific Studies 18 (1999): 67; G. Findlay Shirras, Indian Finance and Banking. 
London: Macmillan & Co, 1919: 270-79. 
91 See Appendix 21 for data used. Obtained from Statistical Tables relating to the Colonial and Other 
Possessions of the United Kingdom. (Parts VII to XIV) and Statement of the Trade of British India and 
Foreign Countries for the Five Years (1869-70 to 1874-75 through to 1876-77 to 1880-81). The gold was 
primarily exported from Melbourne with a smaller portion from Sydney. 
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India.92 Australia, though, remained a key exporter of gold. Over £5 million of gold was 
exported to other countries in 1880. India’s desire for gold had also diminished. From a 
high of approximately £10 million in 1865, the arrivals of gold fell to between £1.5 
million and £2 million in value by the late 1870s.93 One reason for the fall in imports 
related to the downturn in the price and stability of silver.94 
 
There is one concern about the accuracy of the statistics for gold exports from Australia 
to India. For example, the Victoria total of gold exported to Calcutta in 1874 was 
£8,335.95 However, viewing the account statements between James Henty and JM&Co., 
there was £23,880 of gold made in four shipments throughout the year.96 The seemingly 
possible prognosis is that the gold shipments were recorded with a destination of Galle 
(Ceylon) instead of Calcutta.97 There was no direct steamer service to Calcutta. P&O 
mail steamers regularly travelled from Melbourne to Galle. From there a similar service 
provided the transshipment of gold to Calcutta.98 
 
The movement of specie and bullion throughout the Indian Ocean was never-ending. 
Attempting to analyse where Australian gold and silver went is difficult. As mentioned 
above, gold was delivered to Galle by P&O steamers from Melbourne. A portion of that 
gold was to be delivered to Jardine Skinner & Co. in Calcutta. The portion was 
                                      
92 Statement of the Trade of British India with British Possessions and Foreign Countries for the Five 
Years 1875-76 to 1879-80. London: G. E. Eyre and W. Spottiswoode, 1882: 22. 
93 Shirras, Indian Finance and Banking: 452-53. 
94 Arnold P. Kaminsky, ""Lombard Street" and India: Currency Problems in the Late Nineteenth 
Century." Indian Economic and Social History Review 17, no. 3 (1980): 307-09; A. G. Kenwood, and A. 
L. Lougheed, The Growth of the International Economy 1820-1960. London: George Allen & Unwin, 
1971: 120-21; Shirras, Indian Finance and Banking: 122 includes a table of the value of silver through 
the 1870s. 
95 SR VIC 1874: 68. 
96 “Messrs. Jardine Matheson & Co. in account with James Henty & Co.” 31 July 1874 Current accounts: 
Australia JM A8/48/1; “Messrs. Jardine Matheson & Co. in account with James Henty & Co.” 27 January 
1875 Current accounts: Australia JM A8/48/1. 
97 Noel Butlin, The Australian Monetary System 1851 to 1914. Sydney: J. F. Butlin, 1986: 52. 
98 Stephanie Jones, "British India Steamers and the Trade of the Persian Gulf, 1862-1914." The Great 
Circle 7, no. 1 (1985): 26. 
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transhipped from Galle to India.99 For merchants including Lowe Kong Meng, their 
gold was possibly transhipped straight to China on P&O steamers.100 For Chinese 
merchants, this method was considered safer than choosing the sailing vessel.101 It was 
also regulated in that the P&O vessels kept to a timetable and thus Chinese merchants in 
Australia and in Hong Kong knew when the gold would arrive in China. Further, mail 
relating to the gold shipment was on the P&O vessels.102 
 
I have previously shown that Gold was also shipped directly to China from Australia by 
Chinese. Figure 5.5 shows the amount of gold shipped direct to China from each of the 
three colonies, NSW, Victoria and Queensland. From the mid-1860s, merchants, such 
as Louis Ah Mouy, sent their gold to China via Galle instead of direct and thus there is 
a decline of direct shipments from Victoria. The increase in NSW is due to the 
development of the eastern route using E&A steamers. It is of note that although the 
E&A steamers travelled to and from Melbourne, the Chinese merchants continued to 
use the P&O service to Galle and Hong Kong instead.103 
                                      
99 Owing to the various mail contracts between Galle and Indian ports, including Calcutta, the gold was 
first unloaded from the vessel before being loaded onto whichever steamer was first to travel to the port 
of destination. The data from the Statistical Tables show a large amount of gold being shipped from 
Ceylon to India. Statistical Tables relating to the Colonial and Other Possessions of the United Kingdom. 
(Parts V to XVII). 
100 Unlike the transshipment from Galle to ports in India, the journey for the gold from Galle to Hong 
Kong was also by P&O vessel. That is, the gold shipments from Australia were moved from vessel to 
vessel without being unloaded. The data in the Statistical Tables show a negligent amount of gold being 
exported from either Ceylon or India to China. However, up to 1861, the Statistical Tables entry for Hong 
Kong provides the value of treasure (gold, silver and copper) that was imported from India to Hong Kong 
on P&O steamers. While that data stated “India,” I believe that a fair assumption can be made that, in fact, 
this was from Galle and not from India. There were no direct P&O routes from India to Hong Kong and 
the other data, as mentioned, would counter any argument of shipments of treasure from India to Hong 
Kong. Statistical Tables relating to the Colonial and Other Possessions of the United Kingdom. (Parts V 
to XVII). However, no assumptions can be made as to whether this was gold, silver or a combination of 
the two.  
101 Steamers offered a safer route when travelling to China as vessels were able to outrun pirates as well 
as navigate tricky passages. 
102 Mail from the ports of Sydney and Melbourne was sent via the P&O steamers as it was quicker and 
more secure. It is important to note that, at the time, Westerners sent two copies of the same letter, on two 
different vessels. This method of redundancy covered any possibility of loss of the first letter sent. The 
second, or “Press Copy,” was normally hand-written on a poorer quality paper or a pressed copy through 
a device to create such copies. 
103 There is a possibility that the shipping rates were less for transport by P&O as opposed to E&A. Ah 
Mouy continued to transport gold via Galle up until 1880. 
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Figure 5.12. Triangle of Trade: Jardine Matheson & Co. using the sale of tea in 
Australia to assist with the purchasing of goods from India. 
 
 
The shipments that were completed by the Australian European merchants were based 
on the ability to frequently deliver the gold to Calcutta. This depended on the regular 
mail steamer service of P&O which ran between Galle and Australia. However, unlike 
the clearing of drafts where payment was made upon final sales, the Australian 
merchants would submit part-payments in gold at regular intervals. 104  Smaller 
shipments of gold bars were easier to create through the Mint where only a portion of 
the gold was moulded into bars, the remainder primarily for coinage.105 Transporting a 
                                      
104 For example, James Henty & Co. submitted one box of gold, each on three occasions during the 
second half of 1871 – 15 July, 9 October and 6 November. “Messrs. Jardine Matheson & Co. in account 
with James Henty & Co.” 1 January 1872 Current accounts: Australia JM A8/48/1 
105 Except for the period 1862-64, gold bars only account for between 1% and 4% of total minted gold for 
the period 1860-1870. “Enclosure 1. Return of the Quantity and Value of Gold received for Coinage at 
the Sydney Branch of the Royal Mint, of the Gold Coin and Gold Bars issued therefrom, and of the 
Revenue derived from Mint Charges &c., from the opening of the Mint on the 14th May 1855 to the 31st 
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continuous supply of small quantities allowed for improved speculation on the part of 
Jardine Skinner in the Calcutta silver market.106 However, if the shipments were held 
back in Australia, JM&Co. complained that the interest on the tea shipments through 
the drafts was being lost, such was the small gain from the silver sales.107 
 
The decision to use Jardine Skinner & Co. as an intermediary in the tea transactions 
with a select group of Australian merchants was one based on financial imperatives. For 
JM&Co., the movement of gold to pay for the tea allowed the Hong Kong firm to create 
a debit in an account with their Calcutta counterparts. It assisted in maintaining a 
trading avenue between Hong Kong and Calcutta for the movement of such goods 
including cotton and opium. Further, it allowed for JM&Co. and Jardine Skinner & Co. 
to take advantage of business opportunities through trading on the Calcutta silver 
market.108 Figure 5.12 demonstrates the movement of commodities for the connection 
involving Jardine Skinner & Co.  
 
A few Chinese merchants in Australia had strong connections in India. Lowe Kong 
Meng, for example, only returned to Australia in 1853 when his close friends in 
                                                                                                                
December 1870. Second Annual Report of the Deputy Master of the Mint. 1871 HoC, no. C.552 (1872) 
London: G.E. Eyre and W. Spottiswoode, 1872: 63. 
106 Based on the Statistical Tables there appears to be a significant amount of gold entering the Indian 
market. Gold was not a viable currency for standard transactions, though it was available for conversion 
into silver. Statistical Tables relating to the Colonial and Other Possessions of the United Kingdom. 
(Parts V to XVII). 
107 Letter from JM&Co. to Daniell King & Co., 25 July 1867 Letters to India JMA C10/57. 
108 In an alternative version, Andrew Pope states: “The trading firm Jardine, Skinner and Co. engaged, 
amongst other trades, in shipping tea from China to the Australian colonies. The tea was paid for in gold, 
both bars and sovereigns. The gold, however, was not shipped from Australia to China as a simple bi-
lateral settlement, rather, it was shipped to India where Jardine, Skinner and Co. generally sold it to local 
gold dealers. The rupee proceeds of the sales were used to buy opium in India, which was, in turn, 
shipped to China and traded for tea, and so the cycle continued.” Pope’s version was developed from 
viewing the evidence presented by Claud Hamilton of the firm Jardine Skinner & Co., 20 February 1866 
and reproduced in the Mansfield Commission Report, vol. 2: 29. Andrew Pope, "Precious Metals Flow in 
the Indian Ocean in the Colonial Period: Australian Gold to India, 1866-1914." In Evolution of the World 
Economy, Precious Metals and India, edited by John McGuire, Patrick Bertola and Peter Reeves. 155-78. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001: 158. It is unknown why Hamilton would state this when it was 
obviously incorrect and why Hamilton would not mention JM&Co. in his evidence. 
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Calcutta advised him to.109 Thus, there is every possibility that the gold, or a portion of 
it, sent by Meng to Galle was then delivered to his associates in India. Those associates, 
similar to Jardine Skinner & Co., converted the gold into goods such as opium and 
cotton for transportation to Hong Kong. Meng was known as an importer of opium into 
Australia, sometimes as part of clandestine shipments.110 Thus, the opium may have 
originated from India, paid for through Meng’s shipment of gold to India and using 
Hong Kong as a transshipment point prior to delivery to Australian ports. 
 
The preference of Jardine Skinner was to have the gold shipped from Australia in bars 
so that it could be easily sold. The other option, specie (or coinage), was considered 
hard to pass within the markets of India given the fact India was on a mono-metallic 
silver currency at the time. The gold bars were sold for silver Rupees (Rp). The Rupees 
were then credited “in account of the Government Debenture originally deposited as 
security for the execution of the tea contract.”111 Yet, it was also only sold when the 
silver market was favourable. In early 1863 Jardine Skinner informed JM&Co. that they 
were retaining the gold from sale “in view of a better price shortly.”112 The poor 
exchange would have been exacerbated by the glut of imported gold at that time (see 
Figure 5.11). Such was the concern of obtaining the optimum value from the sales in 
Calcutta that JM&Co. requested of Henty “that it would frequently prove of service to 
telegraph to them advice of your gold missions in order that they may take advantage of 
any prospective changes in their market to sell to arrive as desirable.”113 “Them” was 
Jardine Skinner and the service would have proved quite profitable. However, the 
                                      
109 Macgregor, "Lowe Kong Meng and Chinese Engagement”. 
110 Argus 16 September 1863: 4. Kong Meng & Co. was the consignee for shipments from the Jack Frost 
and Kingfisher. Boxes labeled as “dirt” in Chinese characters held large quantities of opium. The 
estimated value of duties that were about to be bypassed was at least £3,000. 
111 Letter from JM&Co. to Jardine Skinner & Co., 20 August 1869 Letters to India JMA C10/59. 
112 Letter from JM&Co. to Jardine Skinner & Co., 17 April 1863 Letters to India JMA C10/55. 
113 Letter from JM&Co. to James Henty & Co., 18 October 1869 Letters to India JMA C10/59. 
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request was made in 1869 prior to the telegraph being connected between Australia and 
Asia. 
 
The quality of the gold was of importance and caused problems. Gold was initially cast 
into specie and bars solely at the Royal Mint in Sydney. In 1872, the Melbourne branch 
of the Royal Mint opened.114 Commonly gold was mixed with copper to increase 
hardness. With pure gold set at 24 carats, the combination with copper alloy at the time 
for coins was 22 carats.115 This was also translated to the casting of gold bars.116 Some 
native Indian merchants, in the early 1860s, found the quality unacceptable and thus 
bought the bars at a lower cost to that of a more pure variety.117 In 1860 the general sale 
was at Rs. 15/1 per tolah but, with some containing copper alloy, perhaps too much, 
                                      
114 H. C. Bolton, and N. H. Williams, "Weighing and Assay in the Early Days of the Melbourne Branch 
of the Royal Mint." Historical Records of Australian Science 14 (2002-03): 47. Copy of Captain Ward’s 
report on the Mint at Sydney, presented to the legislature in January 1860. HoC, no. 358 (1860) C. 
Fortescue. Colonial Office, 5 June 1860: 6. 
115 Bolton, and Williams, “Weighing and Assay”: 48. A carat (or karat) is a measure of the fineness or 
purity of gold. It is measured as a 24th of the percentage such that 24 carat = 100% fineness and 22 carat 
lies between 22/24 and 23/24 or 91.66% to 95.83%. Donald Clark, "Jewelry Metals 101: Gold, Silver, 
and Platinum."  (2017). https://www.gemsociety.org/article/fundametals-jewelery-metals-overview/. 
(cited 5 October 2017). 
116 Though the gold bar was termed and accepted as the “gold of commerce,” that minted in the Sydney 
Royal Mint was inferior in fineness to that from the Royal Mint in London. The silver alloy portion was, 
legally, approximately 6.3% of the total of each bar with 2% allowable of another alloy, mostly copper. 
For the Sydney Royal Mint, the cost to transport the materials for processing the gold, namely the 
chemicals, to Australia was exorbitant and thus the Australians were left with a stronger mix of silver 
alloy. Further, that amount varied with the origin of the gold. That from Victoria was more fine than from 
NSW with Queensland extractions the least fine, containing over the legal level of silver in the gold 
mined. When the gold arrived in Sydney it was mixed together to bring the silver alloy amount as close as 
possible to the 6.3% level. The English gold minted, though, was of a purer amount, the silver being 
leeched out of the gold. Later in the 1860s new technologies were developed by one of the Sydney 
assayers, Francis Miller, which allowed for the extraction and refinements of the silver alloy. At the 
commencement of the 1870s, the improvements meant that Australian minted gold was finally accepted 
by the British government to be used as currency in England. Report from the Select Committee on the 
Sydney Branch Mint; together with the proceedings of the committee, minutes of evidence, appendix, and 
index. HoC, no. 421 (1862) 17 July 1862: xvii, 2-5; Francis. B. Miller, "On Gold Refining by Chlorine 
Gas." Transactions of the Royal Society of New South Wales 3 (1869): 158. Victorian gold was at 23 
carats (96% gold), NSW gold was 22 carats 1 7/8  grain (93.5% gold), Queensland was 21 carats (87¼ 
gold) with as far north as Maryborough at only 85% of gold. The percentage of gold is also called “touch.” 
Thus, Victorian gold was “96 touch.”; David Collins, "The First Chemists an Australian Chronicle Part 
5." Chemistry in Australia 77, no. 7 (2010): 12-16; For the paper on the process, see: Miller, "On Gold 
Refining by Chlorine Gas."; Fourth Annual Report of the Deputy Master of the Mint. 1871. House of 
Commons, no. C.1016 (1874) London: G.E. Eyre and W. Spottiswoode, 1874: 5. 
117 The fact that native Indian merchants were attempting at sourcing purer gold suggests that the gold 
was not then used for bartering but for either some method of adornment or as part of a wealth storage. 
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they were bought for only Rs. 14/15.118 In another shipment, of 1862, the gold was 
found inferior and “sold for one anna per sicca weigh.” From that, Jardine Skinner had 
recommended the bars to be “from 22½ to 23¾ carat instead of one uniform standard of 
22 carat.”119 Further complaints related to the origin of the gold where, as early as 1860, 
the finer quality from Melbourne was found preferable to that of Sydney.120 However, 
as the bars were minted in Sydney, and to the specifications of that Mint, the option of 
choosing solely the better quality gold from Victoria did not exist. Silver became the 
alloy of choice by the Indian buyers and, after the Sydney Mint commenced charging 
“for all silver over and above two per cent contained in gold bars,” Jardine Skinner 
offered other options. A suggestion was made to Daniell King & Co. of Sydney to 
submit a shipment where one half was of gold bars alloyed with silver and the other 
with “2 per cent silver & copper,” to allow the market in Calcutta to be tested.121 
 
The drop in exports of gold from Australia to India at the end of the 1870s was related 
to the fall in the prices of silver. The exchange rate for selling gold for silver made 
transactions unprofitable. Merchants, such as JM&Co., explored other options. JM&Co. 
advised their Australian agencies to make alternate arrangements for remittances. 
The course of exchange between HongKong and Calcutta having becoming very 
adverse we have decided that, for the next four months it will be more 
advantageous that you should remit our friends in London in first class drafts 
instead of continuing shipments of gold to Messrs. Jardine Skinner & Co.122 
 
                                      
118 Letter from JM&Co. to James Henty & Co., 26 August 1860 Letters to Europe JMA C11/28. The 
tolah were a silver rupee coin initially issued by the BEIC in India.) 
119 Letter from JM&Co. to Thacker Daniell & Co., 26 May 1862 Letters to Europe JMA C11/30. 
120 Letter from JM&Co. to Thacker Daniell & Co., 27 October 1860 Letters to Europe JMA C11/28. 
Melbourne related to gold from Victorian mines and Sydney to finds in NSW. 
121 Letter from Daniell King & Co. to JM&Co., 30 December 1870 Correspondence: Business Letters: 
Australasia JMA B6/3. There was no further correspondence on this matter. At that time, the export duty 
on gold differed between NSW (1s. 6d.) and Victoria (1s.) per ounce. Customs tariffs (colonies). Return 
of the changes made in the customs tariffs of Her Majesty’s possessions abroad (in continuation of 
Parliamentary Paper, no. 560, of session 1864). HoC, no. 419 (1867) C. B. Adderley. Colonial Office, 2 
July 1867: 42, 44. 
122 Letter from JM&Co. to James Henty & Co., 12 June 1879 Letters to India JMA C10/65. 
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The letter was a confirmation of a telegram, dated 7 June 1879, from JM&Co. that 
instructed James Henty to “make all remittances on your account to Messrs. Matheson 
& Co. by drafts on London until otherwise instructed.”123 Further, to improve the 
movement of finances and owing to the downturn in London, Henty chose to submit 
direct to JM&Co. a large pre-payment draft on the Bank of Australasia to cover a 
number of indents, both from Henty and from others through Henty.124 However, the 
depression on tea prices matched with the lack of money for purchases and speculative 
decisions meant that the tea markets suffered.125 Thus, the number of indents for tea 
diminished towards the end of the 1870s. The lack of purchases in the latter 1870s was 
another reason for the general downturn of Victorian imports of tea, as shown in Figure 
5.1. 
  
Factors relating to joint-account transactions 
 
The process of generating a joint shipment of tea between a western merchant house in 
China and one in Australia during the 1860s and 1870s had a number of benefits for 
both parties. The gains for both sides came most commonly through the transaction 
charges, especially freight, which were split between the two parties. The insurance was 
not only divided evenly but was also sometimes with two different offices, the 
Australians choosing to insure through England or an Australian firm while JM&Co. 
used the Canton Insurance Office.126 The fact that the shipment was joint meant that 
                                      
123 Letter from James Henty & Co. to JM&Co., 11 June 1879 Correspondence: Business Letters: 
Australasia JMA B6/3. 
124 Letter from James Henty & Co. to JM&Co., 22 March 1879 Correspondence: Business Letters: 
Australasia JMA B6/3. The draft was for £15,000. 
125 Letter from George King & Co. to JM&Co., 19 April 1879 Correspondence: Business Letters: 
Australasia JMA B6/3. 
126 In 1863, for example, Thacker Daniell & Co., of Sydney, organised for their half-share of insurance be 
directed to Matheson & Co. in London to organise. This was common also with James Henty. An 
example of a Thacker Daniell transaction:  Letter from JM&Co. to Thacker Daniell & Co., 31 October 
1863 Letters to India JMA C10/55; Invoice for 8206 packages of tea per Brunswark, 27 October 1863  
for Thacker Daniell & Co., JMA A6/14. 
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each firm trusted the other to do the best for the combined interests. The purchase was 
of best quality and of the best price with the cheapest and fastest freight. Further, 
advantage was always taken of the exchange rates for conversion of pounds sterling to 
dollars and taels. Finally, in Australia, the sales were assumed to be at the optimum 
price. The Hong Kong merchant knew that the best profit was obtained for the parcel.  
 
The shipments were generated based on the information available to the Treaty Port 
merchant. That information was composed of a number of attributes and was delivered 
through correspondence and reports. The movement of vessels from China to Australia 
was keenly recorded, predominantly for insurance purposes. The records furnished a 
picture of the size of the freights heading to individual Australian ports. 127 The 
quantitative information was complemented with a qualitative analysis by the 
Australian partner within the joint account transaction. The Australian merchant 
provided market advice as well as any other factors affecting the market. These 
included political decisions relating to taxes, levies and duties that were found to hinder 
a profitable sale or where an unfortunate event could be exploited. Put together, this 
knowledge allowed for the Hong Kong merchant to make a business judgement relating 
to the ability of a shipment to gain acceptance in the foreign market. 
 
In the 1860s, overcoming distance created delays in the transfer of information. The 
time for a message to arrive and the reply to be available to the original sender was up 
to four months. When the telegraph from Galle to China was installed, messages 
                                      
127 The China-based merchant houses provided their own circulars which detailed this information. Thus, 
the size and number of shipments and their destinations were well documented for tea. See, for example, 
Prices Current AH P945 Cartons 31-33; Prices Current, Melbourne JM G5 and Prices Current and 
Market Reports, Australia JM G6. 
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travelled by steamer from Australia to Galle and then by telegraph to Hong Kong.128 
That reduced the time taken for transfer of information to a few weeks. Australia was 
connected by telegraph to Asia in 1872.129 The telegraph improved communication 
significantly, though it was extremely expensive despite the creation of codes to 
abbreviate the messages.130 Thus letters remained the primary focus of communication 
between Australia and China. The delays created uncertainty for the Treaty Port 
merchants as to the accuracy and relevance of market advices. The delays also hindered 
opportunities to take advantage of favourable markets. When permission from the 
Australian merchant was required prior to proceeding with a purchase, any delay meant 
opportunities could be lost. 
 
The information gathered by the China-based merchants allowed for informed decision 
making. Compiling and evaluating both an understanding of the aspects of the 
Australian markets together with the knowledge of the amount of tea that had departed 
for the Colonies, the merchant in China was in a strong position to understand how any 
new parcel of tea would perform in and react with those markets. The decision-making 
most often related to secondary and later indents during each tea season. It was unusual 
that a first indent, made at the opening of the tea season, would have been held back 
owing to either an excess in deliveries to or an excess of warehoused stock at the 
Australian market.131 The despatching of the first teas to Australia, as with the old tea 
                                      
128 The connection between China and the UK, via India, commenced in 1871. Ariane Knuesel, "British 
Diplomacy and the Telegraph in Nineteenth-Century China." Diplomacy & Statecraft 18, no. 3 (2007): 
523. 
129 Peter Putnis, "The Early Years of International Telegraphy in Australia: A Critical Assessment." 
Media International Australia, Incorporating Culture & Policy no. 129 (2008): 140. See also Chapter 2 
for a discussion of the effect of steamers. 
130 Putnis, "The Early Years”: 145. JM&Co. and a number of Australian merchants created codes to work 
with. Luke Trainor, British Imperialism and Australian Nationalism: Manipulation, Conflict and 
Compromise in the Late Nineteenth Century. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1994: 51. 
Rates into Australia were 10s. per word in the 1870s, as opposed to 2½s. per word for messages from 
NSW to elsewhere in Australia or New Zealand.  
131 Stocks always existed, unsold and in the warehouses, and thus first indents could, and did, reach 
markets in Australia which were still struggling to clear the previous year’s teas. In 1871, F. Parbury & 
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races to London, was of importance to obtain the best price in Australia.132 Commonly, 
there were only two shipments per season to the merchants in Australia. Yet, in some 
seasons the second shipment was held back while in others multiple shipments were 
expected and sold in an encouraging market. The decision making process altered with 
specialised teas, especially Hyson Skin and other green varieties. The Australian 
markets were rarely over-stocked and it was more the timing to fit with the desires of 
the consumers that generated shipments of these specialised varieties of teas. Thus, a 
China-based merchant was more attuned to following through on an indent for green tea 
or fine teas than they would for the normal indents of Congou teas.  
 
The factors affecting the speculation by Australian merchants varied. The information 
passed on from Australia provided details of how the market was reacting to teas as well 
as any surrounding determinants.133 The effect of monetary flow, for example, clearly 
altered the way speculators in Australia proceeded with their purchases. In 1879 a 
shortage of money at the banks meant that these same banks commenced requests on 
their debtors to clear their accounts, a number of these being Australian merchants who 
had imported tea. Thus, the price of tea dropped quickly as the parcels were sold to 
cover the bank drafts now being called.134 That information reached China and the 
result was indents being denied under the belief that the tea would be hard to sell, for a 
                                                                                                                
Co. requested of AH&Co to hold off on the new season’s teas so as to allow for the old stock to be 
cleared. Letter from F. Parbury & Co. to AH&Co., 3 May 1871 FPC. This choice was rare as the old 
stock was generally saleable, whether after all the new stock was cleared, when there was a gap in 
delivery and a need for saleable stock or solely for a lower price than what the market was offering. 
Generally, new stock was preferred. 
132 Initially the first sailing ship to arrive attained an advantage. In 1874, it became a race between two 
steamers – the E&A Legislator and the Amoy. “The Tea Race.” SMH 23 July 1874: 4. That race was 
considered a draw as “honours are divided.” The Legislator arrived in Sydney first and Melbourne second 
and the Amoy arrived in Melbourne first and Sydney second. The Amoy travelled around Cape Leeuwin. 
133 Numerous circulars and hand-written pamphlets were sent to China from Australia explaining the 
situation of tea importations. One group of documents detailed periodically the situation regards the 
forwarding of tea to New Zealand from 1860 to 1862, the period of the initial gold rush in the South 
Island. See the documents within Prices Current, Melbourne JM G5 and Prices Current and Market 
Reports, Australia JM G6. 
134 Letter from George King & Co. to JM&Co., 19 April 1879 Correspondence: Business Letters: 
Australasia JMA B6/3. Parcels were lots that included either packets, chests or half-chests of tea. 
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decent profit.135 Another, though unusual, effect was that of a disaster to a vessel on its 
journey to Australia. When the Hindoo was lost with its load of fine teas in 1871, the 
Melbourne market suffered, being “bare” of such teas. Henty informed JM&Co. 
immediately of the proposition of taking advantage of the loss to obtain a new shipment 
of fine teas for sale in the Melbourne markets.136 One other was an understanding of the 
variance of the price of teas available for purchase in China. The speculation for 
obtaining a profit required not only an estimation of the market the teas were arriving in 
but also the initial cost in Foochow and other ports of purchase.  
 
Sugar for the tea 
 
Tea and sugar were almost inseparable both for the consumer and also as products 
conveyed to Australia from Chinese ports. Sugar was mainly imported from Mauritius 
and Manila while plantations were appearing in Queensland and New South Wales.137 
In the early 1860s, JM&Co. was involved in assisting with shipments of sugar from 
Manila through their agent there, A. Barretto & Co. The Hong Kong firm chartered a 
vessel for delivery to Manila prior to it sailing for Australia with a cargo of sugar and 
other goods.138 The position for JM&Co. was to assist with the purchases, primarily in 
providing the drafts under the Australian merchant’s name and thus as part of their 
account with JM&Co.139 As the Hong Kong firm stated that there was no profit for them 
and little or no commission either, the venture was short lived with only a few parcels 
                                      
135 Letter from JM&Co. to Messrs. Unmack Heussler & Co., 5 August 1879 Letters to India JMA C10/66. 
136 Letter from James Henty & Co. to JM&Co., 22 April 1871 Correspondence: Business Letters: 
Australasia JMA B6/3. 
137 Barry Higham, "The Regional Impact of the Sugar Industry of New South Wales, 1870-1912." 
Australian Geographical Studies 6 (1968): 43-58; Peter Griggs, "The Decline of Competition: The 
Emergence of a Duopoly in the Australian Sugar Refinery Sector, 1841-1915." Australian Geographer 32, 
no. 3 (2001): 359-76; A. C. Hannah, and Donald Spence, The International Sugar Trade. Cambridge, 
UK: Woodhead Publishing, 1996: 13-14. 
138 Letter from JM&Co. to Thacker Daniell & Co., 25 June 1861 Letters to Europe JMA C11/29. 
139 Letter from JM&Co. to Thacker Daniell & Co., 31 October 1861 Letters to Europe JMA C11/29. 
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of sugar using JM&Co. as an intermediary.140 However, during its brief existence, a 
separate, small trade triangle existed. 
 
The proposition of assisting with the shipping of refined sugar to Australia direct from 
China re-emerged for JM&Co. in the late 1860s. A new company had formed in Hong 
Kong, the China Sugar Refinery. Messrs. Wahee Smith & Co. were the initial 
proprietors.141 In mid-1869 a trial shipment of 2,400 bags was delivered from Hong 
Kong to JM&Co.’s trusted agents, Daniell King & Co. in Sydney and James Henty & 
Co. in Melbourne.142 JM&Co. stated that they wanted to introduce Wahee Smith & Co. 
to prospective Australian traders and that JM&Co. had little interest in developing a 
sugar trade from China to Australia.143 The initial shipments were provided by JM&Co. 
on their own account and risk. The remittance from the sales was made as a box of gold 
bars to Jardine Skinner in Calcutta with a pro-forma draft on London sent to JM&Co. to 
pay for the goods. When, in 1872, the number of orders exceeded the capabilities of 
Wahee Smith & Co. and the company appeared to teeter on liquidation, JM&Co. 
stepped in to assist.144  
 
 
 
 
 
                                      
140 Letter from JM&Co. to James Henty & Co., 25 April 1862 Letters to Europe JMA C11/30. 
141 “The Sugar Refinery at East Point.” The Hong Kong Daily Press 30 December 1869: 2; Carl T. Smith, 
Chinese Christians: Elites, Middlemen, and the Church in Hong Kong. Hong Kong: Hong Kong 
University Press, 1985: 50; Shinya Sugiyama, "Marketing and Competition in China, 1895-1932: The 
Taikoo Sugar Refinery." In Commercial Networks in Modern Asia, edited by Shinya Sugiyama and Linda 
Grove. 140-58. Richmond, UK: Curzon, 2001: 152. The date of commencement is unknown. Smith does 
not supply a date, but believes it to be prior to December, 1869. Shinya Sugiyama offers that its 
liquidation in May 1928 was “after sixty-one years of operation,” thus alluding to a commencement 
between 1867 and 1869.  
142 Letter from JM&Co. to Daniell King & Co., 13 May 1869 Letters to India JMA C10/59; Letter from 
JM&Co. to James Henty & Co., 13 May 1869 Letters to India JMA C10/59. 
143 Letter from JM&Co. to Daniell King & Co., 7 March 1871 Letters to India JMA C10/60. 
144 Letter from JM&Co. to George King & Co., 5 July 1872 Letters to India JMA C10/62. 
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Figure 5.13. China Sugar Refinery, located at East Point, Causeway Bay, Hong Kong 
Island.145 
 
 
The China Sugar Refinery (Figure 5.13) recovered within just a few months. A Mr. 
Dickie took over as manager and JM&Co. became a significant partner in the new 
enterprise.146 In an initial shipment of sugars to Australia from the new company, 
JM&Co. requested that, to assist with getting the trade active again, a minimal 
commission be afforded on both sides, Hong Kong and Australia. The shipments 
continued on JM&Co.’s account and risk with the Australian merchant as the 
commission agent receiving and selling the consignments of sugar. Further, the 
remittances were, again, to be in the form of bars of gold and sent to Jardine Skinner in 
Calcutta for JM&Co. on the account of the China Sugar Refinery.147 Small parcels of 
sugar continued to be sent to Australia, though competition with the local refineries 
                                      
145 Arnold Wright, ed. Twentieth Century Impressions of Hong Kong. Singapore: Graham Brash, 1908: 
236. From Hong Kong Memory Project No. WL-HIS-014a. 
146 Sugiyama, “Marketing and Competition”: 140. JM&Co. were owners until 1928. 
147 Letter from JM&Co. to George King & Co., 4 October 1872 Letters to India JMA C10/62. JM&Co. 
was specific in requesting that the sugar remittances should be separate to those for tea. It leaves a slight 
question mark over exactly how sizeable was JM&Co.’s involvement in the company. 
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became a concern.148 By the mid-1870s, interest in Chinese sugar increased. California 
was also another major importer of Hong Kong sugar and thus placed an additional 
burden on the refinery.149 The China Sugar Refinery was struggling to keep up with 
requests and that limited the number of parcels sent to Australia.150 Exportation of sugar 
continued on JM&Co’s account for the remainder of the 1870s. The sugar shipments 
supplemented the floundering Australian tea trade towards the end of the 1870s. 
Remittances continued to be made in boxes of gold from Australia to Calcutta per 
JM&Co., yet separate of the remittances for tea. However, as per that for tea in the late 
1870s, the process of using Calcutta for remittances was terminated and drafts were 
thereafter sent direct to London.  
 
The importation of sugar from China into Australia fluctuated throughout the 1860s and 
1870s. The trade suffered from severe competition with other exporting countries and 
refineries in Australia. Figure 5.14 shows an initial importation of sugar from Hong 
Kong and China for the opening years of the 1860s. These initial imports may be 
accounted for by shipments from Manilla travelling to Australia via Hong Kong. This 
was followed by the lapse of half a decade prior to returning as an import industry. 
Imports were only received in Sydney and Melbourne. The re-emergence of the imports 
in 1868-69 matches with the development of the China Sugar Refinery and the 
involvement of Jardine Matheson & Co. Further, the takeover by JM&Co. in 1872 
mirrors the large increase in imports to Australia in that year from China, as does the 
decrease in 1876 when the refinery was overloaded with requests. Notwithstanding, 
JM&Co. was involved throughout with the transport of sugar from China to Australia 
and the use of Jardine Skinner & Co. in Calcutta for the payment of remittances. The 
                                      
148 Letter from JM&Co. to James Henty & Co., 7 September 1875 Letters to India JMA C10/64. 
149 Sinn, Pacific Crossing: 146. 
150 Letter from George King & Co. to JM&Co., 11 July 1876 Correspondence: Business Letters: 
Australasia JMA B6/3; Letter from JM&Co. to George King & Co., 11 September 1876 Letters to India 
JMA C10/64. 
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investment of these sugars in the Australian markets was purely for the benefit of the 
Hong Kong firm with the Australian agents only receiving a commission for their part 
in disposing of the product.151 
 
Figure 5.14. Sugar imports from China and Hong Kong to Australia, 1860-1880.152 
 
 
Concluding comments 
 
The importation of tea into Australia existed within a multi-lateral trade arrangement 
involving merchant houses in Australia, China, England and India. Its complexity was 
created by the requirement to employ various methods of remittance. Four methods of 
tea transactions have been investigated in this chapter. The simplest methods were 
bartering, submitting drafts from Australia and using a London firm to submit drafts on 
behalf of Australian firms. The more complex method was the joint-account transaction. 
                                      
151 There is another possible connection worth mentioning in passing. The China Sugar Refinery required 
coal, most presumably coking coal, to refine the sugar. In 1880, the refinery used 18,000 tons of coal. 
Thus, there is possibility that coal from Sydney sent to Hong Kong may easily have been for the refinery. 
See n.14 Shannon R. Brown, and Tim Wright, "Technology, Economics, and Politics in the 
Modernization of China's Coal-Mining Industry, 1850-1895." Explorations in Economic History 18 
(1981): 62. 
152 Data obtained from various Australian colonial statistical tables. See Appendix 22 for a summary of 
the data. 
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For each, the purchase stage of tea was similar. The financial arrangements were quite 
different. The arrangements regularly involved merchants located in ports of countries 
other than China or Australia. Thus, it was not uncommon that the financial portion of a 
transaction included the use of financial instruments such as drafts to allow for further 
transactions relating to a third or fourth country’s products. 
 
The variance towards tri-lateral or multi-lateral arrangements was common practice 
with Australian merchant houses and a number of China-based Western houses. The 
importation of tea from China into Australia provided an opportunity for the usage of 
post-transaction drafts or other remittance methodologies to create finances for the 
movement of gold, opium, cotton and other goods. It created a multi-lateral trade 
arrangement that continued throughout the period of the 1860s and 1870s. 
 
To a lesser extent, the Chinese merchants in Australian ports were also involved in the 
tea trade. Most Chinese merchants initially imported tea and other products for the 
Chinese workers. When the restrictive immigration policies of the individual colonies 
created a decline in the Chinese population in Australia, these Chinese merchants turned 
towards also servicing the European population. Merchants, including Lowe Kong 
Meng and Louis Ah Mouy are examples of this change. Meng and Ah Mouy also sent 
gold to Galle regularly to pay for their imports from Hong Kong to Australia. The 
possibility that a portion of the gold was delivered to India to pay for opium sent to 
Hong Kong and then to Australia cannot be discounted. Both Meng and Ah Mouy, 
amongst other merchants, were thus part of the growing multi-lateral trade that included 
India, China and Australia. They were part of a large exportation of gold out of 
Australia. That exportation also included smaller Chinese merchant houses in various 
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ports throughout colonial Australia who traded gold to Hong Kong for various products 
including tea and opium. 
 
Two of the leading Western firms, located in China, JM&Co. and AH&Co., became 
part of joint-account exportations of tea to Australia and, in the former’s case, own-
account shipments of sugar. They chose trusted Australian merchant houses and 
developed close relationships with them, using these houses as commission agents. 
These trust relationships will be dealt with, more comprehensively, in the following 
chapter. For JM&Co., remittances from Australia were completed by the continuous 
freightage of gold to their partner in Calcutta, Jardine Skinner & Co. In doing so, these 
two merchant houses together with their counterparts in Australia created a triangle of 
trade. That continued until the exchange between silver and gold became too unrealistic 
for that methodology of remittance to continue. Otherwise, drafts were either sent or 
drawn on London, through one of its international banking companies. Thus, the trade 
relationship that was created extended to England. For the tea trade, this extension 
verified Australia’s place within the global, multilateral trade and financial realms. 
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CHAPTER 6 
 
TIES AND TRUST 
 
During the 20th century, merchants located in the Chinese ports and in the colonial 
Australian ports developed networks that were fundamental to their ability to reduce 
transaction costs which, at the same time, created mutually beneficial relationships that 
promoted trust. For the 1860s and 1870s, when trade between Chinese and Australian 
ports was still in an expansion stage, developing networks was vital to the maintenance 
of good relationships as well as a continuance of trade. In Chapters 3, 4 and 5, I 
provided an understanding of how the trade of coal, sandalwood and tea, respectively, 
evolved throughout the two decades that this thesis is bounded by. It was through the 
business networks and the relationships that these created that assisted in developing the 
trade relationship between China and colonial Australia. 
 
Socioeconomic historian Wellington K. K. Chan stated that it “would be difficult to 
imagine a firm operating a business without some form of networking.”1 While Chan 
was writing about the Chinese business networks of the Pacific Rim, his comment aptly 
fits a description of all firms involved in trade. Yet, what is a network and how can this 
concept be explored when analysing the trade between China and colonial Australian 
companies? There are numerous definitions of a network throughout various sources, 
from the Australian Oxford Dictionary’s consideration of a complex system involving 
                                      
1 Wellington K.K. Chan, "Chinese Business Networking and the Pacific Rim: The Family Firm's Roles 
Past and Present." Journal of American-East Asian Relations 1, no. 2 (1992): 171. 
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an arrangement of intersecting lines2 to the business and management understanding of 
nodes being connected to each other by specific threads.3 Gordon Boyce and Simon 
Ville extend this further to state that networks are “informed alliances of independent 
decision-makers (people or firms) that band together to promote mutual interests relying 
on bonds of trust.”4 
 
Networks are rarely singular and simple. They tend to be complex and related to various 
entities. Networks are also bounded by various ties, be they social, religious or kinship.5 
For business networks, they are made up of cooperative actions between entities. 
Whether these are individuals or firms, when the interactions between these entities are 
equitable, they create a reduction of transaction costs.6 These economic cooperative 
networks were common within the trade relationships between firms in China and 
Australia. The firms were part of two-way transactions, where one exchange was made 
in the hope for a future return, whether that be a commodity through barter or of 
monetary value. For both parties in a transaction, there was an element of trust and 
confidence that the exchange was correct and that neither party required arbitrage by an 
enforcement institution.7 
 
Thus, an essential characteristic of good networks is trust. Within an organisation, trust 
infuses such states as moral obligations, responsibility, collaboration and confidence 
                                      
2 The Australian Oxford Dictionary.  West End, Qld: Herron Publications, 1988: 307. 
3 Håkan Håkansson, and David Ford, "How Should Companies Interact in Business Networks?". Journal 
of Business Research 55 (2002): 133. 
4 Gordon Boyce, and Simon Ville, The Development of Modern Business. New York: Palgrave, 2002: 
264. 
5 Simon Ville, "Colonial Enterprise." In The Cambridge Economic History of Australia, edited by Simon 
Ville, and Glenn Withers. 202-21. Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2015: 215. 
6 William G. Ouchi, "Bureaucracies, and Clans." Administrative Science Quarterly 25, no. 1 (1980): 130. 
7 Simon Ville, and Grant Fleming, "From Kinship to Relations Economic? The Development of Pastoral 
Networks in Australasia." In Entrepreneurial Networks and Business Culture, edited by Clara E. Núnez. 
115-33. Madrid: International Economic History Conference, 1998: 116; Kenneth J. Arrow, Information 
and Economic Behaviour. Stockholm: Federation of Swedish Industries, 1973: 24. 
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and, in doing so, helps to deter malfeasance and restrains opportunistic behaviour.8 
Within the context of business relations, trust assists in reducing transaction costs as 
members within a strong trust relationship have confidence in the information provided 
and actions taken by each other.9 That is, an element of uncertainty is removed from 
transactions between involved parties.10 Within the trade relations between China-based 
and colonial Australia merchants, and specifically as many Australian merchant houses 
were only in their infancy of interacting with the large China-based houses, there was a 
strong reliance on trust. 
 
The theory behind the evaluation of trust relationships and the networks they serve is 
that presented by Mark Granovetter.11 Granovetter’s thesis on triadic closure using 
strong and weak ties is explored here in relation to the trade relationship. Throughout 
this chapter I investigate how strong and weak ties and triadic closure can be used to 
explain the development of trade relationships between China and colonial Australia. 
Examples relating to transactions and relationships discussed in Chapter 3, 4 and 5 are 
presented to assist the explanations. 
 
The purpose of this chapter, thus, is to bring together the discussions of the previous 
chapters of this thesis within the context of communications, networks and trust. 
Numerous questions are posed and answered. How did communication alter during the 
1860s and 1870s and how did that affect the trade and also the relationships of those 
involved in the trade? What types of transactions took place and how can these be 
                                      
8 Salvador T. Porras, Stewart Clegg, and John Crawford. "Trust as Networking Knowledge: Precedents 
from Australia." Asia Pacific Journal of Management 21, no. 3 (2004): 345-46; Oliver E. Williamson, 
The Economic Institutions of Capitalism: Firms, Markets, Relational Contracting. London: Collier 
Macmillan Publishers, 1985: 64-65. 
9 Boyce and Ville, Development of Modern Business: 262-63. 
10 Mark Granovetter, "Action and Social Structure: The Problem of Embeddedness." American Journal of 
Sociology 91, no. 3 (1985): 489-90, 493-94. 
11 Mark Granovetter, "The Strength of Weak Ties." American Journal of Sociology 78, no. 6 (1973): 
1360-80. 
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analysed within the context of trust and strong and weak ties? Finally, can the analysis 
of trust be extended to develop an understanding of hierarchy within the networks? 
 
Ties and Triads 
 
As with all networks and relationships there are favourites, those whom we as people 
trust, those whom we would assume or, more so, expect to perform duties for us 
whether they felt it was to their advantage or not and, in return, we would do the same 
for them. Sociologist Mark Granovetter has been considered a leader in the field of 
studying these types of relationships.12 In his seminal 1993 paper, Granovetter created 
an understating of how networks and relationships are created and maintained through 
“strong ties” and “weak ties.”13 Though vague in the sense that there is no distinct 
boundary between the two, measuring the strength, Granovetter explains, relates to time, 
emotional intensity, intimacy and reciprocal services.14 That is, the strength relates to 
the frequency of interaction, the trust and the type and amount of information shared 
between two or more actors in a network.15 Within the trade relationships that existed 
between the merchants of colonial Australia and those in China, were a small group that 
fit Granovetter’s strong ties while the remainder fitted the category of weak ties. 
 
Granovetter further argued that there are triangles of networks, which can be referred to 
as a “triadic closure.”16 In Figure 6.1, a triadic closure is presented with the elements A, 
                                      
12 Granovetter has written a number of articles and books relating to economic sociology and is currently 
involved in a two volume analysis of society and economics. 
13 Granovetter. "The Strength of Weak Ties. 
14 Granovetter. "The Strength of Weak Ties.": 1361. 
15 David Easley, and Jon Kleinberg, Networks, Crowds, and Markets: Reasoning About a Highly 
Connected World. New York: Cambridge eText, 2010: 46-48. 
16 Georg Simmel first put forward the idea of a triad in his 1908 work Soziologie, Untersuchungen über 
die Formen der Vergesellschaftung which was translated in 1950. See: Kurt H. Wolff, ed., The Sociology 
of Georg Simmel. Glencoe, Ill: Free Press, 1950: 135-36. See also: Easley and Kleinberg, Networks, 
Crowds and Markets: 44. 
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B and C, such that the relationship between A and B is a strong tie (solid line) and 
between A and C is also a strong tie (solid line). Granovetter advanced that, B and C are, 
at least, a weak tie (dotted line).17 That is, at some point, B and C will communicate and 
exchange, predicated by their relationship with A. The relationship between B and C 
can evolve into a strong tie and that was a common occurrence with the trade 
relationships involving firms in China and colonial Australia. This will be examined in 
more detail shortly. 
 
Figure 6.1. Triadic Closure. 
 
 
However, these weak ties can include other ties (say, D), that may be strong to, say, C 
and yet weak or non-existent to B. An example of the extended ties is given in Figure 
6.2. The importance of this, and other external connections, is that information could 
travel from D to B. C would be a relay of the information. There would be no 
requirement for A to pass on the information. D, thus, becomes a source of useful 
                                      
17 Granovetter, “Strength of Weak Ties.”: 1362. From this point on, graphical representations will include 
solid lines to represent strong ties and dashed lines for weak ties. 
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information that B, and possibly A, did not have without the connection to C.18 The 
extra knowledge transfer assists in decreasing transaction costs in a way that was not 
expected by either A or B.  
 
Figure 6.2. Extended Triadic Closure, including a link to D. 
 
 
Granovetter and others have continued to provide a discussion of strong and weak ties 
which continues to the present day.19 Predominantly, these works have extended the 
theories around triads to involve large and increasingly complex networks. Yet, within 
the simplest form of the triad, I have encountered a problem. The nodes are left without 
any defining name. In my example above, A had strong ties to both B and C which, in 
turn, created the possibility of a weak tie between B and C. As I will provide examples 
in this chapter of various networks, it is important to distinguish this node, the A, and, 
as such, I intend to term it the “dominant node.” The two other nodes within the triad 
                                      
18 Easley and Kleinberg, Networks, Crowds and Markets: 46. 
19 See, for example: Laura K. Gee, Jason J. Jones, Christopher J. Fariss, Moira Burke, and James H. 
Fowler, "The Paradox of Weak Ties in 55 Countries." Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization 133 
(2017): 362-72; John W. Upson, Naga Lakshimi Damaraju, Jonathon R. Anderson, and Jay B. Barney, 
"Strategic Networks of Discovery and Creation Entrepreneurs." European Management Review 35, no. 2 
(2017): 198-210. 
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are also to be termed, for which I label them as “partner nodes”. That is, within a triadic 
closure, a dominant node has two partner nodes and the two partner nodes develop their 
relationship based on their initial relationships with the dominant node. 
 
In many ways, it is the dominant node that defines the relationship. That firm, or person, 
is the initiator of the network. That is, when firm A, say in Australia, wants to introduce 
another Australian firm, firm B, to a China-based, firm C, then firm A, the dominant 
node, is using its strong ties with both the other Australian firm and the China-based 
firm to generate the link between the latter two. Without firm A’s introduction, that link 
between firm B and the China-based firm may not have taken place. As will be shown 
throughout this chapter, the dominant node was not always the China-based firm, but 
was also, quite commonly, an Australian firm or, in some cases, a London firm.  
 
The works of Granovetter, and those who followed, provide a foundation for the 
investigation of the various relationships that existed between firms based in China and 
colonial Australia. As already noted in earlier chapters, these relationships can be 
complex and include numerous firms from various countries. Triadic closures, thus, 
allow for a deconstruction of the relationships into their separate elements. It is through 
an analysis of these elements that a more comprehensive perception of the overall 
relationship is reached. Thus, the purpose of this chapter is to investigate how social 
structures, that were developed through and related to strong and weak ties, provide an 
understanding of transaction analysis between China and Australia during this period of 
emerging trade of the 1860s and 1870s. 
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Multiple firms 
 
The interest in trading with China for Australian firms gained momentum throughout 
the 1860s and into the 1870s. These firms, both established and new, were generally 
located in the capital cities of the Australian colonies and, bar the rare exception, in 
ports around the Australian coastline. Throughout the China Treaty Ports, various firms 
presented themselves as partners for trade relationships and many were highly 
successful. The most prominent, located in Hong Kong or Shanghai, maintained 
relationships with large numbers of Australian firms through which they transacted 
various goods on a regular basis. The fact that over 200 Australian firms were involved 
in these industries shows that there was both a fascination in trading with China for 
Australian-based firms and also that Chinese-based firms were keen to exploit trade 
with these firms. Further, as shall be shown shortly, British firms, with Australian 
connections, were also involved in extending their reach in to the China-Australia trade. 
 
One China-based firm, JM&Co., was corresponding with approximately 160 different 
companies throughout Australia during the 1860s and 1870s.20 A breakdown of the 
number of correspondents per colony, the number of letters per colony, the percentage 
of all letters per colony and the average number of letters per correspondent per colony 
is provided in Table 6.1. The data shows that JM&Co. were involved in correspondence, 
and thus trade, with all colonies over the period from 1860 to 1880. However, it also 
demonstrates the importance of the two predominant colonies of New South Wales and 
Victoria where JM&Co. had their most trusted agents. Further, the large correspondence 
                                      
20 The figure is approximate as the data I have for the period is imperfect, specifically in the earliest years 
as well as half of 1876. Thus, there may have been more correspondents.  Further, with data for an 
amount of correspondence missing in the earlier years, the figures would show a slight bias against the 
colonies of New South Wales and Victoria where the earliest trade was taking place. The figures are only 
for correspondence sent from Australia to JM&Co. in the Chinese treaty ports. There is a strong argument 
to state that JM&Co. were the most active of all Treaty Port merchants who dealt with merchants in 
Australia. 
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with Western Australian firms validates the position and importance of the sandalwood 
trade for JM&Co. 
 
Table 6.1. Correspondence from firms based in the various colonies of Australia to 
Jardine Matheson & Co., 1860-1880.21 
Colony Number of 
Correspondents 
Number of 
Letters 
Percentage of 
all letters 
Letters per 
Correspondent 
New South Wales 66 1483 54.6 22.5 
Queensland 14 56 2.1 4.0 
South Australia 7 10 0.4 1.4 
Tasmania 4 18 0.7 4.5 
Victoria 47 715 26.4 15.2 
Western Australia 21 428 15.8 30.6 
Total 159 2710 100.0  
 
The distribution of the correspondence for JM&Co. with each colony was not even in 
any sense. There were a small number of firms that had precedence in transactions over 
the others and many of the smaller firms were only involved in trade with JM&Co. for a 
short period of time. Of the 159 different firms, 141 had less than 26 items of 
communication while five had between 26 and 50, seven between 51 and 100 and six 
above 100. James Henty & Co. of Melbourne, for example, sent 531 items of 
correspondence over the two decades, averaging more than 25 items per year. Further, 
Henty’s correspondence total represented just under three-quarters of all 
correspondence from Victoria. Such was Henty’s position as the primary agent for 
JM&Co., that Henty was an integral part of JM&Co.’s connections with other parts of 
Australia as well as New Zealand. In NSW, the amount of correspondence was 
somewhat more distributed between a small collection of firms. There were four firms – 
Henry Moore (346), Brown & Co. (202), Charles Stokes (158) and R. B. Wallace (99) – 
that represented most of the total.22 Further, the three incarnations of JM&Co.’s primary 
agents in Sydney – Thacker Daniell &Co., Daniell King & Co. and George King & Co. 
                                      
21 Correspondence: Business Letters: Australasia JMA B6/3 for years from 1860-1880. 
22 Only Charles Stokes, of Newcastle, became an agent for JM&Co. 
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– provided for 337 letters, which over the 18 years of records shows an average of 18.7 
letters per year. 23  The only other merchant house that was involved in lengthy 
correspondence with JM&Co. was J. H. Monger (117) of York, a small town inland of 
Perth, Western Australia.  
 
A similar distribution of correspondence can be found with the other primary merchant 
houses in China and their contacts in Australia. For example, Russell & Co.’s Hong 
Kong office dealt with at least 21 different Australian merchants based in NSW (6), 
Queensland (2), South Australia (4) and Victoria (9).24 In the earlier years Russell & Co. 
was providing tea for the merchant houses in Melbourne, Adelaide and Sydney. When 
the new steam service travelling through the Torres Strait opened in the mid-1870s, 
Russell & Co. branched out to include Queensland firms.25 Using a selection of 
correspondence between Augustine Heard & Co. (AH&Co.) and Australian merchant 
houses, there were letters sent to 45 companies of the same four colonies that Russell & 
Co. engaged in.26 However, unlike Russell & Co., AH&Co. also dealt with a number of 
firms in Newcastle, because of AH&Co.’s interest in the coal industry27 The distribution 
of AH&Co.’s correspondence was NSW (28), Queensland (1), South Australia (5) and 
                                      
23 The three agent companies during the 1860s and 1870s were: Thacker Daniell & Co. (1860 – 1864); 
Daniell King & Co. (1864 – 1871); George King & Co. (1871 – 1880). 
24 Russell & Co. order book Volume 1, Series I, RA; Russell & Co. order book Volume 3, Series I, RA; 
Russell & Co. invoices 1877-1881 Volume 5, Series I, RA. The collection is only from 1872 to 1880 and 
is imperfect. 
25 The first reference in the Russell & Co. collection is for an order by Quinlan Gray & Co. of Brisbane. 
Order from Quinlan Gray & Co. 2 October 1878 Russell & Co. order book Volume 1, Series I, RA. 
26 Aug. 1860 – June 1862 Letters Sent by A. H. & Co. Hong Kong to Pacific (San Francisco, Manilla, 
Sydney, etc.) II-C-1 Volume 516 AHA; June 1863 – Oct. 1863 Letters Sent by A. H. & Co. Hong Kong to 
Pacific (San Francisco, Manilla, Sydney, etc.) II-C-1 Volume 517 AHA; Oct. 1863 – Dec. 1864 Letters 
Sent by A. H. & Co. Hong Kong to Pacific (San Francisco, Manilla, Sydney, etc.) II-C-1 Volume 518 
AHA; Dec. 1864 – Jan. 1866 Letters Sent by A. H. & Co. Hong Kong to Pacific (San Francisco, Manilla, 
Sydney, etc.) II-C-1 Volume 519 AHA; Feb. 1866 – Feb. 1877 Letters Sent by A. H. & Co. Hong Kong to 
Pacific (San Francisco, Manilla, Sydney, etc.) II-C-1 Volume 520 AHA; May 1869 – Feb. 1871 Letters 
Sent by A. H. & Co. Hong Kong to Pacific (San Francisco, Manilla, Sydney, etc.) II-C-1 Volume 521 
AHA; The collection is imperfect. 
27 AH&Co. were keenly interested in the Australian coal industry and imported large amounts of coal 
through various merchants located in Newcastle and Sydney. See, also, Chapter 3 discussion on coal. 
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Victoria (12). Neither Russell & Co. nor AH&Co. engaged firms based in either 
Tasmania or Western Australia as had JM&Co. 
 
The fact that the number of correspondents for Russell & Co. and for AH&Co. were 
less in total size than that for JM&Co. does not diminish the fact that specific firms, 
based in the primary colonial Australian cities, gained more attention than others. That 
is, there are clear patterns of a network of strong ties existing between the companies 
based in China in connection with a select few based in the colonies of Australia. It was 
through these strong ties that a trust existed between the firms of colonial Australia and 
the Treaty Ports beyond those others involved in general transactions. Yet, not all those 
firms that were involved in extensive correspondence were also agents for the China-
based companies. Diversification of interests in numerous companies in Australia not 
only opened up a larger proportion of the market for trade but also spread the risk. 
While that risk generally related to concerns over the abilities of small firms to 
complete transactions, as shall be explained later in this chapter, large firms were not 
exempt from liquidation.   
 
Poor communication and uncertainty 
 
It is not surprising to reveal that the number of correspondents increased as a 
technological diffusion in the field of transport eventuated. The development of steam 
as the primary method of direct maritime transport between China and the Australian 
colonies together with the introduction of telegraphic communication opened, for both 
China-based and Australian merchants, improved avenues that led to a convergence 
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Figure 6.3. Packet transfer prior to the introduction of the steam route in 1873. 
 
 
towards the instantaneous communications of telegraph.28 However, in the years prior to 
these developments in technology in transport and communications, Australian 
merchants throughout the colonies were beset by lengthy delays in the turnover of 
letters and the delivery of reports, commercial documents and other information. During 
the 1860s and the earliest years of the 1870s, these colonial merchants relied 
specifically on either wind powered vessels taking a slow service to China and vice-
versa or using the contracted steam services delivering mail.29 That meant the mail 
packets were delivered through a number of stops prior to reaching Galle and then after 
transhipment, and possible storage awaiting the arrival of the steamer for Australia, 
                                      
28 In Chapter 2, I demonstrated the effect of the opening of the Torres Strait route in 1873 had on the 
speed of communication and goods transport. 
29 In very rare situations, Australian merchants of Sydney used coal vessels to send mail to China. From 
China, a copy of the shipping documents, including Bill of Lading and Invoice, were provided to the 
captain of the tea vessel for delivery to Australia. 
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taken to Melbourne.30 For mail arriving in Sydney, as is evidenced with the P&O route 
shown in Figure 6.3, this was a very long way around. 
 
A further difficulty in obtaining a reduction in the delivery time arose owing to the 
timetables of the steam services. The mail contracts of P&O for the transference of 
packets between Galle and Melbourne commenced as a branch line extended from Galle 
in 1859. That service was monthly.31 The P&O services from Galle to China were bi-
monthly while the French-owned Messageries Maritimes provided a monthly service.32 
Thus, as these services arrived at Galle on different days there remained a lag between 
the arrival of the mail in Galle from one origin and its transhipment to its destination. If, 
for any reason a service was late to arrive at Galle, the mail would be left to wait for the 
following service to its destination. 
 
The period of time for mail to arrive in Hong Kong from Sydney and then for the 
Sydney merchant to receive a response, assuming reasonably short turnover, was thus as 
long as four months at the commencement of the 1860s. For example, on 18 June of that 
year, Thacker Daniell & Co. sent a letter to JM&Co. which was received on 18 August 
and replied to on the 24th of that month.33 The reply from JM&Co. was received and 
replied to by Thacker Daniell on 19 October and this third letter of the chain arrived in 
                                      
30 In 1860, some services travelled via Aden. Letter from JM&Co. to Thacker Daniell & Co., 10 February 
1860 Letters to Europe JMA C11/27. JM&Co. states that a letter sent from Thacker Daniell on 16 
November 1859 arrived between 26 January and 10 February 1860. 
31 Frank Broeze, "Distance Tamed: Steam Navigation to Australia and New Zealand from Its Beginnings 
to the Outbreak of the Great War." Journal of Transport History ser.3:10, no. 1 (1989): 6. 
32 Wm. Fred Mayers, N.B. Dennys, and Chas King, The Treaty Ports of China and Japan. London: 
Trübner and Co., 1867: Appendix A: iv, xxiv. 
33 Letter from Thacker Daniell & Co. to JM&Co., 18 June 1860 Correspondence: Business Letters: 
Australasia JMA B6/3; Letter from JM&Co. to Thacker Daniell & Co., 24 August 1860 Letters to Europe 
JMA C11/28. 
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Hong Kong on 12 December and was eventually replied to on 29 December.34 The 
example here shows that, on average in 1860, the letters took two months to travel and 
be replied to in each case. By 1865, the speed of the mail deliveries improved by a week 
or two and this continued into the early 1870s. By 1875, the speed improved further. 
The introduction of the Torres Strait route for mail and its use by steamers created the 
reduction. That is, packet transfer in 1875 took less than half the time a similar transfer 
took in 1860.  
 
The primary problem created by the slowness of correspondence was the uncertainty of 
the accuracy of information delivered. Merchants searched for ways to counter possible 
volatility and uncertainty that ruled markets and their corresponding stock levels. With a 
delay of around two months, information between Australia and China may have been 
incorrect and out of date upon its arrival. The delay in turnover of mail, thus, created a 
desire to optimise information transfers. With tea purchases to Australia, for example, 
two methods were engaged to assist in minimising the problems. Both were examined 
in Chapter 5. They were the creation of a log of shipments of tea sent to Australia and 
the monthly market advices appended to correspondence from Australia. Together, 
these gave the China-based merchant extra information and through that a better 
opportunity to generate profitable decisions. 
 
Merchants in both Australia and China took advantage of their extended relationships 
with other merchants in their ports. Granovetter’s extended triad, as shown in Figure 6.2, 
assists in explaining this. If a merchant, D, who has a relationship with merchant C but 
not with either merchants A or B passes on valuable information to C, that information 
                                      
34 Letter from Thacker Daniell & Co. to JM&Co., 19 October 1860 Correspondence: Business Letters: 
Australasia JMA B6/3; Letter from JM&Co. to Thacker Daniell & Co., 29 December 1860 Letters to 
Europe JMA C11/28. 
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may then also be transferred to both A and B. That is, say B was JM&Co. and A, James 
Henty & Co. with C and D two other firms in Victoria. The information from D passed 
to C may be unknown to either James Henty & Co. or JM&Co. Yet, that information 
may allow JM&Co. to make informed decisions about tea shipments to either James 
Henty & Co. or firm C. Thus the connection between firms C and D assist in 
minimising uncertainty in transactions. 
 
A further concern for mail was its loss due to accidents at sea or possibly the incorrect 
redirection of the letters. To overcome this problem a simple method of redundancy was 
installed. That was the creation of a copy of the original letter being transcribed and sent 
via an alternate vessel. These second letters were termed the “press copy” and were 
normally written on to a poorer quality paper, generally being tissue paper.35 The usage 
of a press copy generated confidence in both merchants involved in the information 
transfer that the message would be successfully transmitted and thus reduced 
uncertainty. 
 
Technological advancement in communications 
 
The connection through communications between colonial Australia and China in the 
1860s as against the 1870s differed significantly, such was the effect of technological 
advancement of the time. While technological improvements in both communication 
and maritime transport throughout the world were affecting trade prior to the early 
1870s, the Australia to China route, was not part of this early progression. In Chapter 2, 
                                      
35 Frank B. Evans, Donald F. Harrison, Edwin A. Thompson, and William L. Rofes, "A Basic Glossary 
for Archivists, Manuscript Curators, and Records Managers." The American Archivists 37, no. 3 (1974): 
425. Contained within a Letterpress Copybook, these were “copied by transfer of ink through direct 
contact with the original using moisture and pressure in a copy press.” See also: Sonja Titus, Regina 
Schneller, Gerhard Banik, Enke Huhsmann, and Ulrike Hähner, "The Copying Press Process: History and 
Technology." Restaurator. International Journal for the Preservation of Library and Archival Material 
27, no. 2 (2006): 90-102 for a description of the Watt Process of press copying. 
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I have already noted the effect of steam transport and the opening of the Torres Strait 
route for mail and trade between China and the eastern colonies of Australia. The 
addition of the telegraph connection in 1872 brought Australia not only closer to China 
but also closer to England, the primary trade partner of the colonies.36 
 
Figure 6.4. Telegraphic connection to Asia and Australia by the late 1870s. 
 
 
Prior to the completion of the laying of the cable that connected South East Asia to 
Australia, a type of telegraphic connection was already in existence. The development 
of global telegraphic communication was progressive and as foreign ports 
geographically closer to Australia were connected in earlier years, they became 
intermediaries for faster information transfer. This was the case with Galle and 
                                      
36 Peter Putnis, "The Early Years of International Telegraphy in Australia: A Critical Assessment." Media 
International Australia, Incorporating Culture & Policy no. 129 (2008): 140. 
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Singapore.37 As a port where steamers would depart for Australian ports, Galle was also 
a focal point for information, some of it received by steamer from ports including those 
in China and also from telegraphic messages sent there from these same foreign ports.38 
The use of a combination of telegraph and steamer for the China – Australia 
communication reduced the speed of information transfer from two months down to 
approximately two to three weeks, the time for a steamer to journey from Galle to 
Melbourne.39 Similarly, the opening of the cable to Singapore by 1871 presented 
opportunities for faster communications and these were taken up by James Henty & Co., 
who had obtained an agreement with Reuters.40 
 
A consequence of the completion of the telegraph connection with Australia in 1872 
was that it created a stronger connection with those colonial merchants who were 
involved in strong ties with China-based merchants. 41  The cost of telegraphic 
communication was sufficiently exorbitant to prohibit large transfers of information.42 
The early years of the telegraph were beset with problems. Incorrect transcription from 
text to the code transmitted was common and, occasionally, messages were lost at some 
                                      
37 Telegraphic communication was opened to Bombay and Galle in 1870, Singapore and Hong Kong in 
1871. Peter Putnis, "Shipping the Latest News across the Pacific in the 1870s: California's News of the 
World." American Journalism 30, no. 2 (2013): 247; Anto A. Huurdeman, The Worldwide History of 
Telecommunications. Hoboken, NJ: John Wiley & Sons, 2003: 136. 
38 See, for example, the notes in Letter from JM&Co. to J. Henty & Co., 21 June 1871 Letters to India 
JMA C10/61 regards the possible use of this method to speed up communications. 
39 A message sent by telegram from London to Galle and thence by steamer to Melbourne was sent on 12 
August 1871 and arrived on 25 August 1871. Letter from J. Henty & Co. to JM&Co., 9 October 1871 
Correspondence: Business Letters: Australasia JMA B6/3. Putnis. “Shipping the latest News”: 246-47. 
Putnis explains that in 1870 the news of Charles Dickens’ death only took 16 days to arrive in Australia 
through a telegraph message to Galle and then by P&O steamer to Melbourne. 
40 Letter from J. Henty & Co. to JM&Co., 15 July 1871 Correspondence: Business Letters: Australasia 
JMA B6/3; Letter from JM&Co. to J. Henty & Co., 14 September 1871 Letters to India JMA C10/61. 
41 Shirley Shepherd, "The Significance of the Overland Telegraph Line, 1872-1901." Journal of Northern 
Territory History 7 (1996): 42. Putnis, “International Telegraphy in Australia.”: 145. The matter reached 
was discussed at the 1873 Inter-colonial conference on telecommunications but, with inter-colonial 
bickering taking precedence over sensibility, any actions were postponed for nearly two decades. 
42 See discussion in Chapter 5. 
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point along the length of transmission. 43  Merchants overcame this deficiency by 
minimising the length of messages transmitted. They also only sent selective 
information and developed codes. However, this financial restriction meant that regular 
telegraphic information transfer was more commonly left to those involved in strong 
ties, relegating the others to retaining the packet method of information transfer. Thus, 
through the faster information dissemination, those involved in strong ties attained a 
significant advantage over other merchants, the weak ties. For example, JM&Co. in the 
1870s concentrated their telegraphic communications with those they both worked with 
constantly and those they most trusted.44  
 
Complex codes were developed to minimise the length of the telegraphic message. 
Considering the complexity of the codes and the large size of the dictionary of codes, 
only those who were involved in constant communication constructed such code 
dictionaries. Further, each merchant house had their own codes, different to other 
houses, to hide their information, thus creating both security and privacy in transmission. 
For example, the following was a coded message that JM&Co. sent to Henty: “Brisbane 
today sedan 26 2235 657 300 Hamburg shall we ship Ireland 110” which translated as: 
““Steamer “Brisbane” left for you today with 26 chests, 2235 half chests 657 boxes 
congou and 300 boxes scented teas. Gunpowder is low in price, shall we ship? Export 
of tea to Australia is about eleven million pounds.”45  
 
Granovetter’s triads provide an alternative perspective to information transfer through 
telegraphic methods. As explained above, the use of telegraph in the 1870s was limited. 
                                      
43 K. S. Inglis, "The Imperial Connection: Telegraphic Communication between England and Australia, 
1872-1902." In Australia and Britain: Studies in a Changing Relationship, edited by A. F. Madden, and 
W. H. Morris-Jones. 20-36. London: Frank Cass, 1980: 24. 
44 There are no records of telegrams, yet most were recognized in letter correspondence. It is through this 
that my assumptions are made. 
45 Letter from JM&Co. to J. Henty & Co., 30 August 1879 Letters to India JMA C10/66. 
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Those with strong ties gained preference. If information had been passed from JM&Co. 
to James Henty & Co, there is an expectation that James Henty & Co. would pass that 
information, or a portion of it, to their strong tie relationships. When James Henty & Co. 
had a strong tie with a merchant firm in another port, passing the information would not 
affect the market in Melbourne. Yet, the merchant in the other port may gain an 
advantage in their market, especially if they dealt directly with James Henty & Co. and 
not with JM&Co. 
 
The advent of the telegraph did not remove the requirement for packet transfer as 
formal documents, including Bills of Lading, Invoices, insurance documents and others, 
were too large to be transmitted by telegraph. The need for privacy and security for 
these documents also meant they had to be sent by regular mail in packets.46 However, 
along with these were more lengthy letters discussing both the contents of the 
telegraphic messages as well as other items not worthy of telegraphic communication. 
Yet, also relevant was the quality of the telegraph line. Together with the problems of 
transcriptions or loss in sending telegrams there were a number of interruptions to the 
lines during the remainder of the 1870s.47 The fact that telegraph supplanted the packet 
transfer did not alter the requirement for redundancy and thus two copies of letters were 
still disseminated.  
 
By the mid-1870s, merchants involved in trade between China and colonial Australia 
had three choices for methods of information transfer. They could choose short 
messages using telegraph or packet transfer through either the Galle or Torres Strait 
                                      
46 There appears no real change to the number of letters sent between China and Australia. Taking 
JM&Co.’s outgoing letters, there was no alteration around the time of the introduction of telegraph to 
Australia. In fact the number increased by the end of the 1870s with new Australian merchants engaging 
JM&Co. In 1870 JM&Co. sent 108 letters to Australian merchants while in 1879 they sent 172. Letters to 
India JMA C10/59 – 60 and Letters to India JMA C10/65 – 66. 
47 Putnis, “International Telegraphy in Australia.”: 145. Putnis provides data that states interruptions 
totaled 18 days in 1873, 20 in 1874, 7.5 in 1875, 25 in 1876 and 34 in 1877. 
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routes. In Figure 6.4, the telegraph from Australia is shown to be connected at a hub in 
Singapore with messages relayed to East Asia or towards India and then Europe and 
Great Britain. The two alternate steam routes are presented in Figure 6.5. The 
technological advancement in the early 1870s, thus, brought Australian merchants 
closer to their contemporaries in other parts of the world, including to China. This 
advancement solidified persisting strong ties while it also promoted new relationships. 
 
Figure 6.5. Packet transfer between China and Australia after 1873. 
 
 
 
Transactions 
 
The improvements in communications and transport between firms based in China and 
Australia during the 1860s and 1870s furthered the quality and speed of information 
movement. However, the methods employed to complete transactions hardly varied 
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throughout the two decades, even with the innovation alteration. Whether trade occurred 
between two individual firms only or whether they included a number of firms, 
technological enhancement did not alter the overall transaction methodology. It only 
improved the trade by introducing accuracy and efficiency.  
 
Enhancement of communications also did not alter the trust in the strong ties and an 
acceptance of dealing with weak ties. Instead it extended the strength of strong ties. 
There was an exclusivity of preference for the provision of telegraphic communication 
between strong ties in China and Australia. That translated to more relevant information 
being passed, by telegraph, between strong ties. Weak ties were serviced by the slower 
steam-driven mail transfer. Thus transactions between strong ties were processed faster 
than those between weak ties. 
 
The completion of a transaction requires at least two individual firms. One may be the 
seller and one a purchaser. In the case of the China – Australia trade, there were 
normally at least four firms. In one venue were the seller and the shipper or exporter. At 
the other venue were the foreign commission agents and the buyers. The creation of a 
strong connection between the exporter and the commission agent was important. In 
their paper about the 1960s choice of an agent for an exporter, Colin McMillan and 
Sidney Paulden proposed various options relating to choosing a good commission agent. 
These include locating commission agents in foreign markets that match their specific 
needs and devising methods to allow the exporter and commission agent to work 
together efficiently. To the exporter, this information is obtained through their own 
strong and weak ties with merchants elsewhere in their port.48 One other method was to 
be introduced by another firm, one that already had a strong tie with a foreign 
                                      
48 Colin McMillan, and Sidney Paulden, "Choosing an Export Agent." Management Decision 2, no. 4 
(1968): 242-3. 
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commission agent. In this case, there is a level of trust in the other local firm to 
correctly advise the exporter. Finally, the reputation of the commission agent to perform 
their duties at the optimum price and with minimum overheads is equally important in 
the decision process. As McMillan and Paulden conclude, “(y)ou can usually spot a 
good agent from the companies he keeps.”49 Each of these methods were commonplace 
for Australian merchants in their search for China-based commission agents. 
 
Colonial Australian merchant houses that chose to become involved in the China trade 
employed these methods. A few contacted a China-based firm directly50 while others 
were introduced by another Australian firm.51 In a few cases, Australian firms altered 
their China-based commission agent. When one commission agent went into 
receivership, as was the case with AH&Co. in 1875, knowledge of the competition in 
the market allowed the Australian merchant to choose an appropriate alternate 
commission agent. 52  Also, though rare, an Australian exporter changed their 
commission agent as another had a superior reputation. As discussed in Chapter 4, the 
case of Padbury Loton & Co., of Perth, was one where that firm chose to move their 
business from Siemssen & Co. to JM&Co in 1874.53 That is, JM&Co. held a superior 
reputation when dealing with sandalwood transactions in Shanghai than Siemssen & Co. 
 
                                      
49 McMillan, and Paulden, "Choosing an Export Agent.": 242. 
50 For example, Walsh & Co. of Cooktown, Queensland offered their services as an agent in that port and 
for inter-colonial assistance. Letter from Walsh & Co. to JM&Co., 21 June 1877 Correspondence: 
Business Letters: Australasia JMA B6/3. 
51 Letter from J. Henty & Co. to JM&Co., 15 February 1867 Correspondence: Business Letters: 
Australasia JMA B6/3; Letter from JM&Co. to Mr J. H. Barlow Esq., 27 April 1867 Letters to India JMA 
C10/57. Henty’s letter to the Shanghai office of JM&Co. introduced Mr J. H. Barlow as a prospective 
coal exporter. 
52 Letter from JM&Co. to Messrs Charles Jacob & Son, 3 January 1877 Letters to India JMA C10/65. In 
this case, AH&Co. had suggested that JM&Co. contact Charles Jacob & Son to open a connection. 
53 Letter from JM&Co. to Padbury Loton & Co., 6 June 1871 General Letters from Shanghai JMA 
C46/16. The letter from JM&Co. was in reply to a letter from Padbury Loton & Co dated 24 March 1874. 
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Three methods of transactions are dealt with forthwith, each requiring networks and 
trust. Examples of each have been employed within the discussions of the previous 
three chapters. In the first case, are the simple one-to-one, or single, transactions that 
were very common and where only a weak tie had to exist between the Australian firm 
and their China-based counterpart. Here one firm is acting for the other to provide a 
profitable outcome to the trade. In that first case the second firm was purely a 
commission agent for the first firm. However, there were occurrences where the two 
firms involved in this single-transaction combined under a joint-account to process the 
transaction and this is the second case. This meant that all matters relating to the trade 
were shared between the two firms. The final method of transaction involves multiple 
parties where two are involved in strong ties and thus creating an intermediary between 
one of these two and a third or other firm. This, more complex trade, was commonplace 
throughout the 1860s and 1870s. 
 
Single transactions 
 
The most common type of transaction that occurred between merchants in China and 
colonial Australia was, what I define as, the “single transaction.” The single transaction 
was a form of bi-lateral trade where a commodity is exported from one port to be sold in 
another port in exchange for a monetary return. In the context of trade between China-
based firms and those in colonial Australia, there were two types of single transactions, 
each with different levels of trust and risk. The first were goods sent by an exporter 
from one port to a commission agent at another for sale. The second related to the 
indent from a merchant at one port to a commission agent at another for a good to be 
sent to the merchant’s port. While both appear similar, the amount of trust and risk 
incurred and to whom varied. 
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The first case of a good being exported to a commission agent for sale, examples 
include the exportation from NSW of coal, from Western Australia of sandalwood and 
from Hong Kong of sugar, have been discussed in earlier chapters. The exporter was 
responsible for the risk on the shipment, achieving either a profit or a loss upon the 
good’s sale in the other port. The commission agent rarely took any risk during the 
small period of the sale process and, even generally in those cases of storage and sale 
delays, recouped any loss through charges. However, as was noted in Chapter 4, there 
were occasions that the commission agent pre-paid the exporter of a loan prior to the 
sale of the goods. In doing so, the commission agent transferred a portion of the risk to 
himself. That risk was the loan being fully repaid upon completion of the transaction.54 
 
The first case is an example of a one-way trust relationship. The exporter trusted the 
commission agent to complete the transaction so as to obtain the optimum result. More 
so, there was an expectation of the commission agent to take an action on the exporter’s 
behalf. As a one-way trust relationship, there was no requirement for a strong tie to exist 
between the two parties of the transaction. Knowledge that trust would be maintained 
was sufficient for the exporter. 
 
The second case, relating to the completion of an indent, can be expressed through the 
transactions in the tea trade, as shown in Chapter 5. The importer, at one port, requested 
that a commission agent, at another port, purchase the required goods, as per the indent, 
and transmit the goods to the importer. To the importer, there was the assumption that 
the commission agent would purchase the goods and deliver them at a minimal cost. 
The trust for the transaction was either one-way or two-ways. If the importer had 
provided a draft to cover all costs then the commission agent had little or no risk and 
                                      
54 Letter from JM&Co. to I. Brown & Co., 20 July 1871 Letters to India JMA C10/61; Letter from 
JM&Co. to Padbury Loton & Co., 6 June 1874 General Letters from Shanghai JMA C46/16. 
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thus did not require to have any trust in the importer. If, however, the importer was 
financing the transaction on account, then the commission agent had to trust the 
importer to settle all accounts. In both cases, the importer trusted the exporter to 
perform the requisite duties. Further, with the one-way trust relationship, again, only 
weak ties were required. However, for the two-way trust relationship, a strong tie was 
present and preferred to provide some guarantee for the payment of account. 
 
The two cases appear to have been defined by the China-based merchant as the 
predominant party, or dominant node, in the transaction. While there were numerous 
transactions where the exporter in case one and importer in case two were colonial 
Australian merchants, there were few occurrences where these were the China-based 
merchants. Nevertheless, from the previous two chapters, two examples can be 
highlighted. The export of sugar by JM&Co. to Sydney and Melbourne was an example 
of the first case and the requests of coal, direct, by shipping companies was an example 
of the second case. What is noticeable in these two examples is that only strong tie 
relationships were involved. That is, when Australian firms were the exporters or 
importers and China-based firms were the commission agents, weak ties existed. Yet, 
when the roles were reversed, strong ties were required. 
  
Joint-account transactions 
 
The development of joint-account transactions extended the single company 
transactions to disseminate the risk between at least two firms. These firms were 
commonly located in different ports and countries.55 Joint-account transactions existed 
between a company in one country that purchased the goods and a company in the 
                                      
55 As noted in Chapter 1, Western firms in China were also involved in joint-account transactions with 
Chinese firms in China. 
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second country that sold the goods, with both companies sharing all the costs, profits 
and the risks. As a method of transmitting tea to Australia, joint-account shipping was a 
common occurrence where strong ties existed. In Chapter 5, I noted that JM&Co. was 
involved in tea shipments to both Melbourne and Sydney on joint-account as were 
AH&Co. with various companies in the same two ports.56 Although I have not located 
any other examples, the opportunities were available for other Treaty Port Western 
firms to create joint-account shipments of tea with their trusted agents in the Australian 
ports. Further, there appear no examples of goods being sent to China from the 
Australian ports on joint-account.  
 
The ability to split the risk on shipments, either by half or at another ratio, gave both the 
China and Australian-based merchants a broader level of security for their transactions 
than through a single transaction. It also procured for the two firms a belief that the 
maximum advantage would be attained through both the purchasing and sale stages. 
That is, there was a strong element of trust between the two firms. Hence, joint-account 
transactions generally, if not always, took place where there was a strong tie. 
 
The prime reason behind a joint-account shipment was to share the costs and the risk of 
the shipment as well as to reduce the transaction costs for those taking part in the 
exchange of goods. However, the development of a joint-account had a number of other 
advantages. There was a clear assumption that, as the joint-account shipment was for 
the benefit of both firms, the procedures employed by each firm were to the gain of all 
involved. That is, at the purchasing phase of the operation, the China-based firm chose 
                                      
56 JM&Co. was involved in equal risk joint-account tea transactions with James Henty & Co. and their 
Sydney agents (Thacker Daniell & Co., Daniell King & Co. and George King & Co.) among a few others. 
AH&Co. sent joint-account shipments of tea to Wilkinson Brothers of Sydney and to Parbury Brothers, 
also of Sydney. The latter were made at 75% risk to the Australian merchant and 25% to AH&Co. 
Considering that both connected with AH&Co. were this 75-25 ratio, there is a reasonable assumption to 
be made that the decision was made by AH&Co. 
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the optimum time and price to purchase the tea.57 In Australia, the sale of the tea was 
completed at the time considered advantageous to attaining the highest selling price. 
Instead of immediately placing the tea on the market for auction, normally in 
competition with other shipments and thus incurring the possibility of a minimal gain or 
a loss, common practice was for the tea from joint-account shipments to remain in 
storage for a period of time until the opportune moment appeared.58 Only rarely did the 
China-based merchant suggest a quickening in the pace of the sales, tending more to 
trust the judgement of the Australian merchant.59 
 
The transfer of accurate and timely information was of significant importance to both 
parties in a joint-account transaction. Any opportunity to seize upon a method of 
transport for information was taken up. This was in contrast to single transactions where 
the interest of the commission agent was more to do with obtaining their commission, to 
have their other costs covered and thus only the information relative to the purchase was 
relevant. With the joint-account transaction, information related to the market of the 
importer also guided tea purchases. Exporting tea to an oversupplied market or one 
where the sale prices were low only resulted in a potential loss following quick sales or 
a requirement for costly storage in the importer’s godowns. Hence for the purchaser of 
the tea to have a knowledge of the market in China, the information provided of the 
market in Australia and the known shipments already departed for the various ports was 
advantageous to profit maximisation. 
 
                                      
57 Letter from JM&Co. to George King & Co., 29 August 1873 Letters to India JMA C10/62. JM&Co. 
stated that the prices at the time were too high to provide any possible profit and stated that they would 
await a drop of prices in tea at Foochow. 
58 Letter from James Henty & Co. to JM&Co., 21 June 1877 Correspondence: Business Letters: 
Australasia JMA B6/3. Henty stated that they were storing the teas owing to the arrival of another 
shipment which was to be immediately auctioned without reserve and that there was another six months 
until the new teas were to arrive. 
59 Letter from JM&Co. to James Henty & Co., 7 September 1875 Letters to India JMA C10/64. 
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The technological advancement in communications between China and Australia in the 
early 1870s also enhanced the joint-account trade of tea. The adoption of immediate 
information transfer, through telegraph and the employment of codes, allowed for 
questions relating to individual purchases on joint-account to be answered almost 
instantly. As part of the example of a coded message shown above, JM&Co. suggested 
a purchase of gunpowder tea owing to its low price at that time. Henty, would have 
viewed the market in Melbourne to adjudicate a further purchase and be able to inform 
JM&Co. almost instantaneously. Yet, this extra information of JM&Co. was provided 
to Henty as there was an advantage to JM&Co. through the joint-account transactions. 
There was no requirement to submit such information to other merchants who were only 
involved in single transactions. In the case of the single transaction, the additional cost 
of transmitting this message would only have been recovered if the Australian merchant 
chose to make the purchase and thus the China-based firm would have to suffer the cost 
if no purchase was made. Thus the cost of transmitting the message was weighed 
against the potential commission of other purchases. In a joint-account transaction the 
transmission cost was defrayed by the profit on the potential shipment and would have 
always had its cost split between the two parties in that relationship. 
 
The level of trust not only related to the assumed optimum purchases and sales of the 
tea. Upon the sale of a joint-account tea transaction, the portion of the sale for the 
China-based firm was in Australia and required transfer. In Chapter 5, I noted that for 
JM&Co. the remittance of their share of the tea transaction was performed through the 
shipment of gold to Calcutta.60 Trust, therefore, existed between JM&Co. and the 
Australian firm that the latter would fulfil the final part of the transaction process. 
Further, this also meant that a strong tie existed between both parties, such was the trust 
                                      
60 Letter from JM&Co. to J. Henty & Co., 25 January 1860 Letters to Europe JMA C11/27. In this letter, 
JM&Co. replies to Henty’s acceptance of becoming involved in a joint account proposition put to them. 
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of JM&Co in the Australia firms. For AH&Co., and their joint-account tea transactions 
with the Parbury group of firms in Australia, remittances were per drafts sent from 
Australia to London and thence placed in AH&Co.’s account. The risk, and thus trust, 
for AH&Co. was with F. Parbury & Co. in London to make sure that the drafts were 
passed on to AH&Co.’s agent there, Fearon & Co.61 
 
Inter-relationship transactions. 
 
The use of intermediaries in transactions between China-based merchant houses and 
firms in Australasia was not uncommon. However, there were two types of 
intermediaries. The first involved a trusted company based in Australia that dealt with 
either other companies geographically nearby or those in other countries. The second 
involved a parent or representative firm, based in London, whereby the transaction was 
organised through the London house and the initial and final monetary parts of the 
transaction were processed in London. I have detailed numerous cases of the latter type 
in the previous three chapters. Yet, in both cases, there was a trust by the China-based 
firm of the intermediary to complete the transaction, take out their commission and to 
update accounts and, in the former’s case, remit the proceeds to the China-based firm. 
Further, the above type of transaction redirects a portion of the responsibility and risk 
within the transaction to the intermediary and thus also minimises the risk involved with 
the China-based firm dealing with a company it has only a weak tie with.  
While JM&Co. dealt with a number of Australian-based merchants, the company also 
transacted tea to New Zealand. Numerous companies in Wellington, Christchurch and 
Dunedin were receiving parcels of tea, either directly from China or via either 
                                      
61 Letter from F. Parbury. to Augustine Heard & Co., 6 May 1870 FPC. 
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Melbourne or Sydney.62 Extending trade to New Zealand was not an excessive duty for 
the China-based merchant houses as vessels already travelled from China to some of the 
ports in New Zealand.63 However, with new firms from New Zealand entering the 
market and a lack of trust in these owing to a lack of knowledge of the history of these 
firms and markets, an alternate and less risky proposition was required by the China-
based firms. For example, in October 1869, JM&Co. broached the topic with their 
friends in Melbourne, James Henty & Co., about the option of having drafts drawn in 
New Zealand to be payable in Melbourne.64 Henty stated that the coverage of drafts 
from New Zealand was not usual, but agreed that it could be done.65 Thus, JM&Co. was 
placing some of the risk in transactions with New Zealand on to Henty as they were the 
firm to obtain the drafts from the New Zealand firms. Henty was then able to transfer 
the value of the drafts to JM&Co’s account. Thus, JM&Co. avoided any direct financial 
dealings with the New Zealand firm. Instead, James Henty & Co. was responsible. For 
JM&Co., this allowed for a smoother and more secure monetary movement than 
through a direct transaction with a New Zealand firm. The value of those drafts were 
then transferred to Calcutta.66 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                      
62 For example, some of the firms were: Neill & Co., George Gray Russell & Co., Russell Ritchie & Co. 
and Messrs. Cargill & McLean all of Dunedin, Edward Pearce Esq. and Samuel Ludd & Co. of 
Wellington and H. Watson & Co. of Christchurch. 
63 The Prices Current circulars included the list of vessels travelling to New Zealand separate from 
Australia and the amount of tea per vessel and current totals. See Prices Current P945 Cartons 31-33 
AHA. 
64 Letter from JM&Co. to J. Henty & Co., 18 October 1869 Letters to India JMA C10/59. 
65 Letter from J. Henty & Co. to JM&Co., 3 January 1870 Correspondence: Business Letters: Australasia 
JMA B6/3. 
66 “Messrs. Jardine Matheson & Co. in account with James Henty & Co.” 1 January 1872 Current 
accounts: Australia JM A8/48/1. In this account was included a transaction involving George Grey 
Russell & Co. of Dunedin. 
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Figure 6.6. The connection between Neill & Co. of Dunedin to JM&Co. through James 
Henty & Co.  
 
 
There were connections with New Zealand firms that allowed James Henty & Co. to 
create other ties, as shown in the following example. One long-standing company, based 
in Melbourne and Dunedin, New Zealand – McCallum, Neill & Co. – chose, at the end 
of 1870, to dissolve the two port connection, with McCallum, Neill & Co. remaining as 
a company based in Melbourne and a new venture, Neill & Co. commencing business in 
Dunedin.67 James Henty & Co. bought out the Dunedin connection of the original 
firm.68 Through that, a strong tie was created between James Henty & Co. and Neill & 
Co. Hence, a weak tie was also created between JM&Co. and Neill & Co. and that 
allowed for continued transactions between the two as well as a level of trust by 
                                      
67 “Partnership Dissolved.” The Otago Daily Times 13 January 1871: 1; “Public Notices.” Age 3 January 
1871: 1. The partnership and connection was dissolved on 31 December 1870.  
68 Letter from J. Henty & Co. to JM&Co., 2 January 1871 Correspondence: Business Letters: Australasia 
JMA B6/3. The letter was a Notice from J. Henty & Co. to all merchants. There is some concern that 
what was placed in Henty’s letter may not have been the truth. From the following: (a) there is no other 
documentary evidence owing to a lack of archives; (b) there is no mention of Henty in reference to either 
company in the Dunedin newspapers for the few years around the assumed takeover; and (c) the notice in 
the letter to JM&Co. is different to that in the two newspapers (Otago Daily Times and  Age) in that the 
notice states that only the partnership in Dunedin was dissolved when in fact the connection between the 
Melbourne and Dunedin companies was dissolved and that, in fact, the original company McCallum, 
Neill & Co., continued to exist in Melbourne. There is certainly a case to say that Henty misconstrued the 
truth.  
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JM&Co. of Neill & Co. knowing that the latter were under the control of Henty. Figure 
6.6 shows this connection. Thus when Henty organised an indent for Neill & Co. of 150 
tons of tea under the account and risk of Neill & Co., JM&Co. were in the knowledge 
that the transaction could be processed without risk to themselves. As such, JM&Co. 
were to reimburse themselves through drafts drawn on Mathieson & Co. in London to 
be claimed under the protection of Henty.69 
 
Figure 6.7. Redfern Alexander & Co. shipment of tea from JM&Co. to Cargill & Co. of 
Dunedin.70 
 
 
The connection to New Zealand was also extended to merchant houses based in London 
that had strong connections to JM&Co. In 1864 Redfern Alexander & Co. extended the 
inter-relationships between JM&Co. and New Zealand merchants. As discussed in the 
Ettrick example at the beginning of this study, the London-based merchant house 
contacted JM&Co. to request that they purchase and ship 1,000 packets of tea to the 
                                      
69 Letter from J. Henty & Co. to JM&Co., 22 April 1871 Correspondence: Business Letters: Australasia 
JMA B6/3; Letter from JM&Co. to J. Henty & Co., 21 June 1871 Letters to India JMA C10/61; Letter 
from JM&Co. to Messr. Neill & Co., 21 June 1871 Letters to India JMA C10/61; Letter from JM&Co. to 
J. Henty & Co., 17 August 1871 Letters to India JMA C10/61. 
70 The solid lines show strong ties and the dashed lines show weak ties. I have included the link to 
Thacker Daniell & Co. as that was part of the discussion in the Ettrick example at the beginning of the 
thesis. The shipment, as stated in the Ettrick example, included tea for Thacker Daniell & Co. The 
diagram in Figure 6.7 includes a line to Thacker Daniell & Co. to show that there was no connection 
between Thacker Daniell & Co. and the other firms involved in the various triadic closures. 
Jardine Matheson & Co. 
(Hong Kong)
Redfern Alexander & Co. 
(London)
Cargill & Co. 
(Dunedin, NZ) Gilchrist Watt & Co. (Sydney)
Thacker Daniell & Co. 
(Sydney)
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Sydney firm Gilchrist Watt & Co.71 In Sydney the tea was to be transhipped to the 
Dunedin firm Cargill & Co.72 For JM&Co., their position in the transport of tea was the 
purchase and the connection with RA&Co. in London. The initial costs that were 
incurred together with the risk for the shipment from Foochow to Sydney were covered 
in London by RA&Co.73 However, upon arrival in Sydney, the further costs of freight, 
transfer of goods, insurance and other items were to be borne by Cargill & Co. who 
were to reimburse Gilchrist Watt & Co.74 This complex transaction saw little risk 
incurred by JM&Co. because as soon as the tea arrived in Sydney, their part of the 
Cargill & Co. transaction was completed. The risk was then transferred to Gilchrist 
Watt & Co. who then separately worked with Cargill & Co. 
 
The example provides a situation where there are a number of triadic closures, as shown 
in Figure 6.7. A strong tie existed between JM&Co. and RA&Co., the latter holding a 
strong tie with Gilchrist Watt & Co. and also with Cargill & Co. In doing so, the 
connection created an initial weak tie between JM&Co. and Cargill & Co. which was 
added to through the correspondence between the two relating to the tea shipment.75 
Similarly, strong ties between RA&Co. and JM&Co. created the weak tie between 
JM&Co. and Gilchrist Watt & Co. Under the assumption that Gilchrist Watt and Co 
were only working on behalf of Redfern Alexander & Co, then the strong ties for 
RA&Co. with them and with Cargill & Co. generated the weak tie between Gilchrist 
                                      
71 Invoice for 1000 packages tea shipped from Foochow to Sydney, consigned to Gilchrist Watt & Co., 
transhipped to Cargill & Co. of Dunedin and under the account and risk of Redfern Alexander & Co., 
London, 11 February 1864. Invoices of the Hong Kong Office JM A6/14. 
72 Letter from JM&Co. to Gilchrist Watt & Co., 11 February 1864 Letters to India JMA C10/56. 
73 Invoice for 1000 packages tea shipped from Foochow to Sydney, consigned to Gilchrist Watt & Co., 
transhipped to Cargill & Co. of Dunedin and under the account and risk of Redfern Alexander & Co., 
London, 11 February 1864. Invoices of the Hong Kong Office JM A6/14. 
74 Letter from JM&Co. to Gilchrist Watt & Co., 11 February 1864 Letters to India JMA C10/56. 
75 Letter from JM&Co. to Messrs Cargill & Co., 11 February 1864 Letters to India JMA C10/56. 
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Watt & Co. and Cargill & Co. Such was the complexity of dissecting one simple tea 
transaction.76 
 
Problem Solving 
 
Trade and transaction interactions between companies in China and colonial Australia 
were occasionally beset by problems, some simple and others quite complex. Even with 
the spread of risk from Hong Kong to Melbourne or Sydney, there were merchant 
houses in Australia that either caused concerns or suffered problems that affected those 
who were part of the strong ties mechanism. Owing to the inability of a China-based 
company to investigate problems first hand, it would contact its trusted partners in 
Australia to adjudicate the options. The China-based firm provided the Australian agent 
with full jurisdiction to take the appropriate actions to resolve the problems or to 
optimally extract either compensation when it was due or reimbursement where the 
Australian firm had been liquidated. Over the period of the 1860s and 1870s, a number 
of incidents required Australian-based firms to represent their partners in China. 
However, distance created problems and commonly the task borne by the Australian 
firm reaped no rewards. 
 
One such complex incident occurred in 1871 and continued for over a year until a 
compromise was reached. It related to two mortgages taken out by the owners, brothers 
C. J. Hoyt and H. Hoyt, on the Dunedin, New Zealand registered steamer s.s. Albion. 
The first mortgage had been taken up by JM&Co. in Hong Kong77 and, later, a second 
                                      
76 That complexity did not exist for those involved. Based on experience and mutual knowledge and trust, 
the merchants would have organised and concluded these transactions without a second thought. 
77 Letter from J. Henty & Co. to JM&Co., 27 February 1871 Correspondence: Business Letters: 
Australasia JMA B6/3. 
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was obtained in Yokohama, Japan to obtain extra cash funds.78 The vessel travelled 
from Japan to Brisbane and from there the second mortgage was immediately delivered 
to Dunedin at a time prior to the arrival of JM&Co.’s mortgage for registration.79 To 
JM&Co. and others, there was clear evidence that C. J. Hoyt knew about the first 
mortgage when negotiating the second and thus the question of fraud was put forward 
by JM&Co. against C. J. Hoyt.80 
 
The vessel, at the time, was awaiting sale with a full cargo of coal having arrived the 
previous year from Newcastle, NSW.81 In an attempt at obtaining compensation, 
JM&Co. enlisted the aid of their most trusted agent in Melbourne, James Henty & Co.82 
To complicate matters, claims were also made by Hong Kong company, William Pastau 
& Co., sub-mortgagees, Captain Goffrey and the London Chartered Bank of Australia 
as well as the captain of the s.s. Albion, Captain Dunn.83 The matter was then placed 
before both the Admiralty Court and the Equity Court in Melbourne.84 Through Henty, 
a Bill was placed upon the two owners,85 but they successfully removed that through 
                                      
78 Letter from J. Henty & Co. to JM&Co., 22 April 1871 Correspondence: Business Letters: Australasia 
JMA B6/3. 
79 Letter from JM&Co. to J. Henty & Co., 21 June 1871 Letters to India JMA C10/61. 
80 Letter from JM&Co. to J. Henty & Co., 21 June 1871 Letters to India JMA C10/61; Letter from 
JM&Co. to J. Henty & Co., 20 July 1871 Letters to India JMA C10/61. 
81 “Shipping.” Age 19 September 1870: 2. The s.s. Albion was bought by Hoyt Co. from the Otago 
Steamship Co. One possible reason for there being no sale immediately was that Mr Alexander 
McKinnon of New Zealand had claimed insolvency on Mr. C. J. Hoyt as McKinnon stated he sold the 
vessel to Hoyt and the bills for the sale were dishonoured. Argus 29 November 1870: 5. 
82 Letter from JM&Co. to J. Henty & Co., 27 April 1871 Letters to India JMA C10/61; Letter from 
JM&Co. to J. Henty & Co., 20 July 1871 Letters to India JMA C10/61. 
83 Letter from J. Henty & Co. to JM&Co., 22 April 1871 Correspondence: Business Letters: Australasia 
JMA B6/3; Letter from J. Henty & Co. to JM&Co., 20 May 1871 Correspondence: Business Letters: 
Australasia JMA B6/3; Letter from Capt. Dunn to JM&Co., 15 July 1871 Correspondence: Business 
Letters: Australasia JMA B6/3. 
84 Letter from J. Henty & Co. to JM&Co., 27 February 1871 Correspondence: Business Letters: 
Australasia JMA B6/3; Letter from J. Henty & Co. to JM&Co., 20 May 1871 Correspondence: Business 
Letters: Australasia JMA B6/3; Letter from J. Henty & Co. to JM&Co., 17 June 1871 Correspondence: 
Business Letters: Australasia JMA B6/3. 
85
 Letter from J. Henty & Co. to JM&Co., 9 September 1871 Correspondence: Business Letters: 
Australasia JMA B6/3; Letter from J. Henty & Co. to JM&Co., 6 November 1871 Correspondence: 
Business Letters: Australasia JMA B6/3. For a full description on the case to this stage, see: “The News 
of the Day.” Age 3 October 1871: 2. A demurrer is a pleading in a lawsuit that objects to or challenges a 
pleading filed by an opposing party. In this case the Bill by Henty was objected to. 
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demurrer86 which left JM&Co. with the concern that they would be unsuccessful and 
that costs would blow out.87 To JM&Co. it was important not to place any excessive 
supplementary funds into the matter if there was little chance of success and thus left 
the question of continuance to Henty, trusting that he and his legal team would take the 
optimum action.88 
 
With the threat of a commission to be held in Japan to interview the witnesses, and extra 
undue expense to all, H. Hoyt and Henty met to negotiate a compromise.89 After a year 
and a half of negotiations, court actions and continuing correspondence between Henty 
and JM&Co., the settlement meant that JM&Co. received a sum of £500.90 That was 
deemed enough to cover the legal and other costs incurred in Melbourne and left 
JM&Co. with no recompense for the original mortgage.91 Throughout the ordeal, 
JM&Co. backed the decisions made by Henty and, together with advice from London 
on the matter, found the final “arrangements made, under circumstances, perfectly 
satisfactory to us.”92 While JM&Co. was unable to obtain any recompense from the 
matter, the link between them and Henty was further solidified.  
 
                                      
86  Letter from J. Henty & Co. to JM&Co., 9 October 1871 Correspondence: Business Letters: 
Australasia JMA B6/3; Letter from J. Henty & Co. to JM&Co., 16 October 1871 Correspondence: 
Business Letters: Australasia JMA B6/3; “Law Report.” Argus 17 October 1871: 6. 
87 Letter from JM&Co. to J. Henty & Co., 21 June 1871 Letters to India JMA C10/61. 
88 Letter from JM&Co. to J. Henty & Co., 10 January 1872 Letters to India JMA C10/61. 
89 Letter from J. Henty & Co. to JM&Co., 29 February 1872 Correspondence: Business Letters: 
Australasia JMA B6/3; Letter from JM&Co. to J. Henty & Co., 17 April 1872 Letters to India JMA 
C10/62. 
90 Letter from J. Henty & Co. to JM&Co., 19 June 1872 Correspondence: Business Letters: Australasia 
JMA B6/3; Letter from J. Henty & Co. to JM&Co., 16 July 1872 Correspondence: Business Letters: 
Australasia JMA B6/3. 
91 Letter from J. Henty & Co. to JM&Co., 19 June 1872 Correspondence: Business Letters: Australasia 
JMA B6/3. 
92 Letter from JM&Co. to J. Henty & Co., 30 August 1872 Letters to India JMA C10/62. Following the 
settlement with JM&Co. Hoyt was then sued by Dunn in the Vice-Admiralty Court through which Dunn 
was able to receive approximately £2,700 to cover wages, expenses and interest. “Law Report.” Argus 24 
January 1873: 6. 
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Another example was the case of the insolvency of the Sydney branch of Wilkinson 
Brothers in late 1866. This significantly affected the China-based firm AH&Co. 
financially. Wilkinson Brothers were one of a number of firms in Sydney that suffered 
at the time owing to the problems associated with the fall of the Overend Gurney bank 
in England in May 1866.93 Wilkinson Brothers of Sydney chose to place their estate in 
to the Insolvency Court. In a letter to AH&Co., their reasoning was “owing to the heavy 
losses and pressures of time.”94 Wilkinson Brothers’ two branches in Sydney and 
Melbourne also had strong ties to AH&Co. as the two branches had been involved in 
continuous sales of items to China and the purchase of tea from China on joint account 
with AH&Co.95 When a joint-account shipment did cause problems owing to the 
insolvency, AH&Co. were only to suffer the loss on their portion, or so it should have 
been. 
 
The problem related to AH&Co. was due to the handling of a shipment of tea from 
Foochow to Sydney on the vessel Luchnow.96 The insolvency occurred prior to the 
arrival of the Luchnow. The Oriental Banking Corporation (OBC) held drafts to the total 
worth of £16,753 3s 3d in regard to the teas. On the assumption that Wilkinson Brothers 
                                      
93 For a short description of the crash of 10 May 1866, see: Rhiannon Sowerbutts, "The Demise of 
Overend Gurney." Bank of England Quarterly Bulletin 56, no. 2 (2016): 94-106. 
94 Letter from Wilkinson Brothers, Sydney to AH&Co., 23 October 1866 Claim on Wilkinson Bros. of 
Sydney, N. S. W. for loss on tea per “Luchnow” AHA I E 1 EA-2-3. 
95 Wilkinson Brothers were involved in trade with AH&Co. from at least 1860. Letter from AH&Co. to 
Wilkinson Brothers, 23 August 1860 Aug. 1860 – June 1862 Letters Sent by A. H. & Co. Hong Kong to 
Pacific (San Francisco, Manilla, Sydney, etc.) II-C-1 Volume 516 AHA; Letter from AH&Co. to 
Wilkinson Brothers, Sydney, 28 July 1866 Claim on Wilkinson Bros. of Sydney, N. S. W. for loss on tea 
per “Luchnow” AHA I E 1 EA-2-3. For this shipment, AH&Co. held 25% and Wilkinson Brothers, 75%. 
Letter from AH&Co. to Wilkinson Brothers, Sydney, 31 December 1866 Claim on Wilkinson Bros. of 
Sydney, N. S. W. for loss on tea per “Luchnow” AHA I E 1 EA-2-3. 
96 Letter from AH&Co. to Wilkinson Brothers, Sydney, 28 July 1866 Claim on Wilkinson Bros. of 
Sydney, N. S. W. for loss on tea per “Luchnow” AHA I E 1 EA-2-3. See also: Bill of Lading for 2365 
packages of tea, 4 July 1866 Jan. 1866 – Sept. 1866 Hong Kong, Inward and other ports, Outward AHA 
II B 1 volume 173; Bill of Lading for 2788 packages of tea, 4 July 1866 Jan. 1866 – Sept. 1866 Hong 
Kong, Inward and other ports, Outward AHA II B 1 volume 173. 
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would not honour the drafts, the bank chose to store the teas in their own name.97 
Further, AH&Co. were now being held responsible by OBC for the drafts plus interest 
and charges.98 AH&Co. thus contacted the other primary firm they traded with in 
Sydney, Parbury Brothers, giving them Power of Attorney and requesting they take over 
the sale of the teas.99 In a letter to Parbury Brothers, AH&Co. stated: 
We beg now that you will act in the matter for us as may seem best for our 
interests, and to enable you to do so, we now enclose a Power of Attorney, duly 
signed and witnessed. We do so, as we have full confidence in your judgements 
and discretion, and we feel convinced that you will be more able to do us justice 
than a banking institution.100 
 
A supplementary set of letters were sent to the branches of OBC in both Hong Kong 
and in Sydney. The first was for a letter to be forwarded to Sydney requesting that they 
took action in the best interests of AH&Co. or, if Parbury Brothers agreed to work on 
AH&Co’s behalf, to pass the tea to them.101 The second was a copy of the Sydney letter, 
requesting assistance from the Hong Kong branch to stop the Sydney branch from 
selling the teas at a potential loss.102 
 
                                      
97 Letter from OBC, Hong Kong to AH&Co., 15 December 1866 Claim on Wilkinson Bros. of Sydney, N. 
S. W. for loss on tea per “Luchnow” AHA I E 1 EA-2-3. 
98 Letter from OBC, Hong Kong to AH&Co., 9 January 1867 Claim on Wilkinson Bros. of Sydney, N. S. 
W. for loss on tea per “Luchnow” AHA I E 1 EA-2-3. There were five drafts, each dated 10 July 1866 on 
60 days notice and due 16 November. The amounts were: £4,000, £4,000, £4,000, £3,821.19.5 and 
£931.3.10 all drawn against the teas per Luchnow. AH also paid for all other charges amounting to 
£2,622.18.0. Letter from OBC, Hong Kong to AH&Co., 8 June 1867 Claim on Wilkinson Bros. of Sydney, 
N. S. W. for loss on tea per “Luchnow” AHA I E 1 EA-2-3; Letter from AH&Co. to Parbury Brothers, 
Sydney 28 June 1867 Claim on Wilkinson Bros. of Sydney, N. S. W. for loss on tea per “Luchnow” AHA I 
E 1 EA-2-3. 
99 First Letter from AH&Co. to Parbury Brothers, Sydney 31 December 1866 Claim on Wilkinson Bros. 
of Sydney, N. S. W. for loss on tea per “Luchnow” AHA I E 1 EA-2-3. 
100 Second Letter from AH&Co. to Parbury Brothers, Sydney 31 December 1866 Claim on Wilkinson 
Bros. of Sydney, N. S. W. for loss on tea per “Luchnow” AHA I E 1 EA-2-3. 
101 Letter from AH&Co. to OBC, Sydney 31 December 1866 Claim on Wilkinson Bros. of Sydney, N. S. 
W. for loss on tea per “Luchnow” AHA I E 1 EA-2-3. 
102 Letter from AH&Co. to OBC, Hong Kong 31 December 1866 Claim on Wilkinson Bros. of Sydney, N. 
S. W. for loss on tea per “Luchnow” AHA I E 1 EA-2-3; Letter from OBC, Hong Kong to AH&Co. 1 
January 1867 Claim on Wilkinson Bros. of Sydney, N. S. W. for loss on tea per “Luchnow” AHA I E 1 
EA-2-3. 
 325 
The OBC was a financial institution and not a merchant house and thus its decision to 
sell the teas prior to arrival of the mail generated a loss on the trade and thus also for 
AH&Co. While OBC defended its decision to sell prior to advice to the contrary,103 its 
decision also eliminated the effect of Parbury Brothers in this part of the trade.104 A 
quarter of the loss was acceptable to AH&Co. as that was their portion of the trade. 
However, they requested of Parbury Brothers to obtain compensation through the estate 
of Wilkinson Brothers, Sydney. 105  Parbury Brothers eventually advised that the 
dividend was expected to be small and thus a loss on the trade for AH&Co. had to be 
conceded.106 
 
These two examples emphasise the importance of trust and good communications. The 
ability to rely on a firm in Australia to take the appropriate actions on behalf of the 
China-based company relieved them of the task. To complete the task, the Australian 
merchants were provided with complete jurisdiction on behalf of the China-based 
merchant. That is, although the China-based merchant could influence decisions, though 
hindered by a delay owing to poor communications, they had sufficient trust in the 
Australian merchants to act on their behalf and to take options that would attain the 
optimal solution. The level of trust, thus, also equated to a strong tie between the two 
merchant houses. 
                                      
103 Letter from OBC, Sydney to AH&Co. 21 February 1867 Claim on Wilkinson Bros. of Sydney, N. S. W. 
for loss on tea per “Luchnow” AHA I E 1 EA-2-3; Letter from Parbury Brothers, Sydney to AH&Co. 20 
February 1867 Claim on Wilkinson Bros. of Sydney, N. S. W. for loss on tea per “Luchnow” AHA I E 1 
EA-2-3.  The total deficiency from the drafts less the sales was £1,540.14.8. Letter from OBC, Hong 
Kong to AH&Co. 8 June 1867 Claim on Wilkinson Bros. of Sydney, N. S. W. for loss on tea per 
“Luchnow” AHA I E 1 EA-2-3. 
104 Parbury Brothers were scathing in their report of OBC’s decision to sell at the time, not only owing to 
the damage to AH& Co. on this lot but also to the overall market itself. Letter from Parbury Brothers, 
Sydney to AH&Co., 21 March 1867 Claim on Wilkinson Bros. of Sydney, N. S. W. for loss on tea per 
“Luchnow” AHA I E 1 EA-2-3. 
105 First Letter from AH&Co. to Parbury Brothers, Sydney 31 December 1866 Claim on Wilkinson Bros. 
of Sydney, N. S. W. for loss on tea per “Luchnow” AHA I E 1 EA-2-3. 
106 Letter from Parbury Brothers, Sydney to AH&Co., 11 April 1867 Claim on Wilkinson Bros. of Sydney, 
N. S. W. for loss on tea per “Luchnow” AHA I E 1 EA-2-3. There was no further correspondence and an 
assumption can be made that very little if any dividend was made available to AH&Co. 
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The second example, where Parbury Brothers & Co. of Sydney provided a service for 
AH&Co., is also a case where an original weak tie relationship could transform in to a 
strong tie. Parbury Brothers were introduced to AH&Co. in 1864 by F. Parbury & Co. 
of London as an opportunity to add to the Australia tea trade.107 Even though Parbury 
Brothers were solely an intermediary in the transactions, the joint-account existing 
between F. Parbury and AH&Co. evolved into a strong tie. Examples of the evolution 
of ties can be found elsewhere in the trade between China and Australasia, particularly 
so with New Zealand firms. 
 
The strength of strong ties 
 
Echoing throughout this chapter has been the importance of the dominant node to the 
development of new networks as well as to the extension and maturation of old 
networks. Certain firms in colonial Australia stood out. To a lesser extent than 
Melbourne, a number of firms in Sydney became dominant and were vital to these trade 
networks, including Robert Towns & Co., Parbury Brothers, Thacker Daniell & Co. and 
the iterations of that company that followed. That said, the Melbourne firm James 
Henty Co., in their dealings with JM&Co., clearly stands above the others as a primary 
trade partner with China. It was a dominant node or partner node in a number of 
networks involving companies based in various countries outside of Australia as well as 
with other firms in the various colonies of Australia. Henty’s contribution to the overall 
trade relationship between colonial Australia and China during the 1860s and 1870s was 
                                      
107 Letter from AH&Co. to Lamb Parbury & Co., 23 September 1864 Oct. 1863 – Dec. 1864 Letters Sent 
by A. H. & Co. Hong Kong to Pacific (San Francisco, Manilla, Sydney, etc.) II-C-1 Volume 518 AHA. 
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substantial.108 What is noticeable in this chapter, as elsewhere in this thesis, is the 
continuous interaction Henty provided others through their trade with JM&Co. 
 
James Henty & Co. were a merchant house, receiving goods from overseas or the 
colonies of Australia and trading them to others with the intention to make a profit. 
However, the firm was also a commission agent – attaining a profit through the goods 
trade of other firms – and as a consequence of this, they attained the position to be a 
dominant node in some cases and a partner node in others. In correspondence from 
JM&Co. to a trader in Brisbane, the China-based firm stated that as a commission agent 
it would be foolish to ignore any business that would lead unnecessarily for them to 
“have lost a commission without furthering to the smallest extent, the object in 
view.”109 That certainly applied to Henty as well and whenever the option presented 
itself – commonly within the course of assisting JM&Co. in a transaction – there was 
little hesitation on Henty’s part to accept a commission on the transaction. When Henty 
became a commission agent working with JM&Co. is unknown, owing to the sources at 
hand. Even so, as early as 1861, Henty acted on behalf of JM&Co. to assist with the 
financial dealings for a transaction involving JM&Co. and T. & H. Carter of Western 
Australia and, in performing that duty, extracted a commission of one per cent of the 
total transaction.110 
 
The fact that Henty was a commission agent for some of the transactions involving 
JM&Co. meant that Henty was also a trusted agent of JM&Co. beyond the other duties 
in their interactions. At some point, between the company’s resurrection in 1851 and 
                                      
108 It is impossible without sufficient data to measure the percentage of trade between Henty and China 
when compared with other merchants. By using correspondence only, Henty was, by far, the most 
important Australian-based merchant in connection with any China-based firm. 
109 Letter from JM&Co. to Heussler & Co., 2 December 1878 Letters to India JMA C10/65. 
110 Letter from JM&Co. to J. Henty & Co., 26 May 1862 Letters to Europe JMA C11/30. A fuller 
description of the transaction is provided in Chapter 4. 
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1861,111 Henty had moved from just another merchant house in Melbourne to conduct 
business with, into a primary merchant house in that port. As I have noted earlier in this 
chapter, Henty’s communication with JM&Co. took up more than two-thirds of all 
correspondence that emanated from Melbourne to JM&Co.’s premises in China. His 
position as the leading agent for JM&Co. in that port, thus, placed Henty in a position to 
be able to provide access to other merchant houses in ports of New Zealand or other 
colonies. There is little doubt, Henty would have been seen by those other merchant 
houses as a portal to trading with JM&Co. The other houses understood the power of 
trust in international trade relationships and were eager to deal through Henty.  
 
In late 1859, James Henty acted as an intermediary on behalf of Melbourne Chinese 
merchant Lowe Kong Meng in procuring a shipment of opium from Hong Kong. Meng 
held significant stature within the Melbourne merchant community and thus was trusted 
by Henty. In this example, JM&Co., who supplied the opium, knew that Henty would 
be able to cover the cost and Henty was confident that Meng would pay for the goods 
upon arrival. There was no requirement for a weak tie to exist between Meng and 
JM&Co.112 Similarly, in 1879, the two related firms, Parbury, Lamb & Co. of Brisbane 
and Alfred Lamb & Co. of Sydney, for example, both went through Henty with their 
indents to JM&Co. for tea.113 Also in 1879, Henty acted for Alfred Shaw in transactions 
with JM&Co.114 Each firm were also informed by JM&Co. that they had to settle 
                                      
111  Peter Griggs, "Empire of Leaves: Tea Traders in Late Nineteenth-Century and Edwardian 
Melbourne." Victorian Historical Journal 87, no. 1 (2016): 33 
112 Letter from JM&Co. to J. Henty & Co., 27 December 1859 Letters to Europe JMA C11/27. Lowe 
Kong Meng had ordered prepared opium. This caused a problem as P&O refused to transport the drug 
given it was a liquid. The opium was therefore transported later along with a tea shipment. 
113 Letter from JM&Co. to Alfred Lamb & Co., 11 June 1879 Letters to India JMA C10/65. Letter from 
JM&Co. to Parbury Lamb & Co., 30 August 1879 Letters to India JMA C10/66. Henty were organising 
the indent and the finances for the transaction for Alfred Lamb & Co., who then extended the indent to 
cover a shipment by the s.s. Brisbane to their Brisbane counterparts, Parbury Lamb & Co. There does not 
appear to be a connection with F. Parbury & Co. showing in these transactions. Letter from J. Henty & 
Co. to JM&Co., 16 April 1879 Correspondence: Business Letters: Australasia JMA B6/3; Letter from 
JM&Co. to James Henty & Co., 12 June 1879 Letters to India JMA C10/65. 
114 Letter from JM&Co. to James Henty & Co., 29 August 1879 Letters to India JMA C10/66. 
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accounts with Henty.115 Yet, unlike Neill & Co. of Dunedin, there is little evidence that 
the colonial Australia firms had strong ties with Henty. That is, Henty noted the 
opportunity to provide a service as a commission agent, taking their commission on the 
transaction even though they would not have seen any of the tea, it being landed straight 
at Brisbane or Sydney.  
 
One extra advantage that James Henty had achieved over other merchants in Australia 
was their ability to invest the remittances of JM&Co. in the Australian market. At the 
end of 1879, two letters from JM&Co. to Australian merchants reveals this difference. 
JM&Co. explained to Henry Moore that he is to always remit the portion of funds due 
to JM&Co. as a draft on a London bank.116 However, at the same time, in a letter to 
Henty, JM&Co. states “in reference to your remark that our instructions seem to limit 
you in your investment of our funds to Bank Bills we beg to say that if a more 
advantageous rate can be secured, we shall be glad to receive drafts of any private firm 
of undoubted standing and respectability.”117 That is, JM&Co. had the confidence to 
allow Henty to invest their funds in drafts of Australian firms that would attain a better 
rate than the bank bills of London banks at the time. 
 
The position that Henty held within JM&Co.’s overall trade relationship with Australia 
was superior to others. However, did Henty and JM&Co. reach a position of, what 
business theorist Lars Lindkvist calls, a knowledge community within a community of 
                                      
115 Letter from JM&Co. to Alfred Shaw & Co., 30 August 1879 Letters to India JMA C10/66; Letter 
from JM&Co. to Parbury Lamb & Co., 30 August 1879 Letters to India JMA C10/66; Letter from 
JM&Co. to James Henty & Co., 29 August 1879 Letters to India JMA C10/66. Additional to the evidence 
is the implication that Henty was preferred over JM&Co.’s Brisbane agents, Unmack Heussler & Co., in 
dealing with the two other Brisbane firms. 
116 Letter from JM&Co. to H. Moore Esq., 9 October 1879 Letters to India JMA C10/66. 
117 Letter from JM&Co. to James Henty & Co., 9 October 1879 Letters to India JMA C10/66. 
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practice?118 Lindkvist’s work relates primarily to individual organisations and the 
hierarchies and cooperations that exist within. Yet, if the study is extended to the 
economic cooperation within a trade relationship, there is justification to consider that 
the communities of practice theory, in this case, extends beyond that of the level of a 
strong tie. Communities of practice existed within tightly knit groups that were working 
as one for a lengthy period and there are echoes of that in the relationship between 
Henty and JM&Co.119 The point presented is that the relationship between Henty and 
JM&Co. was extremely strong, more than just a strong tie but a close social structure 
that represented some equality in hierarchy as opposed to the numerous other merchant 
houses in Australia that were dealing with China-based firms. 
 
The connection between JM&Co. and Henty appears to have accentuated Henty’s work 
as a commission agent. Thus, there is also a case to say that the definition of strong and 
weak ties can be extended if we are considering trade relationships. Where a very strong 
tie exists in trading relationships, there is a substantial likelihood that one or both nodes 
of the tie would be commission agents for the other as part of their normal duties. This 
is related to the strength of the tie. The stronger the tie, the more trust exists between the 
two nodes to perform the commission agent activity on behalf of the other. 
Notwithstanding, working as a commission agent did not preclude the existence of 
performing import or export activities as well, on their own behalf. The joint-account 
transactions were a clear example. I do not intend to answer whether being a 
commission agent or whether being an importer/exporter were the primary method of 
business, however it is clear that both were utilised by the two firms successfully 
throughout the 1860s and 1870s.  
                                      
118  See Lars Lindkvist, "Knowledge Communities and Knowledge Collectivities: A Typology of 
Knowledge Work in Groups." Journal of Management Studies 42, no. 6 (2005): 1189-210.  
119 Lindkvist, "Knowledge Communities and Knowledge Collectivities.”: 1189. 
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 That relationship also created a hierarchy, such that the dominant firm placed itself in a 
superior position to its partners within this relationship. As networks are not just made 
up of single triangles or one-to-one relationships, this hierarchy attains a complexity 
where certain firms move up as their own relationships improve. In the example of Neill 
& Co., they altered their position. When they were formed, and through their connection 
with James Henty & Co., a weak tie with JM&Co. existed. By the end of the 1870s, that 
weak tie became a strong tie, accessing joint-account transactions with JM&Co. Their 
position within this hierarchy meant that they also acted for other firms in New Zealand; 
Cargill Gibb & Co. of Dunedin, is one example.120 Thus, the embodiment of strong and 
weak ties defines a hierarchical approach to the trade relationships between China-based 
firms and those in colonial Australia.  
 
At the summit of these hierarchical trees are the “agents” of the China-based firms. I 
have put forward a number of examples in this chapter and there are sure to be many 
more. Yet, even with the fact that there are many agents, the level of trust and the 
relationship between the China-based firm and the various Australasian firms will vary. 
From the work throughout this thesis, the connection between JM&Co. and James 
Henty & Co. stands out as the most important and one that should not be 
underestimated. Their connection goes beyond Henty assisting JM&Co. with problems 
that took place in the Australasian region, to the ability to act as commission agents for 
each other. The level of trust that was held in Henty by JM&Co. appeared much higher 
than with their other Australian agents. That is, the relationship between JM&Co. and 
Henty goes beyond the level of just a strong tie. That relationship became equally 
beneficial such that the two companies appeared equal in all dealings and, thus, why 
Lindkvist’s theory of communities of trust fits well to describe this relationship.  
                                      
120 Letter from JM&Co. to Neill & Co., 6 September 1879 Letters to India JMA C10/66. 
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Concluding comments 
 
The trade relationships between merchants in China and colonial Australia were 
extensive and complex. In the majority of cases, they involved a simple, single 
transaction relationship, a form of bartering. These relationships occurred where a good 
was exchanged for another good or a monetary remittance. In these cases, there was a 
tendency for a one-way level of trust. Some China-based merchants extended these 
simple relationships to include themselves in the transactions by creating joint-account 
relationships that spread the risk and trust between the two parties. Finally, there were 
those involved in inter-relationships where a company would be a dominant partner for 
two other companies, thus bringing those two in to connection. 
 
It is this third trade relationship that brings in the work of Mark Granovetter on strong 
and weak ties. Here, the dominant firm, or node within a triangle, uses its strong ties 
with two other firms to allow them to connect. The dominant firm is thus creating a 
triadic closure. Throughout the 1860s and 1870s there were numerous examples of 
triadic closures where dominant firms existed, whether in China, London, Australia or 
even New Zealand. These ties also graduated from weak ties to strong ties as the trust in 
the relationship improved. 
 
Through this thesis, the quantity and quality of relationships between China-based 
merchants with colonial merchants has been examined. Yet, these relationships are 
more than just the indents, the Bills of Lading and Invoices. They are firms of people 
with their own elements of rational thinking that created these networks. The various 
methods of communication were evolving, and developed the ties of trust that allowed 
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for both a stronger relationship but also the likelihood of the minimisation of transaction 
costs. 
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CONCLUSION 
 
Trade played a vital role in the development of the relationships between China and the 
Australian colonies during the 1860s and 1870s. The trade was extensive and involved 
many actors. For the small group of Western merchant houses in the Treaty Ports of 
China to the extensive number of Australian firms enticed by trade prospects, there was 
significant trade. For the Chinese merchants in Australia, who saw business 
opportunities associated with the gold-related migration boom to Australia, they 
effected their trade with China via the mechanisms provided for by Westerners, whether 
that be through communication or transport methodologies. For a number of merchant 
houses in London and the organisations they represented or were linked to, they created 
the glue that brought together many a transaction for the China – Australia trade. For 
those in other ports including Singapore, Calcutta, Galle, Manilla and those in New 
Zealand, each played their part in creating a complex trade network that facilitated the 
notionally simple China – Australia trade. And, for the methodology of transportation 
and communications that were enhanced through advancements in technology in the 
early 1870s, these improved information transfer and, through that, transaction certainty. 
This thesis has argued that, when combined, the above elements have shown that, 
during the 1860s and 1870s, there was a strong and extensive trade relationship between 
China and Australia. 
 
Economic and business historians, such as Noel Butlin and Sandra Tweedie, have 
written about Australian trade from the commencement of the British settlement in  
Australia to the late twentieth century. Their work, where it related to the China – 
Australia trade relationship decidedly relegates the nineteenth century to near 
insignificance. Their conclusions have been drawn by a belief that the trade was solely 
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related to tea imports and, thus, of little relevance to the history of colonial Australia. 
Their dismissal of any significant trade relationship has been questioned and countered 
in this thesis. Upon reducing the trade to the transaction level, an alternate picture 
emerges. This thesis has used the analysis of transactions to propose another perspective 
to the trade relationship, one involving an increasingly complex set of systems. Those 
systems catered for the movement of goods between various countries other than China 
or Australia as well as the transfer of funds, through drafts, between these same 
countries. The work of this thesis has shown that trade between China and Australia 
during the 1860s and 1870s has been worthy of analysis, an analysis that reveals a lot 
more about the relationship between the colonies of Australia and China than just the 
trade of tea. 
 
This thesis investigated the trade of three primary products – coal, sandalwood and tea. 
The results have provided an alternate view of the work done in the historiography of 
the trade between China and Australia. Specifically, it has created a micro-analysis of 
the trade by dissecting the transactions between the various merchant firms. The 
analysis in this study, thus, has gone beyond colonial trade statistics to the investigation 
of the three commodities individually, so as to create a more complete understanding of 
the way each of the various groups of actors were employed within the trade. The 
analysis was completed using the correspondence and financial records from various 
archives of firms based in China, colonial Australia and London. Of particular note is 
the fact that this thesis has drawn attention to the significant but intricate movement of 
finances to facilitate the transactions. The exploration of the financial element of the 
transactions has revealed a variety of remittance methods. Cases existed where the 
remittances were related to drafts, companion transactions in tea or as payment to firms 
located in third countries. That is, beyond the general statistical results that a macro-
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analysis provides, the remittances from the transactions have shown the way that trade 
between colonial Australia and China necessarily included the UK and other countries. 
 
The inclusion of England is an important step to understanding Australia’s overall trade 
processes with China during the late nineteenth century. As the centre of finance in the 
Western world, England, or more specifically, London, provided the base for a large 
proportion of the transactions that related to the China – Australia trade. Many firms in 
Australia, as in China, had agencies located in London so that the financial portion of 
the transaction could be completed there. In other cases, that financial portion also 
related to the purchase of goods in England for the Australian market. Examples of this 
connection, already shown, included Matheson & Co. of London as the agents for both 
JM&Co. and Jardine Skinner & Co. and F. Parbury & Co. as agents for a group of firms 
under banner of the Parbury family. The ability to access the London financial system 
bypassed the requirement of firms in China and Australia to transfer drafts or currency 
between each other, instead referring the financial portion of their trades to London. 
That also reduced a portion of the complexities of the transactions for the two main 
firms involved. 
 
The transactions between firms in China and Australia fell into a number of categories. 
The interpretation in this thesis of the correspondence related to the transactions 
between merchant houses in China and Australia identified various methods. The two 
most common methods were the single transaction and the joint-account transaction. 
The single transaction was either an incidence of goods sent to a commission agent in 
China or Australia for sale or the request of a shipment of goods from China for the 
Australian market. The latter option was primarily used for tea shipments. Although the 
transaction may have been repeated numerous times over the years and between the 
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same merchant houses, each was unique in terms of the conditions and details to its own 
environment. Variance existed for the time of sale, the competition, the exchange rate 
and the ability or desire to either sell or obtain the goods. 
 
The single transaction was the most common method of transaction. It was completed 
where only a small amount of trust was required between the two parties in the 
transaction. However, it was also, in most cases, not purely a simple bilateral exchange. 
The connection with London agents was still quite prevalent as was the ability to 
perform attached companion transactions, including the exchange of remittances for 
shipments of tea or the ability to draw on prospective sales to be used for either tea 
purchases or to be delivered as drafts to England for use for the purchase of goods to be 
sent to Australia from London or another port. The related amount of trust that existed 
between the two merchant firms involved varied owing to the type of transaction and 
where the financial portion of the transfer took place. In these single transactions most 
of the concern over trust was with the China-based merchant firm. 
 
The joint-account transaction was an alternate variant of the transaction that took place 
between firms such as JM&Co. or AH&Co. in their tea trade with a small and select 
group of trusted Australia-based merchants. In the joint-account transaction, the  
merchant firm in China purchased the tea and delivered it to the Australian merchant. 
The whole transaction process was completed on the basis that all the costs would be 
divided between the two firms on a percentage basis. For JM&Co., that was through an 
equal share, while AH&Co. chose only to take on 25 per cent of the costs of the 
transaction. In Australia and later also in New Zealand, JM&Co. and AH&Co. only 
provided this variant of the transaction to the firms they had a long and secure 
relationship with. These included, for JM&Co., James Henty in Melbourne, their 
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primary agents in Sydney together with a few other firms and, for AH&Co., the 
Wilkinson Brothers firms in Sydney and Melbourne and the Parbury group of firms in 
the same ports. 
 
The joint-account transactions that included Australian firms created a number of 
opportunities for the China-based merchant houses. Primarily, it allowed the China 
firms a method of investing in tea shipments, while not taking all of the risk. It allowed 
these firms to act beyond that of a commission house. The risk for the China firms was 
minimised as the Australian firm was not acting as a commission agent in this case, but 
as a merchant house purchasing and selling goods. This diversification and sharing of 
the risk created the need to purchase the best quality tea in China at the best price and 
selling the tea in Australia at the optimum sale price, when considering potential 
transaction costs related to storage and other requirements so as to counter competition 
or a poor market. Sharing the risk also altered the trust requirements. Trust increased to 
levels well beyond that required or existing for single transactions. There was an 
expectation that each firm would complete their part of the transaction by employing the 
best options available. As the Australian firms were selling the tea on behalf of both 
themselves and the China firm, the China firm had to trust that the Australian firm 
would remit the China firm’s portion of the sales. Thus, for the China firms the various 
Australian firms chosen to partake in the joint-account transactions were those whom 
they most trusted.  
 
The value of trust-based relationships altered again through the transactions relating to 
sugar shipments from Hong Kong to either Sydney or Melbourne. The choice by 
JM&Co. to only ship the sugar to their primary agents in those two ports meant that 
JM&Co. only trusted those two merchant houses to take care of the shipments on 
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JM&Co.’s behalf. The sugar shipments also meant that JM&Co. was now acting purely 
as a merchant, on behalf of the company that JM&Co. had become the primary owners 
of, the China Sugar Refinery. JM&Co. were shipping the sugar to Australia and using 
the two Australian firms as commission agents to sell the sugar and then remit the 
proceedings of the sale to either India or England.  
 
The Calcutta firm Jardine Skinner & Co. was an important partner in the joint-account 
tea transactions and the single sugar transactions to Australia. They accepted the 
remittances of JM&Co.’s portion of the transactions in the form of gold bars. The gold 
was then sold locally in order to purchase opium and cotton to ship to JM&Co. in one of 
the China ports. Jardine Skinner & Co. were part of a triangle of trade. The movement 
of gold to India, though, existed within a more complex trade adjustment for Australia’s 
balance of payments. Yet, unlike the requirement to use the Australian gold shipments 
to assist England with paying for her purchases from India, in this case the gold was 
part of the trade balance between India and China. That is, this study has shown that 
there existed an alternate multi-dimensional trade relationship that presented how much 
more intricate commercial relations were than the common perception of imports and 
exports, even in the China – Australia trade relationship. Thus, the transfer of gold for 
JM&Co. and the use of Jardine Skinner & Co. extend the theories of Hamashita and 
others to place Australia firmly within a multilateral, world economy of the time. 
 
The position that Jardine Skinner & Co. held within the China – Australia trade 
relationship exemplifies the need to understand the placement of this trade relationship 
within an existing and complex global multi-lateral financial system. Following the 
discovery of gold in NSW and Victoria in the 1850s, Australia not only found an 
important staple to fund its extensive importations, but also provided the UK with 
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another method of paying for its own debts. The Jardine Skinner & Co. situation 
extends the system to show where Australia fitted within the China – India trade 
relationship. Similarly, numerous transactions involving the trade of a commodity to 
China were then remitted to England, primarily to pay for goods that were to arrive in 
Australia. The examples discussed in this thesis have shown that trade involving 
Australia, whether with China or another country, in the post 1850s, was complex and 
gave Australia an important role to play in other trade relationships. 
 
Australia’s place within the global financial systems, when related to the China – 
Australia trade, had strong British imperial connections. Whether through England, 
British India or British-controlled Singapore, the trade used various colonial 
intermediaries to assist in the completion of the transactions. The inclusion of financial 
institutions based in England, provided significant assistance to the China – Australia 
trade relationship. Thus, in most circumstances, Australia’s trade with China was an 
extension of British trade. Mountford noted this in his analysis of pre-gold rush 
Australia. Yet, his choice not to extend this analysis beyond the 1850s is unfortunate. 
This study has continued Mountford’s work to show that the relationship that he put 
forward for the first half of the nineteenth century was well-cemented by the 1860s and 
1870s.  
 
The complexity and significance of the trade relationship between China and Australia 
during the 1860s and 1870s challenges the validity of the paradigm presented by several 
historians that the issues in the China – Australia relationship during the second half of 
the nineteenth century were overwhelmingly dominated by the Chinese presence in 
Australia. This view has relegated the bilateral trade relations to a minor role. By 
contrast, this thesis not only questions the relevance of this point of view,  but also 
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opens alternate avenues of interpretation of the relationship. The results of this work 
further assist in understanding the Chinese relationship between Chinese in Australia 
and those in China as well as how the Chinese worked with Westerners to complete 
their trade activities.  
 
Where Chinese merchants fit within the overall China – Australia trade relationship has 
received attention in this thesis. Their importance in the sandalwood trade in Singapore 
and in China cannot be denied as Chinese traders controlled the markets, one of which 
was Shanghai, where both JM&Co. and Siemssen & Co. had to operate. The Chinese 
traders in Shanghai were also important to the importation of coking coal from the 
Illawarra region, south of Sydney. The general need for their smelters was, after 1860, 
appended by the construction of arsenals in Shanghai and nearby regions. The export of 
gold, recycled metals and other goods by Chinese-Australian merchants to China 
allowed for the import of numerous Chinese goods to the Australian markets. Primarily, 
these were goods for Chinese consumption. A few Chinese merchants exported their 
gold to Galle on P&O vessels. In doing so, they both entered into and thus became part 
of the global multilateral financial system. 
 
There have been several limitations on the development of the interpretations of the 
trade-related transactions in this thesis. Mostly, this has been due to the lack of any 
previous significant investigation in this area of study. The Introduction stated that there 
is a dearth of historiography relating to the Western trade of Australia with China 
during the nineteenth century. The brief mentions in books by economic historians and 
the bare single chapters by Sandra Tweedie and Ben Mountford in their work on the 
trade between Australia and Asia has shown that these other studies have not taken full 
account of the intricacies of the trade transactions and, as a consequence, their 
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interpretations are incomplete. Thus, there was little evidence of what sources were 
available. The size of the archival material relating to trade between AH&Co., JM&Co. 
and others with Australian firms was overwhelming. For example, I have copies of 
approximately 22,000 records from the JM&Co. archives of which I have only partially 
viewed in developing this thesis. The period available researching in the archives did 
not allow me to examine each of the records as I obtained them. Once this material was 
interrogated, they revealed other connections that require future revisits and the 
development of various theories and questions that I was unable to properly investigate 
and answer in this thesis.  
 
I stated in the Introduction that only a minute number of Australian firms, that 
participated in the trade with China during the 1860s and 1870s, have kept records in 
archives. The archives of JM&Co., AH&Co. and other China-based firms include the 
correspondence to and from these Australian firms. A partial understanding of how 
these Australian firms operated can thus be revealed from the correspondence and other 
material including financial records. The correspondence, for example, has already 
informed us of those merchant firms involved in some of the relationships between the 
UK and Australia. While not complete in any way, what a project of this nature would 
divulge is a more complete grasp of how the UK and Australian firms were run and 
some of the business operations they were involved in. 
 
One by-product of this research has been the discovery of the part played by Australian 
firms in the relationship between JM&Co. in China and Jardine Skinner & Co. in 
Calcutta. Jardine Skinner was an important firm providing for JM&Co. as an exporter 
of goods to China such as opium and cotton. The extension through the gold shipments 
from Australia to Jardine Skinner & Co. helps clarify the Jardine Skinner & Co. – 
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JM&Co. relationship when it came to trade. Analysing the correspondence of each 
firm’s archives, in relation to these gold transfers, would reveal an even stronger picture 
and add to the current literature on their relationship. 
 
The fact that this thesis delivers a capsule of China – Australia trade history within the 
time boundaries of 1860 and 1880 also leaves the requirement to investigate what 
transpired in the period prior to 1860 and following 1880. Mountford delivered an 
outline of the pre-1850 period trade in his 2016 book. Similarly, Tweedie has provided 
an extensive analysis post 1901 Federation. Mountford’s work, though is only the tip of 
a rather large iceberg of Australia’s trade relationships with China, even for that pre-
1850 period. Chapter 1 provided a discussion that related to a number of merchants in 
Australia who were trading with Western merchant houses in Canton pre-1840 and 
Hong Kong and the Treaty Ports in the period leading up to 1860. Information exists 
about the identity of these merchants. But many details about the transactions in which 
they were involved are not known. Similarly, after 1880 the origin of tea for Australia 
slowly altered from China to India. The effect of this change on trade relations between 
Australia and China cannot simply be deciphered through the trade statistics. How it 
affected the trade relationships between firms requires more investigation of the 
correspondence between these firms. Significantly, did the relationship between Jardine 
Skinner & Co. and the Australian firms extend to the export of tea from India to 
Australia? Further, did the continuance of E&A’s steam trade between East Asia and 
the eastern seaboard of colonial Australia assist in maintaining a semblance of the China 
tea trade even when the Indian tea trade commenced its dominance? 
 
The development of transactions between Western merchants in China and Australia 
was hampered by uncertainty of information. Prior to the introduction of telegraph, this 
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was due to the length of time pertinent market advices travelled from port to port. 
Delays created that uncertainty in the accuracy and timeliness of the information for 
those who were making decisions about purchases and sales. Throughout this thesis 
there have been examples of how delays in the transfer of information created 
judgemental errors in the purchasing or sales of various commodities. The relationship 
between the period of time information took to be transferred and the methods of 
overcoming this impediment is an area of study that is worthy of future extended 
research. The transport time, calculated using shipping data, when compared with the 
interpretation of market advices by the merchants develops a picture of the problems 
associated with this uncertainty. The analysis is extended to interpreting the difference 
between the pre-1872 period, the 1872-1874 period and that after 1874. The initiation of 
telegraphic connection to Australia in 1872 and regular steam services between China 
and the eastern colonies of Australia after 1873 must have improved communication 
and thus reduced uncertainty. At what level the uncertainty was reduced and how the 
new communication methods were used is of interest. 
 
A number of Australian merchants, both Western and Chinese were involved in the 
movement of specie and bullion, also called “treasure” in government documents, to 
Galle and beyond. In Chapter 5, I discussed the usage of gold as a method of payment 
for that portion belonging to JM&Co. from the sales of tea or sugar. I also alluded to the 
fact that certain Chinese merchants commonly sent gold to Galle on the P&O steamers 
and that this was done with regard to payment for goods to be sent from Hong Kong to 
Australia. The export of gold and, to a lesser extent, silver as commodities of exchange 
assisted with the reduction of Australia’s trade deficit at the time. The study of the flow 
of such treasure to the region of South Asia is one that is worthwhile for further 
development. The work of Hamashita and others provides a basis for how treasure 
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added to the development and maintenance of a multi-lateral global economy. The 
research of Pope and others on Australian gold only captures the period after 1866. As 
noted, the largest importation of Australian gold into India took place in 1864. Pope’s 
work also does not discuss who was exporting the gold and, significantly, excludes the 
Chinese in the research. Where Australian merchants fitted within the multilateral 
global economy, especially from the point of view of those involved in the gold trade is 
thus of interest.  
 
There are two directions the research can take in addressing the question where 
Australian merchants fitted. The first method interrogates the correspondence and 
related records of the JM&Co. and Jardine Skinner & Co. archives. The records should 
deliver a more comprehensive description of how the gold arrived and was then used for 
the payment of goods to be exported to China. This research should also extend the 
knowledge of the placement of Australian firms within the triangle of trade. 
Complementing the first method is to analyse the export of the gold to India from 
Australia by investigating its continuous movement in the region. This method relies on 
analysing the shipping and other records related to the exportation of the gold from 
Victoria that are available through the local press of the time. Other archives should 
provide further evidence of connections, including those of Jardine Skinner & Co. 
Combined, research along such lines would create a more precise understanding of 
those firms that exported gold and, hopefully, who they exported to, why and what 
happened to the gold upon arrival in either Ceylon or India.  
 
The nineteenth century witnessed a growth and a maturity in the relationship between 
colonial Australia and China. Mountford rightly termed the first half of the nineteenth 
century, the title of his opening chapter, as “sometimes as a half-way house to China.” 
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By the second half of the century, the relationship changed significantly. Not only was 
Australia one of the places to which Chinese workers migrated temporarily for the 
purpose of extracting gold, it was a set of colonies that were involved in developing 
serious trade relations with China. Exports of staples destined for China as coal and 
sandalwood meant that the trade relationship went beyond the importation of tea. 
Instead, it included numerous firms engaged in complex relationships. Yet, more so, the 
trade relationships moved Australia past a position of just being a half-way house. By 
the 1850s, and certainly in the 1860s and 1870s, the foundations were created for the 
strong trade relationship that Australia holds with China at the present time. 
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Appendix 1 
 
Chinese port names using Chinese Postal Map Romanization 
 
 
Western Name Pinyin 
Canton Guangzhou (廣州) 
Chefoo Yantai (烟台) 
Chenkiang Zhenjiang (镇江) 
Hankow Hankou (汉⼜⼝口) [now part of Wuhan] 
Hoikow Haikou (海⼜⼝口) 
Kiukiang Jiujiang (九江) 
Nanking Nanjing (南京) 
Newchang Yingkou (营⼜⼝口) 
Ningpo Ningbo (宁波) 
Peking Beijing (北京) 
Swatow Shantou (汕头) 
Takao  Kaohsuing (⾼高雄) 
Tamsui Tamsui (淡⽔水) [now part of Taipei] 
Taiwan-fu Tainan (臺南) 
Tientsin Tianjin (天津) 
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Appendix 2 
 
Australian merchant houses with correspondence with Jardine Matheson & 
Co., 1860-1880 
 
Abbreviations: 
ADL  Adelaide, South Australia 
BRI Brisbane, Queensland 
BUN Bunbury, Queensland 
CAR Cairns, Queensland 
CKT Cooktown, Queensland 
CLA Clair, South Australia 
DGG Dungog, New South Wales 
FRE Fremantle, Western Australia 
GEE Geelong, Victoria 
GLD Geraldton, Western Australia 
HOB Hobart, Tasmania 
IPS Ipswich, Queensland 
LCT Launceston, Tasmania 
MAR Marlborough, Queensland 
MEL Melbourne, Victoria 
NEW Newcastle, New South Wales 
PER Perth, Western Australia 
POR Portland, Victoria 
RKC Rockhampton, Queensland 
SYD Sydney, New South Waled 
TWN Townsville, Queensland 
YRK York, Western Australia 
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Australian Firm Port Colony No. Letters 
Antonio Rodriguez ADL SA 1 
Harold Bros ADL SA 1 
HP Hansenberg ADL SA 1 
Jas Derwent ADL SA 1 
WC Harrison & Co ADL SA 4 
Wm Morgant ADL SA 1 
Alfred Shaw & Co BRI QLD 3 
Parbury Lamb & CO BRI QLD 3 
Parry Crake BRI QLD 1 
Unmack Heussler & Co BRI QLD 29 
William D Box BRI QLD 1 
David Eedle BUN QLD 3 
Wm Spencer BUN QLD 1 
CJ Scott & Co CAR QLD 2 
Walsh & Co CKT QLD 2 
JWD Bain CLA SA 1 
E Camden DGG NSW 1 
Annele Brig FRE WA 1 
Bickley FRE WA 16 
Geo Sanderson FRE WA 1 
J&W Bateman FRE WA 2 
JH Carter FRE WA 46 
John M Arthurs FRE WA 1 
Marmion FRE WA 49 
Pearse H Ouston FRE WA 6 
Rockingham Mining FRE WA 2 
Thos. Marks FRE WA 1 
Walter Bateman FRE WA 12 
James Sinclair GEE WA 2 
Scott & Gale GLD WA 18 
Crowther & Co GLD WA 5 
Brown & Co HOB TAS 1 
Macfarlane Bros HOB TAS 9 
Weinholf Walker IPS QLD 5 
Geo. Byworth LCT TAS 2 
S Tulloch LCT TAS 6 
C Ruck Keene MAR QLD 1 
AJ Chambers MEL VIC 1 
Alcock & Co MEL VIC 2 
Alfred Wrolby & Co MEL VIC 1 
Bright Bros MEL VIC 1 
C Watt & Co MEL VIC 2 
Crowther Scott & Co MEL VIC 1 
Cuthbertson & Co MEL VIC 1 
Dalgety Blakcwood & Co MEL VIC 1 
Downie Murphy MEL VIC 21 
Duncan Consie MEL VIC 1 
GW Cole MEL VIC 18 
J Balfour & Co MEL VIC 1 
J Robertson MEL VIC 1 
James Henty MEL VIC 531 
 392 
Australian Firm Port Colony No. Letters 
Jas Insight MEL VIC 1 
Jas Lawrence MEL VIC 29 
Jas McEwan & Co MEL VIC 1 
JE Beaves & Co MEL VIC 1 
Jennings MEL VIC 1 
JH Clough & Co MEL VIC 10 
JH Thomas MEL VIC 1 
JH White & Co MEL VIC 3 
JJ Marshall MEL VIC 2 
John McArthur MEL VIC 3 
Josiah Dummelow MEL VIC 1 
JW Jackson MEL VIC 1 
Mclean Rigg & Co MEL VIC 10 
Minmi Colliery MEL VIC 5 
Poms Rutherford & Co MEL VIC 1 
Prost Kholer MEL VIC 8 
R. Rae MEL VIC 1 
Robert Harper & Co MEL VIC 19 
Robertson Errand MEL VIC 2 
Rolfe & Co MEL VIC 2 
S deBeer & Co MEL VIC 1 
Smith MEL VIC 1 
Spence Bros MEL VIC 9 
Thos E Angel MEL VIC 1 
Thos. H. Barlow MEL VIC 5 
W Clifford MEL VIC 1 
William Turner MEL VIC 1 
Wiseman Bros MEL VIC 2 
WM Guiness MEL VIC 4 
Wm. Rigg MEL VIC 1 
Woolley Stephens MEL VIC 1 
Aus Agric Co NEW NSW 20 
Bingle & Co NEW NSW 80 
Bingle White & Co NEW NSW 53 
Chas Robertson NEW NSW 1 
Chas Stokes NEW NSW 158 
J & A Brown NEW NSW 4 
JB Ellis NEW NSW 3 
John Reid NEW NSW 2 
Joseph Ward & Co NEW NSW 9 
Laidley Ireland & Co NEW NSW 1 
Lane & Co NEW NSW 1 
McLelland NEW NSW 1 
Prost Kohler NEW NSW 3 
Rob B Wallace NEW NSW 99 
Shepheard Hart & Co NEW NSW 3 
Wallsend Coal NEW NSW 2 
Bollason PER WA 2 
Chas Shenton PER WA 85 
Glyde & Son PER WA 21 
Henry Saw PER WA 24 
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P. Mason PER WA 17 
Padbury Loton & Co PER WA 1 
WA Coop Soc PER WA 1 
Henty Learnmonth POR VIC 1 
Brown & Risen RKC QLD 1 
GS Curtis RKC QLD 2 
Alex Campbell SYD NSW 1 
Alfred Lamb & Co SYD NSW 13 
Beilby & Scott SYD NSW 3 
Brown & Co SYD NSW 202 
Bulli Mining Co SYD NSW 2 
Cohen Harris & Co SYD NSW 3 
Collishaw Bros SYD NSW 2 
Daniell King & Co SYD NSW 99 
ES Chester & Co SYD NSW 4 
Fergusson Webb SYD NSW 4 
Francis Macaulb SYD NSW 1 
Fred J Davies SYD NSW 1 
FW Jackson SYD NSW 1 
G Ferguson SYD NSW 8 
Geo S Beaver SYD NSW 1 
George King & Co SYD NSW 161 
Gilchrist Watt & Co SYD NSW 3 
Henry Chas Mitchell SYD NSW 1 
Henry Fisher Wen SYD NSW 2 
Henry Moore SYD NSW 346 
J & A Brown SYD NSW 1 
J Banks SYD NSW 1 
J Snorbert SYD NSW 1 
JA Macqueen SYD NSW 1 
James Longridge SYD NSW 1 
Jas H Bates SYD NSW 1 
Jas M Bogie SYD NSW 1 
JE Manning SYD NSW 5 
JG Hanks SYD NSW 1 
JG Sawkins SYD NSW 1 
JL Nicholls SYD NSW 1 
John Cuthbert SYD NSW 5 
John M Pyne SYD NSW 1 
John P Clark SYD NSW 1 
K de Piotrosski SYD NSW 1 
L. Nicholson SYD NSW 3 
Leuder & Co SYD NSW 4 
Montifore Joseph & Co SYD NSW 1 
Mueller SYD NSW 4 
Nicholls Bros SYD NSW 44 
Rabone Feez & Co SYD NSW 3 
Robert J King SYD NSW 15 
Scot. Aus. Mining SYD NSW 4 
TG Sawkins SYD NSW 1 
Thacker Daniell SYD NSW 77 
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Thos. Drayson SYD NSW 1 
Willis Lloyd & Co SYD NSW 2 
WL Brockman SYD NSW 1 
Wm Leipold SYD NSW 1 
Becke Master & Co TWN QLD 2 
JH Monger YRK WA 117 
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Australian merchant houses with correspondence with Augustine Heard & 
Co., 1860-1880. 
 
Abbreviations: 
ADL  Adelaide, South Australia 
BRI Brisbane, Queensland 
GAW Gawler, South Australia 
MEL Melbourne, Victoria 
NEW Newcastle, New South Wales 
SYD Sydney, New South Waled 
 
Australian Firm Port Colony No. Letters 
Capt Askins ADL SA 1 
Elder Smith & Co ADL SA 4 
Samuel White Esq ADL SA 2 
Wm Morgan & Co ADL SA 2 
Stewart & Hammant BRI QLD 6 
W Duffield & Co GAW SA 24 
Bank NSW MEL VIC 1 
Capt Hansen MEL VIC 1 
Capt WA Magill MEL VIC 11 
EL Montefiore Esq MEL VIC 1 
Francis & McPherson MEL VIC 1 
G Parbury Esq MEL VIC 23 
Jas C. Robertson & Co MEL VIC 1 
Lorimer Marwood & Rome MEL VIC 26 
Melbourne, Newcastle & Minmi Colliery MEL VIC 2 
Newell & Co. MEL VIC 2 
NS Anderson & Co MEL VIC 1 
Parbury Bros MEL VIC 23 
Paterson Ray Palmer & Co MEL VIC 4 
Rolfe & Co MEL VIC 12 
Union Bank of Australia MEL VIC 1 
Wilkinson Bros MEL VIC 61 
<unknown> Coal Mining Co NEW NSW 1 
Bingle & Co NEW NSW 5 
Chas F Stokes & Co NEW NSW 30 
Co-op Mining Co NEW NSW 1 
Laidley Ireland & Co NEW NSW 5 
Prost Kholer & Co NEW NSW 1 
R. H. Grierson Esq NEW NSW 3 
Robert B. Wallace Esq NEW NSW 17 
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Bank NSW SYD NSW 1 
Beilby & Scott SYD NSW 66 
C. Fearon Esq SYD NSW 1 
Capt Grand SYD NSW 1 
CSR Co SYD NSW 2 
Edwin J. Beilby & Co SYD NSW 2 
Fanning Griffiths & Co SYD NSW 16 
Frederick ? Esq SYD NSW 1 
Gilchrist Hailer & Co SYD NSW 1 
Jas Murimant/Marriman Esq SYD NSW 3 
Laidley Ireland & Co SYD NSW 11 
Lamb Parbury & Co SYD NSW 5 
Lambton Minmi Colliery Agency SYD NSW 1 
Lorimer Marwood & Rome SYD NSW 13 
Mitchell & Co SYD NSW 5 
Oriental Banking Corp SYD NSW 1 
Parbury Bros SYD NSW 110 
R Towns & Co SYD NSW 14 
Samuel Priz Esq SYD NSW 1 
Tomago Coal Mining Co SYD NSW 4 
Veal d'Aram SYD NSW 1 
WH Eldred Esq SYD NSW 51 
Wilkingson Bros SYD NSW 93 
Unknown SYD NSW 4 
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Appendix 4 
 
Coal Exports from New South Wales, 1863-1880.1 
 
 
 
Table 1. List of all ports importing coal from either Sydney or Newcastle, New South 
Wales, 1863-1880. 
 
Region	   Country	  or	  Port	  
Australasia	   New	  Guinea	  
	  
New	  Zealand	  
Pacific	   Fiji	  
	  
Guam	  
	  
Honolulu	  
	  
New	  Caledonia	  
	  
South	  Sea	  Islands	  
South	  America	   Arica	  
	  
Callao	  
	  
Guayaquil	  
	  
Iquique	  
	  
La	  Plata	  
	  
Valparaiso	  
Central	  America	   Mexico	  
	  
Panama	  
North	  America	   Astoria	  
	  
Boston	  
	  
Kodiak	  
	  
Portland,	  MA	  
	  
San	  Francisco	  
North	  Asia	  (Russia)	   Petropavlovsk	  
East	  Asia	   Cebu	  
	  
Fuzhou	  
	  
Hong	  Kong	  
	  
Ilo	  Ilo	  
	  
Macao	  
	  
Manilla	  
	  
Nagasaki	  
	  
Ningpo	  
	  
Shanghai	  
	  
Xiamen	  
	  
Yantai	  
	  
Yokohama	  
South	  East	  Asia	   Bangkok	  
                                      
1  Statistical Register of New South Wales for the Year … (1863-80) Sydney: Thomas Rickards, 
Government Printer, (1864-81). 
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Batavia	  
	  
Hanoi	  
	  
Java	  
	  
Kupang	  
	  
Makassar	  
	  
Maluku	  Islands	  
	  
Mawlamyine	  
	  
Padang	  
	  
Pathein	  
	  
Penang	  
	  
Saigon	  
	  
Siam	  
	  
Singapore	  
	  
Sumatra	  
	  
Timor	  
	  
Yangon	  
South	  Asia	  and	   Bombay	  
Indian	  Ocean	   Bourbon	  
	  
Calcutta	  
	  
Colombo/Ceylon	  
	  
Galle	  
	  
Kakinada	  
	  
Karachi	  
	  
Madras	  
	  
Mauritius	  
	  
Negapatam	  
	  
Nicobar	  Islands	  
	  
Thoothukudi	  
Other	  Asia	   Aden	  
	  
Basra	  
Africa	   Cape	  of	  Good	  Hope	  
	  
Maputo	  Bay	  
	  
Port	  Natal	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Table 2. Summary by region and countries importing coal from New South Wales, 
1863-1880. 
 
	   	  
Total	  Tonnage	   Years	  with	  
Average	  
Tonnage	  
Region	   Country	   1863-­‐80	   shipments	   per	  year	  
Australasia	   New	  Guinea	   370	   2	   185	  
	  
New	  Zealand	   2038844	   18	   113269	  
Pacific	   Fiji	   5062	   6	   844	  
	  
Guam	   25828	   11	   2348	  
	  
Honolulu	   35464	   9	   3940	  
	  
New	  Caledonia	   65324	   18	   3629	  
	  
South	  Sea	  Island	   47614	   18	   2645	  
South	   Argentina	   502	   1	   502	  
America	   Chile	   51244	   17	   3014	  
	  
Ecuador	   1464	   2	   732	  
	  
Peru	   22100	   13	   1700	  
Central	   Mexico	   1400	   1	   1400	  
America	   Panama	   3875	   3	   1292	  
North	   United	  States	   1381705	   18	   76761	  
America	   	   	   	   	  
North	  Asia	   Russia	   120930	   18	   6718	  
East	  Asia	   China2	   1575190	   18	   87511	  
	  
Japan	   131192	   14	   9371	  
	  
Macao	   410	   1	   410	  
	  
Philippines	   162514	   13	   12501	  
South	  East	  
Asia	  
Netherlands	  
East	  Indies	   252758	   18	   14042	  
	  
Malaysia	   586	   1	   586	  
	  
Burma	   16896	   8	   2112	  
	  
Singapore	   182802	   16	   11425	  
	  
Siam	   5322	   8	   665	  
	  
Timor	   897	   3	   299	  
	  
Indo	  China	   19236	   8	   2405	  
South	  Asia	   India	   263167	   18	   14620	  
	  
Pakistan	   1522	   2	   761	  
	  
Ceylon	   113180	   18	   6288	  
West	  Asia	   Iraq	   1030	   1	   1030	  
	  
Yemen	   2060	   1	   2060	  
Indian	   Mauritius	   100608	   18	   5589	  
Ocean	   Nicobar	  Islands	   160	   1	   160	  
Africa	   Mozambique	   188	   1	   188	  
	  
South	  Africa	   2667	   3	   889	  
 
  
                                      
2 China includes Hong Kong. 
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Appendix 5 
 
Coal mining firms involved in the overseas export trade to China, 1860-
1880, with the year they commenced exports.1 
 
 
 
Hunter Valley/Newcastle Region 
Australian Agricultural Company 1831 
J. & A. Brown 1850 
Co-operative Company 1861 
Wallsend 1861 
Waratah 1863 
Lambton 1864 
Greta 1867 
New Lambton 1868 
Newcastle Coal Company 1877 
Australasian Coal Company 1877 
Ferndale Colliery 1878 
 
Illawarra Region 
Bellambi Coal Company 1857 
Bulli Coal Company 1863 
 
  
                                      
1 Schmitz. Output and Employment: 38, 39, 41, 42, 49, 52, 61, 73, 79, 97, 117, 119, 162, 163. 
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Appendix 6 
 
Shipping from New South Wales to China, 1860-1880. 
 
1. Number of vessels departing Newcastle for Chinese ports. 
2. Number of vessels departing Sydney for Chinese ports. 
3. Tonnage of coal cargo in vessels departing from Newcastle for Chinese ports. 
4. Tonnage of coal cargo in vessels departing from Newcastle for Chinese ports. 
 
Abbreviations: 
AMY  Amoy 
CHE Chefoo 
FZH Foochow 
HKG Hong Kong 
SHA Shanghai 
NPO Ningpo 
SWA Swatow 
TTN Tientsin 
CHN Other China not designated 
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1. Number of vessels departing Newcastle for Chinese ports. 
Dest. AMY CHE FZH HKG SHA NPO SWA TTN CHN Total 
1860 	   	   	   14	   2	   	   	   	   2	   18	  
1861 	   	   	   6	   4	   	   	   	   1	   11	  
1862 	   	   	   14	   27	   	   	   	   	   41	  
1863 	   	   1	   2	   23	   	   	   	   	   26	  
1864 	   	   1	   13	   19	   	   	   	   1	   34	  
1865 	   	   1	   5	   4	   	   	   	   	   10	  
1866 	   	   	   21	   24	   1	   	   	   1	   47	  
1867 	   	   4	   20	   22	   1	   	   	   	   47	  
1868 	   1	   10	   42	   48	   2	   	   	   	   103	  
1869 2	   5	   4	   38	   35	   1	   	   	   	   85	  
1870 	   4	   1	   45	   20	   	   	   	   	   70	  
1871 	   2	   	   39	   9	   	   	   	   	   50	  
1872 3	   5	   2	   59	   12	   	   	   	   	   81	  
1873 4	   3	   	   79	   24	   	   	   	   	   110	  
1874 5	   3	   2	   47	   16	   	   	   	   	   73	  
1875 3	   3	   2	   68	   6	   	   	   	   	   82	  
1876 1	   1	   	   47	   7	   	   	   	   	   56	  
1877 2	   6	   	   77	   19	   	   	   	   2	   106	  
1878 2	   4	   	   77	   8	   	   2	   1	   	   94	  
1879 3	   4	   	   37	   4	   	   2	   	   1	   51	  
1880 	   	   1	   53	   9	   	   1	   	   	   64	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2. Number of vessels departing Sydney for Chinese ports. 
Dest. AMY CHE FZH HKG SHA NPO SWA TTN CHN Total 
1860 	   	   	   19	   8	   	    	   1	   28	  
1861 	   	   	   18	   9	   	    	   	   27	  
1862 	   	   	   16	   56	   	    	   	   72	  
1863 	   	   1	   14	   31	   	    	   	   46	  
1864 	   	   5	   19	   32	   	    	   	   56	  
1865 	   	   5	   16	   32	   3	    	   	   56	  
1866 	   	   2	   26	   50	   	    	   	   78	  
1867 	   	   3	   20	   36	   6	    	   	   65	  
1868 	   1	   2	   29	   38	   2	    	   	   72	  
1869 1	   1	   1	   31	   28	   1	    	   	   63	  
1870 	   	   2	   24	   16	   	    	   	   42	  
1871 2	   	   3	   39	   22	   	    	   	   66	  
1872 3	   	   2	   30	   25	   	    	   	   60	  
1873 2	   1	   2	   23	   27	   	    	   	   55	  
1874 3	   	   3	   26	   34	   	    	   1	   67	  
1875 	   2	   2	   37	   24	   	    	   	   65	  
1876 1	   	   	   27	   24	   	    	   	   52	  
1877 1	   	   1	   24	   36	   	    	   	   62	  
1878 1	   	   2	   29	   18	   	    	   	   50	  
1879 1	   	   3	   21	   31	   	    	   	   56	  
1880 	   1	   1	   31	   18	   	    	   	   51	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3. Tonnage of coal cargo in vessels departing from Newcastle for Chinese ports. 
Dest. AMY CHE FZH HKG SHA NPO SWA TTN CHN Total 
1860    6751 730    1600 9081 
1861    2950 1173    362 4485 
1862    9704 16843     26547 
1863   0 1030 15323     16353 
1864   355 6318 10150    300 17123 
1865   300 2883 1411     4594 
1866    12325 12637 195   565 25722 
1867   1483 11431 13842 372    27128 
1868  400 3160 23475 31861 840    59736 
1869 1158 2594 1635 21342 28352 360    55441 
1870  1540 300 26085 14771     42696 
1871  945  22972 5787     29704 
1872 1253 2459 542 48450 11284     63988 
1873 1975 1385  52728 22749     78837 
1874 2097 1535 831 37710 13583     55756 
1875 978 1643 677 56057 3690     63045 
1876 944 422  30523 4923     36812 
1877 713 2644  69590 14404    1542 88893 
1878 883 1925  71707 6368  1050 525  82458 
1879 1388 2090  34884 3547  977  630 43516 
1880   420 47798 4620  317   53155 
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4. Tonnage of coal cargo in vessels departing from Newcastle for Chinese ports. 
Dest. AMY CHE FZH HKG SHA NPO SWA TTN CHN Total 
1860    12049 2469   1000  15518 
1861    4609 5493     10102 
1862    6282 31928     38210 
1863   123 8646 21932    0 30701 
1864   490 9862 18389     28741 
1865   1195 6563 22288 1114    31160 
1866   542 15188 32539 87    48356 
1867   1236 8719 23657 2498    36110 
1868  300 850 14638 30608 870    47266 
1869 450 322 400 15766 18128 550    35616 
1870   840 11740 11432     24012 
1871 1847  955 19335 14455     36592 
1872 1315  420 13787 19545     35067 
1873 260  900 10389 23610     35159 
1874 1415  1250 13887 29079    430 46061 
1875  885 850 21839 22854     46428 
1876 400   20601 18852     39853 
1877 800  600 13807 31104     46311 
1878 748 0 955 10781 17317     29801 
1879 480  1770 3798 27774     33822 
1880  500 550 5974 12918     19942 
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Appendix 7 
 
Shipping between Hong Kong and the ports of Australia and New Zealand, 
1860-1880.1 
 
 
 
A. Shipping inwards to Hong Kong from Australia 
and New Zealand 
    
 
Inwards 
  Year with cargoes in ballast Total 
1860 45 4 49 
1861 25 18 43 
1862 40 25 65 
1863 24 10 34 
1864 48 8 56 
1865 26 9 35 
1866 53 1 54 
1867 51 0 51 
1868 80 0 80 
1869 87 1 88 
1870 77 0 77 
1871 94 0 94 
1872 96 1 97 
1873 86 0 86 
1874 89 1 90 
1875 114 2 116 
1876 113 0 113 
1877 118 0 118 
1878 103 1 104 
1879 71 1 72 
1880 80 0 80 
 
 
 
  
                                      
1 Hong Kong Blue Book for the Year … (1860-80) Hong Kong: Govt. Printer, (1861-81). 
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B. Shipping outwards from Hong Kong to 
Australia and New Zealand 
    
 
Outwards 
  Year with cargoes in ballast Total 
1860 11 0 11 
1861 24 0 24 
1862 15 0 15 
1863 16 0 16 
1864 14 0 14 
1865 12 0 12 
1866 12 0 12 
1867 7 1 8 
1868 16 0 16 
1869 18 0 18 
1870 13 0 13 
1871 37 0 37 
1872 16 2 18 
1873 29 1 30 
1874 22 0 22 
1875 36 0 36 
1876 38 0 38 
1877 43 0 43 
1878 35 0 35 
1879 28 0 28 
1880 28 0 28 
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Appendix 8 
 
New South Wales exports to China, 1863-1880 (£) 
 
Year Coal Gold Other Total 
1863 40,813 50,960 9,867 101,640 
1864 36,185 47,834 18,904 102,923 
1865 31,294 55,500 22,438 109,232 
1866 59,581 23,071 34,803 117,455 
1867 50,305 18,951 24,100 93,356 
1868 66,148 17,601 17,821 101,570 
1869 56,215 14,008 21,401 91,624 
1870 38,935 600 29,632 69,167 
1871 36,844 44,457 18,162 99,463 
1872 54,572 67,829 19,375 141,776 
1873 86,442 53,022 40,377 179,841 
1874 86,437 58,082 75,175 219,694 
1875 105,681 55,127 46,520 207,328 
1876 72,720 61,633 35,734 170,087 
1877 103,894 69,319 31,680 204,893 
1878 84,302 60,210 35,402 179,914 
1879 57,006 59,720 2,117 118,843 
1880 45,017 71,822 1,166 118,005 
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Appendix 9 
 
Trials of Australia Coal – 1 May 18621
 
                                      
1 Australian coal. Return, showing the result of the recent experiments under the direction of the 
Admiralty, as to the value for naval purposes, of Australian coal House of Commons, no. 337 (1862): 1. 
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Appendix 10 
 
Imports of Foreign Coals to Shanghai, in tons, for the period 1865 to 1870.1 
 
 
Origin 1865 1866 1867 1868 1869 1870 
Great Britain 51,325 60,705 40,987 59,881 41,607 17,210 
America 11,217 10,879 7,362 7,797 11,720 5,705 
Australia 28,689 51,861 34,706 58,340 48,717 27,730 
Japan .. 9,373 22,523 15,344 11,041 23,009 
Formosa .. 6,190 6,005 17,613 12,965 5,759 
Russia .. .. .. 1,811 375 600 
Total 91,231 139,088 111,583 160,786 126,425 80,013 
 
 
  
                                      
1 China. No. 2 (1872). Commercial reports from Her Majesty’s consuls in China. 1870. House of 
Commons no. C.567 (1872): 6. 
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Appendix 11 
 
Freight Rates from New South Wales to China, 1865-1874 
 
 
 
Freight rates for coal shipments from Sydney and Newcastle to the ports of 
Hong Kong and Shanghai from May 1865 to March 18741 
 
Notes: 
1. The date is given in MM-DD 
2. Where only one figure was provided, I have given that as both the low 
and high value. 
3. Blank spaces mean that either no charter was completed in the month or 
that the charter rate was not given. Some of these were home charters or 
similar. 
4. All values are in shillings per ton of coal shipped. 
 
  
                                      
1 Obtained from Empire newspaper’s monthly “Freight Rates and Charters” column 
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Table 1. From Sydney to Hong Kong (HKG) and Shanghai (SHA) 
	   	   	  
in	  s.	  /	  ton	  
	   	  Year	   Date	   HKG(low)	   HKG	  (high)	   SHA	  (low)	   SHA	  (high)	  
1865	   05-­‐20	  
	   	  
23	   35	  
	  
06-­‐21	  
	   	   	   	  
	  
09-­‐21	  
	   	  
28	   29	  
	  
10-­‐21	  
	   	  
29	   29	  
	  
11-­‐21	   23	   23	   29	   30	  
	  
12-­‐21	   22.5	   22.5	   28	   30	  
1866	   01-­‐20	   21	   21	   31	   32	  
	  
02-­‐19	   21	   21	   30	   33	  
	  
03-­‐21	   21	   22.5	   30	   33	  
	  
04-­‐21	   22.5	   24	   32	   35	  
	  
05-­‐23	   21	   24.6	   30	   34	  
	  
06-­‐23	  
	   	  
30	   31	  
	  
07-­‐23	  
	   	  
30	   31	  
	  
08.23	   22	   22.5	   33	   33.5	  
	  
09-­‐22	  
	   	  
30	   32	  
	  
10-­‐23	   23	   23	   28.5	   28.5	  
	  
11-­‐23	  
	   	  
22.5	   22.5	  
	  
12-­‐23	   20	   20	   30	   30	  
1867	   01-­‐23	  
	   	  
30	   32	  
	  
02-­‐21	   20	   20	  
	   	  
	  
03-­‐23	  
	   	  
32	   34	  
	  
04-­‐23	   23	   23	   35	   35	  
	  
05-­‐23	   23	   23	   35	   35.25	  
	  
06-­‐23	   23	   23	   36	   36	  
	  
07-­‐23	   23	   23	   40	   40	  
	  
08-­‐23	  
	   	  
40.5	   41	  
	  
09-­‐23	   25	   25	   42	   44	  
	  
10-­‐23	  
	   	   	   	  
	  
11-­‐23	  
	   	   	   	  
	  
12-­‐23	   28	   28	   45	   45	  
1868	   02-­‐01	   33	   33	   46	   47	  
	  
02-­‐29	   25	   30	   42	   42	  
	  
03-­‐27	   25	   25	   42	   42	  
	  
04-­‐22	   32	   32	  
	   	  
	  
05-­‐20	  
	   	  
42	   42	  
	  
06-­‐17	   32	   32	   45	   48.5	  
	  
07-­‐15	   34	   34	   45	   47.5	  
	  
08-­‐12	   29	   36	   44	   45	  
	  
09-­‐09	   31	   32	   42	   42	  
	  
10-­‐09	  
	   	  
38	   40	  
	  
11-­‐06	  
	   	  
35	   35	  
	  
12-­‐04	  
	   	   	   	  1869	   01-­‐29	  
	   	   	   	  
	  
02-­‐26	   15	   20	   28	   28	  
	  
03-­‐26	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in	  s.	  /	  ton	  
	   	  Year	   Date	   HKG(low)	   HKG	  (high)	   SHA	  (low)	   SHA	  (high)	  
	  
04-­‐21	  
	   	  
26	   26	  
	  
05-­‐19	   15	   17	   25	   25	  
	  
06-­‐16	   15	   15	  
	   	  
	  
07-­‐14	   10	   10	   20	   20	  
	  
08-­‐11	  
	   	   	   	  
	  
09-­‐08	   15	   15	  
	   	  
	  
10-­‐08	  
	   	   	   	  
	  
11-­‐05	  
	   	  
18	   18	  
	  
12-­‐03	   10	   12	  
	   	  
	  
12-­‐31	  
	   	   	   	  1870	   01-­‐28	   11	   11	  
	   	  
	  
02-­‐25	   10	   10	   20	   21	  
	  
03-­‐25	   9	   10	  
	   	  
	  
05-­‐18	   11	   11	   20	   20	  
	  
06-­‐15	   11	   12	   21	   21	  
	  
07-­‐13	   12	   12	   20	   20	  
	  
08-­‐10	  
	   	  
15.5	   15.5	  
	  
09-­‐07	  
	   	   	   	  
	  
10-­‐07	  
	   	   	   	  
	  
11-­‐04	   16	   16	   21	   21	  
	  
12-­‐02	   17	   17	  
	   	  
	  
12-­‐30	  
	   	   	   	  1871	   01-­‐27	   20	   23.5	   27	   32	  
	  
02-­‐24	  
	   	  
32	   32.5	  
	  
03-­‐24	   23	   23.5	  
	   	  
	  
04-­‐19	   24.5	   24.5	  
	   	  
	  
06-­‐14	  
	   	  
32	   32	  
	  
07-­‐12	   26	   28	   30	   31	  
	  
08-­‐09	  
	   	  
30.5	   30.5	  
	  
09-­‐06	   24.5	   25	   31	   33.5	  
	  
10-­‐06	   24.25	   27	   35	   40	  
	  
11-­‐03	  
	   	   	   	  
	  
12-­‐01	  
	   	   	   	  
	  
12-­‐29	   34	   35	  
	   	  1872	   02-­‐26	  
	   	  
42	   44	  
	  
04-­‐20	   39	   39	   42	   43	  
	  
05-­‐18	  
	   	   	   	  
	  
06-­‐18	  
	   	  
42	   42	  
	  
07-­‐13	  
	   	  
42	   42	  
	  
08-­‐10	  
	   	  
40	   43	  
	  
09-­‐07	   39	   40	   40	   45	  
	  
10-­‐07	   38	   38	   38	   44	  
	  
11-­‐04	  
	   	  
34	   34	  
	  
12-­‐02	   37.5	   37.5	   43.5	   43.5	  
	  
12-­‐30	  
	   	  
42	   42	  
1873	   02-­‐24	  
	   	  
43	   44	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in	  s.	  /	  ton	  
	   	  Year	   Date	   HKG(low)	   HKG	  (high)	   SHA	  (low)	   SHA	  (high)	  
	  
04-­‐19	  
	   	  
40	   40	  
	  
05-­‐17	  
	   	  
36	   40	  
	  
06-­‐14	  
	   	  
33.5	   33.5	  
	  
07-­‐12	   30	   30	   35	   35	  
	  
08-­‐09	   30	   30	   31	   35	  
	  
09-­‐06	   20	   20	   30	   30	  
	  
10-­‐06	  
	   	  
32	   32	  
	  
11-­‐03	   24	   24	   32	   33	  
	  
12-­‐01	   30	   30	  
	   	  
	  
12-­‐29	  
	   	   	   	  1874	   02-­‐14	   25	   25	  
	   	  
	  
03-­‐14	  
	   	  
30	   30	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Table 2. From Newcastle to Hong Kong (HKG) and Shanghai (SHA) 
	   	   	  
in	  s.	  /	  ton	  
	   	  Year	   Date	   HKG(low)	   HKG	  (high)	   SHA	  (low)	   SHA	  (high)	  
1865	   05-­‐20	  
	   	   	   	  
	  
06-­‐21	  
	   	   	   	  
	  
09-­‐21	  
	   	   	   	  
	  
10-­‐21	  
	   	   	   	  
	  
11-­‐21	  
	   	   	   	  
	  
12-­‐21	  
	   	   	   	  1866	   01-­‐20	  
	   	   	   	  
	  
02-­‐19	   22.5	   22.5	   34	   34	  
	  
03-­‐21	  
	   	   	   	  
	  
04-­‐21	  
	   	   	   	  
	  
05-­‐23	   24.5	   24.5	  
	   	  
	  
06-­‐23	  
	   	  
33	   34	  
	  
07-­‐23	  
	   	   	   	  
	  
08.23	   25	   26.5	  
	   	  
	  
09-­‐22	  
	   	   	   	  
	  
10-­‐23	   24	   24	  
	   	  
	  
11-­‐23	  
	   	   	   	  
	  
12-­‐23	  
	   	  
32	   32	  
1867	   01-­‐23	   25	   25	  
	   	  
	  
02-­‐21	  
	   	  
34	   34	  
	  
03-­‐23	  
	   	   	   	  
	  
04-­‐23	  
	   	  
37	   37	  
	  
05-­‐23	   30	   30	   39	   39	  
	  
06-­‐23	   28	   28	   42	   43	  
	  
07-­‐23	   30	   31	   45	   45	  
	  
08-­‐23	   33	   33	   44	   47	  
	  
09-­‐23	  
	   	  
47	   47	  
	  
10-­‐23	   30	   30	   48	   48	  
	  
11-­‐23	   35	   35	   50	   50	  
	  
12-­‐23	   35	   35	   50	   50	  
1868	   02-­‐01	  
	   	  
50	   50	  
	  
02-­‐29	   30	   36.5	  
	   	  
	  
03-­‐27	   36	   36	   47	   47	  
	  
04-­‐22	   36	   36	  
	   	  
	  
05-­‐20	   36	   37	   46	   47	  
	  
06-­‐17	   36.5	   37	   48	   49	  
	  
07-­‐15	   37	   37	   49	   50	  
	  
08-­‐12	   37	   37.5	   49	   50	  
	  
09-­‐09	   35	   36.5	   49	   49	  
	  
10-­‐09	   30	   36	  
	   	  
	  
11-­‐06	   20	   20	   40	   42	  
	  
12-­‐04	  
	   	   	   	  1869	   01-­‐29	   23	   23	   37	   38	  
	  
02-­‐26	  
	   	  
34	   35	  
	  
03-­‐26	   20	   20	   34	   34	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in	  s.	  /	  ton	  
	   	  Year	   Date	   HKG(low)	   HKG	  (high)	   SHA	  (low)	   SHA	  (high)	  
	  
04-­‐21	   17.5	   20	   32	   37.5	  
	  
05-­‐19	   20	   22.5	  
	   	  
	  
06-­‐16	   23	   23	   32	   40	  
	  
07-­‐14	   21	   25	   31	   31	  
	  
08-­‐11	  
	   	  
24	   24	  
	  
09-­‐08	  
	   	   	   	  
	  
10-­‐08	  
	   	  
18	   19	  
	  
11-­‐05	   17.5	   19	  
	   	  
	  
12-­‐03	  
	   	   	   	  
	  
12-­‐31	  
	   	   	   	  1870	   01-­‐28	   18	   18	   23	   25	  
	  
02-­‐25	   15	   15	  
	   	  
	  
03-­‐25	   17	   17.5	   15	   24.5	  
	  
04-­‐20	   16	   17	   24	   24	  
	  
05-­‐18	   16	   16	   24	   24	  
	  
06-­‐15	   16	   16.5	   22	   25	  
	  
07-­‐13	   16	   16	   24	   24	  
	  
08-­‐10	   17.5	   18	   23	   23	  
	  
09-­‐07	   20	   20	  
	   	  
	  
10-­‐07	   21	   21	  
	   	  
	  
11-­‐04	   20	   20	  
	   	  
	  
12-­‐02	   20	   20	  
	   	  
	  
12-­‐30	   20	   26	   29	   29	  
1871	   01-­‐27	   23	   23	   25	   25	  
	  
02-­‐24	   25	   28	  
	   	  
	  
03-­‐24	   27.5	   28	   36	   36	  
	  
04-­‐19	   24.5	   24.5	   36	   36	  
	  
06-­‐14	   28	   28	   34	   34	  
	  
07-­‐12	   30	   30	  
	   	  
	  
08-­‐09	  
	   	   	   	  
	  
09-­‐06	  
	   	   	   	  
	  
10-­‐06	   27.5	   30	  
	   	  
	  
11-­‐03	   30	   31	  
	   	  
	  
12-­‐01	   31	   31	   40	   42.5	  
	  
12-­‐29	   37.5	   37.5	  
	   	  1872	   02-­‐26	   36	   40	   46	   47	  
	  
04-­‐20	   37	   42	  
	   	  
	  
05-­‐18	   40	   44	  
	   	  
	  
06-­‐18	   42	   44.5	  
	   	  
	  
07-­‐13	   39	   44	   45	   47.5	  
	  
08-­‐10	   40	   44	   45	   47.5	  
	  
09-­‐07	   38.5	   40	  
	   	  
	  
10-­‐07	   35	   40	  
	   	  
	  
11-­‐04	  
	   	   	   	  
	  
12-­‐02	  
	   	   	   	  
	  
12-­‐30	   30	   40	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in	  s.	  /	  ton	  
	   	  Year	   Date	   HKG(low)	   HKG	  (high)	   SHA	  (low)	   SHA	  (high)	  
1873	   02-­‐24	   30	   37	  
	   	  
	  
04-­‐19	   40	   44	   44	   44	  
	  
05-­‐17	   41	   44	  
	   	  
	  
06-­‐14	   34	   34	   38	   39	  
	  
07-­‐12	   30	   32.5	   38	   39	  
	  
08-­‐09	   30	   37	   40	   45	  
	  
09-­‐06	  
	   	   	   	  
	  
10-­‐06	   27	   27	   30	   30	  
	  
11-­‐03	  
	   	   	   	  
	  
12-­‐01	   30	   30	  
	   	  
	  
12-­‐29	  
	   	   	   	  1874	   02-­‐14	   25	   25	  
	   	  
	  
03-­‐14	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Appendix 12 
 
Shipping from Western Australia to China, 1845-1880 
 
 
 
List of vessels departing from Western Australian ports with sandalwood from 1845 to 
1880.1 The data below is a summary of the shipping data as obtained from the shipping 
lists in the various Western Australian newspapers and other relevant sources. The list is 
in variance to that provided in the Blue Books of Western Australia. A complete list of 
all vessels departing from Western Australia with sandalwood is available from the 
author. There were no shipments of sandalwood made from Western Australia in either 
1854 or 1855. Shipments made from Fremantle to Champion Bay (Geraldton, Western 
Australia), then continued to another port that is unknown. Shipments made to Guam 
were sent to other ports, some of which have been provided in the footnotes below. 
Ship’s captains stated Guam to the Customs to hide where their vessel was heading. 
 
Year Port No. of 
vessels 
1845 Calcutta 1 
 Singapore 2 
1846 Colombo 1 
 Hong Kong 1 
 Singapore 3 
1847 China 1 
 Hong Kong 2 
 Singapore 4 
1848 Batavia 1 
 Hong Kong 2 
 Lombok 1 
 Madras 1 
 Mauritius 1 
 Singapore 12 
1849 Adelaide 1 
 Batavia 2 
 China 1 
 Shanghai 1 
Year Port No. of 
                                      
1 Obtained from Western Australian newspapers, Australasian Shipping News and the correspondence 
from the Jardine Matheson & Co. Archives, Cambridge, UK. 
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vessels 
 Singapore 6 
1850 Batavia 2 
 Canton 1 
 Singapore 2 
1851 Calcutta 1 
 Singapore 7 
1852 Mauritius 1 
 Singapore 1 
1853   
1854   
1855 Singapore 1 
1856 Singapore 5 
1857 Batavia 1 
 Singapore 5 
1858 Singapore 9 
1859 London 1 
 Singapore 7 
1860 Champion Bay 1 
 Singapore 8 
1861 Batavia 1 
 Hong Kong 1 
 Madras 1 
 Singapore 7 
 Sydney 2 
1862 Calcutta 1 
 China 1 
 Hong Kong 1 
 Shanghai 2 
 Singapore 8 
 Sydney 2 
1863 Hong Kong 2 
 Shanghai 3 
 Singapore 10 
 Sydney 1 
1864 Batavia 1 
 Calcutta 2 
 Champion Bay 1 
 Hong Kong 5 
 Madras 1 
 Singapore 6 
1865 Batavia 3 
 Madras 2 
 Shanghai 3 
 Singapore 5 
1866 Batavia 3 
 Bombay 1 
 China 1 
 London 2 
 Melbourne 1 
 Shanghai 2 
Year Port No. of 
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vessels 
 Singapore 9 
 Sydney 1 
1867 Batavia 1 
 China 1 
 London 1 
 Madras 2 
 Melbourne 1 
 Shanghai 2 
 Singapore 4 
 Sydney 2 
1868 Batavia 1 
 Hong Kong 2 
 London 3 
 Shanghai 1 
 Singapore 7 
 Sydney 1 
1869 Adelaide 1 
 Bombay 3 
 Guam 1 
 Hong Kong 1 
 Mauritius 1 
 Shanghai 9 
 Singapore 7 
1870 Bombay 1 
 Calcutta 2 
 Hong Kong 2 
 London 3 
 Melbourne 1 
 Shanghai 4 
 Singapore 16 
1871 Batavia 3 
 Calcutta 3 
 China 1 
 Guam2 2 
 London 1 
 Madras 1 
 Shanghai 2 
 Singapore 10 
1872 Batavia 1 
 Calcutta 1 
 Guam 1 
 London 2 
 Shanghai 3 
 Singapore 18 
1873 Calcutta 1 
 Guam3 1 
 London 1 
Year Port No. of 
                                      
2 One vessel went to Shanghai. 
3 Went to Shanghai. 
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vessels 
 Shanghai 7 
 Singapore 17 
1874 London 3 
 Shanghai 10 
 Singapore 14 
1875 Batavia 2 
 Guam4 1 
 London 1 
 Shanghai 7 
 Singapore 19 
1876 Guam5 1 
 London 2 
 Shanghai 10 
 Singapore 12 
1877 Batavia 1 
 Calcutta 1 
 Hong Kong 3 
 London 1 
 Shanghai 4 
 Singapore 10 
1878 Calcutta 2 
 Hong Kong 5 
 London 1 
 Shanghai 7 
 Singapore 5 
1879 Calcutta 1 
 Hong Kong 4 
 Shanghai 7 
 Singapore 9 
1880 Guam6 3 
 Hong Kong 4 
 Shanghai 7 
 Singapore 14 
 
  
                                      
4 Went to Shanghai. 
5 Went to Singapore. 
6 All three vessels went to Singapore 
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Appendix 13 
 
Distribution of Sandalwood Exports to China by Month, 1860-1880. 
 
 
Number of vessels departing Western Australian ports for ports in China for each month 
of 1860-1880. 
 
 
Month Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec 
1860             
1861       2      
1862  1  2 1     1   
1863     1 1    1 1 1 
1864    1 1      1 1 
1865    1    1   1  
1866     1   1    1 
1867      1  2     
1868   1 1  1       
1869  1 4 1 2 1      1 
1870  1 2 1 1 1       
1871     2 1      1 
1872    1   1  1   1 
1873   2 1 1  1 1    1 
1874 3      3 1   2 1 
1875   1  1 1 1 2 2    
1876 1  3 1 1  1 2   1  
1877 1  1 2 1     1  1 
1878 1 1 1 1 1 2  1 1 2 1  
1879 1 1 2  1 1 1 1 1   1 
1880 2 1 2 2 1 1  2     
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Appendix 14 
 
List of Vessels involved in regular trade between Western Australian ports 
and Singapore or Batavia, 1860-1880.1 
 
 
Vessel Years 
Guyon 1860 – 1864 
New Perseverance 1860 – 1866 
Sea Ripple 1867 – 1878 
Eliza Branche 1868 – 1876 
Bungaree 1869 – 1876 
Rose 1869 – 1875 
Laughing Wave 1868 – 1879 
Amur 1870 – 1876 
Macquarie 1872 – 1876 
Spinaway 1876 – 1878 
 
 
  
                                      
1 Information obtained from Western Australian newspapers. 
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Appendix 15 
 
Shipping from China to Western Australia, 1860-1880 
 
 
List of Vessels Arriving In Fremantle from Chinese Ports, 1860 to 1880.1 
Year  Vessel(s)   Owner (Agent) 
1860  ----- 
1861  Laughing Water2  (C. A. Manning) 
1862  Kestrel 3   (T. & H. Carter) 
1863  Sabrina4 
1864  ----- 
1865  ----- 
1866  Bridgetown   Padbury & Co. 
1867  Kestrel    T. & H. Carter 
1868  Eliza Blanche   W. Owston 
1869  Kestrel    T. & H. Carter 
1870  Rose    (W. D. Moore) 
1871  Laughing Wave  J. & W. Bateman  
  Rose    (W. D. Moore) 
1872  Laughing Wave  J. & W. Bateman 
1873  Laughing Wave  J. & W. Bateman 
1874  Laughing Wave  J. & W. Bateman 
1875  Laughing Wave  J. & W. Bateman 
1876  Spinaway   J. & W. Bateman 
1877  Spinaway    J. & W. Bateman 
1878  ----- 
1879  Mary Smith   W. S. G. Pearse & W. Owston 
  Iris    J. & W. Bateman 
1880  Janet    (W. D. Moore) 
  Iris    J. & W. Bateman 
 
 
  
                                      
1 Information obtained from Western Australian newspapers. 
2 The Laughing Water stopped in Fremantle to land 2000 bags of gram. and thence departed for 
Melbourne. 
3 There is a strong assumption that the Kestrel was purchased by T. & H. Carter as it was used by that 
company on numerous trips to Sydney and the Far East. 
4 The Sabrina stopped in Fremantle solely to obtain water and provisions for its continuing journey to 
Sydney. 
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Appendix 16 
 
Sandalwood Imports to Shanghai, 1870-1874 
 
 
 
Letter from Jardine Matheson & Co., Shanghai to J. H. Monger Esq., dated 29 October 
1874 (JM C46/17) 
 
Dear Sir, 
 … 
 Replying to the remarks in your favour of the 28th July regarding the apparent 
disparity between our market for sandalwood and that of Singapore, considering that 
most of the sandalwood is brought up at that port for transhipment to China, we have 
you carefully into the matter and have as said at the conclusion that the wood can be 
bought in Singapore and HongKong by native dealers at a price which leaves a profit on 
the shipments thence to this market. This is borne out by the fact of large shipments 
constantly coming from the South (principally HongKong we doubt transhipments from 
Singapore) and likewise by the quotations in market reports from these two places. The 
total quantity of sandalwood imported to Shanghai this year to date has been 
 From  Australia  Piculs  43,156 
    “ HongKong     “ 18,444 
    “ Singapore     “   2,327 
    “ Amoy      “        19 
    “ Canton      “      163 
    “   Bangkok     “      374 
    “ Bombay     “      202 
     Piculs 66,685 
 
 The Singapore market report give the following quotations during the distant 
months viz: 
 January  1874   $3.70 @ $3.85 
 May      “   $3.90 @ $3.95 
 August      “   $3.50 @ $3.80 
 October    “   $3.35 @ $3.40 
while the prices in HongKong during the last six months have ranged from $4.35 @ 
$5.70. The latest Singapore quotations in our possession is $3.35 @ $3.40 which would 
show a profit on shipment to HongKong to sell at $3.70 @ $4.00. 
 This would lay down in Shanghai @ Taels 3.40, and admitting a slight 
inferiority in the wood would show a fair profit to native merchants. 
 
 Importations of Sandalwood to Shanghai 
Piculs 1870    1871       1872       1873 1874 to 28th October 
 46.940    35.523    60.115    51.160    66.685 
 of the above was received from HongKong 
   8.380    14.451    30.471    29.706    18.444 
  from Singapore 
   ------          650      5.749  -----   2.327 
 In view of the above statistics it becomes a question for your consideration 
whether it would not be more to your advantage to ship more wood here direct and 
accept a lower price for it as it is very evident when values reach ℑ3.75 and upwards 
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here, the wood from the south can compete with it on favourable terms. The price you 
receive for your wood at Singapore, we cannot make to be at the most more than $3.80.
  With reference to the wood we have stated above as coming from 
HongKong to our port we cannot be certain that it is at all Australian wood, but we 
presume it is as the value of sandalwood from India and other eastern countries is a 
value far higher than this is sold for. 
 In reply to our enquiries at various outports in China as to importations of 
sandalwood, we have not yet received sufficient advices to enable us to give you a 
reliable report. 
 … 
   We are &c. 
 
--------- 
Letter from Jardine Matheson & Co., Shanghai to J. H. Monger Esq., dated 26 
November 1874 (JM C46/18) 
 
Dear Sir, 
 … 
 We may mention that since we last addressed you 2,653 piculs of sandalwood 
have arrived from HongKong. 
 … 
   We remain &c. 
 
--------- 
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Appendix 17 
 
London Banks and Firms connected to Australian Firms 
 
 
 
Asiatic and America Co. 
 Charles F. Stokes & Co. (Newcastle) 
 
Bank of Australasia 
 Brown & Co. (Sydney) 
 J. Henty & Co. (Melbourne) 
 
Bank of South Australia 
 T. & H. Carter & Co. (Fremantle) 
 
Brown & Co. 
 Brown & Co. (Sydney) 
 
Dalgety Du Cruz & Co.  
 Messr W. E. Marmion Esq. (Fremantle) 
 Messr J. H. Monger Esq. (York) 
 
F. Parbury & Co. 
 Parbury Brothers (Melbourne) 
 
Henry Willis & Lloyd  
 Willis Lloyd & Co (Sydney) 
 
J. McDonald & Co 
 J. & W. Bateman and Co. (Perth) 
 G. Glyde & Son (Perth) 
 Padbury Loton & Co. (Perth) 
 Messr H. Saw Esq. (Perth) 
 Messrs Scott & Gale (Geraldton) 
 
John Lacey Esq. 
 T. & H. Carter & Co. (Fremantle) 
 
Manning & Co. 
 Messr G. Shenton Esq.   
 
Oriental Banking Corporation 
 Messr H. Moore Esq. (Sydney) 
 
Redfern Alexander & Co. 
 Messrs Macfarlane Bros. & Co. (Hobart Town) 
 Henty Learnmonth & Co. (Portland, Vic) 
 
William Felgate & Co. 
 Messr G. Shenton Esq.  
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Appendix 18 
 
Seasonal exports of tea from Chinese ports to Australia for the tea export 
seasons of 1861/62-1875/76. 
 
 
 
Season Tea Shipped Note 
1861/62 9,266,220 1 
1862/63 7,932,560 1 
1863/64 9,351,065 1 
1864/65 10,091,338 1 
1865/66 10,341,654 2 
1866/67 10,595,614 3 
1867/68 11,807,000 4 
1868/69 16,115,507 5 
1869/70 12,970,807 6 
1870/71 11,359,408 7 
1871/72 11,679,912 8 
1872/73 15,403,987 9 
1873/74 13,655,445 10 
1874/75 13,582,961 11 
1875/76 14,374,226 12 
 
 
Notes:1 
1. 11 June 1865: 3. 
2. 11 June 1866: 3. 
3. 11 June 1867: 3. 
4. 11 June 1868: 3. 
5. 11 June 1869: 3. 
6. 8 June 1870: 3. 
7. 8 June 1871: 3. 
8. 7 June 1872: 3. 
9. 6 June 1873: 3. 
10. 5 June 1874: 3. 
11. 4 June 1875: 3. 
12. 2 June 1876: 2. 
 
 
 
 
Robert Gardella, using a UK source provides quite different figures for the export of tea 
from Fuzhou alone to Australia.2 Gardella shows the following: 
 
                                      
1 Prices Current AH P945 Cartons 31-33. 
2 Gardella, Robert. Harvesting Mountains: Fujian and the China Tea Trade, 1757-1937.  Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1994: 61. Gardella uses the source: Great Britain, Parliament. Sessional 
Papers, House of Commons, vol. 68 (1867), pp. 648, 654. 
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 Tea Shipped 
1861/62 8.904,944 
1862/63 2,352,405 
1863/64 8,037,750 
1864/65 9,127,246 
1865/66 9,735,272 
 
Gardella’s figures illustrate the common discrepancies between figures that hampers the 
ability of historians to attain any correct analysis of the data when dealing with imports 
to and exports from China. Further, Gardella does not state specifically, though there is 
an assumption that he uses seasons instead of calendar years. The most distressing item 
is that for the 1862/63 season where more than 5½ million pounds of tea appears 
unaccounted for. The House of Commons papers would have been provided by the 
Customs agents in the various ports while the amounts presented in the Prices Current 
circulars would have been those provided by the merchants themselves, primarily for 
insurance purposes. 
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Appendix 19 
 
Australian Imports from China and Exports to China, including Tea 
Imports separately, 1860-1880.1 
 
 
 
 
A. New South Wales 
 
Year All imports All exports Tea imports Differential 
1860 439172 0 395228 439172 
1861 298075 112519 278578 185556 
1862 449715 66245 363946 383470 
1863 346887 101640 310098 245247 
1864 169114 102923 152806 66191 
1865 408173 109232 383292 298941 
1866 432924 117455 425606 315469 
1867 235900 93356 231533 142544 
1868 437753 101570 410269 336183 
1869 458660 92124 401875 366536 
1870 324220 69372 247462 254848 
1871 407600 100412 312360 307188 
1872 391836 143462 277160 248374 
1873 498831 181541 313807 317290 
1874 451076 219694 315710 231382 
1875 443929 207328 319794 236601 
1876 442016 170087 301018 271929 
1877 551513 204893 347476 346620 
1878 490153 179914 302483 310239 
1879 558175 147315 422261 410860 
1880 586582 152421 412972 434161 
 
  
                                      
1 Statistical Tables relating to the Colonial and Other Possessions of the United Kingdom. (Parts VII to 
XVII) 
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B. Victoria 
 
Year All imports All exports Tea imports Differential 
1860 619493 418442 457178 201051 
1861 887224 343685 576106 543539 
1862 888946 329777 517846 559169 
1863 501324 282447 344086 218877 
1864 633041 183347 409441 449694 
1865 468820 138672 410019 330148 
1866 490492 68731 417782 421761 
1867 515581 101481 453273 414100 
1868 777411 80002 595240 697409 
1869 562496 90729 481084 471767 
1870 563011 54023 483412 508988 
1871 599056 39583 476816 559473 
1872 597918 28439 465530 569479 
1873 893815 30519 728508 863296 
1874 557125 24286 459538 532839 
1875 839239 18567 734174 820672 
1876 639676 5094 565546 634582 
1877 595393 4947 491855 590446 
1878 542863 352 428413 542511 
1879 510146 932 384203 509214 
1880 586341 1348 476994 584993 
 
C. South Australia 
 
Year All imports All exports Tea imports Differential 
1860 40104 0 38004 40104 
1861 72948 0 66408 72948 
1862 101726 2755 82073 98971 
1863 45984 0 45207 45984 
1864 76804 10450 76598 66354 
1865 54049 185 53036 53864 
1866 26576 3500 26547 23076 
1867 56650 2602 55641 54048 
1868 67334 0 67331 67334 
1869 89846 790 89498 89056 
1870 41404 0 41404 41404 
1871 57331 0 47830 57331 
1872 53855 470 53788 53385 
1873 90014 354 87094 89660 
1874 114511 15 113572 114496 
1875 111312 49 108196 111263 
1876 111820 0 108954 111820 
1877 70622 24 69926 70598 
1878 113176 0 110538 113176 
1879 87003 4506 85287 82497 
1880 49413 818 48086 48595 
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D. Western Australia 
 
Year All imports All exports Tea imports Differential 
1860 0 0 0 0 
1861 2000 3551 0 -1551 
1862 7424 10517 5000 -3093 
1863 0 11417 0 -11417 
1864 0 15551 0 -15551 
1865 0 5245 0 -5245 
1866 11148 8212 11077 2936 
1867 0 8771 0 -8771 
1868 14245 21348 13475 -7103 
1869 13187 22842 11397 -9655 
1870 11734 28757 11264 -17023 
1871 6777 7234 6627 -457 
1872 9499 7564 9348 1935 
1873 12185 33309 12184 -21124 
1874 11462 36134 11342 -24672 
1875 13525 32537 13409 -19012 
1876 12279 25166 12113 -12887 
1877 15850 14909 15795 941 
1878 74 29346 21 -29272 
1879 21763 23222 21527 -1459 
1880 10637 32331 10446 -21694 
 
E. Tasmania 
 
Year All imports All exports Tea imports Differential 
1860 13464 0 13440 13464 
1861 503 0 3 503 
1862 10151 0 2500 10151 
1863 0 0 0 0 
1864 0 0 0 0 
1865 0 0 0 0 
1866 0 0 0 0 
1867 6410 0 6410 6410 
1868 3602 0 3602 3602 
1869 4820 0 4600 4820 
1870 0 0 0 0 
1871 0 0 0 0 
1872 0 0 0 0 
1873 0 0 0 0 
1874 0 0 0 0 
1875 0 0 0 0 
1876 0 0 0 0 
1877 0 0 0 0 
1878 0 0 0 0 
1879 0 0 0 0 
1880 0 0 0 0 
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F. Queensland 
 
Year All imports All exports Tea imports Differential 
1860 0 0 0 0 
1861 0 450 0 -450 
1862 3 0 0 3 
1863 0 0 0 0 
1864 0 0 0 0 
1865 0 13 0 -13 
1866 0 0 0 0 
1867 0 0 0 0 
1868 0 1 0 -1 
1869 0 0 0 0 
1870 0 0 0 0 
1871 0 0 0 0 
1872 0 0 0 0 
1873 9928 0 0 9928 
1874 34328 0 34011 34328 
1875 79041 103605 38841 -24564 
1876 82965 211500 42237 -128535 
1877 101618 212852 35386 -111234 
1878 72098 170626 31986 -98528 
1879 85590 124443 20609 -38853 
1880 128576 120493 54068 8083 
 
G. All Colonies combined 
 
Year All imports All exports Tea imports Differential 
1860 1112233 418442 903850 693791 
1861 1260750 460205 921095 800545 
1862 1457965 409294 971365 1048671 
1863 894195 395504 699391 498691 
1864 878959 312271 638845 566688 
1865 931042 253347 846347 677695 
1866 961140 197898 881012 763242 
1867 814541 206210 746857 608331 
1868 1300345 202921 1089917 1097424 
1869 1129009 206485 988454 922524 
1870 940369 152152 783542 788217 
1871 1070764 147229 843633 923535 
1872 1053108 179935 805826 873173 
1873 1504773 245723 1141593 1259050 
1874 1168502 280129 934173 888373 
1875 1487046 362086 1214414 1124960 
1876 1288756 411847 1029868 876909 
1877 1334996 437625 960438 897371 
1878 1218364 380238 873441 838126 
1879 1262677 300418 933887 962259 
1880 1361549 307411 1002566 1054138 
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Notes: 
 
1. The Western Australia data for tea from China is an estimate. The data in both the 
Statistical Tables and the Blue Books only provide the amount of tea in lbs. and the 
total value for all tea imported. Thus, using the formula:  
   
  China tea import    x Total Value 
  All tea Imported 
 
the approximate value of the tea imported from China has been calculated. 
 
2. From 1867 to 1875 (Parts XIII to XV) the Statistical Tables contain no individual 
import data for Victoria. This was obtained from the Statistics for the Colony of 
Victoria for the Year 1867 – 1875. 
 
3. For 1864-65 (Part XI) the Statistical Tables include Hong Kong into the grouping 
“Other British Possessions” for the New South Wales data. The correct data was 
obtained from the Statistical Register of New South Wales for the Year 1864 – 1865. 
 
4. For 1863 (Part X) the Statistical Tables do not include correct data for South 
Australia. The correct data was obtained from Statistical Register of South Australia for 
1863. 
 
5. From 1876 the Statistical Tables include a separate country for Formosa. I have 
included this as part of China. 
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Appendix 20 
 
Example of Invoice for tea from China 
 
Invoice from Jardine Matheson & Co. to James Henty & Co. for 7875 packages tea per 
Thomas Brown, dated 13 July 1871.1 
 
 
                                      
1 Invoice for 7875 packages of tea per Thomas Brown for James Henty & Co., JMA A6/21. 
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Notes: 
 
1. The header details the general information about the shipment. Of importance is that 
the account and risk is through a joint account (J/A) with the shipper (JM&Co.). 
 
2. On the top of the left margin is a pictogram. Each merchant firm had a pictogram 
allocated to it, normally with the initials of the company included. These pictograms 
also, sometimes included added information to assist with defining the ownership of the 
consignment. Here the pictogram includes the letters JH Co. for James Henty & Co. 
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3. The remainder of the left margin included the numbers of each parcel of tea. 
Generally, the tea would come from a single batch as provided by the Chinese merchant. 
However, sometimes there were a number of different batches and as in this example, a 
few of the lots were spread over up to four sources of tea. There is no evidence that the 
individual packages were labelled with the number as shown in the left margin, but that 
may have also been the case. Certainly, it was not uncommon for Australian merchants 
to state that they preferred packages from numbers X and Y of the shipment from a 
certain vessel. A minor note here that, in correspondence, the vessels name is used to 
differentiate shipments. If there are more than two sources of the tea from that merchant 
the amount of packages for each type are included as the lower side of what appears a 
fraction. 
 
4. In the main section of the Invoice are six columns. The first is the number of 
packages from that tea merchant. The second is the type of package. These may be 
packets, chests, ½ chests or boxes. The third column divulges the type of tea and here 
all packages are of the Congou type except for Numbers 33 and 34 which are for 
Scented Orange Pekoe. Next are the names of the various Chinese tea merchants. The 
second last column provides the weight of each package in piculs and the final column 
displays the selling cost in Taels per picul. The right side margin is, thus, the total in 
Taels for each purchase. 
 
5. A summary of the complete order is provided at the end of the page with the total 
number of packages, piculs of tea and the cost in Taels. That value is then converted to 
dollars at a rate of 0.720 Taels per dollar. Thus, the total of ℑ52,338.90 became 
$72,692.82. This amount was carried forward to the second page of the Invoice. 
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6. The second page contained the specific commission charges incurred by Jardine 
Matheson & Co. in processing the purchase. These were: 
(a) Marking papers Rattanning shipping &c. 
The marking papers are the labels for each of the packages. The Rattaning is the use of 
the rattan to bind the package – I would assume more common with chests and boxes 
than with packs. The shipping would take up the largest portion of the cost of the group 
of items. Considering that there was no other mention of the loading of tea on to the 
Thomas Brown, an assumption can be made that the loading cost was incorporated into 
the shipping cost. 
(b) Godown rent. 
The godown was a storage place. JM&Co.’s Fuzhou agent would have used the 
company’s godown to house the tea prior to delivery to the Thomas Brown.  
(c) Brokerage inspecting. 
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Appendix 21 
 
India Gold imports from Australia, 1860-1880.1 
 
 
Year From Australia All gold import 
1860 533129 4288037 
1861 928672 4242441 
1862 1121367 5190432 
1863 2073728 6881566 
1864 (4099383) {8.8 m} 
1865 3444743 9875032 
1866 1400899 6372894 
1867 (769234) {4.39 m} 
1868 (326229) {4.60 m} 
1869 (260286) {4.99 m} 
1870 417999 5690400 
1871 213220 2782574 
1872 308107 3573778 
1873 366473 2622371 
1874 174520 1648807 
1875 50376 2089236 
1876 28166 1836381 
1877 28028 1443712 
1878 21422 1578927 
1879 28937 1463050 
1880 8041 2050393 
 
 
 
 
Notes: 
 
1. All data is for year ending 31 March (for years up to 1865) and (30 April) for years 
thereafter. 
 
2. The data for years ending 1860 to 1869 were obtained from the Statistical Tables. 
The Statistical Tables relating to 1871 and thereafter do not include data for India. 
 
                                      
1 Statistical Tables relating to the Colonial and Other Possessions of the United Kingdom. (Parts VII to 
XIV); Statement of the Trade of British India (1869-70 thru 1879-80); G. Findlay Shirras. Indian Finance 
and Banking.  London: Macmillan & Co, 1919: 452. 
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3. The data for years 1870 to 1880 were obtained from the various Statement of the 
Trade for British India.  
 
4. The Australian data for years 1864 and 1867 to 1869 (those in brackets) are estimates, 
though relatively accurate. They resemble the total specie import from Australia made 
up of gold plus silver. Australia exported very little, if any silver throughout the period, 
perhaps up to £50,000 worth. Thus, these figures have remained as is for the graph in 
Figure 5.9. The total gold imported is not included here as the amount of silver 
imported was significantly more than gold and I am unable to separate these two for the 
years in question. 
 
5. The Total gold import data for years 1864 and 1867 to 1869 (those in parentheses) 
are obtained from Table 8 of the book Indian Finance and Banking. The other data in 
the table only approximately matches that from the Statistical Tables and from the 
Statement of the Trade providing another example of the variance of figures presented 
through the numerous sources and returning to the question of which is correct. 
 
6. It should be noted that in the early 1860s, Australia was a primary, if not the primary 
exporter of gold to India. China was the other primary exporter throughout most of the 
two decades. 
 
7. It should be noted that throughout the period the figures provided here differ 
substantially from the export figures from the Australian Colonies to India. That would 
lead to the conclusion that a significant amount of the gold was sent via Ceylon and 
then either continued to India or transhipped to an Indian port. These vessels would 
have stated to the Customs officials in Australia that they were heading to Ceylon. The 
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Peninsular and Orient vessels that carried the mail also commonly carried the gold to 
Ceylon and India. JM&Co.’s representatives in Australia all used P&O vessels to 
transport their gold to JS&Co. of Calcutta. Those vessels went to Galle, Ceylon and the 
gold would have been transhipped to Calcutta from there.  
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Appendix 22 
 
Sugar Imports from China and Hong Kong to Australia, 1860-1880. 
 
 
Value of imports of sugar from Hong Kong and China to ports in Australia (£). 
 
Year Value (£) 
1860 19032 
1861 12424 
1862 42642 
1863 0 
1864 0 
1865 0 
1866 0 
1867 144 
1868 1335 
1869 14817 
1870 34786 
1871 67978 
1872 122047 
1873 175177 
1874 50226 
1875 86524 
1876 12856 
1877 99049 
1878 85158 
1879 304 
1880 6097 
 
 
